Editing Algerian War (section)

== War chronology ==
According to historian Natalya Vince, the FLN leadership understood that they could not achieve Algerian independence through direct military victory over the powerful French army. Instead, they adopted tactics later recognized as asymmetric or [[Guerrilla warfare|revolutionary warfare]], including guerrilla warfare and [[urban terrorism]]. Their strategy aimed to erode France's [[political will]] to continue the conflict, either by increasing the costs of war and exhausting public support or by exposing French repression and undermining its moral authority. The FLN took inspiration from Chinese and Vietnamese revolutionary leaders, particularly [[Mao Zedong]] and [[Ho Chi Minh|Hồ Chí Minh]], and maintained contact with them by 1959. They studied General [[Võ Nguyên Giáp|Vo Nguyen Giap]]’s tactics at the battle of [[Battle of Dien Bien Phu|Dien Bien Phu]], where the [[Viet Minh]] overcame French forces through strategic use of terrain and siege warfare. The FLN also embraced Mao's principle that guerrillas must integrate with the rural population, securing local support to sustain their movement and evade enemy forces.{{Sfn|Vince|2020|pp=68-69}}

=== Beginning of hostilities ===
{{Main|Declaration of 1 November 1954}}
[[File:Moudjahiddines algériens à la montagne.jpg|thumb|Algerian rebel fighters in the mountains|left]]
In the early morning hours of 1 November 1954, FLN ''maquisards'' (guerrillas) attacked military and civilian targets throughout Algeria in what became known as the ''[[Toussaint Rouge]]'' (Red [[All-Saints' Day]]). From [[Cairo]], the FLN broadcast the [[declaration of 1 November 1954]] written by the journalist [[Mohamed Aïchaoui]] calling on Muslims in Algeria to join in a national struggle for the "restoration of the Algerian state – sovereign, democratic and social – within the framework of the principles of Islam." It was the reaction of Premier [[Pierre Mendès France]] ([[Republican, Radical and Radical-Socialist Party|Radical-Socialist Party]]), who only a few months before had completed the liquidation of France's tete empire in [[French Indochina|Indochina]], which set the tone of French policy for five years. He declared in the National Assembly, "One does not compromise when it comes to defending the internal peace of the nation, the unity and integrity of the Republic. The Algerian departments are part of the French Republic. They have been French for a long time, and they are irrevocably French. ... Between them and metropolitan France there can be no conceivable secession." At first, and despite the [[Sétif massacre]] of 8 May 1945, and the pro-Independence struggle before World War II, most Algerians were in favor of a relative status-quo. While Messali Hadj had radicalized by forming the FLN, Ferhat Abbas maintained a more moderate, electoral strategy. Fewer than 500 ''[[fellaghas]]'' (pro-Independence fighters) could be counted at the beginning of the conflict.<ref name="Boisset">"Alger-Bagdad", account of [[Yves Boisset]]'s film documentary, ''[[The Battle of Algiers (film)|La Bataille d'Algers]]'' (2006), in ''[[Le Canard enchaîné]]'', January 10, 2007, n°4498, p.7</ref> The Algerian population radicalized itself in particular because of the terrorist acts of French-sponsored ''[[Main Rouge]]'' (Red Hand) group, which targeted anti-colonialists in all of the [[Maghreb]] region (Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria), killing, for example, Tunisian activist [[Farhat Hached]] in 1952.<ref name="Boisset"/>

=== FLN ===
{{more citations needed section|date=March 2014}}

[[File:National Liberation Army Soldiers (7).jpg|thumb|[[National Liberation Army (Algeria)|National Liberation Army]] soldiers|left]]
[[File:Houari Boumediène - War of Independence.jpg|thumb|[[Houari Boumediène]] (right), the leader of the [[National Liberation Army (Algeria)|National Liberation Army]] and future [[President of Algeria]], during the war|left]]
The FLN uprising presented nationalist groups with the question of whether to adopt armed revolt as the main course of action. During the first year of the war, [[Ferhat Abbas]]'s [[Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto]] (UDMA), the [[ulema]], and the [[Algerian Communist Party]] (PCA) maintained a friendly neutrality toward the FLN. The [[communism|communists]], who had made no move to cooperate in the uprising at the start, later tried to infiltrate the FLN, but FLN leaders publicly repudiated the support of the party. In April 1956, Abbas flew to [[Cairo]], where he formally joined the FLN. This action brought in many ''évolués'' who had supported the UDMA in the past. The [[Association of Algerian Muslim Ulema|AUMA]] also threw the full weight of its prestige behind the FLN. Bendjelloul and the pro-integrationist moderates had already abandoned their efforts to mediate between the French and the rebels.

After the collapse of the [[Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties|MTLD]], the veteran nationalist [[Messali Hadj]] formed the [[leftist]] [[Mouvement National Algérien]] (MNA), which advocated a policy of violent revolution and total independence similar to that of the FLN, but aimed to compete with that organisation. The ''[[Armée de Libération Nationale]]'' (ALN), the military wing of the FLN, subsequently wiped out the MNA [[guerrilla warfare|guerrilla]] operation in Algeria, and Messali Hadj's movement lost what weak influence it had had there. However, the MNA retained the support of many Algerian workers in France through the ''[[Union Syndicale des Travailleurs Algériens]]'' (the [[Trade union|Union]] of Algerian Workers). The FLN also established a strong organization in France to oppose the MNA. The "[[Café wars]]", resulting in nearly 5,000 deaths, were waged in France between the two rebel groups throughout the years of the War of Independence.

