Editing Utilitarianism (section)

== Additional considerations ==

===Average versus total happiness===
{{Main|Average and total utilitarianism}}
In ''[[The Methods of Ethics]]'', [[Henry Sidgwick]] asked, "Is it total or average happiness that we seek to make a maximum?"<ref>{{cite book |last=Sidgwick |first=Henry |title=Methods of Ethics |publisher=Hackett Publishing Co |edition=7th |date=1981 |page=xxxvi |isbn=978-0-915145-28-7}}</ref><ref name="Sidgwick 1981 415">{{cite book |last=Sidgwick |first=Henry |title=Methods of Ethics |publisher=Hackett Publishing Co |edition=7th |date=1981 |page=415 |isbn=978-0-915145-28-7}}</ref> Paley notes that, although he speaks of the happiness of communities, "the happiness of a people is made up of the happiness of single persons; and the quantity of happiness can only be augmented by increasing the number of the percipients, or the pleasure of their perceptions" and that if extreme cases, such as people held as slaves, are excluded the amount of happiness will usually be in proportion to the number of people. Consequently, "the decay of population is the greatest evil that a state can suffer; and the improvement of it the object which ought, in all countries, to be aimed at in preference to every other political purpose whatsoever."<ref>{{cite web |url=https://archive.org/details/principlesmoral08palegoog/page/n4 |title=The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy |last=Paley |first=William |year=1785 |access-date =1 July 2012}}</ref> A similar view was expressed by Smart, who argued that, all other things being equal, a universe with two million happy people is better than a universe with only one million happy people.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Smart |first1=J. J. C. |last2=Williams |first2=Bernard |title=Utilitarianism: For and Against |url=https://archive.org/details/utilitarianismfo00smar |url-access=registration |publisher=Cambridge University Press |date=January 1973 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/utilitarianismfo00smar/page/27 27–28] |isbn=978-0-521-09822-9}}</ref>

Since Sidgwick raised the question it has been studied in detail and philosophers have argued that using either total or average happiness can lead to objectionable results.

According to [[Derek Parfit]], using total happiness falls victim to the [[Mere addition paradox|repugnant conclusion]], whereby large numbers of people with very low but non-negative utility values can be seen as a better goal than a population of a less extreme size living in comfort. In other words, according to the theory, it is a moral good to breed more people on the world for as long as total happiness rises.<ref>{{cite book |last=Parfit |first=Derek |title=Reasons and Persons |publisher=Oxford Paperbacks |date=January 1986 |page=[https://archive.org/details/reasonspersons00parf/page/388 388] |isbn=978-0-19-824908-5 |url=https://archive.org/details/reasonspersons00parf/page/388 }}</ref>

On the other hand, measuring the utility of a population based on the average utility of that population avoids Parfit's repugnant conclusion but causes other problems. For example, bringing a moderately happy person into a very happy world would be seen as an immoral act; aside from this, the theory implies that it would be a moral good to eliminate all people whose happiness is below average, as this would raise the average happiness.<ref>{{cite book |last=Shaw |first=William |title=Contemporary Ethics: Taking Account of Utilitarianism |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |date=November 1998 |pages=31–35 |isbn=978-0-631-20294-3}}</ref>

[[William Shaw (philosopher)|William Shaw]] suggests that the problem can be avoided if a distinction is made between potential people, who need not concern us, and actual future people, who should concern us. He says, "utilitarianism values the happiness of people, not the production of units of happiness. Accordingly, one has no positive obligation to have children. However, if you have decided to have a child, then you have an obligation to give birth to the happiest child you can."<ref>{{cite book |last=Shaw |first=William |title=Contemporary Ethics: Taking Account of Utilitarianism |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |date=November 1998 |page=34 |isbn=978-0-631-20294-3}}</ref>

===Motives, intentions, and actions===
Utilitarianism is typically taken to assess the rightness or wrongness of an action by considering just the consequences of that action. Bentham very carefully distinguishes motive from [[intention]] and says that motives are not in themselves good or bad but can be referred to as such on account of their tendency to produce pleasure or pain. He adds that, "from every kind of motive, may proceed actions that are good, others that are bad, and others that are indifferent."<ref>{{cite book |last=Bentham |first=Jeremy |title=An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation |series=Dover Philosophical Classics |publisher=Dover Publications |date=January 2009 |page=102 |isbn=978-0-486-45452-8}}</ref> Mill makes a similar point<ref>{{cite book |last=Mill |first=John Stuart |editor-first=John |editor-last=Robson |title=Collected Works, volume 31 |publisher=University of Toronto Press |year=1981 |page=51 |chapter=Autobiography |isbn=978-0-7100-0718-6}}</ref> and explicitly says that "motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the agent. He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his trouble."<ref name="Mill 1998 65">{{cite book |last=Mill |first=John Stuart |editor-first=Roger |editor-last=Crisp |title=Utilitarianism |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=1998 |page=65 |isbn=978-0-19-875163-2}}</ref>

