Editing Suez Crisis (section)

== End of hostilities ==
{{Overly detailed|section|date=June 2024}}
=== British anti-war protests ===
[[File:1956-11-12 Near East Crisis.ogv|thumbtime=0:08|thumb|Newsreel from 12 November 1956 about the end of the invasion]]

Although the public believed the British government's justification of the invasion as a separation of Israeli and Egyptian forces,{{R|fairhall20110630}} protests against the war occurred in Britain after it began. On the popular television talk show ''Free Speech'', an especially bitter debate took place on 31 October with the leftist historian [[A. J. P. Taylor]] and the Labour journalist and future party leader [[Michael Foot]] calling their colleague on ''Free Speech'', the Conservative MP [[Robert Boothby, Baron Boothby|Robert Boothby]], a "criminal" for supporting the war.<ref name="Cole, Robert, p. 149">{{Cite book |last=Cole |first=Robert |title=A.J.P. Taylor the Traitor Within the Gates |location=London |publisher=Macmillan |date=1993 |page=149}}</ref>

One television critic spoke of ''Free Speech'' during the war that "the team seemed to not only on the verge of, but actually losing their tempers.... Boothby boomed, Foot fumed and Taylor trephined, with apparent real malice...."<ref name="Cole, Robert, p. 149"/> The angry, passionate, much-watched debates about the Suez war on ''Free Speech'' mirrored the divided public response to the war.<ref name="Cole, Robert, p. 149"/> The British government pressured the BBC to support the war,{{R|goodwin2005}} and seriously considered taking over the network.{{R|fairhall20110630}}

Eden's major mistake had been not to strike in July 1956 when there was widespread anger at Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, as by the fall of 1956 public anger had subsided, with many people in Britain having come to accept the ''[[fait accompli]]'', and saw no reason for war.<ref>{{Harvnb|Turner|2006|pp=230, 254–255}}</ref> This was especially the case as Eden's claims that the Egyptians would hopelessly mismanage the canal had proven groundless, and that by September 1956 it was clear that the change of management had not affected shipping.<ref>{{Harvnb|Turner|2006|p=254}}</ref>

Even more importantly, Eden's obsession with secrecy and his desire to keep the preparations for war as secret as possible meant that the Eden government did nothing in the months running up to the attack to explain to the British people why it was felt that war was necessary.<ref>{{Harvnb|Turner|2006|p=210}}</ref> Many of the reservists who were called up for their [[National Service]] in the summer and fall of 1956 recalled feeling bewildered and confused as the Eden government started preparing to attack Egypt while at the same time Eden insisted in public that he wanted a peaceful resolution of the dispute, and was opposed to attacking Egypt.<ref>{{Harvnb|Turner|2006|pp=206–210}}</ref> The British author [[David Pryce-Jones]] recalled that as a young officer, after the ultimatum was submitted to Egypt, he had to explain to his troops why war with Egypt was necessary without believing a word that he was saying.<ref>Pryce-Jones, David ''The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs'', Chicago: Ivan Dee, 2002, p. 4.</ref> Only one British soldier, however, refused to fight.{{R|fairhall20110630}}

Gaitskell was much offended that Eden had kept him in the dark about the planning for action against Egypt, and felt personally insulted that Eden had just assumed that he would support the war without consulting him first.<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|p=388}}</ref><ref>{{Harvnb|Turner|2006|pp=230–231}}</ref> On 31 October he cited in Parliament the fact that, despite Eden's claim that the British government had consulted closely with the Commonwealth, no other member nation did; in the Security Council, not even Australia had supported the British action. He called the invasion{{R|eayrs1964}}{{Rp|208–209}}
{{Blockquote|an act of disastrous folly whose tragic consequences we shall regret for years. Yes, all of us will regret it, because it will have done irreparable harm to the prestige and reputation of our country ... we shall feel bound by every constitutional means at our disposal to oppose it.}}

The stormy and violent debates in the House of Commons on 1 November 1956 almost degenerated into fist-fights after several Labour MPs compared Eden to Hitler.<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|pp=388–389}}</ref> Yet the Prime Minister insisted, "We [are not] at war with Egypt now.[...] There has not been a declaration of war by us. We are in an armed conflict."<ref>{{Hansard|1956/nov/01/egypt-and-israel|access-date=29 April 2020}}</ref>  The journalist [[Malcolm Muggeridge]] and actor [[Robert Speaight]] wrote in a public letter that
{{Blockquote|The bitter division in public opinion provoked by the British intervention in the Middle East has already had one disastrous consequence. It has deflected popular attention from the far more important struggle in Hungary. A week ago the feelings of the British people were fused in a single flame of admiration for the courage and apparent success of the Hungarian revolt. Now, that success seems threatened by Russian treachery and brute force, and Hungary has appealed to the West.... It is the first, and perhaps will prove the only opportunity to reverse the calamitous decisions of Yalta.... The Prime Minister has told us that 50 million tons of British shipping are at stake in his dispute with President Nasser. What is at stake in Central Europe are rather more than 50 million souls. It may be objected that it is not so easy to help the Hungarians; to this excuse they are entitled to reply that it was not so easy to help themselves.<ref>{{Harvnb|Wilson|2008|pp=65–66}}</ref>}} The Suez Crisis played a key role in the reconciliation of the [[Gaitskellite]] and [[Bevanism|Bevanite]] factions of the [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour Party]], which both condemned the invasion, after the [[1955 Labour Party leadership election|1955 leadership election]]. Gaitskell was so impressed by his erstwhile rival [[Aneurin Bevan]]'s forceful condemnation of the invasion that he offered him the role of [[Shadow Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs|Shadow Foreign Secretary]], replacing [[Alfred Robens, Baron Robens of Woldingham|Alfred Robens]].<ref name=":02">{{Cite book |last=Campbell |first=John |url=https://archive.org/details/pistolsatdawntwo0000camp/13960/t6wx5mm07 |title=Pistols at Dawn: Two Hundred Years of Political Rivalry from Pitt and Fox to Blair and Brown |date=2010 |publisher=Vintage |isbn=978-1-8459-5091-0 |location=London |pages=216–228 |oclc=489636152}}</ref>

