Editing Manhattan Project (section)

=== Soviet spies ===
{{Main|Atomic spies}}
The prospect of sabotage was always present, and sometimes suspected when there were equipment failures. While there were some problems believed to be the result of careless or disgruntled employees, there were no confirmed instances of Axis-instigated sabotage.<ref>{{harvnb|Jones|1985|pp=263–264}}.</ref> However, on 10 March 1945, a Japanese [[fire balloon]] struck a power line, and the resulting power surge caused the three reactors at Hanford to be temporarily shut down.<ref>{{harvnb|Jones|1985|p=267}}.</ref> With so many people involved, security was difficult. A special [[Counter Intelligence Corps]] detachment was formed to handle the project's security issues.<ref>{{harvnb|Jones|1985|pp=258–260}}.</ref> By 1943, it was clear that the Soviet Union was attempting to penetrate the project. Lieutenant Colonel [[Boris T. Pash]], the head of the Counter Intelligence Branch of the [[Western Defense Command]], investigated suspected Soviet espionage at the Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley. Oppenheimer informed Pash that he had been approached by a fellow professor at Berkeley, [[Haakon Chevalier]], about passing information to the Soviet Union.<ref>{{harvnb|Jones|1985|pp=261–265}}.</ref>

The most successful Soviet spy was [[Klaus Fuchs]], a physicist and member of the British Mission who was intimately involved in work at Los Alamos on the design of the implosion bomb.<ref>{{harvnb|Groves|1962|pp=142–145}}.</ref> His espionage activities were not identified until 1950, as a result of [[Venona project]]. The revelation of his espionage activities damaged the United States' nuclear cooperation with Britain and Canada,<ref>{{harvnb|Hewlett|Duncan|1969|pp=312–314}}.</ref> and other instances of espionage were subsequently uncovered, leading to the arrest of [[Harry Gold]], [[David Greenglass]], and [[Julius and Ethel Rosenberg]].<ref>{{harvnb|Hewlett|Duncan|1969|p=472}}.</ref> Other spies like [[George Koval]] and [[Theodore Hall]] remained unknown for decades.<ref>{{cite news |last=Broad |first=William J.|date=12 November 2007|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/12/us/12koval.html |title=A Spy's Path: Iowa to A-Bomb to Kremlin Honor|newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|pages=1–2|access-date=2 July 2011}}</ref> The value of the espionage is difficult to quantify, as the principal constraint on the [[Soviet atomic bomb project]] was their short supply of uranium ore. It may have saved the Soviets at least one or two years in the development of their own bomb,<ref>{{harvnb|Holloway|1994|pp=222–223}}.</ref> although some historians have argued the Soviets spent as much time vetting and reduplicating the information as they would have saved had they trusted it.<ref>{{cite book|last=Gordin|first=Michael D.|title=Red Cloud at Dawn: Truman, Stalin, and the End of the Atomic Monopoly|publisher=Farrar, Straus, and Giroux|year=2009|pages=153–156}}</ref>