Editing H. H. Asquith (section)

==Fall: November–December 1916==

The events that led to the collapse of the First Coalition were exhaustively chronicled by almost all of the major participants{{sfn|Koss|p=217}} (although Asquith himself was a notable exception), and have been studied by historians in the 100 years since.{{sfn|Cassar|p=211}} Although many of the accounts and studies differ in detail, and present a somewhat confusing picture overall, the outline is clear. As [[R. J. Q. Adams]] wrote, "The Prime Minister depended upon [a] majority [in] Parliament. The faith of that majority in Asquith's leadership had been shaken and the appearance of a logical alternative destroyed him."{{sfn|Adams|p=243}}<ref>{{cite journal|last=Fry|first=Michael|date=September 1988|title=Political Change in Britain, August 1914 to December 1916: Lloyd George Replaces Asquith: The Issues Underlying the Drama|journal=The Historical Journal|publisher=Cambridge University Press|volume=31|issue=3|pages=609–627|jstor =2639759|doi=10.1017/S0018246X00023517|s2cid=153441235 }}</ref><ref>John M. McEwen,  "The Struggle for Mastery in Britain: Lloyd George versus Asquith, December 1916." ''Journal of British Studies'' 18#1 (1978): 131–156.</ref>

===Nigeria debate and Lord Lansdowne's memorandum===
[[File:Max Aitken, Lord Beaverbrook.jpg|thumb|right|"a man called Max Aitken"]]
The touch paper for the final crisis was the unlikely subject of the sale of captured German assets in [[Nigeria]].{{sfn|Adams|p=222}} As Colonial Secretary, the Conservative leader Bonar Law led the debate and was subject to a furious attack by Sir Edward Carson. The issue itself was trivial,{{sfn|Koss|p=214}} but the fact that Law had been attacked by a leading member of his own party, and was not supported by Lloyd George (who absented himself from the House only to dine with Carson later in the evening), was not.{{sfn|Koss|p=215}}

Margot Asquith immediately sensed the coming danger: "From that night it was quite clear that Northcliffe, Rothermere, Bonar, Carson, Ll.G (and a man called [[Max Aitken]]) were going to run the Government. I knew it was the end."{{sfn|Margot Asquith 2014|p=306}} Grey was similarly prescient and wrote, "Lloyd George means to break up the Government."{{sfn|Grey|p=248}} Law saw the debate as a threat to his own political position,{{sfn|Bridgeman|pp=111–112}} as well as another instance of lack of grip by the government.{{sfn|Adams|p=223}}

The situation was further inflamed by the publication of a memorandum on future prospects in the war by [[Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne|Lord Lansdowne]].{{sfn|Jenkins|p=418}} Circulated on 13 November, it considered, and did not dismiss, the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the [[Central Powers]]. Asquith's critics immediately assumed that the memorandum represented his own views and that Lansdowne was being used as a stalking horse,{{sfn|Jenkins|p=419}} [[Robert Crewe-Milnes, 1st Marquess of Crewe|Lord Crewe]] going so far as to suggest that the Lansdowne Memorandum was the "veritable ''causa causans''{{efn|name=causa causans}} of the final break-up".{{sfn|Pope-Hennessy|p=181}}

===Triumvirate gathers===

On 20 November 1916 Lloyd George, Carson and Law met at the [[Hyde Park Hotel]].{{sfn|Cassar|p=212}} The meeting was organised by [[Max Aitken]], who was to play central roles both in the forthcoming crisis and in its subsequent historiography.{{sfn|Riddell|p=181}} Max Aitken was a Canadian adventurer, millionaire, and close friend of Law.{{sfn|Adams|p=224}} His book on the fall of the First Coalition, ''Politicians and the War 1914–1916'', although always partial and sometimes inaccurate, gives a detailed insider's view of the events leading up to Asquith's political demise.{{sfn|Taylor|p=121}} The trio agreed on the necessity of overhauling the government and further agreed on the mechanism for doing so; the establishment of a small War Council, chaired by Lloyd George, with no more than five members and with full executive authority for the conduct of the war.{{sfn|Scott|p=243}}