Lady [[Violet Bonham Carter]], an influential Liberal Party member, wrote in a letter to the ''Times'' that
{{Blockquote|I am one of the millions who watching the martyrdom of Hungary and listening yesterday to the transmission of her agonizing appeals of help (immediately followed by our "successful bombings" of Egyptian "targets") who have felt a humiliation, shame and anger which are beyond expression.... We cannot order Soviet Russia to obey the edict of the United Nations which we ourselves have defied, nor to withdraw her tanks and guns from Hungary while we are bombing and invading Egypt. Today we are standing in the dock with Russia.... Never in my lifetime has our name stood so low in the eyes of the world. Never have we stood so ingloriously alone.<ref name="Wilson, A.N. p. 66">{{Harvnb|Wilson|2008|p=66}}</ref>}}

According to public opinion polls at the time, 37% of the British people supported the war while 44% were opposed.<ref name="Walsh 2006">{{Cite web |last=Walsh |first=Lynn |date=October 2006 |title=The Suez Fiasco 1956 |url=http://www.socialismtoday.org/104/suez.html |access-date=22 August 2011 |publisher=Socialism Today}}</ref><ref name="Adamthwaite pages 449-464">{{Harvnb|Adamthwaite|1988|p=463}}</ref> ''[[The Observer]]'' newspaper in a leader (editorial) attacked the Eden government for its "folly and crookedness" in attacking Egypt while ''[[The Manchester Guardian]]'' urged its readers to write letters of protest to their MPs.<ref name="Turner, Barry, p. 354">{{Harvnb|Turner|2006|p=354}}</ref> ''[[The Economist]]'' spoke of the "strange union of cynicism and hysteria" in the government and ''[[The Spectator]]'' stated that Eden would soon have to face "a terrible indictment".<ref name="Turner, Barry, p. 354"/> The majority of letters written to MPs from their constituents were against the Suez attack.<ref>{{Harvnb|Adamthwaite|1988|pp=455–456}}</ref> Significantly, many of the letters came from voters who identified as Conservatives.<ref>{{Harvnb|Adamthwaite|1988|pp=456–457}}</ref> The historian [[Keith Feiling]] wrote "the harm done seems to me terrifying: for my part I have resigned from the party while the present leader is there".<ref name="Adamthwaite pages 449">{{Harvnb|Adamthwaite|1988|p=456}}</ref> The law professor and future Conservative cabinet minister [[Norman St John-Stevas, Baron St John of Fawsley|Norman St. John-Stevas]] wrote at the time:
{{Blockquote|I had wanted to stand for the party at the next election, but I cannot bring myself to vote for the party at the moment, let alone stand for it. I am thinking of joining the Labour Party and am having lunch with Frank Pakenham next week.<ref name="Adamthwaite pages 449"/>}}

The historian [[Hugh Trevor-Roper]] expressed regret that no senior minister resigned and hoped "some kind of national Tory party can be saved from the wreck".<ref name="Adamthwaite pages 449"/> A master at Eton College in a letter to his MP declared:
{{Blockquote|I write to you to express my complete abhorrence of the policy which the government is pursuing.... I have voted Conservative in the last three elections, but I am quite sure my next vote will be for a Labour candidate.<ref name="Adamthwaite pages 449"/>}}

The Labour Party and the Trade Union Congress organised nation-wide anti-war protests, starting on 1 November under the slogan "Law, not war!"<ref name="Walsh 2006"/> On 4 November, at an anti-war rally in Trafalgar Square attended by 30,000 people (making it easily the biggest rally in London since 1945), the Labour MP [[Aneurin Bevan]] accused the government of "a policy of bankruptcy and despair".<ref name="Aneurin Bevan 1956">{{Cite web |date=4 February 2010 |title=Aneurin Bevan 1956 |url=http://www.newstatesman.com/uk-politics/2010/02/aneurin-bevan-1956-speech |access-date=22 August 2011 |website=New Statesman |location=UK}}</ref> Bevan stated at the Trafalgar rally:
{{Blockquote|We are stronger than Egypt but there are other countries stronger than us. Are we prepared to accept for ourselves the logic we are applying to Egypt? If nations more powerful than ourselves accept the absence of principle, the anarchistic attitude of Eden and launch bombs on London, what answer have we got, what complaint have we got? If we are going to appeal to force, if force is to be the arbiter to which we appeal, it would at least make common sense to try to make sure beforehand that we have got it, even if you accept that abysmal logic, that decadent point of view.<br /><br />We are in fact in the position today of having appealed to force in the case of a small nation, where if it is appealed to against us it will result in the destruction of Great Britain, not only as a nation, but as an island containing living men and women. Therefore I say to Anthony, I say to the British government, there is no count at all upon which they can be defended.<br /><br />They have besmirched the name of Britain. They have made us ashamed of the things of which formerly we were proud. They have offended against every principle of decency and there is only way in which they can even begin to restore their tarnished reputation and that is to get out! Get out! Get out!<ref name="Aneurin Bevan 1956"/>{{Dead link|date=October 2021}}}}

