Editing 1982 Lebanon War (section)

===Lebanese Civil War===
{{main|Lebanese Civil War}}

====Incidents 1975–1980====
The violence between Israel and the PLO peaked during [[Operation Litani]] in 1978, provoked by the [[Coastal Road Massacre]] which was carried out by Palestinian militants. The [[United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon]] (UNIFIL) was created after the incursion, following the adoption of [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 425]] in March 1978 to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and help the government of Lebanon restore its effective authority in the area.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://legal.un.org/repertory/art98/english/rep_supp5_vol5-art98_e.pdf#pagemode=none |title=Extracts relating to Article 98 of the Charter of the United Nations: Supplement No 5 (1970–1978) |access-date=6 August 2006|work=Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs |publisher=United Nations |pages=§275 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131019222951/http://legal.un.org/repertory/art98/english/rep_supp5_vol5-art98_e.pdf |archive-date=19 October 2013 }}</ref>

[[File:Lebanon civil war map 1976.gif|thumb|300px|A map showing the power balance in Lebanon, 1976: <br/>Dark Green – controlled by Syria:<br/>Purple – controlled by Maronite groups;<br/>Light Green – controlled by Palestinian militias]]

As early as 1976, Israel had been assisting Lebanese Christian militias in their sporadic battles against the PLO.<ref name="Morrisp???">[[#refMorris1999|Morris, p. ???]]</ref> During [[Operation Litani]] in 1978, Israel established a security zone in southern Lebanon with mostly Christian inhabitants, in which they began to supply training and arms to Christian militias which would later form the [[South Lebanese Army]].<ref name="Moris1999p503">[[#refMorris1999|Morris, p. 503]]</ref> But Israel's main partner was to be the [[Maronites|Maronite]] [[Kataeb Party|Phalange]] party, whose paramilitary was led by [[Bashir Gemayel]], a rising figure in Lebanese politics.<ref name="Moris1999p503" /> Gemayel's strategy during the early stages of the [[Lebanese Civil War]] was to provoke the Syrians into retaliatory attacks on Christians, such that Israel could not ignore.<ref name="Morris, p. 505">[[#refMorris1999|Morris, p. 505]]</ref>

In 1978, [[Menachem Begin]] declared that Israel would not allow a genocide of Lebanese Christians, while refusing direct intervention.<ref name="Morris, p. 505"/> Hundreds of Lebanese militiamen began to train in Israel, at the IDF Staff and Command College. The relationship between Israel and the Maronites began to grow into a political-strategic alliance, and members of the Israeli government like [[Ariel Sharon]] began to conceive of a plan to install a pro-Israel Christian government in Lebanon, as it was known that Bashir wanted to remove the PLO and all Palestinian refugees in the country.<ref>[[#refMorris1999|Morris, p. 509]]</ref>

From June to December 1980 the [[United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon]] (UNIFIL) recorded an increase in activities along the border zone. No attacks by Palestinian forces on Israel were recorded, while the IDF incursions across the armistice line into Lebanon increased markedly, with minefields being laid, gun posts established, and generally involving numerous violations of Lebanese air-space and territorial waters. This was formally protested by the Lebanese government to the UN Security Council and General Assembly in several communications as violations by Israel of United Nations Security Council Resolution 425. During the same period Israel protested numerous attacks by Palestinian forces, unrelated to the Lebanese border zone.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N80/333/72/PDF/N8033372.pdf?OpenElement|title=UN Security Council report S/14295|work=UN.org|access-date=1 May 2017|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141020052325/http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N80/333/72/PDF/N8033372.pdf?OpenElement|archive-date=20 October 2014}}</ref>

====1981 events and cease-fire====
In his report for the period of 12 December 1980 to 12 June 1981 on UNIFIL activities, the Security Council Secretary General noted that infiltrations into the border zone by Palestinian armed forces had decreased relative to the previous six months.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.un.org/en/documents/|title=United Nations Security Council document S/14537|work=UN.org|access-date=1 May 2017}}</ref> Indeed, the PLO had recognized their vulnerable position, and avoided overtly provoking Israel.<ref>{{Cite book |title=The Middle East after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon |date=1986 |publisher=Syracuse University Press |isbn=978-0-8156-2388-5 |editor-last=Freedman |editor-first=Robert Owen |edition=1st |series=Contemporary issues in the Middle East |location=Syracuse, N.Y |pages=235–236}}</ref> In contrast the IDF had launched various attacks on Lebanese territory often in support of the Lebanese Christian militia. In doing so Israel had violated UN Security Council resolution 425 on hundreds of occasions [paragraph 58]. Where the initiator(s) of attacks could be identified in the report, in 15 cases Palestinian militants were to blame while on 23 occasions the Militia and/or the IDF were the instigators, the latter also being responsible for the most violent confrontation of the period on 27 April [paragraph 52].

