Editing Battle of the Little Bighorn (section)

==Controversies==

===Reno's conduct===
The Battle of the Little Bighorn was the subject of an 1879 U.S. Army Court of Inquiry in Chicago, held at Reno's request, during which his conduct was scrutinized.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx?type=goto&id=History.Reno&isize=M&submit=Go+to+page&page=1 |title=A Complete scanned transcript of the Reno Court of Inquiry (RCOI) |publisher=Digicoll.library.wisc.edu |access-date=2012-03-15 |url-status = live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120406080132/http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx?type=goto&id=History.Reno&isize=M&submit=Go+to+page&page=1 |archive-date=April 6, 2012 |df=mdy-all }}</ref> Some testimony by non-Army officers suggested that he was drunk and a coward. The court found Reno's conduct to be without fault. After the battle, Thomas Rosser, James O'Kelly, and others continued to question the conduct of Reno for his hastily ordered retreat.<ref>Donovan, James (2008). ''A Terrible Glory: Custer and the Little Bighorn – the Last Great Battle of the American West'' (Kindle Location 5870). Little, Brown and Company. Kindle Edition.</ref> Defenders of Reno at the trial noted that, while the retreat was disorganized, Reno did not withdraw from his position until it became apparent that he was outnumbered and outflanked by the Native Americans. Contemporary accounts also point to the fact that Reno's scout, Bloody Knife, was shot in the head, spraying him with blood, possibly increasing his panic and distress.<ref name="Fox1993" />

===Custer's errors===
General Terry and others claimed that Custer made strategic errors from the start of the campaign. For instance, he refused to use a battery of Gatling guns and turned down General Terry's offer of an additional battalion of the 2nd Cavalry. Custer believed that the Gatling guns would impede his march up the Rosebud and hamper his mobility. His rapid march en route to the Little Bighorn averaged nearly {{convert|30|mi|km}} a day, so his assessment appears to have been accurate. Custer planned "to live and travel like Indians; in this manner the command will be able to go wherever the Indians can", he wrote in his ''Herald'' dispatch.<ref name="Donovan 2008">Donovan (2008). ''A Terrible Glory'', (Kindle Locations 3080–3086)</ref>

[[File:Pawnee bill wild west show c1905.jpg|thumb|''Death of Custer'', scene by Pawnee Bill's Wild West Show performers c. 1905 of Sitting Bull's stabbing Custer, with dead Native Americans lying on ground]]

By contrast, each Gatling gun had to be hauled by four horses, and soldiers often had to drag the heavy guns by hand over obstacles. Each of the heavy, hand-cranked weapons could fire up to 350 rounds a minute, an impressive rate, but they were known to jam frequently. During the [[Black Hills Expedition]] two years earlier, a Gatling gun had turned over, rolled down a mountain, and shattered to pieces. Lieutenant William Low, commander of the artillery detachment, was said to have almost wept when he learned he had been excluded from the strike force.<ref name="Donovan 2008" />

Custer believed that the 7th Cavalry could handle any Indian force and that the addition of the four companies of the 2nd would not alter the outcome. When offered the 2nd Cavalry, he reportedly replied that the 7th "could handle anything."<ref>Connell, Evan S. (1997). ''Son of the Morning Star''. New York: HarperPerennial, p. 257.</ref> There is evidence that Custer suspected that he would be outnumbered by the Indians, although he did not know by how much. By dividing his forces, Custer could have caused the defeat of the entire column, had it not been for Benteen's and Reno's linking up to make a desperate yet successful stand on the bluff above the southern end of the camp.<ref>Donovan (2008). ''A Terrible Glory'' (Kindle Location 5758)</ref>

The historian James Donovan believed that Custer's dividing his force into four smaller detachments (including the pack train) can be attributed to his inadequate reconnaissance; he also ignored the warnings of his Crow scouts and Charley Reynolds.<ref>Donovan (2008). ''A Terrible Glory'' (Kindle Location 3697)</ref> By the time the battle began, Custer had already divided his forces into three battalions of differing sizes, of which he kept the largest. His men were widely scattered and unable to support each other.<ref>Goodrich, Thomas (1984). ''Scalp Dance: Indian Warfare on the High Plains, 1865–1879''. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, p. 233.</ref><ref>Wert, Jeffry D. (1964/1996) ''Custer: The Controversial Life of George Armstrong Custer''. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 327.</ref> Wanting to prevent any escape by the combined tribes to the south, where they could disperse into different groups,<ref name="Donovan, loc 3699" /> Custer believed that an immediate attack on the south end of the camp was the best course of action.