Inspired by Bevan's speech, the crowd at [[Trafalgar Square]] then marched on [[10 Downing Street]] chanting "Eden Must Go!", and attempted to storm the Prime Minister's residence.<ref name="Kyle, Keith 2011, p. 441">{{Harvnb|Kyle|2003|p=441}}</ref> The ensuing clashes between the police and the demonstrators which were captured by television cameras had a huge demoralising effect on the Eden cabinet,<ref>{{Harvnb|Kyle|2003|pp=441–442}}</ref> which was meeting there.<ref name="Kyle, Keith 2011, p. 441"/> The British historian Anthony Adamthwaite wrote in 1988 that American financial pressure was the key factor that forced Eden to accept a ceasefire, but the public protests, declining poll numbers and signs that many Conservative voters were deserting the government were important secondary factors.<ref name="Adamthwaite pages 449-464"/>

=== Domestic support for Eden ===
According to some historians, the majority of British people were on Eden's side.<ref name="fairhall20110630">{{Cite news |last=Fairhall |first=John |date=30 June 2011 |title=Drama sparks Suez Crisis memories |url=http://www.edp24.co.uk/norfolk-life/drama_sparks_suez_crisis_memories_1_949446 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141102190920/http://www.edp24.co.uk/norfolk-life/drama_sparks_suez_crisis_memories_1_949446 |archive-date=2 November 2014 |access-date=21 January 2015 |work=[[Eastern Daily Press]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Braddon |first=Russell |title=Suez: Splitting of a Nation |date=1973 |publisher=Collins |location=London |pages=111, 113}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last1=Sked |first1=Alan |title=Post-War Britain: A Political History |last2=Cook |first2=Chris |date=1984 |publisher=Penguin |location=London |page=134}}</ref> On 10 and 11 November an opinion poll found 53% supported the war, with 32% opposed.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sandbrook |first=Dominic |title=Never Had It So Good: A History of Britain from Suez to the Beatles |date=2006 |publisher=Abacus |location=London |page=18}}</ref>

The majority of Conservative constituency associations passed resolutions of support to "Sir Anthony".<ref name="Adamthwaite pages 449"/> [[Gilbert Murray]] was among Oxford scholars who signed a statement supporting Eden; such an act by the famous advocate of [[Internationalism (politics)|internationalism]] amazed both sides. He explained that, if not stopped, he believed [[Nasserism]] would become a Soviet-led worldwide anti-western movement.{{R|eayrs1964}}{{Rp|202–203}} British historian [[Barry Turner (journalist)|Barry Turner]] wrote that
{{Blockquote|The public reaction to press comment highlighted the divisions within the country. But there was no doubt that Eden still commanded strong support from a sizeable minority, maybe even a majority, of voters who thought that it was about time that the upset Arabs should be taught a lesson. The ''Observer'' and ''Guardian'' lost readers; so too did the ''News Chronicle'', a liberal newspaper that was soon to fold as a result of falling circulation.<ref name="Turner, Barry, p. 354"/>}} The economist [[Roy Harrod]] wrote at the time that the "more level-headed British, whom I believe to be in the majority though not the most vocal" were supporting the "notable act of courage and statesmanship" of the government.<ref>{{Harvnb|Wilson|2008|pp=66–67}}</ref> Eden himself claimed that his mail went from eight to one against the military action immediately after its start, to four to one in support on the day before the ceasefire.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Eden |first=Anthony |title=Full Circle |date=1960 |publisher=Cassell |location=London |page=546 |author-link=Anthony Eden}}</ref>

The conflict exposed the division within the Labour Party between its middle-class internationalist intelligentsia who opposed the conflict, and working-class voters who supported it.<ref>Sandbrook, p. 19.</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Harrison |first=Brian |title=Seeking a Role: The United Kingdom, 1951–1970 |date=2009 |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=105, 112}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Black |first=Lawrence |date=Autumn 2001 |title='The Bitterest Enemies of Communism': Labour Revisionists, Atlanticism and the Cold War |journal=Contemporary British History |volume=15 |issue=3 |pages=50–51|doi=10.1080/713999414 }}</ref>{{Efn|"As late as 1956 it was the middle class, not the working class, who opposed the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Barnett |first=Correlli |title=The Collapse of British Power |date=1972 |publisher=Eyre Methuen |location=London |page=52, n. 2}}</ref>}} One Conservative MP wrote: "I have lost my middle-class followers, but this has been at least balanced by backing from working-class electors who normally vote Socialist and who favour a strong line on Suez".<ref>{{Cite book |last=James |first=Lawrence |title=The Rise and Fall of the British Empire |date=1998 |publisher=Abacus |location=London |page=583}}</ref>

The Labour MP [[Richard Crossman]] said that "when the Labour Party leadership tried to organise demonstrations in the Provinces of the kind they'd held in Trafalgar Square, there was great reluctance among the working classes, because we were at war. It was Munich in reverse. And it was very, very acute". Fellow Labour MP [[James Callaghan]] agreed: "The [[wikt:horny-handed|horny-handed]] sons of toil rallied to the call of the bugle. They reacted against us in the same way as they did against [[Neville Chamberlain|Chamberlain]] a few months after Munich".{{Sfn|Braddon|1973|p=111}}

