Editing Israeli–Palestinian conflict (section)

=== Israeli security concerns ===
{{See also|United States security assistance to the Palestinian Authority|Palestinian political violence|2010 Palestinian militancy campaign}}
[[File:Terror Strikes Israeli Civilians in Southern Israel.jpg|left|thumb|Remains of an [[Egged (company)|Egged bus]] hit by suicide bomber in the aftermath of the [[2011 southern Israel cross-border attacks]]. Eight people were killed; about 40 were injured.]]

Throughout the conflict, Palestinian violence has been a concern for Israelis. Security concerns have historically been a key driver in Israeli political decision making, often expanding in scope and taking precedence over other considerations such as international law and Palestinian human rights.<ref>{{cite book |first=Noam |last=Chomsky |author-link=Noam Chomsky |title=Fateful Triangle |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aHphMCIkhK0C&pg=PA |year=1999 |publisher=[[Pluto Press]] |isbn=978-0-89608-601-2 |pages= |quote=Evidently, the indigenous population also has a 'security problem'; in fact, the Palestinians have already suffered the catastrophe that Israelis justly fear.}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Khalidi|2013|loc=Introduction}}: "Similarly, in this lexicon, "security" is an absolute priority of Israel's, the need for which is invariably described as rooted in genuine, deep-seated existential fears. "Israeli security" therefore takes precedence over virtually everything else, including international law and the human rights of others. It is an endlessly expansive concept that includes a remarkable multitude of things, such as whether pasta or generator parts can be brought into the Gaza Strip, or whether miserably poor Palestinian villagers can be allowed water cisterns.1 By contrast, in spite of the precarious nature of their situation, Palestinians are presumed not to have any significant concerns about their security. This is the case even though nearly half the Palestinian population have lived for more than two generations under a grinding military occupation without the most basic human, civil, or political rights, and the rest have for many decades been dispersed from their ancestral homeland, many of them living under harsh, authoritarian Arab governments."</ref><ref>{{cite book |first=Shlomo |last=Ben-Ami |title=Prophets Without Honor |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hnhXEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA |year=2022 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |isbn=978-0-19-006047-3 |chapter=The Occupation's Traits of Permanence |quote=The Israeli debate over the occupied territories is, then, not just an ideological divide between right and left; it is also overwhelmingly influenced by the all-encompassing "security network" that injects a security rationale into every political move.}}</ref> The occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem and the continued expansion of settlements in those areas have been justified on security grounds.<ref>{{harvnb|Slater|2020|p=221}}: "In any event, there was no legitimate security argument at all for the Israeli seizure of Arab East Jerusalem immediately after the 1967 war and for subsequently settling religious fanatics in the West Bank. The real motivating forces for most of the postwar Israeli expansionism into the West Bank and East Jerusalem were clearly "Greater Israel" nationalism and religious messianism. If anything, as many Israeli security experts pointed out at the time, the "need" to defend the settlers was a security liability... Israeli governments have long cited "security" as the reason they need to maintain occupation of Arab territories—but when Israel withdrew from Lebanon and Egyptian territory, the attacks against it ended. It is unlikely that an Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territories would have a different result—and if it did, there would be little to prevent Israel from reinvading and occupying those territories. Moreover, in those circumstances repression of any continuing Palestinian violence would have a legitimacy that it currently lacks. For these reasons, Israel has a security problem with the Palestinians only in the same way that colonial powers had "security problems" with nationalist uprisings that eventually forced them to withdraw."</ref>

Israel,<ref name=Kassam /> along with the United States<ref>[http://www.glin.gov/view.action?glinID=189741 "Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006."] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071128105216/http://www.glin.gov/view.action?glinID=189741 |date=28 November 2007 }} [[Global Legal Information Network]]. 26 December 2006. 30 May 2009.</ref>{{better source needed|date=May 2023}} and the European Union, refer to any use of force by Palestinian groups as terroristic and criminal.<ref name="Noura Erakat">{{cite book |first=Noura |last=Erakat |author-link= Noura Erakat| title=Justice for Some |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-zGUDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA |year=2019 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-1357-7 |chapter=From Occupation to Warfare}}</ref><ref name="John B. Quigley">{{cite book |first=John B. |last=Quigley|title=The Case for Palestine |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VaUvqHNd6m0C&pg=PA |year=2005 |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-0-8223-3539-9 |pages=}}</ref>{{page needed|date=July 2024}} The United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/45/130 reflects an international consensus (113 out of 159 voting nations voted in favor, 13 voted against<ref>{{Cite web |date=14 December 1990 |title=<nowiki>Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights :: resolution /: adopted by the General Assembly</nowiki> |url=https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/282163?ln=en|language=en}}</ref>) affirming Palestinians' legitimacy, as a people under foreign occupation, to use armed struggle to resist said occupation.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Right of peoples to self-determination/Struggle by all available means – GA resolution |url=https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-184801/ |access-date=23 October 2024 |website=Question of Palestine |language=en-US |quote="1. Calls upon all States to implement fully and faithfully all the resolutions of the United Nations regarding the exercise of the right to self-determination and independence by peoples under colonial and foreign domination; 2. Reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial domination, apartheid and foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle; 3. Reaffirms also the inalienable right of the Namibian people, the Palestinian people and all peoples under foreign occupation and colonial domination to self-determination, national independence, territorial integrity, national unity and sovereignty without foreign interference..."}}</ref>