[[File:Six chefs FLN - 1954.jpg|thumb|upright=0.9|left|The six historical Leaders of the FLN: [[Rabah Bitat]], [[Mustapha Benboulaïd|Mostefa Ben Boulaïd]], [[Mourad Didouche]], [[Mohammed Boudiaf]], [[Krim Belkacem]] and [[Larbi Ben M'Hidi]]]]

On the political front, the FLN worked to persuade—and to coerce—the Algerian masses to support the aims of the independence movement through contributions. FLN-influenced labor unions, professional associations, and students' and women's organizations were created to lead opinion in diverse segments of the population, but here too, violent coercion was widely used. [[Frantz Fanon]], a psychiatrist from [[Martinique]] who became the FLN's leading political theorist, provided a sophisticated intellectual justification for the use of violence in achieving national liberation.<ref>{{cite book |author=[[Frantz Fanon]] |title=[[Wretched of the Earth]] |year=1961 |publisher=François Maspero}}</ref>{{page needed|date=August 2020}} From [[Cairo]], [[Ahmed Ben Bella]] ordered the liquidation of potential ''interlocuteurs valables'', those independent representatives of the [[Muslim]] community acceptable to the French through whom a compromise or reforms within the system might be achieved.

As the FLN campaign of influence spread through the countryside, many European farmers in the interior (called ''[[pied-noir|Pieds-Noirs]]''), many of whom lived on lands taken from Muslim communities during the nineteenth century,<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/27/algeria-france-colonial-past-islam|date=27 January 2013|title=Algiers: a city where France is the promised land – and still the enemy|access-date=2013-07-21|last=Hussey|first=Andrew|newspaper=The Guardian|quote=Meanwhile, Muslim villages were destroyed and whole populations forced to move to accommodate European farms and industry. As the pieds-noirs grew in number and status, the native Algerians, who had no nationality under French law, did not officially exist.}}</ref> sold their holdings and sought refuge in [[Algiers]] and other Algerian cities. After a series of bloody, random massacres and bombings by Muslim Algerians in several towns and cities, the French ''Pieds-Noirs'' and urban French population began to demand that the French government engage in sterner countermeasures, including the proclamation of a [[states of emergency in France|state of emergency]], capital punishment for political crimes, denunciation of all separatists, and most ominously, a call for 'tit-for-tat' reprisal operations by police, military, and para-military forces. ''[[Colon (Algeria)|Colon]]'' vigilante units, whose unauthorized activities were conducted with the passive cooperation of police authorities, carried out ''ratonnades'' (literally, ''rat-hunts'', ''raton'' being a racist term for denigrating Muslim Algerians) against suspected FLN members of the Muslim community.

By 1955, effective political action groups within the Algerian colonial community succeeded in convincing many of the Governors General sent by Paris that the military was not the way to resolve the conflict. A major success was the conversion of [[Jacques Soustelle]], who went to Algeria as governor general in January 1955 determined to restore peace. Soustelle, a one-time leftist and by 1955 an ardent Gaullist, began an ambitious reform program (the [[Soustelle Plan]]) aimed at improving economic conditions among the Muslim population.

=== After the Philippeville massacre ===
{{more citations needed section|date=August 2014}}
[[File:1955-08-25 Rebellion Spreads in North Africa.ogv|thumb|Universal [[Newsreel]]s ''Rebellion Spreads in North Africa'', 1955]]

The FLN adopted tactics similar to those of nationalist groups in Asia, and the French did not realize the seriousness of the challenge they faced until 1955, when the FLN moved into urbanized areas. An important watershed in the War of Independence was [[Battle of Philippeville|the massacre of Pieds-Noirs civilians]] by the FLN near the town of [[Philippeville, Algeria|Philippeville]] (now known as [[Skikda]]) in August 1955. Before this operation, FLN policy was to attack only military and government-related targets. The commander of the [[Constantine, Algeria|Constantine]] ''wilaya''/region, however, decided a drastic escalation was needed. The killing by the FLN and its supporters of 123 people, including 71 French,<ref name="Gers">[http://www.gers.pref.gouv.fr/acvg/documents/reperesalger.htm Number given by the] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070219113643/http://www.gers.pref.gouv.fr/acvg/documents/reperesalger.htm |date=February 19, 2007 }} [[Prefectures in France|Préfecture]] du [[Gers]], French governmental site – URL accessed on February 17, 2007</ref> including old women and babies, shocked [[Jacques Soustelle]] into calling for more repressive measures against the rebels. The French authorities stated that 1,273 guerrillas died in what Soustelle admitted were "severe" reprisals. The FLN subsequently claimed that 12,000 Muslims were killed.<ref name=Horne/>{{rp|122}} Soustelle's repression was an early cause of the Algerian population's rallying to the FLN.<ref name="Gers"/> After Philippeville, Soustelle declared sterner measures and an all-out war began. In 1956, demonstrations by French Algerians caused the French government to not make reforms.

Soustelle's successor, Governor General [[Robert Lacoste]], a socialist, abolished the [[Algerian Assembly]]. Lacoste saw the assembly, which was dominated by ''pieds-noirs'', as hindering the work of his administration, and he undertook the rule of Algeria by decree. He favored stepping up French military operations and granted the army exceptional police powers—a concession of dubious legality under French law—to deal with the mounting political violence. At the same time, Lacoste proposed a new administrative structure to give Algeria some autonomy and a decentralized government. Whilst remaining an integral part of France, Algeria was to be divided into five districts, each of which would have a territorial assembly elected from a single slate of candidates. Until 1958, deputies representing Algerian districts were able to delay the passage of the measure by the [[National Assembly of France]].