"My working mates were solidly in favour of Eden", recalled future Labour and SDP MP [[David Owen]]. Comparing opposition to Suez to what he described as the [[Cambridge Apostles]]'s "defeatist, even traitorous" support of pre-World War II [[appeasement]], Owen told [[Kenneth Harris (journalist)|Kenneth Harris]], "there was Gaitskell ... criticizing Eden, and here were these men working alongside me, who should have been his natural supporters, furious with him. The ''[[Daily Mirror]]'' backed Gaitskell, but these men were tearing up their ''Daily Mirror''s every day".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Harris |first=Kenneth |title=David Owen: Personally Speaking |publisher=Pan Books Ltd |year=1988 |isbn=978-0-3303-0608-9 |page=17}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Marquand |first=David |title=The Progressive Dilemma: From Lloyd George to Blair |date=1999 |publisher=Phoenix |location=London |page=203}}</ref> Callaghan recalled that up until the fighting started "we had public opinion on our side; but as soon as we actually went to war, I could ''feel'' the change".{{Sfn|Braddon|1973|p=113}} Another Labour MP, [[Barbara Castle]], recalled that Labour's protest against the conflict was "drowned in a wave of public jingoism".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Castle |first=Barbara |title=Fighting All The Way |date=1994 |publisher=Pan |location=London |page=253 |author-link=Barbara Castle}}</ref>

During the [[1957 Lewisham North by-election|Lewisham North]] and [[1957 Warwick and Leamington by-election|Warwick and Leamington]] by-elections held in February and March 1957, Labour instructed its activists not to emphasise their opposition to Suez because the government's action had considerable support.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Morgan |first=Kenneth O. |title=Britain Since 1945: The People's Peace |date=2001 |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=156}}</ref> Callaghan believed that the Conservatives increased their majority at the [[1959 United Kingdom general election|1959 election]] in part because working-class voters were still angry at the party for opposing the conflict.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Callaghan |first=James |title=Time and Chance |date=1987 |publisher=Collins |location=London |page=515 |author-link=James Callaghan}}</ref> The Labour MP [[Stanley Evans]] resigned from his seat and his membership of the party due to his support for British action in Suez.{{Sfn|Sked|Cook|1984|p=134}}

=== International reaction ===

====Response by Western governments====
[[File:1956-08-09 Press Parley.ogv|thumb|thumbtime=0:43|Eisenhower press conference about the crisis, 9 August]]
The operation,<ref name="autogenerated1">{{Harvnb|Varble|2003|p=88.n}}</ref> aimed at taking control of the Suez Canal, [[Gaza Strip|Gaza]], and parts of Sinai, was highly successful for the invaders from a military point of view, but was a disaster from a political point of view, resulting in international criticism and diplomatic pressure. Along with the Suez crisis, the United States was also dealing with the near-simultaneous [[Hungarian revolution of 1956|Hungarian revolution]]. Vice-President [[Richard Nixon]] later explained: "We couldn't on one hand, complain about the Soviets intervening in Hungary and, on the other hand, approve of the British and the French picking that particular time to intervene against Nasser".<ref name="BorhiContRoll">{{Cite journal |last=Borhi |first=László |year=1999 |title=Containment, Rollback, Liberation or Inaction? The United States and Hungary in the 1950s |journal=Journal of Cold War Studies |volume=1 |issue=3 |pages=67–108 |doi=10.1162/152039799316976814 |s2cid=57560214}}</ref> Beyond that, it was Eisenhower's belief that if the United States were seen to acquiesce in the attack on Egypt, that the resulting backlash in the Arab world might win the Arabs over to the Soviet Union.<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|p=391}}</ref>

Despite having no commercial or military interest in the area, many countries were concerned with the growing rift between Western allied nations. The Swedish ambassador to the Court of St. James's, [[Gunnar Hägglöf]] wrote in a letter to the anti-war Conservative M.P. [[Edward Boyle, Baron Boyle of Handsworth|Edward Boyle]],
{{Blockquote|I don't think there is any part of the world where the sympathies for England are greater than in Scandinavia. But Scandinavian opinion has never been more shocked by a British government's action—not even by the [[Anglo-German Naval Agreement|British-German Naval Agreement of 1935]]—than by the Suez intervention.<ref name="Adamthwaite pages 449"/>}}

When Israel refused to withdraw its troops from the Gaza Strip and [[Sharm el-Sheikh]], Eisenhower declared, "We must not allow Europe to go flat on its back for the want of oil." He sought UN-backed efforts to impose economic sanctions on Israel until it fully withdrew from Egyptian territory. Senate Majority Leader [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] and minority leader [[William Knowland]] objected to American pressure on Israel. Johnson told the Secretary of State [[John Foster Dulles]] that he wanted him to oppose "with all its skill" any attempt to apply sanctions on Israel.<ref name=Divine/>