In Israel, Palestinian suicide bombers have targeted civilian buses, restaurants, shopping malls, hotels and marketplaces.<ref>{{Cite news |date=29 January 2007 |title=Analysis: Palestinian suicide attacks |work=[[BBC News]] |language=en-GB |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3256858.stm|access-date=5 March 2022 |archive-date=15 January 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100115102834/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3256858.stm |url-status=live}}</ref> From 1993 to 2003, 303 [[Palestinian suicide attacks|Palestinian suicide bombers]] attacked Israel.{{citation needed|date=June 2024}} In 1994, Hamas initiated their first lethal suicide attack in response to the [[cave of the Patriarchs massacre]] where American-Israeli physician [[Baruch Goldstein]] opened fire in a mosque, killing 29 people and injuring 125.<ref>{{harvnb|Baconi|2018|loc=Military Resistance Comes Undone}}: "On February 25, 1994, an American Jewish settler named Baruch Goldstein walked into the Ibrahimi Mosque in the West Bank city of Hebron during prayer time. Standing behind the rows of kneeling figures in front of him, Goldstein opened fire. Within minutes, twenty-nine Muslim worshippers had been killed and close to one hundred injured. The atrocity jolted the nascent Israeli-Palestinian bilateral negotiations that had gathered pace in the wake of the First Intifada, prompted by the PLO's strategic redirection in 1988. Less than six months before the Hebron attack, in September 1993, PLO chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin had awkwardly shaken hands in a widely publicized event on the South Lawn of the White House. The leaders had assembled in the American capital to sign the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, popularly known as the Oslo Accords, referring to the capital city where the secretive talks leading to the agreement had taken place. Following the signing, negotiations between Israel and the PLO in the form of a "peace process" were launched.1 Goldstein's attack served as a reminder of the bloody challenges this process faced. Forty-one days after the shooting, once the time allotted for Muslim ritual mourning had been respected, a member of Hamas approached a bus stop in Afula, a city in northern Israel. Standing next to fellow passengers, the man detonated a suicide vest, killing seven Israelis. This was on April 6, 1994, a day that marked Hamas's first lethal suicide bombing in Israel."</ref>