In August and September 1956, the leadership of the FLN guerrillas operating within Algeria (popularly known as "internals") met to organize a formal policy-making body to synchronize the movement's political and military activities. The highest authority of the FLN was vested in the thirty-four member [[National Council of the Algerian Revolution]] (Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne, CNRA), within which the five-man Committee of Coordination and Enforcement (''Comité de Coordination et d'Exécution'', CCE) formed the executive. The leadership of the regular FLN forces based in Tunisia and Morocco ("externals"), including Ben Bella, knew the conference was taking place but by chance or design on the part of the "internals" were unable to attend.

{{anchor|Arrest of the leaders of the Algerian independence movement}}In October 1956, the [[French hijacking of the FLN plane|French Air Force intercepted a Moroccan DC-3 plane]] bound for [[Tunis]], carrying [[Ahmed Ben Bella]], [[Mohammed Boudiaf]], [[Mohamed Khider]] and [[Hocine Aït Ahmed]], and forced it to land in Algiers. Lacoste had the FLN external political leaders arrested and imprisoned for the duration of the war. This action caused the remaining rebel leaders to harden their stance.

France opposed [[Egypt]]ian President [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]]'s material and political assistance to the FLN, which some French analysts believed was the revolution's main sustenance. This attitude was a factor in persuading France to participate in the November 1956 attempt to seize the [[Suez Canal]] during the [[Suez Crisis]].

During 1957, support for the FLN weakened as the breach between the internals and externals widened. To halt the drift, the FLN expanded its executive committee to include Abbas, as well as imprisoned political leaders such as Ben Bella. It also convinced communist and Arab members of the [[United Nations]] (UN) to put diplomatic pressure on the French government to negotiate a cease-fire. In 1957, it became common knowledge in France that the French Army was routinely using torture to extract information from suspected FLN members.<ref name=Cohen>{{cite journal |last=Cohen |first=William |title=The Algerian War, the French State and Official Memory |journal=Réflexions Historiques |volume=28 |issue=2 |year=2002|pages=219–239 |jstor=41299235 }}</ref> [[Hubert Beuve-Méry]], the editor of ''Le Monde'', declared in an edition on 13 March 1957: "From now on, Frenchman must know that they don't have the right to condemn in the same terms as ten years ago the [[Oradour-sur-Glane massacre|destruction of Oradour]] and the torture by the [[Gestapo]]."<ref name=Cohen/> Another case that attracted much media attention was the murder of [[Maurice Audin]], a member of the outlawed Algerian Communist party,<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/16/algeria-france-war-macron-apology-murder-michele-audin-interview | title='My father was tortured and murdered in Algeria. At last France has admitted it' | website=[[TheGuardian.com]] | date=16 September 2018 }}</ref> mathematics professor at the University of Algiers and a suspected FLN member whom the French Army arrested in June 1957.<ref name=Cohen/>{{rp|224}} Audin was tortured and killed and his body was never found.<ref name=Cohen/> As Audin was French rather than Algerian, his "disappearance" while in the custody of the French Army led to the case becoming a ''cause célèbre'' as his widow aided by the historian [[Pierre Vidal-Naquet]] determinedly sought to have the men responsible for her husband's death prosecuted.<ref name=Cohen/>

[[Existentialist]] writer, philosopher and playwright [[Albert Camus]], native of Algiers, tried unsuccessfully to persuade both sides to at least leave civilians alone, writing editorials against the use of torture in ''[[Combat (newspaper)|Combat]]'' newspaper. The FLN considered him a fool, and some ''Pieds-Noirs'' considered him a traitor. Nevertheless, in his speech when he received the [[Nobel Prize in Literature]], Camus said that when faced with a radical choice he would eventually support his community. This statement made him lose his status among left-wing intellectuals; when he died in 1960 in a car crash, the official thesis of an ordinary accident (a quick open-and-shut case) left more than a few observers doubtful. His widow claimed that Camus, though discreet, was in fact an ardent supporter of French Algeria in the last years of his life.{{citation needed|date=August 2014}}

=== Battle of Algiers ===
{{Main|Battle of Algiers (1956–57)}}
[[File:Bataille d'Alger.jpg|thumb|Algiers: Muslim quarters (green), European quarters (orange), terrorist attacks]]

To increase international and domestic French attention to their struggle, the FLN decided to bring the conflict to the cities and to call a nationwide [[general strike]] and also to plant bombs in public places. The most notable instance was the Battle of Algiers, which began on September 30, 1956, when three women, including [[Djamila Bouhired]] and [[Zohra Drif]], simultaneously placed bombs at three sites including the downtown office of [[Air France]]. The FLN carried out shootings and bombings in the spring of 1957, resulting in civilian casualties and a crushing response from the authorities.

General [[Jacques Massu]] was instructed to use whatever methods deemed necessary to restore order in the city and to find and eliminate terrorists. Using paratroopers, he broke the strike and, in the succeeding months, destroyed the FLN infrastructure in Algiers. But the FLN had succeeded in showing its ability to strike at the heart of French Algeria and to assemble a mass response to its demands among urban Muslims. The publicity given to the brutal methods used by the army to win the Battle of Algiers, including the use of torture, strong movement control and curfew called ''quadrillage'' and where all authority was under the military, created doubt in France about its role in Algeria. What was originally "[[Peace|pacification]]" or a "public order operation" had turned into a [[colonial war]] accompanied by torture.

