Editing Battle of Britain (section)

===German aims and directives===
[[File:Adolf Hitler Berghof-1936.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Adolf Hitler]] in 1933]] From the outset of his rise to power, Adolf Hitler expressed admiration for Britain, and throughout the Battle period he sought neutrality or a peace treaty with Britain.{{sfn|Bungay|2000|pp=27–31}} In a secret conference on 23 May 1939, Hitler set out his rather contradictory strategy that an attack on Poland was essential and "will only be successful if the Western Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same time" with a surprise attack. "If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been secured. England can then be blockaded from Western France at close quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines extend the range of the blockade."{{sfn|Shirer|1990|pp=589–593}}<ref>{{cite web | title=Hitler and Poland | website=Holocaust Educational Resource | date=23 May 1939 | url=http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/h/hitler-adolf/hitler-and-poland.html | access-date=20 December 2015 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160114124525/http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/h/hitler-adolf/hitler-and-poland.html | archive-date=14 January 2016 | url-status=dead }}</ref>

When war commenced, Hitler and the OKW (''[[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht]]'' or "High Command of the Armed Forces") issued a [[List of Adolf Hitler's directives|series of directives]] ordering, planning and stating strategic objectives. "Directive No. 1 for the Conduct of the War", dated 31 August 1939, instructed the [[invasion of Poland]] on 1 September as [[Fall Weiss (1939)|planned]]. Potentially, Luftwaffe "operations against England" were to:
{{blockquote|dislocate English imports, the armaments industry, and the transport of troops to France. Any favourable opportunity of an effective attack on concentrated units of the English Navy, particularly on battleships or aircraft carriers, will be exploited. The decision regarding attacks on London is reserved to me. Attacks on the English homeland are to be prepared, bearing in mind that inconclusive results with insufficient forces are to be avoided in all circumstances.{{sfn|Shirer|1990|pp=712–713}}<ref name="Führer Directive 1">{{cite web | title=Directive No. 1 for the Conduct of the War | place=Berlin | date=31 August 1939 | url=http://www.alternatewars.com/WW2/WW2_Documents/Fuhrer_Directives/FD_01.htm | access-date=20 December 2015 | archive-date=22 February 2016 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160222101147/http://www.alternatewars.com/WW2/WW2_Documents/Fuhrer_Directives/FD_01.htm | url-status=dead }}</ref>}}

Both France and the UK declared war on Germany; on 9 October, Hitler's "Directive No. 6" planned the offensive to defeat these allies and "win as much territory as possible in the Netherlands, Belgium, and northern France to serve as a base for the successful prosecution of the air and sea war against England".<ref name="Directive 6">{{harvnb | Murray | 2002 | pp=[http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF-Luftwaffe/AAF-Luftwaffe-2.html#cn24 32–33, 35]}}, [http://der-fuehrer.org/reden/english/wardirectives/06.html Directive No. 6 for the Conduct of the War], Berlin, 9 October 1939</ref> On 29 November, OKW "Directive No. 9 – Instructions For Warfare Against The Economy Of The Enemy" stated that once this coastline had been secured, the Luftwaffe together with the [[Kriegsmarine]] (German Navy) was to blockade UK ports with sea mines. They were to attack shipping and warships and make air attacks on shore installations and industrial production. This directive remained in force in the first phase of the Battle of Britain.<ref name="Directive 9">{{harvnb| Overy | 2013 | p=68}}, [http://der-fuehrer.org/reden/english/wardirectives/09.html Directive No. 9 – Instructions For Warfare Against The Economy Of The Enemy], Berlin, 29 November 1939.</ref><ref name="Murray 33">{{harvnb| Murray | 2002 | p=[http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF-Luftwaffe/AAF-Luftwaffe-2.html#cn34 33]}}</ref> It was reinforced on 24 May during the Battle of France by "Directive No. 13", which authorised the Luftwaffe "to attack the English homeland in the fullest manner, as soon as sufficient forces are available. This attack will be opened by an annihilating reprisal for English attacks on the Ruhr Basin."<ref name="Magenheimer 24">{{harvnb|Magenheimer|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=fsFACgAAQBAJ&pg=PT24 24]}}, [http://der-fuehrer.org/reden/english/wardirectives/13.html Directive No. 13], Headquarters, 24 May 1940</ref>