However, with intention the situation is more complex. In a footnote printed in the second edition of ''Utilitarianism'', Mill says: "the morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention—that is, upon what the agent wills to do."<ref name="Mill 1998 65"/> Elsewhere, he says, "Intention, and motive, are two very different things. But it is the intention, that is, the foresight of consequences, which constitutes the moral rightness or wrongness of the act."<ref>{{cite book |last=Mill |first=John Stuart |editor-first=John |editor-last=Robson |title=Collected Works, volume 31 |publisher=University of Toronto Press |year=1981 |pages=252–53 |chapter=Comments upon James Mill's Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind |isbn= 978-0-7100-0718-6}} and as quoted by {{cite journal |last1=Ridge |first1=Michael |year=2002 |title=Mill's Intentions and Motives |journal=Utilitas |volume=14 |pages=54–70 |doi= 10.1017/S0953820800003393|hdl=20.500.11820/deb5b261-303a-4395-9ea4-4a9367e7592b |s2cid=58918919 |url=https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/files/11822135/Mill_s_Intentions_and_Motives.pdf }}</ref>

The correct interpretation of Mill's footnote is a matter of some debate. The difficulty in interpretation centres around trying to explain why, since it is consequences that matter, intentions should play a role in the assessment of the morality of an action but motives should not. One possibility "involves supposing that the 'morality' of the act is one thing, probably to do with the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the agent, and its rightness or wrongness another."<ref name="Mill's Puzzling Footnote">{{cite journal |last1=Dancy |first1=Jonathan |year=2000 |title=Mill's Puzzling Footnote |journal=Utilitas |volume=12 |issue=2 |pages=219–22 |doi= 10.1017/S095382080000279X|s2cid=145777437 }}</ref> [[Jonathan Dancy]] rejects this interpretation on the grounds that Mill is explicitly making intention relevant to an assessment of the act not to an assessment of the agent.

An interpretation given by [[Roger Crisp]] draws on a definition given by Mill in ''[[A System of Logic]]'', where he says that an "intention to produce the effect, is one thing; the effect produced in consequence of the intention, is another thing; the two together constitute the action."<ref>{{cite book |last=Mill |first=John Stuart |title=A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive |series=Classic Reprint |publisher=Forgotten Books |date=February 2011 |page=51 |isbn=978-1-4400-9082-0}}</ref> Accordingly, whilst two actions may outwardly appear to be the same they will be different actions if there is a different intention. Dancy notes that this does not explain why intentions count but motives do not.

A third interpretation is that an action might be considered a complex action consisting of several stages and it is the intention that determines which of these stages are to be considered part of the action. Although this is the interpretation favoured by Dancy, he recognizes that this might not have been Mill's own view, for Mill "would not even allow that 'p & q' expresses a complex proposition. He wrote in his ''System of Logic'' I iv. 3, of 'Caesar is dead and Brutus is alive', that 'we might as well call a street a complex house, as these two propositions a complex proposition'."<ref name="Mill's Puzzling Footnote"/>

Finally, whilst motives may not play a role in determining the morality of an action, this does not preclude utilitarians from fostering particular motives if doing so will increase overall happiness.

=== Other sentient beings ===
{{further|Speciesism|Animal rights|Animal welfare|Moral patienthood}}
[[File:Peter Singer MIT Veritas.jpg|thumb|right|[[Peter Singer]]]]
In ''An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation'', Bentham wrote "the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?"<ref name="BenthamIntroductiontothePrinciples">An Introduction to the Principals of Morals and Legislation, Jeremy Bentham, 1789 ("printed" in 1780, "first published" in 1789, "corrected by the Author" in 1823.) See Chapter I: Of the Principle of Utility. For Bentham on animals, see Ch. XVII Note 122.</ref> Mill's distinction between [[#Higher and lower pleasures|higher and lower pleasures]] might suggest that he gave more status to humans. However, in his essay "Whewell on Moral Philosophy", Mill defends Bentham's position, calling it a "noble anticipation", and writing: "Granted that any practice causes more pain to animals than it gives pleasure to man; is that practice moral or immoral? And if, exactly in proportion as human beings raise their heads out of the slough of selfishness, they do not with one voice answer 'immoral', let the morality of the principle of utility be for ever condemned."<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Mill |first1=J. S. |title=Whewell on Moral Philosophy |url=http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-c/mill01.pdf | journal=Collected Works |volume=10 | pages = 185–87 }}</ref>

