Editing Douglas MacArthur (section)

==Korean War==
{{further|Korean War}}

===South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu===
[[File:MacArthur_e_Walton_Walker.jpg|thumb|right|MacArthur confers with Lieutenant General [[Walton Walker]] (right) and other soldiers of the Eighth Army in July 1950.]]
On 25 June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea, starting the [[Korean War]].{{sfn|James|1985|p=387}} The [[United Nations Security Council]] passed in quick succession [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 82|Resolution 82]], [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 83|Resolution 83]], [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 84|Resolution 84]] and [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 85|Resolution 85]] which authorized a [[United Nations Command]] (UNC) force to assist South Korea.{{sfn|James|1985|p=434}} The UN empowered the American government to select a commander, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously recommended MacArthur.{{sfn|James|1985|p=436}} He therefore became commander-in-chief of the UNC, while remaining SCAP in Japan and [[Far East Command (United States)|Commander-in-Chief, Far East]].{{sfn|James|1985|p=440}} All South Korean forces were placed under his command. As they retreated before the North Korean onslaught, MacArthur received permission to commit U.S. ground forces. All the first units to arrive could do was trade men and ground for time, falling back to the [[Battle of Pusan Perimeter|Pusan Perimeter]].{{sfn|James|1985|pp=433–435}} By the end of August, the crisis subsided. North Korean attacks on the perimeter had tapered off. While the North Korean force numbered 88,000 troops, Lieutenant General [[Walton Walker]]'s Eighth Army now numbered 180,000, and he had more tanks and artillery pieces.{{sfn|James|1985|p=451}}

[[File:IncheonLandingMcArthur.jpg|thumb|left|MacArthur observes the naval shelling of Inchon from {{USS|Mount McKinley|AGC-7|6}}, 15 September 1950 with Brigadier General [[Courtney Whitney]] (left) and Major General [[Edward M. Almond]] (right).|alt=MacArthur is seated, wearing his field marshal's hat and a bomber jacket, and holding a pair of binoculars. Four other men also carrying binoculars stand behind him.]]

In 1949, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General of the Army [[Omar Bradley]], had predicted that "large scale combined amphibious operations&nbsp;... will never occur again", but by July 1950, MacArthur was planning just such an operation.{{sfn|James|1985|p=465}} MacArthur compared his plan with that of General [[James Wolfe]] at the [[Battle of the Plains of Abraham]], and brushed aside the problems of tides, [[hydrography]] and terrain.{{sfn|James|1985|pp=467–469}} In September, despite lingering concerns from superiors, MacArthur's soldiers and Marines made a successful [[Battle of Inchon|landing at Inchon]], deep behind North Korean lines. Launched with naval and close air support, the landing outflanked the North Koreans, recaptured [[Seoul]] and forced them to retreat northward in disarray.{{sfn|James|1985|pp=475–483}} Visiting the battlefield on 17 September, MacArthur surveyed six [[T-34]] tanks that had been knocked out by Marines, ignoring sniper fire around him, except to note that the North Korean marksmen were poorly trained.{{sfn|Stanton|1989|pp=78–80}}

