Editing Scientific method (section)

=== Epistemological anarchism ===
{{Main|Epistemological anarchism}}

{{anchor|noMethod}}[[Paul Feyerabend]] examined the history of science, and was led to deny that science is genuinely a methodological process. In his 1975 book ''[[Against Method]]'' he argued that no description of scientific method [[#critiquesOfFeyerabend|could possibly be broad enough]] to include all the approaches and methods used by scientists, and that there are no useful and exception-free [[methodology|methodological rules]] governing the progress of science. In essence, he said that for any specific method or norm of science, one can find a historic episode where violating it has contributed to the progress of science. He jokingly suggested that, if believers in the scientific method wish to express a single universally valid rule, it should be '[[#theTermSci|anything goes]]'.<ref>[[Paul Feyerabend|Feyerabend, Paul K.]], ''Against Method, Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge'', 1st published, 1975. Reprinted, Verso, London, 1978.
</ref> As has been argued before him however, this is uneconomic; [[Problem solving|problem solver]]s, and researchers are to be prudent with their resources during their inquiry.{{efn-ua|name= FRL-1.136 |{{harvp|Peirce|1899}} First rule of logic (F.R.L)<ref name= reasonsFirstRule /> Paragraph 1.136: From the first rule of logic, if we truly desire the goal of the inquiry we are not to waste our resources.<ref name=econ/><ref name= SuitableTest/> — [[Terence Tao]] wrote on the matter that not all approaches can be regarded as "equally suitable and deserving of equal resources" because such positions would "sap mathematics of its sense of direction and purpose".<ref name= taoTime >{{cite journal | last=Tao | first=Terence | title=What is good mathematics? |url=https://www.ams.org/journals/bull/2007-44-04/S0273-0979-07-01168-8/S0273-0979-07-01168-8.pdf |journal=Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society |series=New Series |volume=44 |issue=4 |date=October 2007 |pages=623–634  | doi=10.1090/S0273-0979-07-01168-8 | arxiv=math/0702396 }}</ref>}}

A more general inference against formalised method has been found through research involving interviews with scientists regarding their conception of method. This research indicated that scientists frequently encounter difficulty in determining whether the available evidence supports their hypotheses. This reveals that there are no straightforward mappings between overarching methodological concepts and precise strategies to direct the conduct of research.<ref name="Schickore Hangel 2019">{{cite journal | last1=Schickore | first1=Jutta | last2=Hangel | first2=Nora | title="It might be this, it should be that…" uncertainty and doubt in day-to-day research practice | journal=European Journal for Philosophy of Science | volume=9 | issue=2 | date=2019 | issn=1879-4912 | doi=10.1007/s13194-019-0253-9 | page=}}</ref>