The Israeli government initiated the construction of a [[West Bank Barrier|security barrier]] following scores of suicide bombings and terrorist attacks in July 2003. Israel's coalition government approved the security barrier in the northern part of the green line between Israel and the West Bank. According to the [[Israel Defense Forces|IDF]], since the erection of the fence, terrorist acts have declined by approximately 90%.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.law.idf.il/351-en/Patzar.aspx |title=The Security Barrier (Fence) |publisher=IDF Military Advocate General |access-date=5 October 2014 |archive-date=12 October 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171012044945/http://www.law.idf.il/351-en/Patzar.aspx |url-status=dead}}</ref> The decline in attacks can also be attributed to the permanent presence of Israeli troops inside and around Palestinian cities and increasing security cooperation between the IDF and the Palestinian Authority during this period.<ref>{{harvnb|Scott-Baumann|2023}}: "Far fewer Israelis were killed in Palestinian suicide bombs after the construction of the barrier (130 in 2003 and fewer than 25 in 2005), convincing most Israelis that it saved the lives of fellow Israelis and was necessary for their security. However, the decline in bombings can also be attributed to the permanent presence of Israeli troops inside and around Palestinian cities and increasing security cooperation between the IDF and the PA, particularly after the Second Intifada ended in 2005."</ref> The barrier followed a route that ran almost entirely through land occupied by Israel in June 1967, unilaterally seizing more than 10% of the West Bank, including whole neighborhoods and settlement blocs, while splitting Palestinian villages in half with immediate effects on Palestinian's freedom of movement. The barrier, in some areas, isolated farmers from their fields and children from their schools, while also restricting Palestinians from moving within the West Bank or pursuing employment in Israel.<ref>{{cite book |first=Albert Habib |last=Hourani |title=A History of the Arab Peoples |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=A_History_of_the_Arab_Peoples&pg=PA |year=2010 |publisher=[[Harvard University Press]] |isbn=978-0-674-01017-8 |quote=In places the barrier separated farmers from their lands, even children from their schools, while preventing Palestinians from travelling within the West Bank or seeking work in Israel.}}</ref>{{page needed|date=July 2024}}<ref>{{harvnb|Shlaim|2015|loc=The Road Map to Nowhere 2003–2006}}: "The barrier followed a route that ran almost entirely through land occupied by Israel in June 1967."</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Baconi|2018|loc=Chapter 3}}: "Rather than building the wall on Israeli land or along the 1967 borders, however, the structure snaked through Palestinian territories, unilaterally seizing more than 10 percent of the West Bank, including whole neighborhoods around East Jerusalem as well as major settlement blocs that were integrated into this de facto border. The structure split whole Palestinian villages in half and had an immediate effect on the freedom of movement for Palestinians within the occupied territories. Jewish settlers living illegally within the same land continued to be linked into Israel through exclusive Jewish-only highways and bypass roads. On July 20, 2004, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion ruling that the wall was illegal, to no effect.4 With Israel's planned disengagement from the Gaza Strip and the construction of advanced "security" infrastructure, Sharon was actively restructuring the framework of Israel's occupation."</ref>

In 2004 the [[International Court of Justice]] ruled that the construction of the barrier violated the Palestinian right to self-determination, contravened the Fourth Geneva Convention, and could not be justified as a measure of Israeli self-defense.<ref>{{cite book |first=Noura |last=Erakat |title=Justice for Some: Law and the Question of Palestine |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Justice_for_Some&pg=PA |year=2019 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-0883-2 |chapter=Notes |quote=Its 2004 decision held that the construction of the wall in the West Bank, as opposed to along the 1949 armistice line, violated the Palestinian right to self-determination, contravened the Fourth Geneva Convention, and could not be justified as a measure of Israeli self-defense. It advised Israel to "terminate its breaches of international law; it is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein situated." The court also observed that all states had an obligation "not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction."}}</ref> The ICJ further expressed that the construction of the wall by Israel could become a permanent fixture, altering the status quo. Israel's High Court, however, disagreed with the ICJ's conclusions, stating that they lacked a factual basis. Several human rights organizations, including B'Tselem, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, echoed the ICJ's concerns. They suggested that the wall's route was designed to perpetuate the existence of settlements and facilitate their future annexation into Israel, and that the wall was a means for Israel to consolidate control over land used for illegal settlements. The sophisticated structure of the wall also indicated its likely permanence.<ref>{{cite book |last=Finkelstein |first=Norman G. |author-link=Norman Finkelstein |title=Knowing Too Much |publisher=OR Books |publication-place=New York |date=2012 |isbn=978-1-935928-77-5 |chapter=Appendix |quote=In its advisory opinion the ICJ voiced concern that "the construction of the wall and its associated régime create a 'fait accompli' on the ground that could well become permanent."115 Taking note of this ICJ concern, Israel's High Court rejoined that the ICJ lacked a "factual basis" for reaching definite conclusions.116 Not just the ICJ, however, but also many respected human rights organizations expressed such worries. B'Tselem concluded that the "underlying reason" of the wall's route was "to establish facts on the ground that would perpetuate the existence of settlements and facilitate their future annexation into Israel." Likewise, Human Rights Watch concluded that the "existing and planned route of the barrier appears to be designed chiefly to incorporate and make contiguous with Israel illegal civilian settlements." Likewise, Amnesty International concluded that Israel was building the wall to "consolidate its control over land which is being used for illegal Israeli settlements," and that "the very expensive and sophisticated structure of the fence/wall indicates that it is likely intended as a permanent structure."117}}</ref>