On 11 September, Truman issued an order, [[National security directive#Truman and Eisenhower administrations|NSC 81/1]], to MacArthur and UN forces for an advance beyond the 38th parallel into North Korea. Truman, Secretary of State [[Dean Acheson]], Secretary of Defense George Marshall, U.S. Ambassador to the UN [[Warren R. Austin]], and the British and French governments all agreed on the decision to invade and occupy all of North Korea. MacArthur, busy with the Pusan Perimeter defense and the upcoming Inchon landings, had nothing to do with this decision.<ref>{{Cite web |title=MacArthur and the Chinese Communist Intervention in the Korean War, September-December 1950 |last=James |first=D. Clayton |url=https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/n/new-equation.html |access-date=2 February 2024}}</ref><ref>{{cite report |url=https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/national-security-council-report-nsc-811-united-states-courses-action-respect-korea |title=Note by the Executive Secretary on United States Courses of Action with Respect to Korea |last=Lay |first=James S. |date=9 September 1950 |publisher=National Security Council |via=Wilson Center Digital Archive |access-date=10 September 2023}}</ref> There was controversy over whether U.S. troops should cross the 38th parallel with only the approval from the U.S. government (NSC 81/1 was solely a U.S. order) because the original UN resolution only called for the restoration of South Korea below the 38th parallel. MacArthur was very hesitant about advancing north of the 38th parallel and waited for further instructions. Marshall ordered MacArthur on 30 September to feel "unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of 38th parallel." This ambiguity was finally resolved by the UN General Assembly greenlighting MacArthur to advance northward on 4 October with Resolution 376(V), which authorized him and UN forces to cross the 38th parallel and to unify all of Korea under the Republic of Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 October further clarified to MacArthur that the official mandate for UN forces was the unification of a democratic Korea.<ref>{{Cite news |newspaper=The Michigan Daily |title=38th Parallel Crossing |date=14 October 1950 |page=2  |via=Google News Archive Search |url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2706&dat=19501014&id=zQhbAAAAIBAJ&sjid=EU4NAAAAIBAJ&pg=838,5258849 |access-date=29 November 2023}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.macarthurmemorial.org/483/Korean-War-Messages|title=Korean War Messages |publisher=MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk Virginia |access-date=12 October 2022}}</ref> MacArthur now planned another amphibious assault, on [[Wonsan]] on the east coast, but it fell to South Korean troops before the 1st Marine Division could reach it by sea.{{sfn|James|1985|pp=486–493}} In October, MacArthur met with Truman at the [[Wake Island Conference]], with Truman emulating Roosevelt's wartime meeting with MacArthur in Hawaii. MacArthur reassured Truman, commenting:{{blockquote|"I can assure you one thing, Mr. President, if you ever have to run against a military man, his name won't be MacArthur.".{{sfn|MacArthur|1964|pp=372–373}}}}.{{sfn|James|1985|p=500}} The president awarded MacArthur his fifth Distinguished Service Medal.{{sfn|MacArthur|1964|pp=360–363}} Briefly questioned about the Chinese threat, MacArthur dismissed it, saying that he hoped to be able to withdraw the Eighth Army to Japan by Christmas, and to release a division for service in Europe in January. He regarded the possibility of Soviet intervention as a more serious threat.{{sfn|James|1985|pp=507–508}}

On 20 October MacArthur flew to the [[Sukchon]]-[[Sunchon]] area of North Korea, north of Pyongyang, to supervise and observe an airborne operation by the [[187th Infantry Regiment (United States)#Airborne assault, 20 October 1950|187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team]]. This was the first of two airborne operations done by UN forces during the Korean War. MacArthur's [[Lockheed C-121 Constellation|unarmed airplane]] was subject to attack by enemy aircraft known to be based at [[Sinuiju]]. MacArthur received a [[Distinguished Flying Cross (United States)|Distinguished Flying Cross]] for supervising the operation in person.<ref>{{cite web |title=Douglas MacArthur – Distinguished Flying Cross, Awarded for Actions During Korean War |work=Hall of Valor Project |url=https://valor.militarytimes.com/hero/676#94835 |access-date=26 March 2021 |archive-date=26 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210326062616/https://valor.militarytimes.com/hero/676#94835 |url-status=live }}</ref>

A month later, things had changed. The enemy were engaged by the UN forces at the [[Battle of Unsan]] in late October, which demonstrated the presence of Chinese soldiers in Korea and rendered significant losses to the American and other UN troops. Nevertheless, Willoughby downplayed the evidence about Chinese intervention in the war. He estimated that up to 71,000 Chinese soldiers were in the country, while the true number was closer to 300,000.<ref name="Halberstam" /> He was not alone in this miscalculation. On 24 November, the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] reported to Truman that while there could be as many as 200,000 Chinese troops in Korea, "there is no evidence that the Chinese Communists plan major offensive operations".{{sfn|Manchester|1978|p=604}}

That day, MacArthur flew to Walker's headquarters, and he later wrote:{{blockquote|For five hours I toured the front lines. In talking to a group of officers I told them of General Bradley's desire and hope to have two divisions home by Christmas&nbsp;... What I had seen at the front line worried me greatly. The R.O.K. troops were not yet in good shape, and the entire line was deplorably weak in numbers. If the Chinese were actually in heavy force, I decided I would withdraw our troops and abandon any attempt to move north. I decided to reconnoiter and try to see with my own eyes, and interpret with my own long experience what was going on&nbsp;...{{sfn|MacArthur|1964|pp=372–373}}}} MacArthur flew over the front line himself in his [[Douglas C-54 Skymaster]] but saw no signs of a Chinese build up and therefore decided to wait before ordering an advance or withdrawal. Evidence of the Chinese activity was hidden to MacArthur: the Chinese Army traveled at night and dug in during the day.<ref name="Halberstam" /> For his reconnaissance efforts, MacArthur was nonetheless awarded the honorary [[United States Aviator Badge|combat pilot's wings]].{{sfn|MacArthur|1964|pp=372–373}}

