Editing Battle of Britain (section)

====Assault on RAF: radar and airfields====
[[File:East Coast Chain Home radar station CH15176.jpg|thumb|East Coast [[Chain Home]] radar operators.]]
Poor weather delayed ''[[Adlertag]]'' ("Eagle Day") until 13 August 1940. On 12 August, the first attempt was made to blind the Dowding system, when aircraft from the specialist fighter-bomber unit [[Erprobungskommando#Erprobungsgruppe 210|''Erprobungsgruppe'' 210]] attacked four [[Chain Home|radar stations]]. Three were briefly taken off the air but were back working within six hours.<ref name="Bungay, 2000, pp. 203–205">{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|pp=203–205}}</ref> The raids appeared to show that British radars were difficult to knock out. The failure to mount follow-up attacks allowed the RAF to get the stations back on the air, and the Luftwaffe neglected strikes on the supporting infrastructure, such as phone lines and power stations, which could have rendered the radars useless, even if the lattice-work towers themselves, which were very difficult to destroy, remained intact.<ref name="Allen"/>

''Adlertag'' opened with a series of attacks, led again by ''Erpro'' 210,<ref name="Bungay, 2000, pp. 203–205"/> on coastal airfields used as forward landing grounds for the RAF fighters, as well as 'satellite airfields'<ref group=nb>"Satellite" airfields were mostly fully equipped but did not have the sector control room which allowed "Sector" airfields such as Biggin Hill to monitor and control RAF fighter formations. RAF units from Sector airfields often flew into a satellite airfield for operations during the day, returning to their home airfield in the evenings.</ref> including [[RAF Manston|Manston]] and [[RAF Hawkinge|Hawkinge]].<ref name="Bungay, 2000, pp. 203–205" /> As the week drew on, the airfield attacks moved further inland, and repeated raids were made on the radar chain. 15 August was "The Greatest Day" when the Luftwaffe mounted the largest number of sorties of the campaign. ''Luftflotte'' 5 attacked the north of England. Raiding forces from Denmark and Norway, which believed Fighter Command strength to be concentrated in the south, ran into resistance which was unexpectedly strong. Inadequately escorted by Bf 110s, Bf109s having insufficient range to escort raids from Norway, bombers were shot down in large numbers. North East England was attacked by 65 Heinkel 111s escorted by 34 Messerschmitt 110s, and [[RAF Driffield|RAF Great Driffield]] was attacked by 50 unescorted Junkers 88s. Out of 115 bombers and 35 fighters sent, 75 planes were destroyed and many others were damaged beyond repair. Furthermore, due to early engagement by RAF fighters, many of the bombers dropped their payloads ineffectively early.<ref>[http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/document-32.html "Document 32.] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110723024634/http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/document-32.html |date=23 July 2011 }} ''Battle of Britain Historical Society''. Retrieved: 19 March 2015.</ref> As a result of these casualties, ''Luftflotte'' 5 did not appear in strength again in the campaign.
[[File:Pilots of No. 310 (Czechoslovak) Squadron RAF in front of Hawker Hurricane Mk I at Duxford, Cambridgeshire, 7 September 1940. CH1299.jpg|thumb|[[Czechoslovakia|Czechoslovak]] fighter pilots of [[No. 310 Squadron RAF]] at [[RAF Duxford]] in 1940]]

18 August, which had the greatest number of casualties to both sides, has been dubbed "[[The Hardest Day]]". Following this grinding battle, exhaustion and the weather reduced operations for most of a week, allowing the Luftwaffe to review their performance. "The Hardest Day" had sounded the end for the Ju 87 in the campaign.<ref>{{harvnb|Price|1980|p=179}}</ref> This veteran of ''Blitzkrieg'' was too vulnerable to fighters to operate over Britain. Göring withdrew the ''Stuka'' from the fighting to preserve the ''Stuka'' force, removing the main Luftwaffe precision-bombing weapon and shifting the burden of pinpoint attacks onto the already-stretched ''Erpro'' 210. The Bf 110 proved too clumsy for dogfighting with single-engined fighters, and its participation was scaled back. It would be used only when range required it or when sufficient single-engined escort could not be provided for the bombers.
[[File:Pilots of No. 19 Squadron RAF relax in the crew room at Fowlmere, the satellite airfield to Duxford in Cambridgeshire, September 1940. CH1461.jpg|thumb|Pilots of [[No. 19 Squadron RAF]] relax in the crew room at [[RAF Fowlmere]], 1940]]
Göring made yet another important decision: to order more bomber escorts at the expense of free-hunting sweeps. To achieve this, the weight of the attack now fell on ''Luftflotte'' 2, and the bulk of the Bf 109s in ''[[Luftflotte 3]]'' were transferred to Kesselring's command, reinforcing the fighter bases in the [[Pas-de-Calais]]. Stripped of its fighters, ''Luftflotte 3'' would concentrate on the night bombing campaign. Göring, expressing disappointment with the fighter performance thus far in the campaign, also made sweeping changes in the command structure of the fighter units, replacing many ''[[Geschwaderkommodore]]'' with younger, more aggressive pilots such as  Adolf Galland and [[Werner Mölders]].<ref>{{harvnb|Deighton|1996|p=182}}</ref>

Finally, Göring stopped the attacks on the radar chain. These were seen as unsuccessful, and neither the ''[[Reichsmarschall]]'' nor his subordinates realised how vital the Chain Home stations were to the defence systems. It was known that radar provided some early warning of raids, but the belief among German fighter pilots was that anything bringing up the "[[Tommy Atkins|Tommies]]" to fight was to be encouraged.{{citation needed|date=October 2017}}