By the end of June 1940, Germany had defeated Britain's allies on the continent, and on 30 June the OKW Chief of Staff, [[Alfred Jodl]], issued his review of options to increase pressure on Britain to agree to a negotiated peace. The first priority was to eliminate the RAF and gain air supremacy. Intensified air attacks against shipping and the economy could affect food supplies and civilian morale in the long term. Reprisal attacks of terror bombing had the potential to cause quicker capitulation, but the effect on morale was uncertain. On the same day, the Luftwaffe Commander-in-Chief, [[Hermann Göring]] issued his operational directive: to destroy the RAF, thus protecting German industry, and also to block overseas supplies to Britain.{{sfn|Bungay|2000|pp=31–33, 122}}<ref name="Murray 44-5">{{harvnb| Murray | 2002 | pp=[http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF-Luftwaffe/AAF-Luftwaffe-2.html#cn76 44–45]}}</ref> The German Supreme Command argued over the practicality of these options.

In "Directive No. 16 – On preparations for a landing operation against England" on 16 July,<ref name="Führer Directive 16">{{cite web| title=Directive No. 16 – On preparations for a landing operation against England| place=Führer Headquarters| date=16 July 1940| url=http://www.alternatewars.com/WW2/WW2_Documents/Fuhrer_Directives/FD_16.htm| access-date=11 February 2016| archive-date=3 March 2016| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303194212/http://www.alternatewars.com/WW2/WW2_Documents/Fuhrer_Directives/FD_16.htm| url-status=dead}}</ref> Hitler required readiness by mid-August for the possibility of an invasion he called [[Operation Sea Lion]], unless the British agreed to negotiations. The Luftwaffe reported that it would be ready to launch its major attack early in August. The Kriegsmarine Commander-in-Chief, Grand Admiral [[Erich Raeder]], continued to highlight the impracticality of these plans and said sea invasion could not take place before early 1941. Hitler now argued that Britain was holding out in hope of assistance from Russia, and the [[Operation Barbarossa|Soviet Union was to be invaded]] by mid 1941.{{sfn|Bungay|2000|pp=110–114}} Göring met his air fleet commanders, and on 24 July issued "Tasks and Goals" of firstly gaining air supremacy, secondly protecting invasion forces and attacking the Royal Navy's ships. Thirdly, they were to blockade imports, bombing harbours and stores of supplies.{{sfn|Overy|2013|p=72}}

Hitler's "Directive No. 17 – For the conduct of air and sea warfare against England" issued on 1 August attempted to keep all the options open. The Luftwaffe's ''[[Adlertag]]'' campaign was to start around 5 August, subject to weather, with the aim of gaining air superiority over southern England as a necessary precondition of invasion, to give credibility to the threat and give Hitler the option of ordering the invasion. The intention was to incapacitate the RAF so much that the UK would feel open to air attack, and would begin peace negotiations. It was also to isolate the UK and damage war production, beginning an effective blockade.<ref name="Dir 17">{{harvnb | Bungay | 2000 | pp=31–33}}<br>[http://www.alternatewars.com/WW2/WW2_Documents/Fuhrer_Directives/FD_17.htm Directive No. 17 – For the conduct of air and sea warfare against England] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303201904/http://www.alternatewars.com/WW2/WW2_Documents/Fuhrer_Directives/FD_17.htm |date=3 March 2016 }}, Führer Headquarters, 1 August 1940.</ref> Following severe Luftwaffe losses, Hitler agreed at a 14 September OKW conference that the air campaign was to intensify regardless of invasion plans. On 16 September, Göring gave the order for this change in strategy,{{sfn|Overy|2001|pp=87–89}} to the first independent strategic bombing campaign.{{sfn|Overy|2013|p=90}}

====Negotiated peace or neutrality====
Hitler's 1925 book ''[[Mein Kampf]]'' mostly set out his hatreds: he only admired ordinary German World War I soldiers and Britain, which he saw as an ally against communism. In 1935 Hermann Göring welcomed news that Britain, as a potential ally, was rearming. In 1936 he promised assistance to defend the British Empire, asking only a free hand in Eastern Europe, and repeated this to [[Edward Wood, 1st Earl of Halifax|Lord Halifax]] in 1937. That year, [[Joachim von Ribbentrop|von Ribbentrop]] met Churchill with a similar proposal; when rebuffed, he told Churchill that interference with German domination would mean war. To Hitler's great annoyance, all his diplomacy failed to stop Britain from declaring war when he invaded Poland. During the fall of France, he repeatedly discussed peace efforts with his generals.{{sfn|Bungay|2000|pp=27–31}}

