Editing Douglas MacArthur (section)

===South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu===
[[File:MacArthur_e_Walton_Walker.jpg|thumb|right|MacArthur confers with Lieutenant General [[Walton Walker]] (right) and other soldiers of the Eighth Army in July 1950.]]
On 25 June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea, starting the [[Korean War]].{{sfn|James|1985|p=387}} The [[United Nations Security Council]] passed in quick succession [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 82|Resolution 82]], [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 83|Resolution 83]], [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 84|Resolution 84]] and [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 85|Resolution 85]] which authorized a [[United Nations Command]] (UNC) force to assist South Korea.{{sfn|James|1985|p=434}} The UN empowered the American government to select a commander, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously recommended MacArthur.{{sfn|James|1985|p=436}} He therefore became commander-in-chief of the UNC, while remaining SCAP in Japan and [[Far East Command (United States)|Commander-in-Chief, Far East]].{{sfn|James|1985|p=440}} All South Korean forces were placed under his command. As they retreated before the North Korean onslaught, MacArthur received permission to commit U.S. ground forces. All the first units to arrive could do was trade men and ground for time, falling back to the [[Battle of Pusan Perimeter|Pusan Perimeter]].{{sfn|James|1985|pp=433–435}} By the end of August, the crisis subsided. North Korean attacks on the perimeter had tapered off. While the North Korean force numbered 88,000 troops, Lieutenant General [[Walton Walker]]'s Eighth Army now numbered 180,000, and he had more tanks and artillery pieces.{{sfn|James|1985|p=451}}

[[File:IncheonLandingMcArthur.jpg|thumb|left|MacArthur observes the naval shelling of Inchon from {{USS|Mount McKinley|AGC-7|6}}, 15 September 1950 with Brigadier General [[Courtney Whitney]] (left) and Major General [[Edward M. Almond]] (right).|alt=MacArthur is seated, wearing his field marshal's hat and a bomber jacket, and holding a pair of binoculars. Four other men also carrying binoculars stand behind him.]]

In 1949, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General of the Army [[Omar Bradley]], had predicted that "large scale combined amphibious operations&nbsp;... will never occur again", but by July 1950, MacArthur was planning just such an operation.{{sfn|James|1985|p=465}} MacArthur compared his plan with that of General [[James Wolfe]] at the [[Battle of the Plains of Abraham]], and brushed aside the problems of tides, [[hydrography]] and terrain.{{sfn|James|1985|pp=467–469}} In September, despite lingering concerns from superiors, MacArthur's soldiers and Marines made a successful [[Battle of Inchon|landing at Inchon]], deep behind North Korean lines. Launched with naval and close air support, the landing outflanked the North Koreans, recaptured [[Seoul]] and forced them to retreat northward in disarray.{{sfn|James|1985|pp=475–483}} Visiting the battlefield on 17 September, MacArthur surveyed six [[T-34]] tanks that had been knocked out by Marines, ignoring sniper fire around him, except to note that the North Korean marksmen were poorly trained.{{sfn|Stanton|1989|pp=78–80}}