From 16 June to 10 December 1981,<ref name="UN1981">{{cite web|url=https://www.un.org/en/documents/|title=United Nations Security Council document S/14789|work=UN.org|access-date=1 May 2017}}</ref> a relative quiet was reported continuing from 29 May 1981 until 10 July. This was broken when "Israeli aircraft resumed strikes against targets in southern Lebanon north of the UNIFIL area. (The Israeli strikes) led to exchanges of heavy firing between armed elements (Palestinians), on the one hand, and IDF and the de facto forces (Christian Militia) on the other. On 13 and 14 July, widespread Israeli air-strikes continued. Armed elements (Palestinians) fired into the enclave and northern Israel." Israeli-initiated attacks had led to rocket and artillery fire on northern Israel. This pattern continued in the coming days.

Israel renewed its air strikes in an attempt to trigger a war that would allow it to drive out the PLO and restore peace to the region.<ref name=schiff>[[#refSchiff1984|Schiff & Ya'ari, pp.&nbsp;35–36]]</ref> On 17 July, the Israel Air Force launched a massive attack on PLO buildings in downtown Beirut. "Perhaps as many as three hundred died, and eight hundred were wounded, the great majority of them civilians."<ref name="Benny Morris p507">[[#refMorris1999|Morris, p. 507]]</ref> The Israeli army also heavily targeted PLO positions in south Lebanon without success in suppressing Palestinian rocket launchers and guns.<ref name="The Israeli Air Force">{{cite web|url=http://www.iaf.org.il/2557-30092-en/IAF.aspx|title=The Israeli Air Force|work=IAF.org.il|access-date=1 May 2017}}</ref>

As a result, thousands of Israeli citizens who lived near the Lebanese border headed south. There patterns of Israeli-initiated airstrikes and Palestinian retaliations with attacks on northern Israel are in contrast with the official Israeli version "A ceasefire declared in July 1981 was broken: the terrorists continued to carry out attacks against Israeli targets in Israel and abroad, and the threat to the northern settlements became unbearable."<ref name="The Israeli Air Force"/>

On 24 July 1981, United States Undersecretary of State Philip Habib brokered a ceasefire badly needed by both parties,<ref name=UN1981 /> the best achievable result from negotiations via intermediaries, aimed at complying with the decisions of UN Security Council resolution 490. The process was complicated, requiring
<blockquote>shuttle diplomacy between Damascus, Jerusalem, and Beirut, United States. Philip Habib concluded a ceasefire across the Lebanon border between Israel and the PLO. Habib could not talk to the PLO directly because of Kissinger's directive, so he used a Saudi member of the royal family as mediator. The agreement was oral – nothing could be written down since Israel and the PLO did not recognize each other and refused to negotiate with each other – but they came up with a truce. ... Thus the border between Lebanon and Israel suddenly stabilized after over a decade of routine bombing.<ref>Kameel B. Nazr (2007) ''Arab and Israeli Terrorism: The Causes and Effects of Political Violence''. McFarland & Company. {{ISBN|978-0-7864-3105-2}} [https://books.google.com/books?id=QRXURzwdXS4C]</ref></blockquote>

Between July 1981 and June 1982, as a result of the Habib ceasefire, the Lebanese-Israeli border "enjoyed a state of calm unprecedented since 1968."<ref name="Morris2"/> But the 'calm' was tense. US Secretary of State, [[Alexander Haig]] filed a report with US President [[Ronald Reagan]] on Saturday 30 January 1982 that revealed Secretary Haig's fear that Israel might, at the slightest provocation, start a war against Lebanon.<ref>[[#refReagan2007|Reagan, p.&nbsp;66]]</ref>

The 'calm' lasted nine months. Then, on 21 April 1982, after a landmine killed an Israeli officer while he was visiting a South Lebanese Army gun emplacement in [[Taybeh (Marjaayoun)|Taibe]], Lebanon, the Israeli Air Force attacked the Palestinian-controlled coastal town of [[Damour]], killing 23 people.<ref>[[#reffisk2001|Fisk, p.&nbsp;194]]</ref> Fisk reports further on this incident: "The Israelis did not say what the soldier was doing ... I discovered that he was visiting one of Haddad's artillery positions (Christian militia) and that the mine could have been lain &#91;sic&#93; as long ago as 1978, perhaps even by the Israelis themselves".