Asquith was to be retained as prime minister, and given honorific oversight of the War Council, but day to day operations would be directed by Lloyd George.{{sfn|Cassar|p=212}} This scheme, although often reworked, remained the basis of all proposals to reform the government until Asquith's fall on 6 December. Until almost the end, both Law{{sfn|Adams|p=226}} and Lloyd George{{sfn|Grigg 1985|p=444}} wished to retain Asquith as premier, but Aitken,{{sfn|Taylor|p=121}} Carson{{sfn|Taylor|p=110}} and Lord Northcliffe emphatically did not.{{sfn|Grigg 1985|p=441}}

===Power without responsibility===
[[File:The Independent (1849) (14595849278).jpg|thumb|Lord Northcliffe teeing up]]
Lord Northcliffe's role was critical, as was the use Lloyd George made of him, and of the press in general. Northcliffe's involvement also highlights the limitations of both Aitken's and Lloyd George's accounts of Asquith's fall. Both minimised Northcliffe's part in the events. In his ''War Memoirs'', Lloyd George stated emphatically "Lord Northcliffe was never, at any stage, brought into our consultations."{{sfn|Lloyd George Volume II|p=982}} Aitken supported this by saying, "Lord Northcliffe was not in active co-operation with Lloyd George."{{sfn|Beaverbrook|p=403}}

But these claims are contradicted by others. In their biography of Northcliffe, [[Reginald Pound]] and Geoffrey Harmsworth record Northcliffe's brother [[Harold Harmsworth, 1st Viscount Rothermere|Rothermere]] writing contemporaneously, "Alfred has been actively at work with Ll.G. with a view to bringing about a change."{{sfn|Pound & Harmsworth|p=513}} Riddell wrote in his diary for 27 May 1916: "LG never mentions directly that he sees Northcliffe but I am sure they are in daily contact."{{sfn|Riddell|p=157}} Margot Asquith was also certain of Northcliffe's role, and of Lloyd George's involvement, although she obscured both of their names when writing in her diary: "I only hope the man responsible for giving information to Lord N- will be heavily punished: God may forgive him; I never can."{{sfn|Margot Asquith 1962|p=308}}

The claims are also contradicted by events. Northcliffe met with Lloyd George on each of the three days just prior to Lloyd George's resignation, on 1, 2, and 3 December,{{sfn|Jenkins|p=445}} including two meetings on 1 December, both before and after Lloyd George put his revised proposals for the War Council to Asquith.{{sfn|Lee|p=160}} It seems improbable that ongoing events were not discussed and that the two men confined their conversations to negotiating article circulation rights for Lloyd George once he had resigned, as Pound and Harmsworth weakly suggest.{{sfn|Pound & Harmsworth|p=514}}

The attempts made by others to use Northcliffe and the wider press also merit consideration. In this regard, some senior military officers were extremely active. Robertson, for example, wrote to Northcliffe in October 1916, "The Boche gives me no trouble compared with what I meet in London. So any help you can give me will be of Imperial value."{{sfn|Pound & Harmsworth|p=508}} Lastly, the actions of Northcliffe's newspapers must be considered—in particular ''The Times'' editorial on 4 December which led Asquith to reject Lloyd George's final War Council proposals.{{sfn|Jenkins|p=450}} Thompson, Northcliffe's most recent biographer, concludes, "From the evidence, it appears that Northcliffe and his newspapers should be given more credit than they have generally received for the demise of the Asquith government in December 1916."{{sfn|Thompson|p=264}}

===To-ing and fro-ing===

Law met again with Carson and Lloyd George on 25 November and, with Aitken's help, drafted a memorandum for Asquith's signature.{{sfn|Adams|p=227}} This would see a "Civilian General Staff", with Lloyd George as chairman and Asquith as president, attending irregularly but with the right of referral to Cabinet as desired.{{sfn|Adams|p=227}} This Law presented to Asquith, who committed to reply on Monday the following week.{{sfn|Cassar|p=213}}

His reply was an outright rejection; the proposal was impossible "without fatally impairing the confidence of colleagues, and undermining my own authority."{{sfn|Cassar|p=213}} Law took Asquith's response to Carson and Lloyd George at Law's office in the Colonial Office. All were uncertain of the next steps.{{sfn|Jenkins|p=426}} Law decided it would be appropriate to meet with his senior Conservative colleagues, something he had not previously done.{{sfn|Jenkins|p=427}} He saw [[Austen Chamberlain]], [[Lord Curzon]] and [[Lord Robert Cecil]] on Thursday 30 November. All were united in opposition to Lloyd George's War Council plans, with Chamberlain writing, "(we) were unanimously of opinion (sic) that (the plans) were open to grave objection and made certain alternative proposals."{{sfn|Chamberlain|p=117}}