On 11 September, Truman issued an order, [[National security directive#Truman and Eisenhower administrations|NSC 81/1]], to MacArthur and UN forces for an advance beyond the 38th parallel into North Korea. Truman, Secretary of State [[Dean Acheson]], Secretary of Defense George Marshall, U.S. Ambassador to the UN [[Warren R. Austin]], and the British and French governments all agreed on the decision to invade and occupy all of North Korea. MacArthur, busy with the Pusan Perimeter defense and the upcoming Inchon landings, had nothing to do with this decision.<ref>{{Cite web |title=MacArthur and the Chinese Communist Intervention in the Korean War, September-December 1950 |last=James |first=D. Clayton |url=https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/n/new-equation.html |access-date=2 February 2024}}</ref><ref>{{cite report |url=https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/national-security-council-report-nsc-811-united-states-courses-action-respect-korea |title=Note by the Executive Secretary on United States Courses of Action with Respect to Korea |last=Lay |first=James S. |date=9 September 1950 |publisher=National Security Council |via=Wilson Center Digital Archive |access-date=10 September 2023}}</ref> There was controversy over whether U.S. troops should cross the 38th parallel with only the approval from the U.S. government (NSC 81/1 was solely a U.S. order) because the original UN resolution only called for the restoration of South Korea below the 38th parallel. MacArthur was very hesitant about advancing north of the 38th parallel and waited for further instructions. Marshall ordered MacArthur on 30 September to feel "unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of 38th parallel." This ambiguity was finally resolved by the UN General Assembly greenlighting MacArthur to advance northward on 4 October with Resolution 376(V), which authorized him and UN forces to cross the 38th parallel and to unify all of Korea under the Republic of Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 October further clarified to MacArthur that the official mandate for UN forces was the unification of a democratic Korea.<ref>{{Cite news |newspaper=The Michigan Daily |title=38th Parallel Crossing |date=14 October 1950 |page=2  |via=Google News Archive Search |url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2706&dat=19501014&id=zQhbAAAAIBAJ&sjid=EU4NAAAAIBAJ&pg=838,5258849 |access-date=29 November 2023}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.macarthurmemorial.org/483/Korean-War-Messages|title=Korean War Messages |publisher=MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk Virginia |access-date=12 October 2022}}</ref> MacArthur now planned another amphibious assault, on [[Wonsan]] on the east coast, but it fell to South Korean troops before the 1st Marine Division could reach it by sea.{{sfn|James|1985|pp=486–493}} In October, MacArthur met with Truman at the [[Wake Island Conference]], with Truman emulating Roosevelt's wartime meeting with MacArthur in Hawaii. MacArthur reassured Truman, commenting:{{blockquote|"I can assure you one thing, Mr. President, if you ever have to run against a military man, his name won't be MacArthur.".{{sfn|MacArthur|1964|pp=372–373}}}}.{{sfn|James|1985|p=500}} The president awarded MacArthur his fifth Distinguished Service Medal.{{sfn|MacArthur|1964|pp=360–363}} Briefly questioned about the Chinese threat, MacArthur dismissed it, saying that he hoped to be able to withdraw the Eighth Army to Japan by Christmas, and to release a division for service in Europe in January. He regarded the possibility of Soviet intervention as a more serious threat.{{sfn|James|1985|pp=507–508}}

On 20 October MacArthur flew to the [[Sukchon]]-[[Sunchon]] area of North Korea, north of Pyongyang, to supervise and observe an airborne operation by the [[187th Infantry Regiment (United States)#Airborne assault, 20 October 1950|187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team]]. This was the first of two airborne operations done by UN forces during the Korean War. MacArthur's [[Lockheed C-121 Constellation|unarmed airplane]] was subject to attack by enemy aircraft known to be based at [[Sinuiju]]. MacArthur received a [[Distinguished Flying Cross (United States)|Distinguished Flying Cross]] for supervising the operation in person.<ref>{{cite web |title=Douglas MacArthur – Distinguished Flying Cross, Awarded for Actions During Korean War |work=Hall of Valor Project |url=https://valor.militarytimes.com/hero/676#94835 |access-date=26 March 2021 |archive-date=26 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210326062616/https://valor.militarytimes.com/hero/676#94835 |url-status=live }}</ref>

A month later, things had changed. The enemy were engaged by the UN forces at the [[Battle of Unsan]] in late October, which demonstrated the presence of Chinese soldiers in Korea and rendered significant losses to the American and other UN troops. Nevertheless, Willoughby downplayed the evidence about Chinese intervention in the war. He estimated that up to 71,000 Chinese soldiers were in the country, while the true number was closer to 300,000.<ref name="Halberstam" /> He was not alone in this miscalculation. On 24 November, the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] reported to Truman that while there could be as many as 200,000 Chinese troops in Korea, "there is no evidence that the Chinese Communists plan major offensive operations".{{sfn|Manchester|1978|p=604}}

That day, MacArthur flew to Walker's headquarters, and he later wrote:{{blockquote|For five hours I toured the front lines. In talking to a group of officers I told them of General Bradley's desire and hope to have two divisions home by Christmas&nbsp;... What I had seen at the front line worried me greatly. The R.O.K. troops were not yet in good shape, and the entire line was deplorably weak in numbers. If the Chinese were actually in heavy force, I decided I would withdraw our troops and abandon any attempt to move north. I decided to reconnoiter and try to see with my own eyes, and interpret with my own long experience what was going on&nbsp;...{{sfn|MacArthur|1964|pp=372–373}}}} MacArthur flew over the front line himself in his [[Douglas C-54 Skymaster]] but saw no signs of a Chinese build up and therefore decided to wait before ordering an advance or withdrawal. Evidence of the Chinese activity was hidden to MacArthur: the Chinese Army traveled at night and dug in during the day.<ref name="Halberstam" /> For his reconnaissance efforts, MacArthur was nonetheless awarded the honorary [[United States Aviator Badge|combat pilot's wings]].{{sfn|MacArthur|1964|pp=372–373}}