Since 2001, the threat of [[Qassam rocket]]s fired from Palestinian territories into Israel continues to be of great concern for Israeli defense officials.<ref>{{cite news |last=Harel |first=Amos |url=http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/932106.html |title=Defense officials concerned as Hamas upgrades Qassam arsenal |work=[[Haaretz]] |date=7 December 2007 |access-date=30 March 2009 |archive-url= |archive-date=}}</ref> In 2006—the year following Israel's disengagement from the Gaza Strip—the Israeli government claimed to have recorded 1,726 such launches, more than four times the total rockets fired in 2005.<ref name=Kassam>{{cite web |url=http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Victims+of+Palestinian+Violence+and+Terrorism+sinc.htm |title=Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism since September 2000 |publisher=Israeli Ministry of Internal Affairs |access-date=10 April 2007 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070403024612/http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-%2BObstacle%2Bto%2BPeace/Palestinian%2Bterror%2Bsince%2B2000/Victims%2Bof%2BPalestinian%2BViolence%2Band%2BTerrorism%2Bsinc.htm |archive-date=3 April 2007}}</ref><ref>{{Cite report |url=https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/08/06/rockets-gaza/harm-civilians-palestinian-armed-groups-rocket-attacks |title=Rockets from Gaza |publisher=[[Human Rights Watch]] |date=6 August 2009 |access-date=15 November 2023 |archive-date=18 June 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170618234837/https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/08/06/rockets-gaza/harm-civilians-palestinian-armed-groups-rocket-attacks |url-status=live |last1=Esveld |first1=Bill Van}}</ref> As of January 2009, over 8,600 rockets have been launched,<ref name=BBC_Q&A>{{Cite news |date=18 January 2009 |title=Q&A: Gaza conflict |language=en-GB |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7818022.stm |work=[[BBC News]] |access-date=5 March 2022 |archive-date=5 July 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140705061215/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7818022.stm |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=21 January 2008 |title=Gaza's rocket threat to Israel |language=en-GB |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3702088.stm |work=[[BBC News]] |access-date=5 March 2022 |archive-date=23 September 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110923035807/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3702088.stm |url-status=live}}</ref> causing widespread psychological trauma and disruption of daily life.<ref name=BBC_catandmouse>{{Cite news |date=28 February 2008 |title=Playing cat and mouse with Gaza rockets |language=en-GB |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7270168.stm |work=[[BBC News]] |access-date=5 March 2022 |archive-date=6 March 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080306235209/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7270168.stm|url-status=live}}</ref> As a result of these attacks, Israelis living in southern Israel have had to spend long periods in bomb shelters. The relatively small payload carried on these rockets, Israel's advanced early warning system, American-supplied anti-missile capabilities, and network of shelters made the rockets rarely lethal. In 2014, out of 4,000 rockets fired from the Gaza Strip, only six Israeli civilians were killed. For comparison, the payload carried on these rockets is smaller than Israeli tank shells, of which 49,000 were fired in Gaza in 2014.<ref>{{harvnb|Khalidi|2020|loc=Chapter 6}}: "However, none of the rockets had a warhead of the size or lethality of the over 49,000 tank and artillery shells fired by Israel in 2014. The Soviet-designed 122mm Grad or Katyusha rocket commonly used by Hamas and its allies normally carried either a 44- or 66-pound warhead (compared with the 96-pound 155mm shells), although many were fitted with smaller warheads to increase their range. Most of the homemade Qassam rockets that were used had considerably smaller warheads. Together, the 4,000 Qassam, Katyusha, Grad, and other missiles that were fired from the Gaza Strip, and that reached Israel (many were so imprecise and poorly manufactured that they fell short and landed within the strip), would have likely had less explosive power in total than a dozen 2,000-pound bombs."</ref>

There is significant debate within Israel about how to deal with the country's security concerns. Options have included military action (including [[targeted killing]]s and [[House demolition in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict|house demolitions]] of terrorist operatives), diplomacy, unilateral gestures toward peace, and increased security measures such as checkpoints, roadblocks and [[West Bank Barrier|security barriers]]. The legality and the wisdom of all of the above tactics have been called into question by various commentators.{{citation needed|date=July 2024}}

Since mid-June 2007, Israel's primary means of dealing with security concerns in the West Bank has been to cooperate with and permit United States-sponsored training, equipping, and funding of the Palestinian Authority's security forces, which with Israeli help have largely succeeded in quelling West Bank supporters of Hamas.<ref name="Nathan Thrall">{{cite magazine |url=http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/oct/14/our-man-palestine/ |title=Our Man in Palestine |first=Nathan |last=Thrall |magazine=[[The New York Review of Books]] |date=14 October 2010 |access-date=30 September 2010 |archive-date=16 October 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151016073306/http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/oct/14/our-man-palestine/ |url-status=live}}</ref>