Lloyd George had also been reflecting on the substance of the scheme and, on Friday 1 December, he met with Asquith to put forward an alternative. This would see a War Council of three, the two Service ministers and a third without portfolio. One of the three, presumably Lloyd George although this was not explicit, would be chairman. Asquith, as prime minister, would retain "supreme control."{{sfn|Grigg 1985|p=450}}

Asquith's reply the same day did not constitute an outright rejection, but he did demand that he retain the chairmanship of the council.{{sfn|Jenkins|p=430}} As such, it was unacceptable to Lloyd George and he wrote to Law the next day (Saturday 2 December), "I enclose copy of P.M.'s letter. The life of the country depends on resolute action by you now."{{sfn|Beaverbrook|p=406}}

===Last four days: Sunday 3 December to Wednesday 6 December===
In a four-day crisis Asquith was unaware how fast he was losing support. Lloyd George now had growing Unionist support, the backing of Labour and (thanks to the efforts of [[Christopher Addison]]) a majority of Liberal MPs. Asquith fell and Lloyd George answered the loud demands for a much more decisive government. He energetically set up a new small war cabinet, a cabinet secretariat under Hankey, and a secretariat of private advisors in the '[[The Garden Suburb|Garden Suburb]]' to move towards prime ministerial control.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Morgan|first=Kenneth O.|author-link = Kenneth O. Morgan|date=19 October 2017|title=7 December 1916: Asquith, Lloyd George and the Crisis of Liberalism|journal=[[Parliamentary History]]|volume=36|issue=3|pages=361–371|doi=10.1111/1750-0206.12318}}</ref>

====Sunday 3 December====

Sunday 3 December saw the Conservative leadership meet at Law's house, Pembroke Lodge.{{sfn|Beaverbrook|p=410}} They gathered against a backdrop of ever-growing press involvement, in part fomented by Max Aitken.{{sfn|Taylor|p=113}} That morning's ''[[Reynold's News]]'', owned and edited by Lloyd George's close associate [[Henry Dalziel, 1st Baron Dalziel of Kirkcaldy|Henry Dalziel]], had published an article setting out Lloyd George's demands to Asquith and claiming that he intended to resign and take his case to the country if they were not met.{{sfn|Beaverbrook|p=411}} At Law's house, the Conservatives present drew up a resolution which they demanded Law present to Asquith.{{sfn|Jenkins|p=435}}

This document, subsequently the source of much debate, stated that "the Government cannot continue as it is; the Prime Minister (should) tender the resignation of the Government" and, if Asquith was unwilling to do that, the Conservative members of the Government would "tender (their) resignations."{{sfn|Beaverbrook|p=413}} The meaning of this resolution is unclear, and even those who contributed to it took away differing interpretations.{{sfn|Grigg 1985|p=453}}

Chamberlain felt that it left open the options of either Asquith or Lloyd George as premier, dependent on who could gain greater support. Curzon, in a letter of that day to Lansdowne, stated that no one at the Pembroke Lodge meeting felt that the war could be won under Asquith's continued leadership, and that the issue for the Liberal politicians to resolve was whether Asquith remained in a Lloyd George administration in a subordinate role, or left the government altogether.{{sfn|Grigg 1985|pp=453–454}} Max Aitken's claim that the resolution's purpose was to ensure that "Lloyd George should go"{{sfn|Beaverbrook|p=414}} is not supported by most of the contemporary accounts,{{sfn|Dutton|pp=132–133}} or by the assessments of most subsequent historians.

