Editing Dean Rusk (section)

==Legacy==
The consensus of historians is that Rusk was a very intelligent man, but very shy and so deeply immersed in details and the complexities of each case that he was reluctant to make a decision and unable to clearly explain to the media what the government's policies were.<ref>[[Roger Hilsman]], ''To Move a Nation: The politics of foreign-policy in the administration of John F. Kennedy'' (1967) pp 40–43.</ref> Jonathan Coleman says that he was deeply involved in the Berlin Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, NATO, and the [[Vietnam War]]. Typically he was highly cautious on most issues, except for Vietnam:
{{Blockquote|He established only a distant relationship with President Kennedy but worked more closely with President Johnson. Both presidents appreciated his loyalty and his low‐key style. Although an indefatigable worker, Rusk exhibited little talent as a manager of the Department of State.<ref>Jonathan Coleman, "Rusk, Dean (1909–94)' in Gordon Martel, ed.  ''The Encyclopedia of Diplomacy'' (2018) https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118885154.dipl0478</ref>}}

Regarding Vietnam, historians agree that President Johnson relied heavily on the advice of Rusk, Defense Secretary [[Robert McNamara]], and national security adviser [[McGeorge Bundy]] to the effect that a communist takeover of all of Vietnam was unacceptable, and the only way to prevent it was to escalate America's commitment. Johnson took their conclusions and rejected dissenting views.<ref>{{cite book |first=Robert D. |last=Schulzinger |chapter=Fighting the Vietnam War |editor=Mitchell B. Lerner |title=A Companion to Lyndon B. Johnson |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3CrDygRnbnYC&pg=PA338 |date=2012 |publisher=Wiley |page=338 |isbn=9781444347470}}</ref>

Rusk's son Rich wrote about his father's time as Secretary of State: "With this reticent, reserved, self-contained, emotionally bound-up father of mine from rural Georgia, how could the decision making have gone any differently? His taciturn qualities, which served him so well in negotiating with the Russians, ill-prepared him for the wrenching, introspective, soul-shattering journey that a true reappraisal of Vietnam policy would have involved. Although trained for high office, he was unprepared for such a journey, for admitting that thousands of American lives, and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese, might have been lost in vain."<ref name="New Light on Dean Rusk126" />

George Herring wrote about Rusk in 1992: "He is a man utterly without pretense, a thoroughly decent individual, a man of stern countenance and unbending principles. He is a man with a passion for secrecy. He is a shy and reticent man, who as Secretary of State sipped scotch to loosen his tongue for press conferences. Stolid and normally laconic, he also has a keen, dry wit. He has often been described as the 'perfect number two,' a loyal subordinate who had strong—if unexpressed—reservations about the Bay of Pigs operation, but after its failure could defend it as though he had planned it."<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Herring |first1=George |title=Rusks on Rusk: A Georgian's Life as Collaborative Autobiography |journal=The Georgia Historical Quarterly |date=Spring 1992 |volume=76 |issue=1 |page=66}}</ref>

Summarizing the views of historians and political scientists, Smith Simpson states:
:Here was a man who had much going for him but failed in crucial respects. A decent, intelligent, well-educated man of broad experience in world affairs who, early in life, evidenced qualities of leadership, seemed diffidently to hold back rather than to lead as secretary of state, seeming to behave, in important ways, like a sleeve-plucking follower of presidents rather than their wise and persuasive counselor.<ref>Smith Simpson, "Featured Review"  ''Perspectives on Political Science'' (1991) 20#4 221–49 [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10457097.1991.9944494?journalCode=vpps20 Excerpt]</ref>