=== Guerrilla war ===
[[File:1956-05-21 France Digs in For Total War in Algeria.ogv|thumb|1956 newsreel about the war]]

During 1956 and 1957, the FLN successfully applied [[hit-and-run tactics]] in accordance with [[guerrilla warfare]] theory. Whilst some of this was aimed at military targets, a significant amount was invested in a terror campaign against those in any way deemed to support or encourage French authority. This resulted in acts of sadistic torture and brutal violence against all, including women and children. Specializing in ambushes and night raids and avoiding direct contact with superior French firepower, the internal forces targeted army patrols, military encampments, police posts, and colonial farms, mines, and factories, as well as transportation and communications facilities. Once an engagement was broken off, the guerrillas merged with the population in the countryside, in accordance with Mao's theories.

Although successfully provoking fear and uncertainty within both communities in Algeria, the revolutionaries' coercive tactics suggested that they had not yet inspired the bulk of the Muslim people to revolt against French colonial rule. Gradually, however, the FLN gained control in certain sectors of the [[Aurès]], the [[Kabylie]], and other mountainous areas around Constantine and south of Algiers and [[Oran]]. In these places, the FLN established a simple but effective—although frequently temporary—military administration that was able to collect taxes and food and to recruit manpower.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Paul |first1=Christopher |title=Algerian Independence, 1954–1962: Case Outcome: COIN Loss |date=2013 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhsjk.16 |work=Paths to Victory |pages=75–93 |access-date=2023-03-21 |series=Detailed Insurgency Case Studies |publisher=RAND Corporation |isbn=978-0-8330-8109-4 |last2=Clarke |first2=Colin P. |last3=Grill |first3=Beth |last4=Dunigan |first4=Molly |jstor=10.7249/j.ctt5hhsjk.16 |archive-date=21 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230321173223/https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhsjk.16 |url-status=live }}</ref> But it was never able to hold large, fixed positions.

The loss of competent field commanders both on the battlefield and through defections and political purges created difficulties for the FLN. Moreover, power struggles in the early years of the war split leadership in the wilayat, particularly in the Aurès. Some officers created their own fiefdoms, using units under their command to settle old scores and engage in private wars against military rivals within the FLN.

=== French counter-insurgency operations ===
Despite complaints from the military command in Algiers, the French government was reluctant for many months to admit that the Algerian situation was out of control and that what was viewed officially as a pacification operation had developed into a war. By 1956, there were more than 400,000 French troops in Algeria. Although the elite airborne infantry units of the [[Troupes coloniales]] and the [[French Foreign Legion|Foreign Legion]] bore the brunt of offensive counterinsurgency combat operations, approximately 170,000 Muslim Algerians also served in the regular French army, most of them volunteers. France also sent air force and naval units to the Algerian theater, including helicopters. In addition to service as a flying ambulance and cargo carrier, French forces utilized the [[helicopter]] for the first time in a ground attack role in order to pursue and destroy fleeing FLN guerrilla units. The American military later used the same helicopter combat methods in the [[Vietnam War]]. The French also used [[napalm]].<ref name=StoraSiri/>

The French army resumed an important role in local Algerian administration through the Special Administration Section (''[[Section Administrative Spécialisée]]'', SAS), created in 1955. The SAS's mission was to establish contact with the Muslim population and weaken nationalist influence in the rural areas by asserting the "French presence" there. SAS officers—called ''képis bleus'' (blue caps)—also recruited and trained bands of loyal Muslim irregulars, known as ''[[harki]]s''. Armed with shotguns and using guerrilla tactics similar to those of the FLN, the ''harkis'', who eventually numbered about 180,000 volunteers, more than the FLN activists,<ref name="Major Gregory D p.33">Major Gregory D. Peterson, ''The French Experience in Algeria, 1954–62: Blueprint for U.S. Operations in Iraq'', p.33</ref> were an ideal instrument of counterinsurgency warfare.

''Harkis'' were mostly used in conventional formations, either in all-Algerian units commanded by French officers or in mixed units. Other uses included [[platoon]] or smaller size units, attached to French battalions, in a similar way as the [[Kit Carson Scouts]] by the U.S. in Vietnam. A third use was an [[intelligence gathering]] role, with some reported minor [[False flag|pseudo-operations]] in support of their intelligence collection.<ref>{{cite book |first=John |last=Pimlott |author-link=John Pimlott (historian) |chapter=The French Army: From Indochina to Chad, 1946–1984 |editor-first=Ian F. W. |editor-last=Beckett |editor2-first=John |editor2-last=Pimlott |title=Armed Forces & Modern Counter-Insurgency |location=New York |publisher=[[St Martin's Press]] |year=1985 |page=[https://archive.org/details/armedforcesmoder0000unse/page/66 66] |isbn=978-0-312-04924-9 |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/armedforcesmoder0000unse/page/66 }}</ref> U.S. military expert [[Lawrence E. Cline]] stated, "The extent of these pseudo-operations appears to have been very limited both in time and scope. ... The most widespread use of pseudo type operations was during the 'Battle of Algiers' in 1957. The principal French employer of [[covert agents]] in Algiers was the Fifth Bureau, the [[psychological warfare]] branch. "The Fifth Bureau" made extensive use of 'turned' FLN members, one such network being run by Captain Paul-Alain Leger of the 10th Paras. "[[Persuasion|Persuaded]]" to work for the French forces included by the use of torture and threats against their family; these agents "mingled with FLN cadres. They planted incriminating forged documents, spread false rumors of treachery and fomented distrust. ... As a frenzy of throat-cutting and disemboweling broke out among confused and suspicious FLN cadres, nationalist slaughtered nationalist from April to September 1957 and did France's work for her."<ref>{{cite journal |first1=Martin S. |last1=Alexander |first2=J. F. V. |last2=Kieger |title=France and the Algerian War: Strategy, Operations, and Diplomacy |journal=[[Journal of Strategic Studies]] |volume=25 |issue=2 |year=2002 |pages=6–7 |doi=10.1080/01402390412331302635 |s2cid=154354671 }}</ref> But this type of operation involved individual operatives rather than organized covert units.

