Editing Charles Sanders Peirce (section)

== Signs ==
{{Main|Semiotic theory of Charles Sanders Peirce}}
{{See also|Representation (arts)#Peirce and representation|Sign (semiotics)#Triadic signs}}
{{Hatnote|A list of noted writings by Peirce on signs and sign relations is at [[Semiotic theory of Charles Sanders Peirce#References and further reading|Semiotic theory of Charles Sanders Peirce § References and further reading]].}}

=== Sign relation ===
Peirce's theory of signs is known to be one of the most complex semiotic theories due to its generalistic claim. Anything is a sign—not absolutely as itself, but instead in some relation or other. The ''[[sign relation]]'' is the key. It defines three roles encompassing (1) the sign, (2) the sign's subject matter, called its ''object'', and (3) the sign's meaning or ramification as formed into a kind of effect called its ''interpretant'' (a further sign, for example a translation). It is an irreducible ''[[triadic relation]]'', according to Peirce. The roles are distinct even when the things that fill those roles are not. The roles are but three; a sign of an object leads to one or more interpretants, and, as signs, they lead to further interpretants.

''Extension × intension = information.'' Two traditional approaches to sign relation, necessary though insufficient, are the way of ''[[Extension (semantics)|extension]]'' (a sign's objects, also called breadth, denotation, or application) and the way of ''[[intension]]'' (the objects' characteristics, qualities, attributes referenced by the sign, also called depth, [[Comprehension (logic)|comprehension]], significance, or connotation). Peirce adds a third, the way of ''[[Logic of information|information]]'', including change of information, to integrate the other two approaches into a unified whole.<ref>Peirce (1867), "Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension" (CP 2.391–426), ([http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v2/w2/w2_06/v2_06.htm ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce'', 2:70–86] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191209161818/http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v2/w2/w2_06/v2_06.htm |date=2019-12-09  }}).</ref> For example, because of the equation above, if a term's total amount of information stays the same, then the more that the term 'intends' or signifies about objects, the fewer are the objects to which the term 'extends' or applies.

''Determination.'' A sign depends on its object in such a way as to represent its object—the object enables and, in a sense, determines the sign. A physically causal sense of this stands out when a sign consists in an indicative reaction. The interpretant depends likewise on both the sign and the object—an object determines a sign to determine an interpretant. But this determination is not a succession of dyadic events, like a row of toppling dominoes; sign determination is triadic. For example, an interpretant does not merely represent something which represented an object; instead an interpretant represents something ''as'' a sign representing the object. The object (be it a quality or fact or law or even fictional) determines the sign to an interpretant through one's collateral experience<ref name="collateral">See pp. 404–409 in "Pragmatism" in ''The Essential Peirce'', 2. Ten quotes on collateral experience from Peirce provided by Joseph Ransdell can be viewed [http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/messages?id=57101 here] at peirce-l's Lyris archive. Note: Ransdell's quotes from ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', 8.178–179 are also in ''The Essential Peirce'', 2:493–494, which gives their date as 1909; and his quote from ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', 8.183 is also in ''The Essential Peirce'', 2:495–496, which gives its date as 1909.</ref> with the object, in which the object is found or from which it is recalled, as when a sign consists in a chance semblance of an absent object. Peirce used the word "determine" not in a strictly deterministic sense, but in a sense of "specializes", ''bestimmt'',<ref name="determined">Peirce, letter to William James, dated 1909, see ''The Essential Peirce'', 2:492.</ref> involving variable amount, like an influence.<ref name="Marty">See "[http://perso.numericable.fr/robert.marty/semiotique/76defeng.htm 76 definitions of the sign by C. S. Peirce]", collected by Robert Marty (U. of Perpignan, France).</ref> Peirce came to define representation and interpretation in terms of (triadic) determination.<ref>Peirce, A Letter to Lady Welby (1908), ''[[#SS|Semiotic and Significs]]'', pp. 80–81: {{quote|I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the former. My insertion of "upon a person" is a sop to Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception understood.}}</ref> The object determines the sign to determine another sign—the interpretant—to be related to the object ''as the sign is related to the object'', hence the interpretant, fulfilling its function as sign of the object, determines a further interpretant sign. The process is logically structured to perpetuate itself, and is definitive of sign, object, and interpretant in general.<ref name="Marty"/>

=== Semiotic elements ===
Peirce held there are exactly three basic elements in semiosis (sign action):

