Editing Gödel's incompleteness theorems (section)

==== Finsler ====
{{harvtxt|Finsler|1926}} used a version of [[Richard's paradox]] to construct an expression that was false but unprovable in a particular, informal framework he had developed.{{sfn|Finsler|1926}} Gödel was unaware of this paper when he proved the incompleteness theorems (Collected Works Vol. IV., p.&nbsp;9). Finsler wrote to Gödel in 1931 to inform him about this paper, which Finsler felt had priority for an incompleteness theorem. Finsler's methods did not rely on formalized provability and had only a superficial resemblance to Gödel's work.{{sfn|van Heijenoort|1967|p=328}} Gödel read the paper but found it deeply flawed, and his response to Finsler laid out concerns about the lack of formalization.{{sfn|Dawson|1996|p=89}} Finsler continued to argue for his philosophy of mathematics, which eschewed formalization, for the remainder of his career.