Editing Austro-Prussian War (section)

=== Bismarck's plot ===
There are many interpretations of [[Otto von Bismarck]]'s behaviour before the Austrian-Prussian war, which concentrate mainly on the fact that he had a master plan that resulted in this war, the North German Confederation and the unification of Germany. Bismarck maintained that he orchestrated the conflict in order to bring about the North German Confederation, the Franco-Prussian War and the eventual unification of Germany.{{Sfn|Taylor|1955|page=3}}

On 22 February 1866, [[Alajos Károlyi|Count Károlyi]], Austrian ambassador in [[Berlin]], sent a dispatch to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, [[Alexander von Mensdorff-Pouilly, Prince Dietrichstein von Nicolsburg|Count Alexander Mensdorff-Pouilly]]. He explained to him that Prussian public opinion had become extremely sensitive about the Duchies issue and that he had no doubt that "this artificial exaggeration of the danger by public opinion formed an essential part of the calculations and actions of Count Bismarck [who considered] the annexation of the Duchies ... a matter of life and death for his political existence [and wished] to make it appear such for Prussia too."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Brooks |first=Stephen |title=Nineteenth Century Europe |date=1992 |publisher=Macmillan Press |pages=39–40}}</ref>

Possible evidence can be found in Bismarck's orchestration of the Austrian alliance during the [[Second Schleswig War]] against Denmark, which can be seen as his diplomatic "masterstroke". Taylor also believes that the alliance was a "test for Austria rather than a trap" and that the goal was not war with Austria, contradicting what Bismarck later gave in his memoirs as his main reason for establishing the alliance. It was in the Prussian interest to gain an alliance with Austria to defeat Denmark and settle the [[history of Schleswig-Holstein|issue]] of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. The alliance can be regarded as an aid to Prussian expansion, rather than a provocation of war against Austria. Many historians believe that Bismarck was simply a Prussian [[expansionism|expansionist]], rather than a German nationalist, who sought the unification of Germany. It was at the [[Gastein Convention]] that the Austrian alliance was set up to lure Austria into war.<ref name="Pflanze1963">{{Cite book |last=Pflanze |first=Otto |author-link=Otto Pflanze |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ollxA6i_aK8C |title=Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of Unification, 1815–1871 |date=1963 |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |isbn=0-691-00765-9}}</ref>{{page needed|date=August 2020}}

Florence gave a good chance to Bismarck as it wanted to annex the remainder of [[Francis Joseph I|Emperor Francis Joseph]]'s [[Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia]]. The timing of the [[Italo-Prussian alliance|Italo-Prussian Alliance]] of 8 April 1866 was perfect, because all other European powers were either bound by relations that forbade them from entering the conflict opposed to Berlin, or had domestic problems that had priority. Obvious reasons why none of the great powers of Europe was about to intervene are listed below:

'''Russia''': Saint Petersburg was unlikely to enter on the side of Vienna, due to ill will over Francis Joseph's support for the Anglo-French alliance during the [[Crimean War]] despite the [[house of Romanov]]'s aid to him against the [[Hungarian Revolution of 1848|Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–1849]]. Moreover, Prussia had stood by Russia during the [[January Uprising]] in Poland, signing the [[Alvensleben Convention]] of February 1863 with the Empire, whereas Austria had not.<ref name="kitchen">{{Cite web |last=Kitchen |first=Martin |author-link=Martin Kitchen |title=A History of Modern Germany 1800–2000 |url=https://ens9004-mza.infd.edu.ar/sitio/upload/14-%20KITCHEN,%20M.%20-%20LIBRO%20-%20A%20History%20of%20Modern%20Germany_1.pdf |access-date=24 April 2019 |publisher=[[Blackwell Publishing|Blackwell]]}}{{Dead link|date=September 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes}}</ref>

'''France''': Paris was also unlikely to enter on the side of Austria, because Bismarck had visited Emperor [[Napoleon III]] in [[Biarritz]] and they allegedly discussed whether or not France would intervene in a potential Austro-Prussian war. The details of the negotiation are unknown but many historians think Bismarck was guaranteed French neutrality in the event of a war.

'''Britain''': London focused on its own affairs in [[splendid isolation]] and had no stake economically or politically in a war between the Central European powers, thus, was not going to intervene.
 
This meant that Austria would be fighting both Italy and Prussia, without any non-German allies of its own. Bismarck was aware of an available numerical superiority but still "he was not prepared to advise it immediately even though he gave a favourable account of the international situation".<ref name="feuchtwanger">{{Cite book |last=Feuchtwanger |first=Edgar |author-link=Edgar Feuchtwanger |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=B7NEAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA125 |title=Bismarck: A Political History |date=2014 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=978-1317684329 |page=125}}</ref>