===Admiration for Custer===
Criticism of Custer was not universal. While investigating the battlefield, Lieutenant General [[Nelson A. Miles]] wrote in 1877, "The more I study the moves here [on the Little Big Horn], the more I have admiration for Custer."<ref>Sklenar, p. 341.</ref> Facing major budget cutbacks, the U.S. Army wanted to avoid bad press and found ways to exculpate Custer. They blamed the defeat on the Indians' alleged possession of numerous repeating rifles and the overwhelming numerical superiority of the warriors.{{NoteTag|Twenty-three men were called to testify at the inquiry, which met in session daily except Sundays. For the army, far more was at stake than individual reputations, as the future of the service could be affected. On January 2, General Sheridan had quoted Lee's report of agent malfeasance in a supplement to his annual report, which continued the General's running battle with the [[Bureau of Indian Affairs]] and the [[Department of the Interior]]. At the same time, a House committee was busy debating a new appropriations bill that required a major reorganization of the army. "Reduction of expenses" was emphasized. One proposal would lop off entire regiments, including two cavalry regiments. Another would set the line officers (those in the field) from Major down back a few years in the promotion schedule. The total reduction in officers was proposed to be 406, almost 25 percent of the total. The military strongly wanted to avoid confirmation of incompetency or cowardice—rumors of which were circulating around the impending court of inquiry in Chicago. Donovan (2008). ''A Terrible Glory'' (Kindle Locations 6395–6403)}}

The widowed [[Elizabeth Bacon Custer]], who never remarried, wrote three popular books in which she fiercely protected her husband's reputation.<ref>{{cite journal|last1= Smith|first1= Gene|year= 1993|journal= American Heritage|volume= 44|issue= 8|url= http://www.americanheritage.com/content/libbie-custer|title= Libbie Custer|access-date= 10 September 2012|url-status = live|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20131220201035/http://www.americanheritage.com/content/libbie-custer|archive-date= December 20, 2013|df= mdy-all}}</ref>{{NoteTag|Libbie Custer "spent almost sixty years commemorating her marriage—and her memories of it quite literally kept her alive....she was quintessentially the professional widow, forcing it to become a very touchy matter for any military writer or officer to criticize Custer for having insanely launched an attack without taking the most elementary precautions or making even an attempt at reconnaissance. To say or write such put one in the position of standing against bereaved Libbie". Smith, Gene (1993) ''op cit''.}} She lived until 1933, hindering much serious research until most of the evidence was long gone.<ref>Smith, Gene (1993) ''op cit''.</ref> In addition, Captain Frederick Whittaker's 1876 book idealizing Custer was hugely successful.<ref>''A Complete Life of General George A. Custer'' (1876), noted in Donovan (2008). ''A Terrible Glory'' (Kindle Locations 6222–6223)</ref> Custer as a heroic officer fighting valiantly against savage forces was an image popularized in ''Wild West'' extravaganzas hosted by showman [[Buffalo Bill|"Buffalo Bill" Cody]], [[Pawnee Bill]], and others. It was not until over half a century later that historians took another look at the battle and Custer's decisions that led to his death and loss of half his command and found much to criticize.<ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.historynet.com/buffalo-bills-skirmish-at-warbonnet-creek.htm|title= Buffalo Bill's Skirmish At Warbonnet Creek|author= Robert B.Smith|date= June 12, 2006|work= American History Magazine|access-date= August 25, 2012|url-status = live|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20121001171445/http://www.historynet.com/buffalo-bills-skirmish-at-warbonnet-creek.htm|archive-date= October 1, 2012|df= mdy-all}}</ref>

===Gatling gun controversy===
General Alfred Terry's Dakota column included a single battery of artillery, comprising two [[3-inch ordnance rifle]]s and two [[Gatling gun]]s.{{NoteTag|: Terry's column out of Fort Abraham Lincoln included "...artillery (two Rodman and two Gatling guns)..."<ref>Sklenar, 2000, p. 68</ref>}}{{NoteTag|"[Three] rapid-fire artillery pieces known as Gatling guns" were part of Terry's firepower included in the Dakota column.<ref>Lawson, 2007, p. 48</ref>}} (According to historian Evan S. Connell, the precise number of Gatlings has not been established: either two or three.){{NoteTag|"How many Gatling guns lurched across the prairie is uncertain. Probably three."<ref>Connell, 1984, p. 101</ref>}}