[[Henry Sidgwick]] also considers the implications of utilitarianism for nonhuman animals. He writes:<blockquote>"We have next to consider who the 'all' are, whose happiness is to be taken into account. Are we to extend our concern to all the beings capable of pleasure and pain whose feelings are affected by our conduct? or are we to confine our view to human happiness? The former view is the one adopted by Bentham and Mill, and (I believe) by the Utilitarian school generally: and is obviously most in accordance with the universality that is characteristic of their principle&nbsp;... it seems arbitrary and unreasonable to exclude from the end, as so conceived, any pleasure of any sentient being."<ref>{{cite book |last=Sidgwick |first=Henry |title=Methods of Ethics |publisher=Hackett Publishing Co |edition=7th |date=1981 |page=414 |isbn=978-0-915145-28-7}}</ref></blockquote>Among contemporary utilitarian philosophers, Peter Singer is especially known for arguing that the well-being of all [[sentience|sentient]] beings ought to be given [[equal consideration of interests|equal consideration]]. Singer suggests that rights are conferred according to the level of a creature's sentience, regardless of their species. He adds that humans tend to be [[speciesism|speciesist]] (discriminatory against non-humans) in ethical matters, and argues that, in utilitarianism, speciesism cannot be justified as there is no rational distinction that can be made between the suffering of humans and the suffering of nonhuman animals; all suffering ought to be reduced. Singer writes: "The racist violates the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of his own race, when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of another race. Similarly the speciesist allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of members of other species. The pattern is the same in each case&nbsp;... Most human beings are speciesists."<ref>Peter Singer, ''Animal Liberation'', Chapter I, pp. 7–8, 2nd edition, 1990.</ref>

In John Stuart Mill's essay "On Nature"<ref>{{cite web |date=1904 |title=Mill's "On Nature" |url=http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/users/philosophy/texts/mill_on.htm |access-date=2015-08-09 |website=www.lancaster.ac.uk}}</ref> he argues that the [[wild animal suffering|welfare of wild animals]] is to be considered when making utilitarian judgments. [[Tyler Cowen]] argues that, if individual animals are carriers of utility, then we should consider limiting the predatory activity of carnivores relative to their victims: "At the very least, we should limit current subsidies to nature's carnivores."<ref name="Cowen2003">{{Cite journal |last1=Cowen |first1=T. |year=2003 |editor1-last=c. Hargrove |editor1-first=Eugene |title=Policing Nature |journal=Environmental Ethics |volume=25 |issue=2 |pages=169–182 |doi=10.5840/enviroethics200325231|bibcode=2003EnEth..25..169C }}</ref>

This view still might be contrasted with [[deep ecology]], which holds that an intrinsic value is attached to all forms of life and nature, whether currently assumed to be sentient or not. According to utilitarianism, the forms of life that are unable to experience anything akin to either enjoyment or discomfort are denied [[moral status]], because it is impossible to increase the happiness or reduce the suffering of something that cannot feel happiness or suffer. Singer writes:
<blockquote>The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any meaningful way. It would be nonsense to say that it was not in the interests of a stone to be kicked along the road by a schoolboy. A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer. Nothing that we can do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare. A mouse, on the other hand, does have an interest in not being tormented, because it will suffer if it is. If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering—in so far as rough comparisons can be made—of any other being. If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account.</blockquote>

Thus, the moral value of one-celled organisms, as well as some multi-cellular organisms, and natural entities like a river, is only in the benefit they provide to sentient beings. Similarly, utilitarianism places no direct intrinsic value on [[biodiversity]], although the benefits that biodiversity brings to sentient beings may mean that, in utilitarianism, biodiversity ought to be maintained in general.

==== Digital minds ====
{{further|Artificial consciousness|Utility monster|}}
[[Nick Bostrom]] and Carl Shulman consider that, as advancements in [[artificial intelligence]] continue, it will probably be possible to engineer digital minds that require less resources and have a much higher rate and intensity of [[subjective experience]] than humans. These "super-beneficiaries" could also be unaffected by [[hedonic adaptation]]. Nick Bostrom said that we should find "paths that will enable digital minds and biological minds to coexist, in a mutually beneficial way where all of these different forms can flourish and thrive".<ref>{{Cite web |last=Fisher |first=Richard |title=The intelligent monster that you should let eat you |url=https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20201111-philosophy-of-utility-monsters-and-artificial-intelligence |access-date=2023-07-02 |website=www.bbc.com |date=13 November 2020 |language=en}}</ref>