Editing Scientific method (section)

====Situated cognition and relativism====
{{See also|Postpositivism|Relativism}}

On the idea of Fleck's ''thought collectives'' sociologists built the concept of [[situated cognition]]: that the perspective of the researcher fundamentally affects their work; and, too, more radical views.

[[Norwood Russell Hanson]], alongside [[Thomas Kuhn]] and [[Paul Feyerabend]], extensively explored the theory-laden nature of observation in science. Hanson introduced the concept in 1958, emphasizing that observation is influenced by the [[Situated cognition|observer's conceptual framework]]. He used the concept of [[gestalt psychology|gestalt]] to show how preconceptions can affect both observation and description, and illustrated this with examples like the initial rejection of [[Golgi apparatus|Golgi bodies]] as an artefact of staining technique, and the differing interpretations of the same sunrise by Tycho Brahe and Johannes Kepler. [[Intersubjectivity]] led to different conclusions.<ref name="Hanson1958">{{Citation
|last=Hanson
|first=Norwood
|title=Patterns of Discovery
|year=1958
|publisher=Cambridge University Press
|isbn=978-0-521-05197-2
}}</ref>{{efn|name= Kepler1604 }}

Kuhn and Feyerabend acknowledged Hanson's pioneering work,<ref>{{cite book |last=Kuhn |first=Thomas S. |title=The Structure of Scientific Revolutions |publisher=University of Chicago Press |location=Chicago, IL |year=2009 |isbn=978-1-4432-5544-8 |page=113 |title-link=The Structure of Scientific Revolutions}}<!--ISBN matches 2009 publication, not the 1962.-->
</ref><ref>Feyerabend, Paul K (1960) "Patterns of Discovery" The Philosophical Review (1960) vol. 69 (2) pp. 247–252</ref> although Feyerabend's views on methodological pluralism were more radical. Criticisms like those from Kuhn and Feyerabend prompted discussions leading to the development of the [[strong programme]], a sociological approach that seeks to explain scientific knowledge without recourse to the truth or validity of scientific theories. It examines how scientific beliefs are shaped by social factors such as power, ideology, and interests.

The [[postmodernism|postmodernist]] critiques of science have themselves been the subject of intense controversy. This ongoing debate, known as the [[science wars]], is the result of conflicting values and assumptions between [[postmodernist]] and [[scientific realism|realist]] perspectives. Postmodernists argue that scientific knowledge is merely a discourse, devoid of any claim to fundamental truth. In contrast, realists within the scientific community maintain that science uncovers real and fundamental truths about reality. Many books have been written by scientists which take on this problem and challenge the assertions of the postmodernists while defending science as a legitimate way of deriving truth.<ref>For example:
* ''Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science'', The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997
* ''Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science'', Picador. 1999
* ''The Sokal Hoax: The Sham That Shook the Academy'', University of Nebraska Press, 2000 {{ISBN|0-8032-7995-7}}
* ''A House Built on Sand: Exposing Postmodernist Myths About Science'', Oxford University Press, 2000
* ''Intellectual Impostures'', Economist Books, 2003</ref>