=== China enters the war ===
China considered the UN offensive to its border a serious threat to its security. China's fears of an invasion were reinforced by MacArthur's public statements that he wanted to conventionally bomb, but not invade, China and use [[Kuomintang]] forces stationed in Formosa to augment UN forces in the Korean peninsula in response to China first initiating hostile actions against UN troops in non-Chinese territory (North Korea) during October and November. MacArthur was banned by Truman from sending any airplanes, even reconnaissance planes, over Chinese territory and his Air Force and Navy pilots complained to him about Chinese (and also very likely Soviet) jets illegally attacking them across the Yalu River inside North Korean territory while UN planes were bombing North Korean infrastructure south of the Yalu. For the purpose of domestic mobilization, the Chinese government lied about how the war started by falsely claiming MacArthur initiated the hostilities when he landed his troops at Inchon.{{sfn|Zhao|2022|pp=32-33}}<ref>{{citation |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA353574.pdf |title=United States Army in the Korean War – Policy and Direction: The First Year |last=Schnabel |first=James F. |publisher=Center of Military History United States Army |location=Washington, D. C. |date=1992 |pages=247–250 |access-date=5 September 2023 |isbn=0-16-035955-4}}</ref> The theory that Chinese leader [[Mao Zedong]] only entered the war because of MacArthur's Yalu offensive and comments has been accepted without question for many decades after the Korean War. However, recent research from historian [[Arthur L. Herman]] and others in the 2010s, citing evidence from Chinese historical archives, showed that Mao actually planned on directly intervening in the Korean War ever since July 1950, when the first American soldiers landed in South Korea, long before the Inchon and Yalu battles and long before MacArthur's public statements regarding Taiwan and China in late August 1950. The Chinese were planning to get involved in Korea with or without MacArthur's Yalu offensive.<ref>{{YouTube|id=udPpvxkFfT0|title=Douglas MacArthur: American Warrior|time=33m45s}}</ref> In fact, China had already indirectly intervened in the beginning of the Korean War by transferring 69,200 [[People's Liberation Army]] soldiers who were [[Koreans in China|Chinese citizens with Korean ethnicity]] to the North Korean [[Korean People's Army]] in 1949–50. These three Chinese army divisions that were transferred to North Korea were the [[12th Division (North Korea)|156th Division]], [[5th Division (North Korea)|164th Division]], and [[6th Division (North Korea)|166th Division]]. These former Chinese soldiers turned North Korean soldiers made up 47% of North Korea's 148,680-man army by June 1950.{{sfn|Tsui|2015|pp=45–47}}

On 25 November 1950, Walker's Eighth Army was attacked by the Chinese Army and soon the UN forces were in retreat. MacArthur provided US Army chief of staff General [[J. Lawton Collins]] with a series of nine successive withdrawal lines.{{sfn|James|1985|pp=537–538}} On 23 December, Walker was killed when his jeep collided with a truck and was replaced by Lieutenant General [[Matthew Ridgway]], whom MacArthur had selected in case of such an eventuality.{{sfn|James|1985|p=545}} Ridgway noted that MacArthur's "prestige, which had gained an extraordinary luster after Inchon, was badly tarnished. His credibility suffered in the unforeseen outcome of the November offensive&nbsp;..."{{sfn|James|1985|p=559}}

Collins discussed the possible use of nuclear weapons in Korea with MacArthur in December, and later asked him for a list of targets in the Soviet Union in case it entered the war. MacArthur testified before Congress in 1951 that he had never recommended the use of nuclear weapons, and considered but did not recommend a plan to cut off North Korea with radioactive poisons, although he broached the latter with Eisenhower, then president-elect, in 1952. In 1954, in an interview published after his death, he stated he had wanted to drop atomic bombs on enemy bases, explaining that "I would have dropped between 30 and 50 atomic bombs on his air bases and other depots strung across the neck of Manchuria from just across the Yalu River from Antung (northwestern tip of Korea) to the neighborhood of Hunchun (just north of the northeastern tip of Korea near the border of the U.S.S.R.)". In 1960, he challenged a statement by Truman that he had advocated using atomic bombs. Truman issued a retraction, stating that he had no evidence of the claim; it was merely his personal opinion. In January 1951, MacArthur refused to entertain proposals for the [[forward-basing|forward deployment]] of nuclear weapons to cover a UN retreat in Korea as proposed by Truman.{{sfn|James|1985|pp=578–581}}<ref name="Senate 15 May 1951" />{{sfn|Dingman|1988|p=68}}