One organized pseudo-guerrilla unit, however, was created in December 1956 by the French [[Direction de la surveillance du territoire|DST]] domestic intelligence agency. The ''Organization of the French Algerian Resistance'' (ORAF), a group of counter-terrorists had as its mission to carry out [[false flag]] terrorist attacks with the aim of quashing any hopes of political compromise.<ref>[[Roger Faligot]] and [[Pascal Krop]], ''DST, Police Secrète'', Flammarion, 1999, p. 174</ref> But it seemed that, as in Indochina, "the French focused on developing native guerrilla groups that would fight against the FLN", one of whom fought in the Southern [[Atlas Mountains]], equipped by the French Army.<ref name=Cline>{{cite book|last=Cline|first=Lawrence|title=Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons From Other Countries|publisher=Strategic Studies Institute|year=2005|isbn=978-1584871996|url=http://www.blackwaterusa.com/btw2005/articles/080105counter.pdf|page=8|access-date=2007-02-14|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161116130502/http://www.blackwaterusa.com/btw2005/articles/080105counter.pdf|archive-date=2016-11-16|url-status=dead}}</ref>

The FLN also used pseudo-guerrilla strategies against the French Army on one occasion, with Force K, a group of 1,000 Algerians who volunteered to serve in Force K as guerrillas for the French. But most of these members were either already FLN members or were turned by the FLN once enlisted. Corpses of purported FLN members displayed by the unit were in fact those of dissidents and members of other Algerian groups killed by the FLN. The French Army finally discovered the war ruse and tried to hunt down Force K members. However, some 600 managed to escape and join the FLN with weapons and equipment.<ref name=Cline/><ref name=Horne/>{{rp|255–7}}

Late in 1957, General [[Raoul Salan]], commanding the French Army in Algeria, instituted a system of ''quadrillage'' (surveillance using a grid pattern), dividing the country into sectors, each permanently garrisoned by troops responsible for suppressing rebel operations in their assigned territory. Salan's methods sharply reduced the instances of FLN terrorism but tied down a large number of troops in static defense. Salan also constructed a heavily patrolled system of barriers to limit infiltration from Tunisia and Morocco. The best known of these was the [[Morice Line]] (named for the French defense minister, [[André Morice]]), which consisted of an electrified fence, barbed wire, and mines over a 320-kilometer stretch of the Tunisian border. Despite ruthless clashes during the [[Battle of the borders (Algerian war)|Battle of the borders]], the ALN failed to penetrate these defence lines.{{citation needed|date=October 2022}}

[[File:Le barrage électrifié sur les frontières Est de l'Algérie.jpg|thumb|left|Electrified barriers along the entire length of Algeria's eastern and western borders]]
The French military command ruthlessly applied the principle of collective responsibility to villages suspected of sheltering, supplying, or in any way cooperating with the guerrillas. Villages that could not be reached by mobile units were subject to aerial bombardment. FLN guerrillas that fled to caves or other remote hiding places were tracked and hunted down. In one episode, FLN guerrillas who refused to surrender and withdraw from a cave complex were dealt with by French Foreign Legion Pioneer troops, who, lacking flamethrowers or explosives, simply bricked up each cave, leaving the residents to die of suffocation.<ref name="Leulliette">{{cite book |last=Leulliette |first=Pierre |title=St. Michael and the Dragon: Memoirs of a Paratrooper |url=https://archive.org/details/stmichaeldrago00leul |url-access=registration |publisher=Houghton Mifflin |year=1964 }}</ref>

Finding it impossible to control all of Algeria's remote farms and villages, the French government also initiated a program of concentrating large segments of the rural population, including whole villages, in camps under military supervision to prevent them from aiding the rebels. In the three years (1957–60) during which the ''regroupement'' program was followed, more than 2&nbsp;million Algerians<ref name="countrystudies">{{cite web|url=http://countrystudies.us/algeria/55.htm|publisher=countrystudies.us|title=Algeria – The Revolution and Social Change|access-date=2017-01-13|archive-date=3 November 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161103012751/http://countrystudies.us/algeria/55.htm|url-status=live}}</ref> were removed from their villages, mostly in the [[Bouzegza Mountain|mountainous areas]], and resettled in the plains, where it was difficult to reestablish their previous economic and social systems. Living conditions in the fortified villages were poor. In hundreds of villages, orchards and croplands not already burned by French troops went to seed for lack of care. These [[population transfers]] effectively denied the use of remote villages to FLN guerrillas, who had used them as a source of rations and manpower, but also caused significant resentment on the part of the displaced villagers. Relocation's social and economic disruption continued to be felt a generation later.{{citation needed|date=October 2022}} At the same time, the French tried to gain support from the civilian population by providing money, jobs and housing to farmers<ref name="Aoudjit"/>