As one example, Gilmour, Curzon's biographer, writes that the Unionist ministers "did not, as Beaverbrook alleged, decide to resign themselves in order to strengthen the Prime Minister's hand against Lloyd George..(their intentions) were completely different."{{sfn|Gilmour|p=455}} Similarly, Adams, Law's latest biographer, describes Aitken's interpretation of the resolution as "convincingly overturned".{{sfn|Adams|p=231}} [[John Ramsden (historian)|John Ramsden]] is equally clear: "the Unionist ministers acted to strengthen Lloyd George's hand, from a conviction that only greater power for Lloyd George could put enough drive into the war effort."{{sfn|Ramsden|p=132}}

Law then took the resolution to Asquith, who had, unusually, broken his weekend at [[Walmer Castle]] to return to Downing Street.{{sfn|Koss|p=218}} At their meeting Law sought to convey the content of his colleagues' earlier discussion but failed to produce the resolution itself.{{sfn|Jenkins|p=439}} That it was never actually shown to Asquith is incontrovertible, and Asquith confirmed this in his writings.{{sfn|Asquith 1928b|p=131}} Law's motives in not handing it over are more controversial. Law himself maintained he simply forgot.{{sfn|Adams|p=232}} Jenkins charges him with bad faith, or neglect of duty.{{sfn|Jenkins|p=440}} Adams suggests that Law's motives were more complex (the resolution also contained a clause condemning the involvement of the press, prompted by the ''Reynold's News'' story of that morning){{sfn|Beaverbrook|p=420}} and that, in continuing to seek an accommodation between Asquith and Lloyd George, Law felt it prudent not to share the actual text.{{sfn|Adams|p=233}}

The outcome of the interview between Law and Asquith was clear, even if Law had not been.{{sfn|Dutton|p=133}} Asquith immediately decided that an accommodation with Lloyd George, and a substantial reconstruction to placate the Unionist ministers, were required.{{sfn|Asquith 1928b|p=132}} He summoned Lloyd George and together they agreed a compromise that was, in fact, little different from Lloyd George's 1 December proposals.{{sfn|Jenkins|p=441}} The only substantial amendment was that Asquith would have daily oversight of the War Council's work and a right of veto.{{sfn|Jenkins|p=441}} [[John Grigg]] saw this compromise as "very favourable to Asquith".{{sfn|Grigg 1985|p=457}} Cassar is less certain: "The new formula left him in a much weaker position[, his] authority merely on paper for he was unlikely to exercise his veto lest it bring on the collective resignation of the War Council."{{sfn|Cassar|p=219}} Nevertheless, Asquith, Lloyd George, and Law who had rejoined them at 5.00&nbsp;pm, all felt a basis for a compromise had been reached, and they agreed that Asquith would issue a bulletin that evening announcing the reconstruction of the Government.{{sfn|Cassar|p=219}} Crewe, who joined Asquith at Montagu's house at 10.00&nbsp;p.m., recorded: "accommodation with Mr. Lloyd George would ultimately be achieved, without sacrifice of (Asquith's) position as chief of the War Committee; a large measure of reconstruction would satisfy the Unionist Ministers."{{sfn|Pope-Hennessy|p=185}}

Despite Lloyd George's denials of collaboration, the diary for 3 December by Northcliffe's factotum Tom Clarke, records that: "The Chief returned to town and at 7.00 o'clock he was at the War Office with Lloyd George."{{sfn|Herbert Asquith|p=272}} Meanwhile, [[Duff Cooper]] was invited to dinner at Montagu's [[Queen Anne's Gate]] house, he afterwards played bridge with Asquith, Venetia Montagu and Churchill's sister-in-law "Goonie", recording in his diary : "..the P.M. more drunk than I have ever seen him, (..) so drunk that one felt uncomfortable&nbsp;... an extraordinary scene."{{sfn|Cooper|p=40}}

====Monday 4 December====

The bulletin was published on the morning of Monday 4 December. It was accompanied by an avalanche of press criticism, all of it intensely hostile to Asquith.{{sfn|Cassar|p=221}} The worst was a leader in Northcliffe's ''Times''.{{sfn|Koss|p=219}} This had full details of the compromise reached the day before, including the names of those suggested as members of the War Council. More damagingly still, it ridiculed Asquith, claiming he had conspired in his own humiliation and would henceforth be "Prime Minister in name only."{{sfn|Cassar|p=221}} Lloyd George's involvement is uncertain; he denied any,{{sfn|Grigg 1985|p=460}} but Asquith was certain he was the source.{{sfn|Cassar|p=222}} The author was certainly the editor, [[Geoffrey Dawson]], with some assistance from Carson. But it seems likely that Carson's source was Lloyd George.{{sfn|Jenkins|p=445}}