On 9 May 1982, Israeli aircraft again attacked targets in Lebanon. Later that same day, UNIFIL observed the firing of rockets from Palestinian positions in the [[Tyre, Lebanon|Tyre]] region into northern Israel, but none of the projectiles hit Israeli towns<ref>Friedman, Thomas L. "Israeli Jets Raid P.L.O. in Lebanon; Shelling follows". ''The New York Times'', 10 May 1982, p. 1.</ref> – the gunners had been ordered to miss.<ref name="Benny Morris p507"/> Major-General Erskine (Ghana), Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported to the [[United Nations Secretary-General|Secretary-General]] and the [[Security Council]] (S/14789, S/15194) that from August 1981 to May 1982, inclusive, there were 2096 violations of Lebanese airspace and 652 violations of Lebanese territorial waters.<ref>[[#refCobban1984|Cobban, p.&nbsp;112]]</ref><ref name="UN15194">[http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/687deff0fe05590a85257019006e4036!OpenDocument UN Doc S/15194] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081202004040/http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/687deff0fe05590a85257019006e4036%21OpenDocument |date=2 December 2008 }} of 10 June 1982 ''Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon''</ref> The freedom of movement of UNIFIL personnel and UNTSO observers within the enclave remained restricted due to the actions of [[Amal Movement|Amal]] and the [[South Lebanon Army]] under Major [[Saad Haddad]]'s leadership with the backing of Israeli military forces.<ref name="UN15194"/>

Prior to establishing ceasefire in July 1981, U.N. Secretary-General [[Kurt Waldheim]] noted: "After several weeks of relative quiet in the area, a new cycle of violence has begun and has, in the past week, steadily intensified." He further stated: "There have been heavy civilian casualties in Lebanon; there have been civilian casualties in Israel as well. I deeply deplore the extensive human suffering caused by these developments." The President of the [[United Nations Security Council|U.N. Security Council]], [[Ide Oumarou]] of [[Niger]], expressed "deep concern at the extent of the loss of life and the scale of the destruction caused by the deplorable events that have been taking place for several days in Lebanon".<ref>[http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/43220e2368a3ddf7052568000052412c?OpenDocument UN Doc S/PV.2292] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060312224248/http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/43220e2368a3ddf7052568000052412c?OpenDocument |date=12 March 2006 }}, 17 July 1981.</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/feb2002/sab-f22.shtml |title=Sharon's war crimes in Lebanon: the record |publisher=Wsws.org |date=22 February 2002 |access-date=29 February 2012}}</ref>

====Immediate causes====
From the ceasefire, established in July 1981, until the start of the war, the Israeli government reported 270 militant attacks by the PLO in Israel, the occupied territories, and the Jordanian and Lebanese border (in addition to 20 attacks on Israeli interests abroad).<ref name="Becker">{{cite book|last=Becker|first=Jillian|title=PLO: The Rise and Fall of the Palestine Liberation Organization|publisher=AuthorHouse|year=1984|isbn=978-1-4918-4435-9|page=257}}</ref>

In Ariel Sharon's biography by his son, Gilad Sharon, the author referring to the Habib ceasefire, comments: "However, the agreement was explicit only regarding preventing terror from Lebanon, which is why my father encouraged the cabinet not to accept the offer as presented by the Americans."<ref>Gilad Sharon (2011). ''Sharon: The Life of a Leader''. Translated by Mitch Ginsberg. Harper Collins. Chapter 14 [https://books.google.com/books?id=jLq-12NxKZkC]</ref>
<blockquote>The cease-fire, as both the PLO and the Americans saw it, did not include terror attacks stemming from Lebanon and carried out against Jews in Europe and other locales. In a meeting my father had with Alexander Haig and Philip Habib on 25 May 1982, Habib repeated what he had already said many times before: "Terrorist attacks against Israelis and Jews in Europe are not included in the cease-fire agreement.</blockquote>

Arafat pressured the radical factions to maintain the ceasefire because he did not wish to provoke the Israelis into an all-out attack. The PLO acceptance of the ceasefire had led to dissension even within Fatah itself. A faction sympathetic to Abu Nidal forced a military confrontation, with accompanying arrests and executions&nbsp;— an event unprecedented in PLO internal disputes'. Arafat even attempted to distance himself from Palestinian unrest on the West Bank to prevent an Israeli attack.<ref name=Shindler/>