In April 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff drafted orders for MacArthur authorizing nuclear attacks on Manchuria and the [[Shandong Peninsula]] if the Chinese launched airstrikes originating from there against his forces.{{sfn|James|1985|p=591}} The next day Truman met with the chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, [[Gordon Dean (lawyer)|Gordon Dean]],{{sfn|Anders|1988|pp=1–2}} and arranged for the transfer of nine [[Mark 4 nuclear bomb]]s to military control.<ref name="HNN Cumings" /> Dean was apprehensive about delegating the decision on how they should be used to MacArthur, who lacked expert technical knowledge of the weapons and their effects.{{sfn|Anders|1988|pp=3–4}} The Joint Chiefs were not entirely comfortable about giving them to MacArthur either, for fear that he might prematurely carry out his orders.{{sfn|James|1985|p=591}} Instead, they decided that the nuclear strike force would report to the [[Strategic Air Command]].{{sfn|Dingman|1988|p=72}}

===Removal from command===
{{main|Relief of Douglas MacArthur}}
[[File:Douglas MacArthur and family, 1950.jpg|thumb|right|Douglas MacArthur (rear), Jean MacArthur, and son [[Arthur MacArthur IV]] returning to the Philippines for a visit in 1950|alt=The MacArthur family standing at the top of the stairs leading from a passenger aircraft. Douglas MacArthur stands behind while his wife Jean and son Arthur wave to those below.]]
[[File:Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway, Major General Doyle Hickey, and General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of... - NARA - 531405.tif|thumb|225x225px|From right to left: MacArthur, Major General [[Doyle Overton Hickey|Doyle Hickey]], and General [[Matthew Ridgway]] in a jeep at a UN command post, April 1951, just eight days before his removal by President Truman]]
Within weeks of the Chinese attack, MacArthur was forced to retreat from North Korea.{{sfn|Schnabel|1972|pp=300–304}} Seoul fell in January 1951, and both Truman and MacArthur were forced to contemplate the prospect of abandoning Korea entirely.{{sfn|Schnabel|1972|pp=310–314}} European countries did not share MacArthur's world view, distrusted his judgment, and were afraid that he might use his stature and influence with the American public to re-focus American policy away from Europe and towards Asia. They were concerned that this might lead to a major war with China, possibly involving nuclear weapons.{{sfn|Schnabel|1972|pp=287–292}} Since in February 1950 the Soviet Union and China had signed a defensive alliance committing each to go to war if the other party was attacked, the possibility that an American attack on China would cause World War III was considered to be very real at the time.  In a visit to the United States in December 1950, the British prime minister, [[Clement Attlee]], had raised the fears of the British and other European governments that "General MacArthur was running the show".{{sfn|Lowe|1990|p=636}}

Under Ridgway's command, the Eighth Army pressed north again in January. He inflicted heavy casualties on the Chinese,{{sfn|Schnabel|1972|pp=333–339}} recaptured Seoul in March 1951, and pushed on to the 38th Parallel.{{sfn|Schnabel|1972|pp=354–355}} With the improved military situation, Truman now saw the opportunity to offer a negotiated peace but, on 24 March, MacArthur called upon China to admit that it had been defeated, simultaneously challenging both the Chinese and his own superiors. Truman's proposed announcement was shelved.{{sfn|Schnabel|1972|pp=357–359}}

On 5 April, Representative [[Joseph William Martin Jr.]], the Republican leader in the House of Representatives, read aloud on the floor of the House a letter from MacArthur critical of Truman's Europe-first policy and limited-war strategy.{{sfn|James|1985|pp=584–589}} The letter concluded with:
{{blockquote|It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you pointed out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory.{{sfn|James|1985|p=590}}}}