The French Army shifted its tactics at the end of 1958 from dependence on ''quadrillage'' to the use of mobile forces deployed on massive [[search-and-destroy]] missions against FLN strongholds. In 1959, Salan's successor, General [[Maurice Challe]], appeared to have suppressed major rebel resistance, but political developments had already overtaken the French Army's successes.{{citation needed|date=October 2022}}

=== Fall of the Fourth Republic ===
{{Main|May 1958 crisis in France}}

Recurrent cabinet crises focused attention on the inherent instability of the [[Fourth French Republic|Fourth Republic]] and increased the misgivings of the army and of the pieds-noirs that the security of Algeria was being undermined by party politics. Army commanders chafed at what they took to be inadequate and incompetent political initiatives by the government in support of military efforts to end the rebellion. The feeling was widespread that another debacle like that of Indochina in 1954 was in the offing and that the government would order another precipitate pullout and sacrifice French honor to political expediency. Many saw in de Gaulle, who had not held office since 1946, the only public figure capable of rallying the nation and giving direction to the French government.

After his time as governor general, Soustelle returned to France to organize support for de Gaulle's return to power, while retaining close ties to the army and the ''pieds-noirs''. By early 1958, he had organized a [[coup d'état]], bringing together dissident army officers and ''pieds-noirs'' with sympathetic Gaullists. An army junta under Massu seized power in Algiers on the night of May 13, thereafter known as the [[May 1958 crisis]]. General Salan assumed leadership of a Committee of Public Safety formed to replace the civil authority and pressed the junta's demands that de Gaulle be named by French president [[René Coty]] to head a government of national unity invested with extraordinary powers to prevent the "abandonment of Algeria".

On May 24, French paratroopers from the Algerian corps landed on [[Corsica]], [[Operation Corsica|taking the French island]] in a bloodless action. Subsequently, preparations were made in Algeria for [[Operation Resurrection]], which had as its objectives the seizure of Paris and the removal of the French government. Resurrection was to be implemented in the event of one of three following scenarios: Were de Gaulle not approved as leader of France by the parliament; were de Gaulle to ask for military assistance to take power; or if it seemed that communist forces were making any move to take power in France. De Gaulle was approved by the French parliament on May 29, by 329 votes against 224, 15 hours before the projected launch of Operation Resurrection. This indicated that the Fourth Republic by 1958 no longer had any support from the French Army in Algeria and was at its mercy even in civilian political matters. This decisive shift in the balance of power in civil-military relations in France in 1958, and the threat of force, was the primary factor in the return of de Gaulle to power in France.

=== De Gaulle ===
{{Main|Presidency of Charles de Gaulle}}
Many people, regardless of citizenship, greeted de Gaulle's return to power as the breakthrough needed to end the hostilities. On his trip to Algeria on 4 June 1958, de Gaulle calculatedly made an ambiguous and broad emotional appeal to all the inhabitants, declaring, "Je vous ai compris" ("I have understood you"). De Gaulle raised the hopes of the ''pied-noir'' and the professional military, disaffected by the indecisiveness of previous governments, with his exclamation of "''{{Ill|Vive l'Algérie française|fr|Vive l'Algérie française !}}''" ("Long live French Algeria") to cheering crowds in Mostaganem. At the same time, he proposed economic, social, and political reforms to improve the situation of the Muslims. Nonetheless, de Gaulle later admitted to having harbored deep pessimism about the outcome of the Algerian situation even then. Meanwhile, he looked for a "third force" among the population of Algeria, uncontaminated by the FLN or the "ultras" (''colon'' extremists), through whom a solution might be found.

De Gaulle immediately appointed a committee to draft a new constitution for France's Fifth Republic, which would be declared early the next year, with which Algeria would be associated but of which it would not form an integral part. All Muslims, including women, were registered for the first time on electoral rolls to participate in a referendum to be held on the new constitution in September 1958.

De Gaulle's initiative threatened the FLN with decreased support among Muslims. In reaction, the FLN set up the [[Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic]] (Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne, GPRA), a government-in-exile headed by [[Ferhat Abbas|Abbas]] and based in Tunis. Before the referendum, Abbas lobbied for international support for the GPRA, which was quickly recognized by [[Morocco]], [[Tunisia]], China, and several other African, Arab, and Asian countries, but not by the Soviet Union.

In February 1959, de Gaulle was elected president of the new Fifth Republic. He visited Constantine in October to announce a program to end the war and create an Algeria closely linked to France. De Gaulle's call on the rebel leaders to end hostilities and to participate in elections was met with adamant refusal. "The problem of a cease-fire in Algeria is not simply a military problem", said the GPRA's Abbas. "It is essentially political, and negotiation must cover the whole question of Algeria." Secret discussions that had been underway were broken off.

From 1958 to 1959, the French army won military control in Algeria and was the closest it would be to victory. In late July 1959, during [[Operation Jumelles]], [[Marcel Bigeard|Colonel Bigeard]], whose elite paratrooper unit fought at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, told journalist [[Jean Lartéguy]], ([http://www.ina.fr/archivespourtous/index.php?vue=notice&from=fulltext&full=alg%E9rie+r%E9trospective&num_notice=1&total_notices=28 source])

{{blockquote|We are not making war for ourselves, not making a colonialist war, Bigeard wears no shirt (he shows his opened uniform) as do my officers. We are fighting right here right now for them, for the evolution, to see the evolution of these people and this war is for them. We are defending their freedom as we are, in my opinion, defending the West's freedom. We are here ambassadors, Crusaders, who are hanging on in order to still be able to talk and to be able to speak for.|Col. Bigeard (July 1959)}}