When Churchill came to power, there was still wide support for Halifax, who as Foreign Secretary openly argued for peace negotiations in the tradition of British diplomacy, to secure British independence without war. On 20 May, Halifax secretly requested a Swedish businessman to make contact with Göring to open negotiations. Shortly afterwards, in the [[May 1940 War Cabinet Crisis]], Halifax argued for negotiations involving the Italians, but this was rejected by Churchill with majority support. An approach made through the Swedish ambassador on 22 June was reported to Hitler, making peace negotiations seem feasible. Throughout July, as the battle started, the Germans made wider attempts to find a diplomatic solution.{{sfn|Bungay|2000|pp=9–13, 33}} On 2 July, the day the armed forces were asked to start preliminary planning for an invasion, Hitler got von Ribbentrop to draft a speech offering peace negotiations. On 19 July Hitler made this speech to the German Parliament in Berlin, appealing "to reason and common sense", and said he could "see no reason why this war should go on".<ref name="My Last Appeal to Great Britain">Hitler 1940 [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1940/1940-07-19b.html My Last Appeal to Great Britain]</ref> His sombre conclusion was received in silence, but he did not suggest negotiations and this was perceived as being effectively an ultimatum by the British government, which rejected the offer.{{sfn|Bishop|2010|pp=114–115}}{{sfn|Overy|2013|pp=68–69}} Halifax kept trying to arrange peace until he was sent to Washington in December as ambassador,{{sfn|Bungay|2000|p=13}} and in January 1941 Hitler expressed continued interest in negotiating peace with Britain.{{sfn|Overy|2001|p=109}}

====Blockade and siege====
A May 1939 planning exercise by [[Luftflotte 3]] found that the Luftwaffe lacked the means to do much damage to Britain's war economy beyond laying [[naval mine]]s.{{sfn|Bungay|2000|p=32}} [[Joseph Schmid]], in charge of Luftwaffe intelligence, presented a report on 22 November 1939, stating that, "Of all Germany's possible enemies, Britain is the most dangerous."{{sfn|Bungay|2000|p=ii}} This "Proposal for the Conduct of Air Warfare" argued for a [[Blockade of Germany (1939–45)|counter to the British blockade]] and said "Key is to paralyse the British trade".<ref name="Directive 9" /> Instead of the Wehrmacht attacking the French, the Luftwaffe [[Battle of the Atlantic|with naval assistance]] was to block imports to Britain and attack seaports. "Should the enemy resort to terror measures{{snd}}for example, to attack our towns in western Germany" they could retaliate by bombing industrial centres and London. Parts of this appeared on 29 November in "Directive No. 9" as future actions once the coast had been conquered.<ref name="Murray 33" /> On 24 May 1940 "Directive No. 13" authorised attacks on the blockade targets, as well as retaliation for RAF bombing of industrial targets in the Ruhr.<ref name="Magenheimer 24" />

After the defeat of France, the OKW felt they had won the war, and some more pressure would persuade Britain to give in. On 30 June, the OKW Chief of Staff Alfred Jodl issued his paper setting out options: the first was to increase attacks on shipping, economic targets and the RAF: air attacks and food shortages were expected to break morale and lead to capitulation. Destruction of the RAF was the first priority, and invasion would be a last resort. Göring's operational directive issued the same day ordered the destruction of the RAF to clear the way for attacks cutting off seaborne supplies to Britain. It made no mention of invasion.<ref name="Murray 44-5" />{{sfn|Bungay|2000|pp=31, 110, 122}}