In contrast, Begin, Sharon and Eitan were searching for any excuse to neutralize their military opponents through a breach of the ceasefire. They believed that Arafat was buying time to build up his conventional forces. The Israeli interpretation of the conditions for the ceasefire placed responsibility for any act of Palestinian violence on Arafat's shoulders. It presumed that Arafat had complete control, not only over all factions within the PLO such as the rejectionist Popular Front of George Habash, but also over those outside such as Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Council and Ahmed Jibril's Popular Front&nbsp;— General Command.<ref name=Shindler/>

In Begin's eyes, the ceasefire was not geographically limited to the Lebanese border. He argued that if Palestinian terrorism struck internationally, then this too would be regarded as a breach of the ceasefire. Begin thus took a stand-off in a local battle as applying to the entire war anywhere in the Middle East or any incident internationally.<ref name=Shindler/>

Eitan commented that there was no difference if a militant threw a grenade in Gaza or fired a shell at a Northern settlement&nbsp;— all such acts broke the ceasefire. Sharon similarly did not wish to draw distinctions between different Palestinian factions, since all blame had to be attached to the PLO. He dismissed attempts at more rational evaluation as masking the real issue. In a speech to a Young Herut conference in April 1982, he accused those who tried to take a more objective standpoint of erecting 'a protective wall around the PLO inside and outside Israel'.<ref name="Shindler">{{Cite book |last=Shindler |first=Colin |url=https://archive.org/details/landbeyondpromis0000shin/mode/2up |title=The Land Beyond Promise: Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream |publisher=[[I.B. Tauris]] |year=2002 |isbn=978-1-86064-774-1 |publication-place=London; New York |pages=117–120  |postscript=. "A second re-titled edition of Israel, Likud and the Zionist dream: power, politics and ideology from Begin to Netanyahu, published in 1995." Page ix}}</ref>

Further support comes from [[George Wildman Ball|George Ball]], that the PLO had observed the ceasefire.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Siklaw|first=Rami|title=The Dynamics of the Amal Movement in Lebanon 1975–90|journal=[[Arab Studies Quarterly]]|date=Winter 2012|volume=34|issue=1|pages=4–26}}</ref> Israel, he said, continued looking for the "internationally recognized provocation" that Secretary of State [[Alexander Haig]] said would be necessary to obtain American support for an Israeli invasion of Lebanon.<ref>Ball, George W. ''Error and Betrayal in Lebanon'', p. 35.</ref> Secretary Haig's critics have accused him of "greenlighting" the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon in June 1982.<ref>{{cite web|last=Lee |first=Timothy |url=http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2004/06/not_even_a_hedgehog.html |title=The stupidity of Ronald Reagan. – Slate Magazine |date=7 June 2004 |publisher=Slate.com |access-date=29 February 2012}}</ref> Haig denies this and says he urged restraint.<ref name="time">{{cite news|url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,952421,00.html |title=Alexander Haig |newspaper=Time |location=New York |date=9 April 1984 |access-date=6 April 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110428221723/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0%2C9171%2C952421%2C00.html |archive-date=28 April 2011 |url-status=dead }}</ref> In the biography of ceasefire broker Philip Habib, Alexander Haig is cited as leaving the worst impression of all in the lead up to Israel's Lebanon invasion:
<blockquote>Haig thus comes off very badly: not a team player, not able to keep the rest of the administration informed of what was going on beforehand, not willing to tell anyone in the White House why Sharon was so confident during the invasion, hoping that Reagan's special envoy would fail in his mission, and having little sense of what the national security of the United States required—which was not a confrontation between Israeli and Soviet tanks on the road from Beirut to Damascus.<ref>John Boykin (2002), Cursed Is the Peacemaker (Belmont, CA: Applegate Press: 0971943206). Quoted in PHILIP HABIB AND ARIEL SHARON: FROM THE ARCHIVES (2007)[http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2007/03/philip_habib_an.html]</ref></blockquote>

