Editing Blitzkrieg (section)

==Notes==
{{notelist
|notes =

{{efn
|name=misconception of blitzkrieg
|Some of the historians that have addressed the misconception of the originality and formalisation of blitzkrieg in their works are: Shimon Naveh {{harv|Naveh|1997|pp=107–108}}, John Paret {{harv|Paret|Craig|Gilbert|1986|p=587}}, [[Karl-Heinz Frieser]] {{harv|Frieser|2005|pp=28–32}}, Richard Overy {{harv|Overy|1995|pp=233–235}}, [[Mungo Melvin]] {{harv|Melvin|2011|pp=137}}, and Steven Mercatante {{harv|Mercatante|2012|pp=4–5}}.
}}

{{efn
|name=casual usage of blitzkrieg
|These are some of the many notable historians that have casually used the term ''blitzkrieg''—including some who have written on its misconception—to describe several Wehrmacht military operations that were spearheaded by a [[force concentration|dense concentration]] of armoured and motorised formations with the aim of delivering a breakthrough, and exploiting it with speed to paralyse and encircle the enemy: David Glantz ({{harvnb|Glantz|2010|p=14}}; {{harvnb|Glantz|2009|p=164}}; {{harvnb|Glantz|2001b}}), [[Jonathan House]] ({{harvnb|Glantz|House|1999|pp=254, 269}}; {{harvnb|Glantz|House|1995|pp=61, 125, 167, 226, 274, 286, 288}}), Lloyd Clark {{harv|Clark|2012|pp=22–27, 187}}, Antony Beevor ({{harvnb|Beevor|1999|pp=13, 148}}; {{harvnb|Beevor|2006|p=157}}), Mungo Melvin {{harv|Melvin|2011|pp=46, 79–80, 199}}, [[John Erickson (historian)|John Erickson]] {{harv|Erickson|2001|pp=558, 567}} and Steven Mercatante {{harv|Mercatante|2012|pp=65, 77, 91, 301}}.
}}

{{efn
|name=Nazi crimes against Soviet POWs
|58 percent of prisoners died through neglect, starvation, or other causes associated with [[Nazi crimes against Soviet POWs]] {{Harv|Glantz|House|1995|p=57}}.
}}

{{efn
|name=terror bombing
|Nothing appeared in Luftwaffe 'doctrine' stipulating "terror" as a major operational factor. The method of "terror", was denied to German aerial operations (and strategic bombing methods) by the Luftwaffe field manual ''The Conduct of Air Operations'', Regulation 16, issued in 1935 {{harv|Corum|1992|pp=167–169}}. Regulation 16 denied "terror" operations against civilians, and it was not until 1942 when indiscriminate "terror" operations, in which terror and civilian casualties become the primary target, took place {{harv|Corum|1997|pp=7, 143}}.
}}

{{efn
|name=Junker sirens
|As far as the Ju 87 is concerned, it is thought the sirens were suggested to the Junkers company by [[Ernst Udet]] to undermine the morale of enemy forces {{harv|Griehl|2001| p= 31}}.
}}

{{efn
|name=Alphonse Joseph Georges statement
|General [[Alphonse Joseph Georges]] wrote, "Crediting our enemies with our own procedure we had imagined that they would not attempt the passage of the Meuse until after they had brought up ample artillery. The five or six days necessary for that would have easily given us time to reinforce our own dispositions" {{harv|Liddell Hart|1970|p=73}}.
}}

{{efn
|name=Heer
|''Heer'' is the generic German word for army; the armies of the German states which existed before Nazi rule (1933–1945) are commonly referred to as: the [[German Army (German Empire)|Imperial German Army]] (1871–1918) and ''[[Reichswehr]]'' (1919–1935). The ''Heer'' under the Nazis was a component of the [[German Army (Wehrmacht)|''Wehrmacht'']] – the German Armed Forces (1935–1946).
}}

{{efn
|name=Citadel as blitzkrieg
|Some of the military historians who consider Operation Citadel, or at least the southern pincer, as envisioning a blitzkrieg attack or state it was intended as such are: Lloyd Clark {{harv|Clark|2012|p=187}}, Roger Moorhouse {{harv|Moorhouse|2011|p=342}}, Mary Kathryn Barbier {{harv|Barbier|2002|p=10}}, David Glantz (<!--{{harvnb|Glantz|1986|p=24}} no reference-->; {{harvnb|Glantz|House|2004|pp=63, 78, 149, 269, 272, 280}}), Jonathan House {{harv|Glantz|House|2004|pp=63, 78, 149, 269, 272, 280}}, Hedley Paul Willmott {{harv|Willmott|1990|p=300}}, Oscar Pinkus {{harv|Pinkus|2005|p=35}} and others.
}}

{{efn
|name=German participants on Citadel
|Many of the German participants of Operation Citadel made no mention of blitzkrieg in their characterisation of the operation. Several German officers and commanders involved in the operation wrote their account of the battle after the war, and some of these postwar accounts were collected by the US Army. Some of these officers are: Theodor Busse {{harv|Newton|2002|pp=3–27}}, Erhard Raus {{harv|Newton|2002|pp=29–64}}, Friedrich Fangohr {{harv|Newton|2002|pp=65–96}}, Peter von der Groeben {{harv|Newton|2002|pp=97–144}}, Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin {{harv|Mellenthin|1956|pp=212–234}}, Erich von Manstein {{harv|Manstein|1983|pp=443–449}}, and others.
}}

}}