Dulles rebuffed Johnson's request, and informed Eisenhower of the objections made by the Senate. Eisenhower was "insistent on applying economic sanctions" to the extent of cutting off private American assistance to Israel which was estimated to be over $100&nbsp;million a year. Ultimately, the [[Democratic Party (United States)|Democratic Party]]-controlled [[United States Senate|Senate]] would not co-operate with Eisenhower's position on Israel. Eisenhower finally told Congress he would take the issue to the American people, saying, "America has either one voice or none, and that voice is the voice of the President – whether everybody agrees with him or not."<ref name="Divine">{{Cite book |last=Divine |first=Robert |title=Eisenhower and the Cold War |date=1981 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=New York |pages=64–66}}</ref> The President spoke to the nation by radio and television where he outlined Israel's refusal to withdraw, explaining his belief that the UN had "no choice but to exert pressure upon Israel".<ref name=Divine/>

====Reception in the Muslim world====
The attack on Egypt greatly offended many in the [[Muslim world]]. In [[Pakistan]], 300,000 people took part in a rally in [[Lahore]] to show solidarity with Egypt, and a violent mob in [[Karachi]] chanting anti-British slogans burned down the [[British High Commission]].<ref>Pike, Francis ''Empires at War'', London: I.B. Tauris 2009, p. 303.</ref> In [[Syria]], the government blew up the [[Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline]], which had allowed Iraqi oil to reach tankers in the [[Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]], to punish [[Kingdom of Iraq|Iraq]] for supporting the invasion and to cut Britain off from one of its main routes for taking delivery of Iraqi oil.<ref>{{Harvnb|Turner|2006|p=328}}</ref> King [[Saud of Saudi Arabia]] imposed a total oil embargo on Britain and France.<ref>Lacey, Robert ''The Kingdom'', New York: Avon 1981, p. 315.</ref>

====U.N. General Assembly Resolution 997====
[[File:Nasser and Eisenhower, 1960.jpg|thumb|Presidents Eisenhower and Nasser meeting in New York, 1960]]
On 30 October, the Security Council held a meeting, at the request of the United States, when it submitted a draft resolution calling upon Israel immediately to withdraw its armed forces behind the established armistice lines. It was not adopted because of British and French vetoes. A similar draft resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union was also rejected.<ref name="UNEFbkgr">[https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unef1backgr2.html Establishment of UNEF, Background] at UN.org</ref> On 31 October, also [[Protocol of Sèvres|as planned]], France and the UK launched an air attack against targets in Egypt, which was followed shortly by a landing of their troops at the northern end of the canal zone. Later that day, considering the grave situation created by the actions against Egypt, and with lack of unanimity among the permanent members preventing it from exercising its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council passed [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 119|Resolution 119]]; it decided to call an [[emergency special session]] of the [[United Nations General Assembly|General Assembly]] for the [[First emergency special session of the United Nations General Assembly|first time]], as provided in the 1950 "Uniting for Peace" [[United Nations General Assembly Resolution 377|resolution]], in order to make appropriate recommendations to end the fighting.<ref name="UNEFbkgr"/>

[[File:1956-04-12 Full Scale War Looms.ogv|thumb|thumbtime=1:14|Universal Newsreel from 4 December about Dag Hammarskjöld's meeting with Nasser]]

The emergency special session was convened 1 November; the same day Nasser requested diplomatic assistance from the U.S., without requesting the same from the Soviet Union; he was at first sceptical of the efficacy of U.S. diplomatic efforts at the UN, but later gave full credit to Eisenhower's role in stopping the war.<ref name="Love557">{{Harvnb|Love|1969|pp=557–558}}</ref>

In the early hours of 2 November, the General Assembly adopted the United States' proposal for Resolution 997 (ES-I); the vote was 64 in favour and 5 opposed (Australia, New Zealand, Britain, France, and Israel) with 6 abstentions.<ref>John Allphin Moore and Jerry Pubantz, ''Encyclopedia of the United Nations'' (2008) 2:399</ref> It called for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of all forces behind the [[1949 Armistice Agreements#With Egypt|armistice lines]], an arms embargo, and the reopening of the Suez Canal, which was now blocked. The Secretary-General was requested to observe and report promptly on compliance to both the Security Council and General Assembly, for further action as deemed appropriate in accordance with the UN Charter.<ref name="UNEFbkgr"/>

Over the next several days, the emergency special session consequently adopted a series of enabling resolutions, which established the first [[United Nations Emergency Force]] (UNEF), on 7 November by Resolution 1001.<ref name="UNGAfschwaESSs">[https://www.un.org/ga/sessions/emergency.shtml UNGA Emergency Special Sessions]. Un.org. Retrieved on 8 September 2011.</ref> This proposal of the emergency force and the resulting cease-fire was made possible primarily through the efforts of [[Lester B. Pearson]], the [[Minister of Foreign Affairs (Canada)|Secretary of External Affairs of Canada]], and [[Dag Hammarskjöld]], the [[Secretary-General of the United Nations]]. Britain and France agreed to withdraw from Egypt within a week; Israel did not.