The American reaction was that they would not apply any undue pressure on Israel to quit Lebanon as the Israeli presence in Lebanon may prove to be a catalyst for the disparate groups of Lebanon to make common cause against both Syrian and Israeli forces. Haig's analysis, which [[Ronald Reagan]] agreed with, was that this uniting of Lebanese groups would allow President [[Elias Sarkis]] to reform the Lebanese central Government and give the Palestinian refugees Lebanese citizenship.<ref>[[#refReagan2007|Reagan, pp.&nbsp;87–90]]</ref> Additional evidence that the United States approved the Israeli invasion comes from longtime CIA analyst Charles Cogan, who says that he was in the room during a May 1982 meeting in [[The Pentagon]] during which Sharon explained to Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]] "in great detail how the Israelis were going to invade Lebanon&nbsp;... Weinberger just sat there and said ''nothing''."<ref>{{cite book|last1=Blight|first1=James G.|title=Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979–1988|year=2012|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publishers|isbn=978-1-4422-0830-8|pages=19, 110–111|display-authors=etal}}</ref>

According to [[Avi Shlaim]], the real driving force behind the Israeli invasion to Lebanon was the defense minister Ariel Sharon. One of his aims was the destruction of PLO military infrastructure in Lebanon and undermining it as a political organization, in order to facilitate the absorption of the West Bank by Israel. The second aim was the establishment of the [[Maronite]] government in Lebanon, headed by [[Bashir Gemayel]] and signing the peace treaty between two countries, the third aim was the expelling of the Syrian Army from Lebanon. Also, according to Shlaim, with the completion of Israeli withdrawals from Sinai in March 1982, under the terms of the [[Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty]], the [[Likud]]-led government of Israel hardened its attitude to the Arab world and became more aggressive.<ref>[[#refshlaim2007|Shlaim 2007, p. 412]]</ref>

According to [[Zeev Maoz]] in ''Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's National Security and Foreign Policy'', the goals of the war were primarily developed by then Minister of Defense [[Ariel Sharon]] and were fourfold:

# "Destroy the PLO infrastructure in Lebanon, including the PLO headquarters in Beirut."
# "Drive Syrian forces out of Lebanon."
# "Install a Christian-dominated government in Lebanon, with [[Bashir Gemayel]] as President."
# "Sign a peace treaty with the Lebanese government that would solidify the informal Israeli-Christian alliance and convert it into a binding agreement."<ref>[[#refmaoz2006|Maoz, p.&nbsp;181]]</ref>

George Ball testified before the [[US Senate]]'s [[United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs|Foreign Affairs Committee]] that Sharon's long-term strategy, as revealed in conversations, was one of "squeezing the Palestinians out of the West Bank . .allowing only enough of them to remain for work."<ref>[[Yevgeny Primakov]], [https://books.google.com/books?id=qXHKs5WaNgMC&pg=PA201 ''Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from the Cold War to the Present,''] [[Basic Books]] 2009 p.201.</ref>

The military plan with the code name "Big Pines", prepared by IDF, envisaged invasion to Lebanon up to the highway Damascus-Beirut and linking with Maronite forces. It was first presented to Israeli cabinet on 20 December 1981 by Begin, but rejected by the majority of ministers. According to Avi Shlaim, Sharon and chief of staff [[Rafael Eitan]], realizing that there was no chance in persuading the cabinet to approve a large-scale operation in Lebanon, adopted a different tactic and intended to implement "Operation Big Pines" in stages by manipulating enemy provocations and Israeli responses.<ref>[[#refshlaim1999|Shlaim 1999, pp. 396–397]]</ref>

On 3 June 1982 Israel's ambassador to the United Kingdom, [[Shlomo Argov]] was shot and seriously wounded in London by militants belonging to the Iraqi-backed [[Abu Nidal group|Abu Nidal militant organization]]. The attack was ordered by the [[Iraqi Intelligence Service]].<ref name="Michael Knights">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FDJmjUUR9CUC&pg=PA5|title=Cradle of Conflict: Iraq And the Birth of Modern U.S. Military Power|access-date=31 May 2012|page=5|isbn=978-1-59114-444-1|last1=Knights|first1=Michael|year=2005|publisher=Naval Institute Press }}</ref><ref name="Mark Ensalaco">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_ptMTQN8tM8C&pg=PA133|title=Middle Eastern Terrorism: From Black September to September 11|access-date=31 May 2012|author=Ensalaco, Mark|page=133|isbn=978-0-8122-2135-0|date=August 2010|publisher=University of Pennsylvania Press }}</ref><ref name="Goodarzi">{{cite book| url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Co6YXWrepvYC&pg=PA61|title=Syria And Iran: Diplomatic Alliance And Power Politics in the Middle East|access-date=31 May 2012|author=Goodarzi, Jubin|page=61|isbn=978-1-84511-127-4|year=2006|publisher=Bloomsbury Academic }}</ref> Following the attack, the assassins drove to the Iraqi embassy in London, where they deposited the weapon.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Blight|first1=James G.|title=Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979–1988|year=2012|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publishers|isbn=978-1-4422-0830-8|page=104|display-authors=etal}}</ref> In his memoirs, Sharon stated that the attack was "merely the spark that lit the fuse".<ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/25/israelandthepalestinians.lebanon | title=Obituary of Shlomo Argov | newspaper=The Guardian | access-date=31 May 2012 | quote=At last, the then Israeli defence minister Ariel Sharon had a pretext for his long-planned campaign to eliminate the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and its headquarters in the Lebanese capital, Beirut. In his memoirs, Sharon admits that the Dorchester ambush was "merely the spark that lit the fuse". | first=Lawrence | last=Joffe | date=25 February 2003}}</ref>

