Editing Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (section)

=== Involvement in politics ===
Several Sangh Parivar politicians such as [[Balraj Madhok]] in the 1960s and 1970s to the [[BJP]] leaders like [[L. K. Advani]] have complained about the RSS's interference in party politics. Though some former Hindu nationalists believed that Sangh should take part in politics, they failed to draw the RSS, which was intended to be a purely cultural movement, into the political arena until the 1950s. Savarkar tried to convince Hedgewar and later Golwalkar, to tie up with the [[Hindu Mahasabha]], but failed to do so.{{sfn|Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalism Reader|2007|p=175–179}}

Under pressure from other ''swayamsevaks'', Golwalkar gradually changed his mind after independence under unusual circumstances during the ban on RSS in 1948 after the assassination of Gandhi. After the first wave of arrests of RSS activists at that time, some of its members who had gone underground recommended that their movement be involved in politics, seeing that no political force was present to advocate the cause of RSS in parliament or anywhere else. One such member who significantly suggested this cause was [[K. R. Malkani]], who wrote in 1949:{{sfn|Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalism Reader|2007|p=175–179}}

{{quote box|Sangh must take part in politics not only to protect itself against the greedy design of politicians, but to stop the un-Bharatiya and anti-Bharatiya policies of the Government and to advance and expedite the cause of Bharatiya through state machinery side by side with official effort in the same direction. ... Sangh must continue as it is, an ''ashram'' for the national cultural education of the entire citizenry, but it must develop a political wing for the more effective and early achievement of its ideals.
}}

Golwalkar approved of Malkani's and others' views regarding the formation of a new party in 1950. Jaffrelot says that the death of Sardar Patel influenced this change since Golwalkar opined that Patel could have transformed the Congress party by emphasising its affinities with Hindu nationalism, while after Patel, Nehru became strong enough to impose his 'anti-communal' line within his party. Accordingly, Golwalkar met [[Syama Prasad Mukherjee]] and agreed for endorsing senior ''swayamsevaks'', who included [[Deendayal Upadhyaya]], Balraj Madhok and [[Atal Bihari Vajpayee]], to the [[Bharatiya Jana Sangh]], a newly formed political party by Mukherjee. These men, who took their orders from RSS, captured power in the party after Mukherjee's death.{{sfn|Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalism Reader|2007|p=175–179}}

[[Balasaheb Deoras]], who succeeded Golwalkar as the chief of RSS, got very much involved in politics. In 1965, when he was the general secretary of the RSS, he addressed the annual meeting of Jana Sangh, which is seen as an "unprecedented move" by an RSS dignitary that reflected his strong interest in politics and his will to make the movement play a larger part in the public sphere. Jaffrelot says that he exemplified the specific kind of swayamsevaks known as 'activists', giving expression to his leanings towards political activism by having the RSS support the [[Bihar Movement|JP Movement]].{{sfn|Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalism Reader|2007|p=175–179}} The importance that RSS began to give to the electoral politics is demonstrated when its ''shakhas'' were made constituency-based in the early 1970s, from which the RSS ''shakhas'' began to involve directly in elections, not only of legislatures, but also of trade unions, student and cultural organisations.{{sfn|Tapan Basu, Khaki Shorts|1993|pp=51–54}}