The role of Nehru, both as Indian Prime minister and a leader of the [[Non Aligned Movement]] was significant; the Indian historian Inder Malhotra wrote that "Now Nehru—who had tried to be even-handed between the two sides—denounced Eden and co-sponsors of the aggression vigorously. He had a powerful, if relatively silent, ally in the U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower who went to the extent of using America's clout in the [[International Monetary Fund|IMF]] to make Eden and Mollet behave".<ref name="IndExNoth"/> The Indian historian Inder Malhotra wrote about Nehru's role that: "So the Suez War ended in Britain's humiliation. Eden lost his job. Nehru achieved his objective of protecting Egypt's sovereignty and Nasser's honour".<ref name="IndExNoth">{{Cite web |last=Malhotra |first=Inder |date=2010-03-05 |title=Nothing common and there is no wealth |url=https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/nothing-common-and-there-is-no-wealth |url-access=subscription |access-date=2023-03-17 |website=The Indian Express}}</ref>

===== Condemnation of the U.N. in West Germany =====
A rare example of support for the Anglo-French actions against Egypt came from [[West Germany]]. Though his Cabinet was divided, West Germany's Chancellor [[Konrad Adenauer]] was furious with the United States for its "chumminess with the Russians" as Adenauer called the U.S. refusal to intervene in Hungary and voting with the Soviet Union at the UN Security Council. Adenauer told his Cabinet on 7 November that Nasser was a pro-Soviet force that needed to be cut down to size, and in his view the attack on Egypt was completely justified.<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pp. 241–242.</ref>

What appalled Adenauer about the crisis was that the United States had come out against the attack on Egypt and voted with the Soviet Union at Security Council against Britain and France, which led Adenauer to fear that the United States and Soviet Union would "carve up the world" according to their own interests with no thought for the interests of European states.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter p. 242"/> Adenauer was especially worried by the fact that the American embassy in [[Bonn]] would not provide a clear answer as to what was the American policy in response to the Bulganin letters.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter p. 244">Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 p. 244.</ref> Adenauer maintained to his Cabinet that the French had every right to invade Egypt because of Nasser's support for the FLN in Algeria, but the British were partly to blame because they "inexplicably" shut down their Suez Canal base in 1954.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter p. 242">Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 p. 242.</ref>

Subsequently, the traditionally [[Francophile]] Adenauer drew closer to Paris.<ref name="Dietl 2008, p. 273">{{Harvnb|Dietl|2008|p=273}}</ref> On 5–6 November 1956, he refused to cancel a planned visit to Paris, and his summit with Mollet was clearly meant to be seen as a gesture of moral support.<ref name="Dietl 2008, p. 273"/> One of Adenauer's aides, Fritz von Eckardt, commented regarding the opening ceremony in Paris where Mollet and Adenauer stood side by side that the national anthems were played "[i]n the most serious hour France had experienced since the end of the war[;] the two governments were standing shoulder by shoulder".<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter p. 244"/> During the summit in Paris, Mollet commented to Adenauer that a Soviet nuclear strike could destroy Paris at any moment, which added considerably to the tension and helped to draw the French and Germans closer.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter p. 244"/>

====Post-invasion Israeli initiatives====
On 7 November, David Ben-Gurion addressed the [[Knesset]] and declared a great victory, saying that the [[1949 Armistice Agreements|1949 armistice agreement]] with Egypt was dead and buried, and that the armistice lines were no longer valid and could not be restored. Under no circumstances would Israel agree to the stationing of UN forces on its territory or in any area it occupied.<ref name="AlterasIkeIsr">{{Harvnb|Alteras|1993|p=246}}</ref><ref name="PerlmRestl">{{Cite book |last=Brecher |first=Michael |title=A Restless Mind: Essays in Honor of Amos Perlmutter |date=1996 |publisher=Psychology Press |isbn=978-0-7146-4607-7 |editor-last=Frankel |editor-first=Benjamin |pages=104–143 |chapter=Eban and Israeli Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, War and Disengagement |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qkK_j0qz9EgC&pg=PA105}}</ref>{{Rp|104–117}} He also made an oblique reference to his intention to annex the Sinai Peninsula.<ref name="AlterasIkeIsr"/> Isaac Alteras writes that Ben-Gurion 'was carried away by the resounding victory against Egypt' and while 'a statesman well known for his sober realism, [he] took flight in dreams of grandeur.'

The speech marked the beginning of a four-month-long diplomatic struggle, culminating in withdrawal from all territory, under conditions far less palatable than those envisioned in the speech, but with conditions for sea access to [[Eilat]] and a UNEF presence on Egyptian soil.<ref name="AlterasIkeIsr"/> The speech immediately drew increased international pressure on Israel to withdraw.<ref name="PerlmRestl"/> That day in New York, the emergency session passed Resolution 1002, again calling for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops to behind the armistice lines, and for the immediate withdrawal of British and French troops from Egyptian territory.<ref name="UNEFbkgr"/> After a long Israeli cabinet meeting late on 8 November, Ben-Gurion informed Eisenhower that Israel declared its willingness to accept withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai, 'when satisfactory arrangements are made with the international force that is about to enter the canal zone'.<ref name="AlterasIkeIsr"/>

====Soviet sabre-rattling====
Although the [[Soviet Union]]'s position in the crisis was as helpless as was the United States' regarding Hungary's uprising, Premier [[Nikolai Bulganin]] threatened to intervene on the Egyptian side, and to launch rocket attacks on Britain, France and Israel.<ref name="AlterasIkeIsr"/><ref name="Shlaim181">{{Cite book |last=Shlaim |first=Avi |title=The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World |date=2001 |publisher=W. W. Norton |isbn=978-0-3933-2112-8 |location=New York |page=181 |author-link=Avi Shlaim}}</ref> Bulganin accused Ben-Gurion of supporting European colonialism, and Mollet of hypocrisy for leading a socialist government while pursuing a right-wing foreign policy.