The leak prompted an immediate reaction from Asquith: "Unless the impression is at once corrected that I am being relegated to the position of an irresponsible spectator of the War, I cannot possibly go on."{{sfn|Grigg 1985|p=460}} Lloyd George's reply was prompt and conciliatory: "I cannot restrain nor I fear influence Northcliffe. I fully accept in letter and in spirit your summary of the suggested arrangement—subject of course to personnel."{{sfn|Jenkins|pp=447–448}} But Asquith's mind was already turning to rejection of the Sunday compromise and outright confrontation with Lloyd George.{{sfn|Cassar|p=224}}

It is unclear exactly whom Asquith spoke with on 4 December. Beaverbrook and Crewe state he met Chamberlain, Curzon and Cecil.{{sfn|Beaverbrook|p=441}}{{sfn|Asquith 1928b|p=133}} Cassar follows these opinions, to a degree.{{sfn|Cassar|p=223}} But Chamberlain himself was adamant that he and his colleagues met Asquith only once during the crisis and that was on the following day, Tuesday 5 December. Chamberlain wrote at the time, "On Tuesday afternoon the Prime Minister sent for Curzon, Bob Cecil and myself. This is the first and only time the three of us met Asquith during those fateful days."{{sfn|Chamberlain|p=123}} His recollection is supported by details of their meetings with Law and other colleagues,{{sfn|Chamberlain|p=123}} in the afternoon, and then in the evening of the 4th,{{sfn|Lindsay|pp=372–373}} and by most modern historians, e.g. Gilmour{{sfn|Gilmour|p=457}} and Adams.{{sfn|Adams|p=234}} Crawford records how little he and his senior Unionist colleagues were involved in the key discussions, and by implication, how much better informed were the press lords, writing in his diary: "We were all in such doubt as to what had actually occurred, and we sent out for an evening paper to see if there was any news!"{{sfn|Lindsay|p=373}} Asquith certainly did meet his senior Liberal colleagues on the evening of 4 December; they were unanimously opposed to compromise with Lloyd George and supported Asquith's growing determination to fight.{{sfn|Cassar|p=224}} His way forward had been cleared by his tendering the resignation of his government to the King earlier in the day.{{sfn|Cassar|p=223}} Asquith also saw Law, who confirmed that he would resign if Asquith failed to implement the War Council agreement as discussed only the day before.{{sfn|Grigg 1985|p=461}} In the evening, and having declined two requests for meetings, Asquith threw down the gauntlet to Lloyd George by rejecting the War Council proposal.{{sfn|Grigg 1985|p=462}}

====Tuesday 5 December====
[[File:A.J. Balfour LCCN2014682753 (cropped).jpg|thumb|left|upright|[[Arthur Balfour]]]]
Lloyd George accepted the challenge by return of post, writing: "As all delay is fatal in war, I place my office without further parley at your disposal."{{sfn|Grigg 1985|p=462}} Asquith had anticipated this response, but was surprised by a letter from Arthur Balfour, who until that point had been removed from the crisis by illness.{{sfn|Jenkins|p=453}} On its face, this letter merely offered confirmation that Balfour believed that Lloyd George's scheme for a smaller War Council deserved a chance and that he had no wish to remain at the Admiralty if Lloyd George wished him out. Jenkins argues that Asquith should have recognised it as a shift of allegiance.{{sfn|Jenkins|p=453}} Asquith discussed the crisis with Lord Crewe and they agreed an early meeting with the Unionist ministers was essential. Without their support, "it would be impossible for Asquith to continue."{{sfn|Cassar|p=226}}

Asquith's meeting with Chamberlain, Curzon and Cecil at 3.00&nbsp;p.m. only highlighted the weakness of his position.{{sfn|Dutton|p=133}} They unanimously declined to serve in a Government that did not include Law and Lloyd George,{{sfn|Jenkins|p=454}} as a Government so constituted offered no "prospect of stability". Their reply to Asquith's follow-up question as to whether they would serve under Lloyd George caused him even more concern. The "Three Cs" stated they would serve under Lloyd George if he could create the stable Government they considered essential for the effective prosecution of the war.{{sfn|Chamberlain|p=124}}

The end was near, and a further letter from Balfour declining to reconsider his earlier decision brought it about. The Home Secretary, [[Herbert Samuel]], recorded in a contemporaneous note: "We were all strongly of opinion, from which [Asquith] did not dissent, that there was no alternative [to resignation]. We could not carry on without LlG and the Unionists and ought not to give the appearance of wishing to do so."{{sfn|Samuel|p=122}}

