Editing Alfred von Schlieffen (section)

==War planning==

{{Main|Schlieffen Plan}}

[[Image:Schlieffen Plan.jpg|thumb|{{centre|"Western Front 1914. Schlieffen Plan of 1905. French Plan XVII" ([[United States Military Academy|USMA]]) "...a mishmash...." and "An armchair strategist's dream....", according to Terence Zuber (2011){{sfn|Zuber|2011|pp=54–57}}{{sfn|Schuette|2014|p=38}}{{sfn|Stoneman|2006|pp=142–143}}}}]]
The cornerstone of Schlieffen's war planning was undoubtedly the strategic counter-offensive. Schlieffen was a great believer in the power of the attack in the context of the defensive operation. Germany's smaller forces relative to the Franco-Russian Entente meant that an offensive posture against one or both was basically suicidal. On the other hand, Schlieffen placed great faith in Germany's ability to use its railways to launch a counter-offensive against a hypothetical French or Russian invasion force, defeat it, then quickly re-group her troops and launch a counter-offensive against the other. To quote Holmes:

{{quote|The {{lang|de|Generalstabsreise Ost}} [eastern wargame] of 1901 followed on from a {{lang|de|Generalstabsreise West}} of the same year, in which the French attacked through [[Belgium]] and [[Luxembourg]] and were decisively beaten by a counter-attack on the left bank of the [[Rhine]] near to the Belgian border. It was this defensive victory that Schlieffen was referring to when he spoke of the need to crush one enemy first and then turn against the other. He insisted that the Germans 'must wait for the enemy to emerge from behind his defensive ramparts, which he will do eventually'. That was the approach adopted in this exercise, and the Germans won a decisive victory over the French.{{sfn|Holmes|2014|pp=205}}}}

Schlieffen also recognised the need for ''offensive'' planning, however, as failing to do so would limit the German Army's capabilities if the situation called for them. In 1897, starting from a plan of 1894, Schlieffen developed a tactical plan that – acknowledging the German army's limited offensive power and capacity for strategic manoeuvres – basically amounted to using brute force to advance beyond the French defences on the Franco-German border.{{sfn|Dupuy|1977|p= 135}} To complement this unsophisticated manoeuvre and improve its chances of success he deemed it necessary to outflank the fortress line to the north and focus on destroying it from north–south starting at [[Verdun]]. This was a ''tactical'' plan centred around the destruction of the fortress-line that called for very little movement by the forces involved.{{sfn|Walter|1967|p= 132}}

In 1905, however, Schlieffen developed what was truly his first plan for a ''strategic offensive operation'' – the ''Schlieffen plan Denkschrift'' (Schlieffen plan memorandum). This plan was based on the hypothesis of an isolated Franco-German war which ''would not'' involve Russia and called for Germany to attack France. The rough draft of this plan was so crude as not to consider questions of supply at all and be vague on the actual number of troops involved, but theorised that Germany would need to raise at least another 100,000 professional troops and 100,000 "ersatz" militiamen (the latter being within Germany's capabilities even in 1905) in addition to being able to count on [[Austria-Hungary|Austro-Hungarian]] and [[Italy|Italian]] forces being deployed to German [[Alsace-Lorraine]] to defend it. The German Army would then move through the [[Netherlands|Dutch]] province of [[Limburg (Netherlands)|Limburg]] and northern Belgium, securing southern Belgium and Luxembourg with a flank-guard to protect both Germany and the main force from a French offensive during this critical manoeuvre [this being the point of the 1913 French Plan XVII].{{sfn|Zuber|2010|loc=Chapter 1905/06}}

Another factor considered for the plan was the size of armies of Germany herself and her enemies.  Schlieffen calculated that Germany would have peacetime strength of 612,000, which is stronger than 593,000 of France. While the size of Russia's population and army was terrifying in one glance, Schlieffen did not considered it as a great threat for his plans. Witnessing the [[Russo-Japanese War]] and humiliating defeat of the Russian Army, Schlieffen did not consider Russia as a great threat, considering their poor railway systems.{{Sfn|Howard|2007|p=19-20}}

But it is here, in the second and final phase of the operation, that Schlieffen shows his true genius: he notes the immense strength of the French "second defensive area" in which the French can use the fortress-sector of Verdun, "Fortress Paris", and the River Marne as the basis of a ''very'' strong defensive line. Appreciating its defensive power, Schlieffen knew that he would have to try to force the French back from the Marne or at least secure a [[bridgehead]] over the [[Marne (river)|Marne]] and/or [[Seine]] if he did not want the second German operation/campaign of the war to result in heavy losses. To do this, Schlieffen insisted that they cross the Seine ''to the west'' of Paris and, if they managed to cross in strength against sufficiently weak opposition, then they might even be able to force the French back from the westernmost sections of the Marne and surround Paris.{{sfn|Zuber|2010|loc=Chapter 1905/06}}

However, the bulk of Schlieffen's planning still followed his personal preferences for the counter-offensive. ''Aufmarsch II'' and ''Aufmarsch Ost'' (later ''Aufmarsch II West'' and ''Aufmarsch I Ost'', respectively) continued to stress that Germany's best hope for survival if faced by a war with the Franco-Russian entente was a defensive strategy. This "defensive strategy", was reconciled with a very offensive ''tactical'' posture as Schlieffen held that the ''destruction'' of an attacking force required that it be surrounded and attacked from all sides until it surrendered, and not merely repulsed as in a "passive" defense:

{{quote|Discussing the proper German response to a French offensive between Metz and Strasbourg, he insists that the invading army ''must not'' be driven back to its border position, but ''annihilated on German territory'', and "that is possible only by means of an attack on the enemy's flank and rear". Whenever we come across that formula we have to take note of the context, which frequently reveals that Schlieffen is talking about ''a counter-attack in the framework of a defensive strategy'' [italics ours].{{sfn|Holmes|2014|pp=206}}}}

In August 1905 Schlieffen was kicked by a companion's horse, making him "incapable of battle". During his time off, now at the age of 72, he started planning his retirement. His successor was yet undetermined. [[Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz|Goltz]] was the primary candidate, but the Emperor was not fond of him.{{sfn|Walter|1967|p= 138}} A favourite of the Emperor was [[Helmuth von Moltke the Younger]], who became Chief of Staff after Schlieffen retired.

Moltke went on to devise ''Aufmarsch II Ost'', a variant upon Schlieffen's ''Aufmarsch Ost'' designed for an isolated Russo-German war. Schlieffen seems to have tried to impress upon Moltke that an offensive strategy against France could work only for isolated Franco-German war, as German forces would otherwise be too weak to implement it.{{sfn|Walter|1967|p= 139}} Thus, Moltke still attempted to apply the offensive strategy of ''Aufmarsch I West'' to the two-front war Germany faced in 1914 and Schlieffen's defensive plan ''Aufmarsch II West''. With too few troops to cross west of Paris, let alone attempt a crossing of the Seine, Moltke's campaign failed to breach the French "second defensive sector" and his troops were pushed back in the Battle of the Marne.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Otto, Helmut|title=Alfred Graf von Schlieffen: Generalstabschef und Militärtheoretiker des Imperialistischen Deutschen Kaiserreiches Zwischen Weltmachstreben und Revolutionsfurcht|journal=Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire|volume= 43 |date=July 1979|pages= 74}}</ref>