The Soviet threat to send troops to Egypt to fight the Allies led Eisenhower to fear that this might be the beginning of World War III.<ref name="Neff, Donald p. 403">{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|p=403}}</ref> One of Eisenhower's aides Emmet Hughes recalled that the reaction at the White House to the Bulganin letters was "sombre" as there was fear that this was the beginning to the countdown to World War III, a war that if it occurred would kill hundreds of millions of people.<ref>{{Harvnb|Turner|2006|p=368}}</ref> In private, Eisenhower told Undersecretary of State [[Herbert Hoover Jr.]] of his fears that: {{Blockquote|The Soviet Union might be ready to undertake any wild adventure. They are as scared and furious as Hitler was in his last days. There's nothing more dangerous than a dictatorship in that frame of mind.<ref name="Neff, Donald p. 403"/>}}

If the Soviet Union did go to war with NATO allies Britain and France, then the United States would be unable to remain neutral, because the United States' obligations under NATO would come into effect, requiring them to go to war with the Soviet Union in defence of Britain and France. Likewise, if the Soviet Union attacked Israel, though there was no formal American commitment to defend Israel, the Eisenhower administration would come under heavy domestic pressure to intervene. From Eisenhower's viewpoint, it was better to end the war against Egypt rather than run the risk of this escalating into the Third World War, in case Khrushchev was serious about going to war in defence of Egypt as he insisted in public that he was.{{Sfn|Kyle|2003|p=458}}

Eisenhower's reaction to these threats from the Soviet Union was: "If those fellows start something, we may have to hit 'em — and, if necessary, with everything in the bucket."{{Cn|date=February 2023}} Eisenhower immediately ordered [[Lockheed U-2]] flights over Syria and Israel to search for any Soviet air forces on Syrian bases, so the British and French could destroy them. He told Hoover and CIA director [[Allen Dulles]], "If the Soviets attack the French and British directly, we would be in a war and we would be justified in taking military action even if Congress were not in session."{{Sfn|Kyle|2003|p=458}} The Americans excluded Israel from the guarantee against Soviet attack, however, alarming the Israeli government.{{R|AlterasIkeIsr}} The U-2 showed that Soviet aircraft were not in Syria despite the threats.<ref name="cia1992">{{Cite book |last1=Pedlow |first1=Gregory W. |url=http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB434 |title=The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954–1974 |last2=Welzenbach |first2=Donald E. |date=1992 |publisher=History Staff, Central Intelligence Agency |isbn=978-0-7881-8326-3 |location=Washington, D.C. |pages=113–120}}</ref>

Khrushchev often claimed to possess a vast arsenal of nuclear-tipped [[Intercontinental ballistic missile|ICBMs]], and while disclaiming any intention of starting a war, maintained that he would be more than happy to turn a conventional war into a nuclear one if war did come.<ref>{{Harvnb|Gaddis|1998|pp=237–240}}</ref> U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, which were intended to discover if the country really did have the nuclear arsenal that it claimed to have, only started in July 1956, and it was not until February 1959 that it firmly established that Khrushchev had [[Missile gap|vastly exaggerated his nuclear strength]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Gaddis|1998|pp=245–246}}</ref>

The supposedly huge Soviet arsenal of ICBMs, with which Khrushchev would wipe out the cities of Britain, France, Israel, and if necessary the United States consisted only of four ''[[R-7 Semyorka|Semyorka]]'' missiles stationed at a swamp south of [[Arkhangelsk]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Gaddis|1998|p=240}}</ref> From the viewpoint of Eisenhower, in 1956 he had no way of knowing for certain whether Khrushchev's nuclear braggadocio was for real or not.{{Sfn|Gaddis|1998|pp=239–240}}

Earlier in 1956, Dulles had warned Eisenhower that Khrushchev was "the most dangerous person to lead the Soviet Union since the [[October Revolution]]" as Khrushchev was "not a coldly calculating person, but rather one who reacted emotionally. He was obviously intoxicated much of the time and could be expected to commit irrational acts."{{Sfn|Gaddis|1998|pp=239–240}} Khrushchev later admitted in his memoirs that he was not seriously "thinking of going to war" in November 1956 as he claimed at the time as he lacked the necessary ICBMs to make good his threats.<ref>{{Harvnb|Gaddis|1998|p=239}}</ref>

=== Economic pressure on Britain and France ===
The United States also put financial pressure on the UK to end the invasion. Because the [[Bank of England]] had lost $45 million between 30 October and 2 November, and Britain's oil supply had been restricted by the closing of the Suez Canal, the British sought immediate assistance from the IMF, but it was denied by the United States. Eisenhower in fact ordered his Secretary of the Treasury, [[George M. Humphrey]], to prepare to sell part of the US Government's [[Gilt-edged securities|Sterling Bond]] holdings. The UK government considered invading [[Kuwait]] and [[Qatar]] if oil sanctions were put in place by the US.<ref>Williams, Charles ''Harold Macmillan'' (2009) pp. 259–261</ref>

Britain's [[Chancellor of the Exchequer]], [[Harold Macmillan]], advised his Prime Minister, [[Anthony Eden]], that the United States was fully prepared to carry out this threat. He also warned his Prime Minister that Britain's [[foreign exchange reserves]] simply could not sustain the [[devaluation]] of the pound that would come after the United States' actions; and that within weeks of such a move, the country would be unable to import the food and energy supplies needed to sustain the population on the islands. However, there were suspicions in the Cabinet that Macmillan had deliberately overstated the financial situation in order to force Eden out. What Treasury officials had told Macmillan was far less serious than what he told the Cabinet.<ref>{{Harvnb|Kyle|2003|p=464}}</ref>