At 7.00&nbsp;pm, having been prime minister for eight years and 241 days, Asquith went to Buckingham Palace and tendered his resignation.{{sfn|Asquith 1928b|p=134}} Describing the event to a friend sometime later, Asquith wrote, "When I fully realised what a position had been created, I saw that I could not go on without dishonour or impotence, or both."{{sfn|Asquith 1933|p=241}} That evening, he dined at Downing Street with family and friends, his daughter-in-law Cynthia describing the scene: "I sat next to the P.M.—he was too darling—rubicund, serene, puffing a guinea cigar and talking of going to Honolulu."{{sfn|Cynthia Asquith|p=241}} Cynthia believed that he would be back "in the saddle" within a fortnight with his position strengthened.{{sfn|De Courcy|2014|pp=330–340}}

Later that evening Law, who had been to the Palace to receive the King's commission, arrived to enquire whether Asquith would serve under him. Lord Crewe described Asquith's reply as "altogether discouraging, if not definitely in the negative."{{sfn|Asquith 1928b|p=134}}{{efn|That evening, Aitken and Churchill were dining with [[F. E. Smith]] at the latter's [[Grosvenor Gardens]] home. The dinner ended acrimoniously, as Aitken records: {{"'}}Smith,' said Winston with great emphasis, 'This man knows I am not to be in the Government.' He picked up his coat and hat and dashed into the street&nbsp;... a curious end to the day." Churchill was detested by the Conservatives for his defection to the Liberals in 1904, for his role as an active, partisan Liberal thereafter, and for his role in the disastrous [[Dardanelles campaign]]; despite his energy and ability Lloyd George was not able to bring him back into the government until the summer of 1917.{{sfn|Chisholm & Davie|p=149}}}}

====Wednesday 6 December====
{{Quote box|width=30%|bgcolor=#c6dbf7|align=right|quoted=y | quote= I am personally very sorry for poor old Squiff.  He has had a hard time and even when 'exhilarated' seems to have had more capacity and brain power than any of the others.  However, I expect more action and less talk is needed now |salign = right|source=General Douglas Haig on Asquith's fall (6 December){{sfn|Sheffield & Bourne|p=259}}}}
Wednesday saw an afternoon conference at Buckingham Palace, hosted by the King and chaired by Balfour.{{sfn|Jenkins|p=455}} There is some doubt as to the originator of the idea,{{sfn|Jenkins|p=455}} although Adams considers that it was Law.{{sfn|Adams|p=238}} This is supported by a handwritten note of Aitken's, reproduced in [[A. J. P. Taylor|A.J.P. Taylor's]] life of that politician, which reads: "6th Wed. Meeting at BL house with G. (Lloyd George) and C. (Carson)—Decide on Palace Conference."{{sfn|Taylor|p=107}} Conversely, Crewe suggests that the suggestion came jointly from Lord Derby and Edwin Montagu.{{sfn|Pope-Hennessy|p=187}}

However the meeting came about, it did not bring the compromise the King sought. Within two hours of its break-up, Asquith, after consulting his Liberal colleagues,{{sfn|Koss|p=222}} except for Lloyd George, declined to serve under Law,{{sfn|Adams|p=238}} who accordingly declined the King's commission.{{sfn|Cassar|p=231}} At 7.00&nbsp;pm. Lloyd George was invited to form a Government. In just over twenty four hours he had done so, forming a small [[War Cabinet#First World War|War Cabinet]] instead of the mooted War Council, and at 7.30&nbsp;p.m. on Thursday 7 December he [[Kissing hands|kissed hands]] as prime minister.{{sfn|Grigg 1985|p=481}}

Lloyd George's achievement in creating a government was considerable, given that almost all of the senior Liberals sided with Asquith.{{sfn|Young|p=370}} Balfour's acceptance of the Foreign Office made it possible.{{sfn|Egremont|p=280}} Others placed a greater responsibility on Asquith as the author of his own downfall, for example Churchill: "A fierce, resolute Asquith, fighting with all his powers would have conquered easily. But the whole trouble arose from the fact that there was no fierce resolute Asquith to win this war or any other."{{sfn|Taylor|p=119}}