Israeli prime Minister Begin used this as the "internationally recognized provocation" necessary to invade Lebanon. The fact that the Abu Nidal organization was the longtime rival of PLO, that its head was condemned to death by the PLO court, and that the British police reported that PLO leaders were on the "hit list" of the attackers did not deter Begin. Iraq's motives for the assassination attempt may have been to punish Israel for its [[Operation Opera|destruction of Iraq's nuclear reactor in June 1981]], and to provoke a war in Lebanon that Iraqi leaders calculated would be detrimental to the rival Ba'ath regime in Syria—whether Syria intervened to help the PLO or not!<ref>[[#refSchiff1984|Schiff & Ya'ari pp. 97, 99–100]]</ref>

At the Israeli Cabinet meeting the following day, both Begin and Eitan belittled intelligence reports that the likely culprit was the Abu Nidal group. Begin cut short his own advisor on terrorism, arguing that all Palestinian militants were members of the PLO, while Eitan ridiculed the intelligence staff for splitting hairs and demanded to strike at the PLO. Yet Abu Nidal had broken with Arafat and PLO in 1974 over a fundamental principle: namely, that the Palestinian national movement would adopt a phased piecemeal approach to secure a Palestinian state and embark on a political path. The lack of understanding of the difference between Palestinian groups and the total ignorance of Palestinian politics on the part an overwhelming majority of Israelis and Jews played into the hands of those who did not wish to distinguish between the PLO and the Abu Nidal group. Thus, instead of an initiative to locate the Abu Nidal group in Damascus or Baghdad, the plan to invade Lebanon was activated.<ref name=Shindler />

The PLO denied complicity in the attack, but Israel retaliated with punishing air and artillery strikes against Palestinian targets in Lebanon, including the PLO camps. [[Shatila refugee camp|Sabra and the Shatila refugee camp]] were bombed for four hours and the local "Gaza" hospital was hit there. About 200 people were killed during these attacks.<ref>[[#refchomsky1983|Chomsky, p. 197]]</ref> The PLO hit back firing rockets at northern Israel causing considerable damage and some loss of life.{{Citation needed|date=August 2011}} According to another source, twenty villages were targeted in Galilee and 3 Israelis were wounded.<ref name="Shlaim">[[#refshlaim1999|Shlaim 1999, p. 404]]</ref>

According to Shlaim, Yasser Arafat, at that time being in Saudi Arabia, told the Americans through the Saudis that he was willing to suspend cross-border shelling. But that message was disregarded by the Israeli government. President Reagan also sent a message to Begin urging him not to widen the attack.<ref name="Shlaim"/>

On 4 June the Israeli cabinet authorized a large scale invasion.<ref>[[#refHerzog2005|Herzog & Gazit, pp.&nbsp;340–43]]</ref><ref>Hogg, Ian V., Israeli War Machine, Hamlyn Publishing Group Ltd, (1983) p. 171-175 {{ISBN|978-0-600-38514-1}}</ref>

A [[Mossad]] document declassified in 2022 revealed that planning for the invasion began in mid-1981 and that the Lebanese Christian leader Pierre Gemayel was informed of it in January 1982.<ref name=Aderet2022>{{cite news | title = What Historical Mossad Files Reveal About 'Israel's Most Planned War' | author = Ofer Aderet | date = September 8, 2022 | newspaper = Haaretz | url = https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2022-09-08/ty-article-magazine/.premium/israels-most-planned-war-historical-mossad-file-details-lebanon-policy/00000183-1dce-d11f-a1e3-5fde579b0000}}</ref> According to the document, Israel's Lebanon policy was mostly dictated by the military rather than the government.<ref name=Aderet2022/>