As soon as the RSS men took over the Jana Sangh party, the Hindu traditionalists who previously joined the party because of S. P. Mukherjee were sidelined.{{Citation needed|date=March 2020|reason=Your explanation here}} The organisation of the party was restructured and all its organisational secretaries, who were the pillars of the party, came from the RSS, both at the district and state level. The party also took the vision of RSS in its mission, where its ultimate objective, in the long run, was the reform of society, but not the conquest of power, since the 'state' was not viewed as a prominent institution. Hence the Jana Sangh initially remained reluctant to join any alliance that was not fully in harmony with its ideology. In 1962, Deendayal Upadhyaya, who was the party's chief, explained this approach by saying that "coalitions were bound to degenerate into a struggle for power by opportunist elements coming together in the interest of expediency". He wanted to build the party as an alternative party to the Congress and saw the elections as an "opportunity to educate the people on political issues and to challenge the right of the Congress to be in power". Jaffrelot says that this indifferent approach of party politics was in accordance with its lack of interest in the 'state' and the wish to make it weaker, or more decentralised.{{sfn|Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalism Reader|2007|p=175–179}} After India's defeat in the [[Sino-Indian War|1962 Sino–Indian war]], the RSS and other right-wing forces in India were strengthened since the leftist and centrist opinions, sometimes even Nehru himself, could then be blamed for being 'soft' towards China. The RSS and Jana Sangh also took complete advantage of the [[Indo-Pakistani War of 1965|1965 war with Pakistan]] to "deepen suspicion about Muslims", and also en-cashed the growing unpopularity of Congress, particularly in the [[Hindi Belt|Hindi-belt]], where a left-wing alternative was weak or non-existent.{{sfn|Tapan Basu, Khaki Shorts|1993|pp=51–54}} The major themes on the party's agenda during this period were banning [[Cattle slaughter in India|cow slaughter]], abolishing the [[Article 370 of the Constitution of India|special status given to Jammu and Kashmir]], and legislating a [[uniform civil code]]. Explaining the Jana Sangh's failure to become a major political force despite claiming to represent the national interests of the Hindus, scholar Bruce Desmond Graham states that the party's close initial ties with the Hindi-belt and its preoccupation with the issues of North India such as promotion of Hindi, energetic resistance to Pakistan etc., had become a serious disadvantage to the party in the long run. He also adds that its interpretation of Hinduism was "restrictive and exclusive", arguing that "its doctrines were inspired by an activist version of Hindu nationalism and, indirectly, by the values of [[Brahmanism]] rather than the devotional and quietist values of popular Hinduism."{{sfn|Graham; Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics|2007|p=253}} Desmond says that, if the Jana Sangh had carefully moderated its Hindu nationalism, it could have been able to well-exploit any strong increase in support for the traditional and nationalist Hindu opinion, and hence to compete on equal terms with the Congress in the northern states. He also remarks that if it had adopted a less harsh attitude towards Pakistan and Muslims, "it would have been much more acceptable to Hindu traditionalists in the central and southern states, where partition had left fewer emotional scars."{{sfn|Graham; Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics|2007|p=42}}

The Jana Sangh started making alliances by entering the anti-Congress coalitions since the 1960s. It became part of the 1971 Grand Alliance and finally merged itself with the [[Janata Party]] in 1977.{{sfn|Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalism Reader|2007|p=175–179}} The success of Janata Party in [[1977 Indian general election|1977 elections]] made the RSS members central ministers for the first time (Vajpayee, Advani and [[Brij Lal Verma]]),{{sfn|Tapan Basu, Khaki Shorts|1993|pp=51–54}} and provided the RSS with an opportunity to avail the state and its instruments to further its ends, through the resources of various state governments as well as the central government.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8v7Vr2iQUHkC&pg=PA240|title=India Since Independence: Making Sense of Indian Politics|last1=Krishna|first1=Ananth V.|publisher=Pearson Education India|year=2011|isbn=9788131734650|pages=240|language=en}}</ref> However, this merge, which was seen as a dilution of its original doctrine, was viewed by the ex-Jana Sanghis as submersion of their initial identity. Meanwhile, the other components of the Janata Party denounced the allegiance the ex-Jana Sanghis continued to pay to the RSS. This led to a 'dual membership' controversy, regarding the links the former Jana Sangh members were retaining with the RSS, and it led to the split of Janata Party in 1979.{{sfn|Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalism Reader|2007|p=175–179}}