In March 1951, secret United States intercepts of diplomatic dispatches disclosed clandestine conversations from Spanish and Portuguese diplomats in Tokyo embassies to their home countries in which they claimed that MacArthur expressed confidence to them that he would succeed in "disposing of the Chinese Communist question" once and for all. This conversation log did not record MacArthur saying this but Spanish and Portuguese diplomats claiming that MacArthur said that. When these alleged claims from the diplomats came to the attention of President Truman, he was enraged to learn that MacArthur was supposedly not only trying to increase public support for his position on conducting the war but had secretly informed foreign governments that he planned to initiate actions that were counter to United States policy. The President was unable to act immediately since he could not afford to reveal the existence of the intercepts and because of MacArthur's popularity with the public and political support in Congress. However, following the release on 5 April by Representative Martin of MacArthur's letter, Truman concluded he could relieve MacArthur of his commands without incurring unacceptable political damage.{{sfn|Goulden|1982|pp=476–478}}{{sfn|Nitze|Smith|Rearden|1989|pp=109–111}}

Truman summoned Secretary of Defense George Marshall, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Omar Bradley, Secretary of State Dean Acheson and [[Averell Harriman]] to discuss what to do about MacArthur.{{sfn|James|1985|pp=591–597}} They concurred MacArthur should be relieved of his command but made no recommendation to do so. Although they felt that it was correct "from a purely military point of view",{{sfn|Pearlman|2008|p=214}} they were aware that there were important political considerations as well.{{sfn|Pearlman|2008|p=214}} Truman and Acheson agreed that MacArthur was insubordinate, but the Joint Chiefs avoided any suggestion of this.{{sfn|James|1985|p=594}} Insubordination was a military offense, and MacArthur could have requested a public court martial similar to that of Billy Mitchell. The outcome of such a trial was uncertain, and it might well have found him not guilty and ordered his reinstatement.{{sfn|Meilinger|1989|p=179}} The Joint Chiefs agreed that there was "little evidence that General MacArthur had ever failed to carry out a direct order of the Joint Chiefs or acted in opposition to an order". "In point of fact", Bradley insisted, "MacArthur had stretched but not legally violated any JCS directives. He had violated the President's 6 December directive [not to make public statements on policy matters], relayed to him by the JCS, but this did not constitute violation of a JCS order."{{sfn|James|1985|p=594}} Truman ordered MacArthur's relief by Ridgway, and the order went out on 10 April with Bradley's signature.{{sfn|James|1985|pp=607–608}}

In a 3 December 1973 article in ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'' magazine, Truman was quoted as saying in the early 1960s:
{{blockquote|I fired him because he wouldn't respect the authority of the President. I didn't fire him because he was a dumb son of a bitch, although he was, but that's not against the law for generals. If it was, half to three-quarters of them would be in jail.<ref>{{cite magazine |title=Historical Notes: Giving Them More Hell |url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,908217,00.html |url-status=dead |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]] |date=3 December 1973 |access-date=17 January 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071012203926/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,908217,00.html |archive-date=12 October 2007}}</ref>}}

The relief of the famous general by the unpopular politician created a storm of public controversy. Polls showed that the majority of the public disapproved of the decision to relieve MacArthur.{{sfn|Casey|2008|pp=253–254}} By February 1952, almost nine months later, Truman's approval rating had fallen to 22 percent. {{As of|2023}}, that remains the lowest [[Gallup Poll]] approval rating recorded by any serving president.{{sfn|Pearlman|2008|pp=246, 326}}<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.gallup.com/poll/116677/presidential-approval-ratings-gallup-historical-statistics-trends.aspx |title=Presidential Approval Ratings – Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends |date=12 March 2008 |publisher=[[The Gallup Organization]] |access-date=6 May 2021 |archive-date=17 March 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090317075329/http://www.gallup.com/poll/116677/Presidential-Approval-Ratings-Gallup-Historical-Statistics-Trends.aspx |url-status=live }}</ref> As the increasingly unpopular war in Korea dragged on, Truman's administration was beset with a series of corruption scandals, and he eventually decided not to run for re-election.{{sfn|Casey|2008|p=327}} Beginning on 3 May 1951, a Joint Senate Committee—chaired by Democrat [[Richard Russell Jr.]]—investigated MacArthur's removal. It concluded that "the removal of General MacArthur was within the constitutional powers of the President but the circumstances were a shock to national pride."{{sfn|Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations|1951|p=3601}}