Editing Maginot Line (section)

== Postwar assessment ==
In analysing the Maginot Line, Ariel Ilan Roth summarised its main purpose: it was not "as popular myth would later have it, to make France invulnerable", but it was constructed to make the appeal of [[flanking]] the French "far outweigh the appeal of attacking them head on".{{sfn|Roth|2010|p=6}} J.E. Kaufmann and H.W. Kaufmann added that before construction in October 1927, the Superior Council of War adopted the final design for the line and identified that one of the main missions would be to deter a German cross-border assault with only minimal force to allow "the army time to mobilise."{{sfn|Kaufmann|Kaufmann|2006|p=14}} In addition, the French envisioned that the Germans would conduct a [[Schlieffen Plan|repeat of their First World War battle plan]] to flank the defences and drew up their overall strategy with that in mind.{{sfn|Jackson|2003|pp=26–27}}{{sfn|Kaufmann|Kaufmann|2006|pp=4, 85–86, 88}}

Julian Jackson highlighted one of the line's roles was to facilitate that strategy by "free[ing] manpower for offensive operations elsewhere... and to protect the forces of manoeuvre"; the latter included a more mechanised and modernised military, which would advance into Belgium and engage the German main thrust flanking the line.{{sfn|Jackson|2003|pp=26–27}} In support, Roth commented that the French strategy envisioned one of two possibilities by advancing into Belgium: "either there would be a decisive battle in which France might win, or, more likely, a front would develop and stabilise". The latter meant the next war's destructive consequences would not take place on French soil.{{sfn|Roth|2010|p=6}}
[[File:Line maginot tunel.jpg|thumb|Tunnel, Ouvrage Schoenenbourg, the decauville]]

Postwar assessment of whether the Maginot Line served its purpose has been mixed. Its enormous cost and its failure to prevent German forces from invading France have caused journalists and political commentators to remain divided on whether the line was worthwhile.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/shortcuts/2017/oct/25/whats-the-stupidest-thing-a-nation-has-ever-done |title=What's the stupidest thing a nation has ever done? |first=Gavin |last=Haynes |date=25 October 2017 |website=Theguardian.com |access-date=2023-02-23}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-difficult-truths-behind-dunkirk/2017/08/11/5d1cbaf0-7c57-11e7-b2b1-aeba62854dfa_story.html|title=Opinion – The difficult truths behind 'Dunkirk'|newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]|access-date=25 October 2017}}</ref>

The historian Clayton Donnell commented, "If one believes the Maginot Line was built for the primary purpose of stopping a German invasion of France, most will consider it a massive failure and a waste of money... in reality, the line was not built to be the ultimate saviour of France".{{sfn|Donnell|2017|p=4}} Donnell argued that the primary purpose of "prevent[ing] a concerted attack on France through the traditional invasion routes and to permit time for the mobilisation of troops... was fulfilled", as was the French strategy of forcing the Germans to enter Belgium, which ideally would have allowed "the French to fight on favourable terrain". However, he noted that the French failed to use the line as the basis for an offensive.{{sfn|Donnell|2017|p=45}}

Marc Romanych and Martin Rupp highlight that "poor decisions and missed opportunities" plagued the line and point to its purpose of conserving manpower: "about 20 percent of [France's] field divisions remained inactive along the Maginot Line". Belgium was overrun, and British and French forces [[Dunkirk evacuation|evacuated at Dunkirk]]. They argue had those troops been moved north, "it is possible that Heeresgruppe A's advance could have been blunted, giving time for Groupe d'armees 1 to reorganise".{{sfn|Romanych|Rupp|2010|p=91}} Kaufmann and Kaufmann commented, "When all is said and done, the Maginot Line did not fail to accomplish its original mission... it provided a shield that bought time for the army to mobilise... [and] concentrate its best troops along the Belgian border to engage the enemy."{{sfn|Kaufmann|Kaufmann|2006|p=182}}

The psychological factor of the Maginot Line has also been discussed. Its construction created a false sense of security, which was widely believed by the French population.{{sfn|Donnell|2017|p=4}} Kaufmann and Kaufmann comment that it was an unintended consequence of André Maginot's efforts to "focus the public's attention on the work being done, emphasising the role and nature of the line". That resulted in "the media exaggerating their descriptions by turning the line into an impregnable fortified position that would seal the frontier". The false sense of security contributed "to the development of the "Maginot mentality".{{sfn|Kaufmann|Kaufmann|2006|p=15}}

Jackson commented that "it has often been alleged that the Maginot Line contributed to France's defeat by making the military too complacent and defence-minded. Such accusations are unfounded".{{sfn|Jackson|2003|p=27}} Historians have pointed to numerous reasons for the French defeat: faulty strategy and doctrine, dispersion of forces, the loss of command and control, poor communications, faulty intelligence that provided excessive German numbers, the slow nature of the French response to the German penetration of the Ardennes and a failure to understand the nature and speed of the German doctrine.{{sfn|Kaufmann|Kaufmann|2006|pp=153, 157, 160}}{{sfn|Jackson|2003|p=221}} More seriously, historians have noted rather than the Germans doing what the French had envisioned, the French played into the Germans' hand, culminating in their defeat.{{sfn|Roth|2010|p=7}}{{sfn|Donnell|2017|p=45}}

When the French Army failed in Belgium, the Maginot Line covered their retreat.{{sfn|Kaufmann|Kaufmann|2006|p=182}} Romanych and Rupp indicate that except for the loss of several insignificant fortifications from insufficient defending troops, the actual fortifications and troops "withstood the test of battle", repulsed numerous attacks, and "withstood intense aerial and artillery bombardment".{{sfn|Romanych|Rupp|2010|pp=91–92}} Kaufmann and Kaufmann point to the Maginot Line along the Italian border, which "demonstrated the effectiveness of the fortifications... when properly employed".{{sfn|Kaufmann|Kaufmann|2006|p=180}}