During this period in France, however, popular opposition to the conflict was growing, notably in the [[French Communist Party]], then one of the country's strongest political forces, which supported the Algerian Revolution. Thousands of relatives of conscripts and reserve soldiers suffered loss and pain; revelations of torture and the indiscriminate brutality of the army against the Muslim population prompted widespread revulsion, and a significant constituency supported the principle of national liberation. By 1959, it was clear that the status quo was untenable and France could either grant Algeria independence or allow real equality with the Muslims. De Gaulle told an advisor: "If we integrate them, if all the Arabs and the Berbers of Algeria were considered French, how could they be prevented from settling in France, where the living standard is so much higher? My village would no longer be called Colombey-les-Deux-Églises but Colombey-les-Deux-Mosquées".<ref name=Shatz>{{cite web|last=Shatz|first=Adam|title=The Torture of Algiers|publisher=Algeria-Watch|date=21 November 2002|url=http://www.algeria-watch.org/farticle/analyse/shatz_torture.htm|access-date=2016-10-25|archive-date=15 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180515064649/http://www.algeria-watch.org/farticle/analyse/shatz_torture.htm|url-status=live}}</ref>

International pressure was also building on France to grant Algeria independence. Since 1955, the [[UN General Assembly]] annually considered the Algerian question, and the FLN position was gaining support. France's seeming intransigence in settling a colonial war that tied down half the manpower of its armed forces was also a source of concern to its [[NATO|North Atlantic Treaty Organization]] allies. In a 16 September 1959 statement, de Gaulle dramatically reversed his stand and uttered the words "self-determination" as the third and preferred solution, which he envisioned as leading to majority rule in an Algeria formally associated with France. In Tunis, Abbas acknowledged that de Gaulle's statement might be accepted as a basis for settlement, but the French government refused to recognize the GPRA as the representative of Algeria's Muslim community.

=== Week of barricades ===
<!-- This section is linked from [[Organisation armée secrète]]. -->
[[File:Semaine des barricades Alger 1960 Haute Qualité.jpg|thumb|Barricades in Algiers, January 1960. The banner reads: "Long live Massu" (''Vive Massu'').]]

Convinced that de Gaulle had betrayed them, some units of European volunteers (''Unités Territoriales'') in Algiers led by student leaders [[Pierre Lagaillarde]] and [[Jean-Jacques Susini]], café owner Joseph Ortiz, and lawyer [[Jean-Baptiste Biaggi]] staged an insurrection in the Algerian capital starting on 24 January 1960, and known in France as {{ill|Week of barricades|lt=''La semaine des barricades''|fr|Semaine des barricades}} ("the week of barricades"). The ''ultras'' incorrectly believed that they would be supported by Massu. The insurrection order was given by Colonel Jean Garde of the Fifth Bureau. As the army, police, and supporters stood by, civilian ''pieds-noirs'' threw up barricades in the streets and seized government buildings. General Maurice Challe, responsible for the army in Algeria, declared Algiers under [[siege]], but forbade the troops to fire on the insurgents. Nevertheless, six rioters were killed during shooting on [[Boulevard Mohamed-Khemisti|Boulevard Laferrière]].

In Paris on 29 January 1960, de Gaulle called on his ineffective army to remain loyal and rallied popular support for his Algerian policy in a televised address:

<blockquote>I took, in the name of France, the following decision—the Algerians will have the free choice of their destiny. When, in one way or another – by ceasefire or by complete crushing of the rebels – we will have put an end to the fighting, when, after a prolonged period of appeasement, the population will have become conscious of the stakes and, thanks to us, realised the necessary progress in political, economic, social, educational, and other domains. Then it will be the Algerians who will tell us what they want to be.... Your French of Algeria, how can you listen to the liars and the conspirators who tell you that, if you grant free choice to the Algerians, France and de Gaulle want to abandon you, retreat from Algeria, and deliver you to the rebellion?.... I say to all of our soldiers: your mission comprises neither equivocation nor interpretation. You have to liquidate the rebellious forces, which want to oust France from Algeria and impose on this country its dictatorship of misery and sterility.... Finally, I address myself to France. Well, well, my dear and old country, here we face together, once again, a serious ordeal. In virtue of the mandate that the people have given me and of the national legitimacy, which I have embodied for 20 years, I ask everyone to support me whatever happens.<ref>French: "''J'ai pris, au nom de la France, la décision que voici: les Algériens auront le libre choix de leur destin. Quand d'une manière ou d'une autre – conclusion d'un cessez-le-feu ou écrasement total des rebelles – nous aurons mis un terme aux combats, quand, ensuite, après une période prolongée d'apaisement, les populations auront pu prendre conscience de l'enjeu et, d'autre part, accomplir, grâce à nous, les progrès nécessaires dans les domaines, politique, économique, social, scolaire, etc., alors ce seront les Algériens qui diront ce qu'ils veulent être. ... Français d'Algérie, comment pouvez-vous écouter les menteurs et les conspirateurs qui vous disent qu'en accordant le libre choix aux Algériens, la France et De Gaulle veulent vous abandonner, se retirer de l'Algérie et vous livrer à la rébellion? ... Je dis à tous nos soldats: votre mission ne comporte ni équivoque, ni interprétation. Vous avez à liquider la force rebelle qui veut chasser la France de l'Algérie et faire régner sur ce pays sa dictature de misère et de stérilité. ... Enfin, je m'adresse à la France. Eh bien! mon cher et vieux pays, nous voici donc ensemble, encore une fois, face à une lourde épreuve. En vertu du mandat que le peuple m'a donné et de la légitimité nationale que j'incarne depuis vingt ans (sic), je demande à tous et à toutes de me soutenir quoi qu'il arrive''".</ref></blockquote>