====Invasion plans====
In November 1939, the OKW reviewed the potential for an air- and seaborne invasion of Britain: the Kriegsmarine was faced with the threat the Royal Navy's larger [[Home Fleet]] posed to a crossing of the [[English Channel]], and together with the [[German Army (Wehrmacht)|German Army]] viewed control of airspace as a necessary precondition. The German navy thought air superiority alone was insufficient; the German naval staff had already produced a study (in 1939) on the possibility of an invasion of Britain and concluded that it also required naval superiority.<ref>Operation Sea Lion – The German Invasion Plans section (David Shears) Thornton Cox 1975 – p. 156</ref> The Luftwaffe said invasion could only be "the final act in an already victorious war."{{sfn|Bishop|2010|pp=106–107}}

Hitler first discussed the idea of an invasion at a 21 May 1940 meeting with Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, who stressed the difficulties and his own preference for a blockade. OKW Chief of Staff Jodl's 30 June report described invasion as a last resort once the British economy had been damaged and the Luftwaffe had full air superiority. On 2 July, OKW requested preliminary plans.{{sfn|Bungay|2000|pp=31–33}}{{sfn|Overy|2013|pp=68–69}}

In Britain, Churchill described "the great invasion scare" as "serving a very useful purpose" by "keeping every man and woman tuned to a high pitch of readiness".{{sfn|Bishop|2010|pp=70–71}}  Historian [[Len Deighton]] stated that on 10 July Churchill advised the War Cabinet that invasion could be ignored, as it "would be a most hazardous and suicidal operation".{{sfn|Deighton|1996|p=77}}

On 11 July, Hitler agreed with Raeder that invasion would be a last resort, and the Luftwaffe advised that gaining air superiority would take 14 to 28 days. Hitler met his army chiefs, [[Walther von Brauchitsch|von Brauchitsch]] and [[Franz Halder|Halder]], at the Berchtesgaden on 13 July where they presented detailed plans on the assumption that the navy would provide safe transport.{{sfn|Bungay|2000|p=111}} Von Brauchitsch and Halder were surprised that Hitler took no interest in the invasion plans, unlike his usual attitude toward military operations,{{sfn|Bishop|2010|p=105}} but on 16 July he issued Directive No. 16, ordering preparations for Operation Sea Lion.{{sfn|Bishop|2010|pp=107–108}}

The navy insisted on a narrow beachhead and an extended period for landing troops; the army rejected these plans: the Luftwaffe could begin an air attack in August. Hitler held a meeting of his army and navy chiefs on 31 July. The navy said 22 September was the earliest possible date and proposed postponement until the following year, but Hitler preferred September. He then told von Brauchitsch and Halder that he would decide on the landing operation eight to fourteen days after the air attack began. On 1 August, he issued Directive No. 17 for intensified air and sea warfare, to begin with Adlertag on or after 5 August, subject to weather, keeping options open for negotiated peace or blockade and siege.{{sfn|Bungay|2000|pp=113–114}}

====Independent air attack====
Under the continuing influence of the 1935 "Conduct of the Air War" doctrine, the main focus of the Luftwaffe command (including Göring) was in concentrating attacks to destroy enemy armed forces on the battlefield, and "blitzkrieg" [[close air support]] of the army succeeded brilliantly. They reserved [[Strategic bombing during World War II|strategic bombing]] for a stalemate situation or revenge attacks, but doubted if this could be decisive on its own and regarded bombing civilians to destroy homes or undermine morale as a waste of strategic effort.{{sfn|Overy|2013|pp=42–43, 60–65}}{{sfn|Magenheimer|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=fsFACgAAQBAJ&pg=PT20 20]}}

The defeat of France in June 1940 introduced the prospect for the first time of independent air action against Britain. A July ''[[1st Air Corps (Germany)|Fliegercorps I]]'' paper asserted that Germany was by definition an air power: "Its chief weapon against England is the Air Force, then the Navy, followed by the landing forces and the Army." In 1940, the Luftwaffe would undertake a "''strategic offensive'' ... on its own and independent of the other services", according to an April 1944 German account of their military mission. Göring was convinced that strategic bombing could win objectives that were beyond the army and navy, and gain political advantages in the Third Reich for the Luftwaffe and himself.{{sfn|Overy|2013|pp=66–67, 70, 75, 690}} He expected air warfare to decisively force Britain to negotiate, as all in the OKW hoped, and the Luftwaffe took little interest in planning to support an invasion.{{sfn|Bungay|2000|p=114}}<ref name="Murray 44-5" />