In concert with U.S. actions, [[Saudi Arabia]] started an oil embargo against Britain and France. The U.S. refused to fill the gap until Britain and France agreed to a rapid withdrawal. Other NATO members refused to sell oil they received from Arab nations to Britain or France.<ref>{{Harvnb|Love|1969|p=651}}</ref>

=== Ceasefire ===
[[File:1957-02-14 Tel Aviv Israel.ogv|thumbtime=0:12|thumb|Israelis protesting against the UN order to evacuate Gaza and Sinai, 14 February 1957]]

Because the British government faced political and economic pressure, the Prime Minister, [[Anthony Eden]], announced a cease fire on 6 November, warning neither France nor Israel beforehand. Troops were still in Port Said and on operational manoeuvres when the order came from London. Port Said had been overrun, and the military assessment was that the Suez Canal could have been completely taken within 24 hours.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Trueman |first=C N |date=25 May 2015 |title=The Suez Crisis of 1956 |url=https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-to-1980/the-cold-war/the-suez-crisis-of-1956 |access-date=2023-03-17 |website=The History Learning Site |language=en-GB}}</ref> Eisenhower initially agreed to meet with Eden and Mollet to resolve their differences, but then cancelled the proposed meeting after Secretary of State Dulles advised him it risked inflaming the Middle Eastern situation further.<ref name="qjmed.oxfordjournals.org">{{Cite journal |last=Owen |first=CH |date=6 May 2005 |title=The effect of Prime Minister Anthony Eden's illness on his decision-making during the Suez crisis |url=http://qjmed.oxfordjournals.org/content/98/6/387.full |url-status=bot: unknown |journal=QJM: An International Journal of Medicine |volume=98 |issue=6 |pages=387–402 |doi=10.1093/qjmed/hci071 |issn=1460-2393 |pmid=15879438 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111114034940/http://qjmed.oxfordjournals.org/content/98/6/387.full |archive-date=14 November 2011 |access-date=6 May 2021 |doi-access=free}}</ref>

Eisenhower was not in favour of an immediate withdrawal of British, French and Israeli troops until the US ambassador to the United Nations, [[Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.]] pushed for it. Eden's predecessor [[Winston Churchill]] commented on 22 November, "I cannot understand why our troops were halted. To go so far and not go on was madness."<ref>{{Harvnb|Alteras|1993|p=243}}</ref> Churchill further added that while he might not have dared to begin the military operation, nevertheless once having ordered it he would certainly not have dared to stop it before it had achieved its objective. Without further guarantee, the Anglo-French Task Force had to finish withdrawing by 22 December 1956, to be replaced by Danish and Colombian units of the UNEF.<ref>[http://www.ecpad.fr/ecpa/PagesDyn/result.asp?reportageid=1012 Service Cinématographique des Armées SCA reportage de Paul Corcuff, 22 December 1956] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081206002311/http://www.ecpad.fr/ecpa/PagesDyn/result.asp?reportageid=1012 |date=6 December 2008}} French Ministry of Defense archives ECPAD MO56141AR14</ref>

The Israelis refused to host any UN force on Israeli-controlled territory and withdrew from the Sinai and Gaza in March 1957. Before the withdrawal the Israeli forces systematically destroyed infrastructure in the Sinai peninsula such as roads, railways and telephone lines, and all houses in the villages of [[Abu Ageila]] and El Quseima.<ref name="Chomsk">{{Cite book |last=Chomsky |first=Noam |url=https://archive.org/details/fatefultriangleu00chom |title=The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians |date=1983 |publisher=[[South End Press]] |isbn=978-0-8960-8187-1 |location=New York |page=[https://archive.org/details/fatefultriangleu00chom/page/194 194] |url-access=registration}}</ref> Before the railway was destroyed, Israeli troops confiscated [[Egyptian National Railways]] equipment including six locomotives<ref>{{Cite book |last=Cotterell |first=Paul |title=The Railways of Palestine and Israel |date=1984 |publisher=Tourret Publishing |isbn=978-0-9058-7804-1 |pages=100–101}}</ref> and a 30-ton [[Crane (railroad)#Breakdown cranes|breakdown crane]] for use by [[Israel Railways]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Gallery |url=http://www.rail.co.il/EN/Fun/Museum/Pages/gallery.aspx |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120619041704/http://rail.co.il/EN/Fun/Museum/Pages/gallery.aspx |archive-date=19 June 2012 |access-date=25 May 2011 |website=Fun |publisher=Israel Railways |df=dmy-all}}</ref>

The UNEF was formed by forces from countries that were not part of the major alliances, [[NATO]] and the [[Warsaw Pact]]. [[Canadian Armed Forces]] troops participated in later years, since Canada had spearheaded the idea of a neutral force. By 24 April 1957, the canal was fully reopened to shipping.<ref name="ucsb">{{Cite web |date=14 January 1958 |title=Message to the Congress Transmitting the 11th Annual Report on United States Participation in the United Nations |url=http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=11356 |access-date=5 March 2009 |publisher=University of California Santa Barbara}}</ref><ref name="usatoday">{{Cite news |date=28 August 2001 |title=Suez crisis, 1956 |url=https://www.usatoday.com/news/world/mideast/timeline.htm |access-date=5 March 2009 |work=The Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1947–present}}</ref>