# A ''sign'' (or ''representamen''){{efn|''Representamen'' ({{IPAc-en|ˌ|r|ɛ|p|r|ɪ|z|ɛ|n|ˈ|t|eɪ|m|ə|n}} {{respell|REP|ri|zen|TAY|mən}}) was adopted ([[wikt:representamen|not coined]]) by Peirce as his technical term for the ''sign'' as covered in his theory, in case a divergence should come to light between his theoretical version and the popular senses of the word "sign". He eventually stopped using "representamen". See ''The Essential Peirce'', 2:272–273 and ''[[#SS|Semiotic and Significs]]'' p. 193, quotes in "[http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/representamen.html Representamen]" at ''Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce''.}} represents, in the broadest possible sense of "represents". It is something interpretable as saying something about something. It is not necessarily symbolic, linguistic, or artificial—a cloud might be a sign of rain for instance, or ruins the sign of ancient civilization.<ref>{{cite book |author-last=Eco |author-first=Umberto |title=Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language |date=1984 |publisher=Indiana University Press |location=Bloomington & Indianapolis |isbn=978-0-25320398-4 |page=[https://archive.org/details/semioticsphiloso00ecou/page/15 15] |url=https://archive.org/details/semioticsphiloso00ecou/page/15}}</ref> As Peirce sometimes put it (he defined ''sign'' at least 76 times<ref name="Marty"/>), the sign stands ''for'' the object ''to'' the interpretant. A sign represents its object in some respect, which respect is the sign's ''ground''.<ref name="ground"/>
# An ''object'' (or ''semiotic object'') is a subject matter of a sign and an interpretant. It can be anything thinkable, a quality, an occurrence, a rule, etc., even fictional, such as [[Prince Hamlet]].<ref name="fictive">Peirce (1909), A Letter to William James, ''The Essential Peirce'', 2:492–502. Fictional object, 498. Object as universe of discourse, 492. See "[http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/dynamicalobject.html Dynamical Object]" at ''Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce''.</ref> All of those are special or partial objects. The object most accurately is the [[universe of discourse]] to which the partial or special object belongs.<ref name="fictive"/> For instance, a perturbation of Pluto's orbit is a sign about Pluto but ultimately not only about Pluto. An object either (i) is ''immediate'' to a sign and is the object as represented in the sign or (ii) is a ''dynamic'' object, the object as it really is, on which the immediate object is founded "as on bedrock".<ref>See "Immediate Object", etc., at [http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html ''Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce''].</ref>
# An ''[[interpretant]]'' (or ''interpretant sign'') is a sign's meaning or ramification as formed into a kind of idea or effect, an interpretation, human or otherwise. An interpretant is a sign (a) of the object and (b) of the interpretant's "predecessor" (the interpreted sign) as a sign of the same object. An interpretant either (i) is ''immediate'' to a sign and is a kind of quality or possibility such as a word's usual meaning, or (ii) is a ''dynamic'' interpretant, such as a state of agitation, or (iii) is a ''final'' or ''normal'' interpretant, a sum of the lessons which a sufficiently considered sign ''would'' have as effects on practice, and with which an actual interpretant may at most coincide.
Some of the understanding needed by the mind depends on familiarity with the object. To know what a given sign denotes, the mind needs some experience of that sign's object, experience outside of, and collateral to, that sign or sign system. In that context Peirce speaks of collateral experience, collateral observation, collateral acquaintance, all in much the same terms.<ref name="collateral"/>

=== Classes of signs ===
{{C. S. Peirce ninefold sign table}}

Among Peirce's many sign typologies, three stand out, interlocked. The first typology depends on the sign itself, the second on how the sign stands for its denoted object, and the third on how the sign stands for its object to its interpretant. Also, each of the three typologies is a three-way division, a [[Trichotomy (philosophy)|trichotomy]], via Peirce's three phenomenological [[#Theory of categories|categories]]: (1) quality of feeling, (2) reaction, resistance, and (3) representation, mediation.<ref name="9signs"/>

I. ''Qualisign, sinsign, legisign'' (also called'' tone, token, type,'' and also called ''potisign, actisign, famisign''):<ref name="terms">On the varying terminology, look up in [http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html ''Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce''].</ref> This typology classifies every sign according to the sign's own phenomenological category—the qualisign is a quality, a possibility, a "First"; the sinsign is a reaction or resistance, a singular object, an actual event or fact, a "Second"; and the legisign is a habit, a rule, a representational relation, a "Third".

II. ''Icon, index, symbol'': This typology, the best known one, classifies every sign according to the category of the sign's way of denoting its object—the icon (also called semblance or likeness) by a quality of its own, the index by factual connection to its object, and the symbol by a habit or rule for its interpretant.

III. ''Rheme, dicisign, argument'' (also called ''sumisign, dicisign, suadisign,'' also ''seme, pheme, delome,''<ref name="terms"/> and regarded as very broadened versions of the traditional ''term, proposition, argument''): This typology classifies every sign according to the category which the interpretant attributes to the sign's way of denoting its object—the rheme, for example a term, is a sign interpreted to represent its object in respect of quality; the dicisign, for example a proposition, is a sign interpreted to represent its object in respect of fact; and the argument is a sign interpreted to represent its object in respect of habit or law. This is the culminating typology of the three, where the sign is understood as a structural element of inference.

Every sign belongs to one class or another within (I) ''and'' within (II) ''and'' within (III). Thus each of the three typologies is a three-valued parameter for every sign. The three parameters are not independent of each other; many co-classifications are absent, for reasons pertaining to the lack of either habit-taking or singular reaction in a quality, and the lack of habit-taking in a singular reaction. The result is not 27 but instead ten classes of signs fully specified at this level of analysis.