The former Jana Sangh elements formed a new party, [[Bharatiya Janata Party]] (BJP), in 1980. However, BJP originated more as a successor to the Janata Party and did not return to the beginning stages of the Hindu nationalist identity and Jana Sangh doctrines. The RSS resented this dilution of ideology – the new slogans promoted by the then BJP president Vajpayee like 'Gandhian socialism' and 'positive secularism'. By the early 1980s, RSS is said to have established its political strategy of "never keeping all its eggs in one basket". It even decided to support Congress in some states, for instance, to create the [[Hindu Munnani]] in Tamil Nadu in the backdrop of the [[1981 Meenakshipuram conversion|1981 Meenakshipuram mass conversion to Islam]], and to support one of its offshoots, [[Vishva Hindu Parishad]] (VHP), to launch an enthno-religious movement on the [[Ayodhya dispute]]. BJP did not have much electoral success in its initial years and was able to win only two seats in the [[1984 Indian general election|1984 elections]]. After L. K. Advani replaced Vajpayee as party president in 1986, the BJP also began to rally around the Ayodhya campaign. In 1990, the party organised the ''[[Ram Rath Yatra]]'' to advance this campaign in large-scale.{{sfn|Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalism Reader|2007|p=175–179}}{{sfn|Tapan Basu, Khaki Shorts|1993|pp=51–54}} Advani also attacked the then ruling Congress party with the slogans such as '[[pseudo-secularism]]', accusing Congress of misusing secularism for the political appeasement of minorities, and established an explicit and unambiguous path of Hindu revival.<ref name=":0" />

The 'instrumentalisation' of the Ayodhya issue and the related communal riots which polarised the electorate along religious lines helped the BJP make good progress in the subsequent elections of [[1989 Indian general election|1989]], [[1991 Indian general election|1991]] and [[1996 Indian general election|1996]]. However, in the mid-1990s, BJP adopted a more moderate approach to politics in order to make allies. As Jaffrelot remarks, it was because the party realised during then that it would not be in a position to form the government on its own in the near future. In 1998, it built a major coalition, [[National Democratic Alliance (India)|National Democratic Alliance]] (NDA), in the Lok Sabha and succeeded in the [[1998 Indian general election|general election in 1998]], and was able to succeed again in the [[1999 Indian general election|mid-term elections of 1999]], with Vajpayee as their Prime Ministerial candidate. Though the RSS and other Sangh Parivar components appreciated some of the steps taken by the Vajpayee government, like the [[Pokhran-II|testing of a nuclear bomb]], they felt disappointed with the government's overall performance. The fact that no solid step was taken towards building the [[Rama|Ram]] temple in Ayodhya was resented by the VHP. The [[Premiership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee#Economic policy|liberalisation policy of the government]] faced objection from the [[Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh]], a trade union controlled by the RSS. Jaffrelot says, RSS and the other Sangh Parivar elements had come to the view that the "BJP leaders had been victims of their thirst for power: they had preferred to compromise to remain in office instead of sticking to their principles."{{sfn|Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalism Reader|2007|p=175-179}}

After the end of Vajpayee's tenure in 2004, BJP remained as a major opposition party in the subsequent years; and again in the year 2014, the NDA came to power after BJP gained an overwhelming majority in the [[2014 Indian general election|2014 general elections]], with [[Narendra Modi]], a former RSS member who previously served as Gujarat's chief minister for three tenures, as their prime ministerial candidate. Modi was able to project himself as a person who could bring about "development", without focus on any specific policies,<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last1=Jaffrelot|first1=Christophe|s2cid=142912068|date=3 April 2015|title=The Modi-centric BJP 2014 election campaign: new techniques and old tactics|journal=Contemporary South Asia|volume=23|issue=2|pages=151–166|doi=10.1080/09584935.2015.1027662|issn=0958-4935}}</ref> through the "Gujarat development model" which was frequently used to counter the allegations of communalism.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Bobbio|first1=Tommaso|s2cid=154422056|date=1 May 2012|title=Making Gujarat Vibrant: Hindutva, development and the rise of subnationalism in India|journal=Third World Quarterly|volume=33|issue=4|pages=657–672|doi=10.1080/01436597.2012.657423|issn=0143-6597|url=https://zenodo.org/record/1047619}}</ref> Voter dissatisfaction with the Congress, as well as the support from RSS are also stated as reasons for the BJP's success in the 2014 elections.<ref name=":1" />