Most of the Army heeded his call, and the siege of Algiers ended on 1 February with Lagaillarde surrendering to General Challe's command of the French Army in Algeria. The loss of many ''ultra'' leaders who were imprisoned or transferred to other areas did not deter the French Algeria militants. Sent to prison in Paris and then paroled, Lagaillarde fled to Spain. There, with another French army officer, [[Raoul Salan]], who had entered [[clandestine operation|clandestinely]], and with Jean-Jacques Susini, he created the ''[[Organisation armée secrète]]'' (Secret Army Organization, OAS) on December 3, 1960, with the purpose of continuing the fight for French Algeria. Highly organized and well-armed, the OAS stepped up its terrorist activities, which were directed against both Algerians and pro-government French citizens, as the move toward negotiated settlement of the war and self-determination gained momentum. To the FLN rebellion against France were added civil wars between extremists in the two communities and between the ''ultras'' and the French government in Algeria.

Beside Pierre Lagaillarde, Jean-Baptiste Biaggi was also imprisoned, while [[Alain de Sérigny]] was arrested, and [[Joseph Ortiz (activist)|Joseph Ortiz]]'s [[Front national français|FNF]] dissolved, as well as General [[Lionel Chassin]]'s [[Mouvement populaire du 13-Mai|MP-13]]. De Gaulle also modified the government, excluding [[Jacques Soustelle]], believed to be too pro-French Algeria, and granting the Minister of Information to [[Louis Terrenoire]], who quit [[Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française|RTF]] (French broadcasting TV). [[Pierre Messmer]], who had been a member of the [[French Foreign Legion|Foreign Legion]], was named Minister of Defense, and dissolved the Fifth Bureau, the [[psychological warfare]] branch, which had ordered the rebellion. These units had theorized the principles of a [[counter-revolutionary war]], including the use of torture. During the [[Indochina War]] (1947–54), officers such as [[Roger Trinquier]] and [[Lionel-Max Chassin]] were inspired by Mao Zedong's strategic doctrine and acquired knowledge of [[crowd psychology|convince the population]] to support the fight. The officers were initially trained in the ''[[Centre d'instruction et de préparation à la contre-guérilla]]'' (Arzew). [[Jacques Chaban-Delmas]] added to that the ''[[Centre d'entraînement à la guerre subversive Jeanne-d'Arc]]'' (Center of Training to Subversive War Joan of Arc) in [[Skikda|Philippeville]], Algeria, directed by Colonel Marcel Bigeard.
The French army officers' uprising was due to a perceived second betrayal by the government, the first having been [[Indochina War|Indochina]] (1947–1954). In some aspects the Dien Bien Phu garrison was sacrificed with no metropolitan support, order was given to commanding officer [[Christian de Castries|General de Castries]] to "let the affair die of its own, in serenity" ("''laissez mourir l'affaire d'elle même en sérénité''"<ref name="ena">{{cite web|url=http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm|publisher=ena.lu|title=Accueil – CVCE Website - French Army audio archives|access-date=2017-02-04|archive-date=23 October 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061023025336/http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm|url-status=dead}}</ref>).

The opposition of the [[Union Nationale des Étudiants de France|UNEF]] student trade-union to the participation of conscripts in the war led to a secession in May 1960, with the creation of the ''[[Federation of Nationalist Students|Fédération des étudiants nationalistes]]'' (FEN, Federation of Nationalist Students) around [[Dominique Venner]], a former member of [[Jeune Nation]] and of [[MP-13|MP13]], [[François d'Orcival]] and [[Alain de Benoist]], who would theorize in the 1980s the "[[New Right]]" movement. The FEN then published the ''Manifeste de la classe 60''.

A [[Front national pour l'Algérie française]] (FNAF, National Front for French Algeria) was created in June 1960 in Paris, gathering around de Gaulle's former Secretary Jacques Soustelle, [[Claude Dumont]], [[Georges Sauge]], [[Yvon Chautard]], [[Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour]] (who later competed in the [[1965 French presidential election|1965 presidential election]]), [[Jacques Isorni]], [[Victor Barthélemy]], [[François Brigneau]] and Jean-Marie Le Pen. Another ''ultra'' rebellion occurred in December 1960, which led de Gaulle to dissolve the FNAF.

After the publication of the ''[[Manifeste des 121]]'' against the use of torture and the war,<ref name="marxists">{{cite web|url=http://www.marxists.org/history/france/algerian-war/1960/manifesto-121.htm|author=Jean-Paul Sartre|author2=Henri Curiel|display-authors=et al|publisher=marxists.org|title=Declaration on the Right to Insubordination in the War in Algeria by 121 French citizens - Manifeste des 121, transl. in English|access-date=2017-01-13|archive-date=20 November 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191120070530/https://www.marxists.org/history/france/algerian-war/1960/manifesto-121.htm|url-status=live}}</ref> the opponents to the war created the [[Rassemblement de la gauche démocratique]] (Assembly of the Democratic Left), which included the [[French Section of the Workers' International]] (SFIO) socialist party, the [[Radical Party (France)|Radical-Socialist Party]], [[Force ouvrière]] (FO) trade union, [[Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens]] trade-union, UNEF trade-union, etc., which supported de Gaulle against the ''ultras''.