[[File:Mitrailleuse-gatling-p1000591.jpg|thumb|The Gatling gun, invented in 1861 by [[Richard Jordan Gatling|Richard Gatling]]. Custer declined an offer of a battery of these weapons, explaining to Terry that they would "hamper our movements". Said Custer, "The Seventh can handle anything it meets."<ref>Lawson, 2007, p. 50</ref>]]

Custer's decision to reject Terry's offer of the rapid-fire Gatlings has raised questions among historians as to why he refused them and what advantage their availability might have conferred on his forces at the Battle of the Little Bighorn.{{NoteTag|"Custer refused Terry's offer of the Gatling gun battery."<ref>Lawson, 2008, p. 50</ref><br />"Military historians have speculated whether this decision was a mistake. If Gatling guns had made it to the battlefield, they might have allowed Custer enough firepower to allow Custer's companies to survive on Last Stand Hill."<ref>Donovan, 2008, p. 175:</ref><br />"Since its invention during the Civil War, the Gatling gun had been used sparingly in actual battle, but there was no denying, potentially at least, an awesome weapon."<ref>Philbrick, 2010, p. 73</ref>}}

One factor concerned Major Marcus Reno's recent 8-day reconnaissance-in-force of the Powder-Tongue-Rosebud Rivers, June 10 to 18.<ref>Sklenar, 2000, pp. 71, 75</ref>{{NoteTag| Reno's wing "left...on June 10...accompanied by a Gatling gun and its crew..."<ref>Donovan, 2008, pp. 162–63:</ref>}} This deployment had demonstrated that artillery pieces mounted on gun carriages and hauled by horses no longer fit for cavalry mounts (so-called condemned horses) were cumbersome over mixed terrain and vulnerable to breakdowns.<ref>Donovan, 2008, p. 163: "The [Gatling gun] and its ammunition...was mostly pulled by two 'condemned' cavalry mounts [p. 176: "...drawn by four condemned horses..."] judged not fit to carry troopers, but it needed the occasional hauling by hand through some of the rougher ravines. (The gun would eventually upset and injure three men.)" and p. 175: "...Reno had taken [a Gatling gun] on his [June reconnaissance mission], and it had been nothing but trouble."</ref><ref>Sklenar, 2000, p. 72: On Reno's [June 10 to June 18] reconnaissance "the Gatling guns proved to be an annoying burden...they either fell apart or had to be disassembled and carried in pieces over rough terrain." And p. 79: "During the Reno scout [reconnoitering], the two guns were actually abandoned (and retrieved later) because soldiers got tired of dragging them over rough spots...[I]f Custer did not already have a fully formed negative opinion of the Gatlings on such an expedition, the experience of the Reno [reconnaissance of early June] surely convinced him."</ref><ref>Philbrick, 2010, p. 73: "The biggest problem with the [Gatling] gun was transporting it to where it might be of some use... [in the week preceding the Battle of the Little Bighorn], the Gatling, not the mules, proved to be the biggest hindrance to the expedition."</ref><ref>Donovan, 2008, p. 175: "...Reno had taken one [Gatling gun] along [on his June reconnaissance], and it had been nothing but trouble." And p. 195: Custer, in comments to his officer staff before the Battle of the Little Bighorn, said that "...if hostiles could whip the Seventh [Cavalry]...they could defeat a much larger force."</ref> Custer, valuing the mobility of the 7th Cavalry and recognizing Terry's acknowledgment of the regiment as "the primary strike force" preferred to remain unencumbered by the Gatling guns.<ref>Hatch, 1997, pp. 80–81: The Gatling guns "were cumbersome and would cause delays over the traveled route. The guns were drawn by four condemned horses [and] obstacles in the terrain [would] require their unhitching and assistance of soldier to continue...Terry's own battery [of Gatling guns]—the one he had offered to Custer—[would have] a difficult time keeping up with the march of Colonel John Gibbon's infantry."</ref><ref>Lawson, 2007, p. 50: "[Custer] turned down General Terry's offer to bring the three Gatling guns, because they would slow down his movement."</ref><ref>Philbrick, 2010, p. 99: "Custer knew he had to move quickly to accomplish his objective. That was why he ultimately declined the offer of the Gatling guns that had proven such a bother to Reno."</ref><ref>Sklenar, 2000, p. 79: After the 7th Cavalry's departure up Rosebud Creek, "even Brisbin would acknowledge that everyone in Gibbon's command understood [that]...the Seventh was the primary strike force."</ref> Custer insisted that the artillery was superfluous to his success, in that the 7th Cavalry alone was sufficient to cope with any force they should encounter, informing Terry: "The 7th can handle anything it meets".<ref>Philbrick, 2010, p. 99: "Thinking his regiment powerful enough to handle anything it might encounter, [Custer, in addition to declining the Gatling guns] declined the offer of four additional cavalry companies from [Gibbon's] Montana column." And p. 114: Custer told his officer staff days before the battle that he "opted against the Gatling guns...so as not to 'hamper our movements'"</ref><ref>Sklenar, 2000, p. 92: Custer "on the evening of 22 June...[informed his officer staff]...why he had not accepted the offers...of Gatling guns (he thought they might hamper his movements at a critical moment)."</ref><ref>Lawson, 2007 p. 50: "Custer...refused Major James Brisbin's offer to include his Second Cavalry Regiment [200 troopers], told Terry "the 7th can handle anything it meets."</ref><ref>Donovan, 2008, p. "Explaining his refusal of the Gatling gun detachment and the Second Cavalry battalion, he convolutedly reaffirmed his confidence in the Seventh's ability to defeat any number of Indians they could find."</ref> In addition to these practical concerns, a strained relationship with Major James Brisbin induced Custer's polite refusal to integrate Brisbin's Second Cavalry unit—and the Gatling guns—into his strike force, as it would disrupt any hierarchical arrangements that Custer presided over.<ref>Hatch, 1997, p. 24: "Brisbin argued with Terry that Custer was undermanned, and requested that his troops [which had the] Gatling guns – with Terry in command because Brisbin did not want to serve under Custer—be permitted to accompany [Custer's] column. Custer refused the assistance, and Terry abided by that."</ref><ref>Sklenar, 2000, pp. 78–79: "Apparently, Terry offered [Major James] Brisbin's battalion and Gatling gun battery to accompany the Seventh, but Custer refused these additions for several reasons. First of all, Custer and Brisbin did not get along and Custer thus would not have wanted to place Brisbin in a senior command position. Custer was on the verge of abolishing the wings led by Reno and Benteen, and the inclusion of Brisbin would have complicated the arrangement he had in mind. Also, Custer retained the conviction that the Seventh could handle any force of Indians it might encounter, and he may have reasoned that taking the Second Cavalry would leave [Colonel John] Gibbon's column susceptible to attack and defeat..."</ref><ref>Hatch, 1997, p. 80: "The offer of 3 Gatling Guns...was made to Custer by General Alfred Terry [at the] urging of Major James Brisbin, who also desired his Second Cavalry to become part of Custer's detachment. Custer respectfully declined both offers, state that the Gatlings would impede his march.</ref>

Historians have acknowledged the firepower inherent in the Gatling gun: they were capable of firing 350 .45–70 ({{convert|0.45|in|mm|disp=out}}) caliber rounds per minute. Jamming caused by black powder residue could lower that rate,<ref>Hatch, 1997, p. 80: "The Gatling Guns would have brought formidable firepower into play; this rapid fire artillery could fire up to 350 rounds in 1 minute."</ref><ref>Donovan, 2008, p. 175: "Each of these heavy, hand-cranked weapons could fire up to 350 rounds a minute, an impressive rate, but they were known to jam frequently.</ref> raising questions as to their reliability under combat conditions.<ref>Hatch, 1997, pp. 80–81: "The Gatlings had major drawbacks, such as frequent jamming due to residue from black powder..."</ref><ref>Philbrick, 2010, p. 73: "Military traditionalists like to claim the gun was unreliable, but in actuality the Gatling functioned surprisingly well."</ref> Researchers have further questioned the effectiveness of the guns under the tactics that Custer was likely to face with the Lakota and Cheyenne warriors. The Gatlings, mounted high on carriages, required the battery crew to stand upright during its operation, making them easy targets for Lakota and Cheyenne sharpshooters.<ref>Hatch, 1997, p. 81: "...The [Gatling] guns were mounted on large [diameter] wheels, which meant that in order to operate them the gun crews would [necessarily] be standing upright, making them [extremely vulnerable] to Indian snipers."</ref>

Historian [[Robert M. Utley]], in a section entitled "Would Gatling Guns Have Saved Custer?" presents two judgments from Custer's contemporaries: General [[Henry J. Hunt]], expert in the tactical use of artillery in Civil War, stated that Gatlings "would probably have saved the command", whereas General [[Nelson A. Miles]], participant in the Great Sioux War declared "[Gatlings] were useless for Indian fighting."<ref>Utley, 1987, pp. 80–81</ref>