Editing Battle of Britain (section)

===Main assault===
The main attack upon the RAF's defences was code-named ''Adlerangriff'' ("Eagle Attack"). Intelligence reports gave Göring the impression that the RAF was almost defeated, and raids would attract British fighters for the Luftwaffe to shoot down.{{sfn|Bungay|2000|pp=123–125}} The strategy agreed on 6 August was to destroy RAF Fighter Command across the south of England in four days, then bombing of military and economic targets was to systematically extend up to the Midlands until daylight attacks could proceed unhindered over the whole of Britain, culminating in a major bombing attack on London.{{sfn|Overy|2001|pp=56–57, 61–62}}{{sfn|Overy|2013|pp=82–83, 85}}

====Assault on RAF: radar and airfields====
[[File:East Coast Chain Home radar station CH15176.jpg|thumb|East Coast [[Chain Home]] radar operators.]]
Poor weather delayed ''[[Adlertag]]'' ("Eagle Day") until 13 August 1940. On 12 August, the first attempt was made to blind the Dowding system, when aircraft from the specialist fighter-bomber unit [[Erprobungskommando#Erprobungsgruppe 210|''Erprobungsgruppe'' 210]] attacked four [[Chain Home|radar stations]]. Three were briefly taken off the air but were back working within six hours.<ref name="Bungay, 2000, pp. 203–205">{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|pp=203–205}}</ref> The raids appeared to show that British radars were difficult to knock out. The failure to mount follow-up attacks allowed the RAF to get the stations back on the air, and the Luftwaffe neglected strikes on the supporting infrastructure, such as phone lines and power stations, which could have rendered the radars useless, even if the lattice-work towers themselves, which were very difficult to destroy, remained intact.<ref name="Allen"/>

''Adlertag'' opened with a series of attacks, led again by ''Erpro'' 210,<ref name="Bungay, 2000, pp. 203–205"/> on coastal airfields used as forward landing grounds for the RAF fighters, as well as 'satellite airfields'<ref group=nb>"Satellite" airfields were mostly fully equipped but did not have the sector control room which allowed "Sector" airfields such as Biggin Hill to monitor and control RAF fighter formations. RAF units from Sector airfields often flew into a satellite airfield for operations during the day, returning to their home airfield in the evenings.</ref> including [[RAF Manston|Manston]] and [[RAF Hawkinge|Hawkinge]].<ref name="Bungay, 2000, pp. 203–205" /> As the week drew on, the airfield attacks moved further inland, and repeated raids were made on the radar chain. 15 August was "The Greatest Day" when the Luftwaffe mounted the largest number of sorties of the campaign. ''Luftflotte'' 5 attacked the north of England. Raiding forces from Denmark and Norway, which believed Fighter Command strength to be concentrated in the south, ran into resistance which was unexpectedly strong. Inadequately escorted by Bf 110s, Bf109s having insufficient range to escort raids from Norway, bombers were shot down in large numbers. North East England was attacked by 65 Heinkel 111s escorted by 34 Messerschmitt 110s, and [[RAF Driffield|RAF Great Driffield]] was attacked by 50 unescorted Junkers 88s. Out of 115 bombers and 35 fighters sent, 75 planes were destroyed and many others were damaged beyond repair. Furthermore, due to early engagement by RAF fighters, many of the bombers dropped their payloads ineffectively early.<ref>[http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/document-32.html "Document 32.] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110723024634/http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/document-32.html |date=23 July 2011 }} ''Battle of Britain Historical Society''. Retrieved: 19 March 2015.</ref> As a result of these casualties, ''Luftflotte'' 5 did not appear in strength again in the campaign.
[[File:Pilots of No. 310 (Czechoslovak) Squadron RAF in front of Hawker Hurricane Mk I at Duxford, Cambridgeshire, 7 September 1940. CH1299.jpg|thumb|[[Czechoslovakia|Czechoslovak]] fighter pilots of [[No. 310 Squadron RAF]] at [[RAF Duxford]] in 1940]]

18 August, which had the greatest number of casualties to both sides, has been dubbed "[[The Hardest Day]]". Following this grinding battle, exhaustion and the weather reduced operations for most of a week, allowing the Luftwaffe to review their performance. "The Hardest Day" had sounded the end for the Ju 87 in the campaign.<ref>{{harvnb|Price|1980|p=179}}</ref> This veteran of ''Blitzkrieg'' was too vulnerable to fighters to operate over Britain. Göring withdrew the ''Stuka'' from the fighting to preserve the ''Stuka'' force, removing the main Luftwaffe precision-bombing weapon and shifting the burden of pinpoint attacks onto the already-stretched ''Erpro'' 210. The Bf 110 proved too clumsy for dogfighting with single-engined fighters, and its participation was scaled back. It would be used only when range required it or when sufficient single-engined escort could not be provided for the bombers.
[[File:Pilots of No. 19 Squadron RAF relax in the crew room at Fowlmere, the satellite airfield to Duxford in Cambridgeshire, September 1940. CH1461.jpg|thumb|Pilots of [[No. 19 Squadron RAF]] relax in the crew room at [[RAF Fowlmere]], 1940]]
Göring made yet another important decision: to order more bomber escorts at the expense of free-hunting sweeps. To achieve this, the weight of the attack now fell on ''Luftflotte'' 2, and the bulk of the Bf 109s in ''[[Luftflotte 3]]'' were transferred to Kesselring's command, reinforcing the fighter bases in the [[Pas-de-Calais]]. Stripped of its fighters, ''Luftflotte 3'' would concentrate on the night bombing campaign. Göring, expressing disappointment with the fighter performance thus far in the campaign, also made sweeping changes in the command structure of the fighter units, replacing many ''[[Geschwaderkommodore]]'' with younger, more aggressive pilots such as  Adolf Galland and [[Werner Mölders]].<ref>{{harvnb|Deighton|1996|p=182}}</ref>

Finally, Göring stopped the attacks on the radar chain. These were seen as unsuccessful, and neither the ''[[Reichsmarschall]]'' nor his subordinates realised how vital the Chain Home stations were to the defence systems. It was known that radar provided some early warning of raids, but the belief among German fighter pilots was that anything bringing up the "[[Tommy Atkins|Tommies]]" to fight was to be encouraged.{{citation needed|date=October 2017}}

====Raids on British cities====
On the afternoon of 15 August, ''Hauptmann'' [[Walter Rubensdörffer]] leading ''Erprobungsgruppe'' 210 mistakenly bombed [[Croydon Airport|Croydon airfield]] (on the outskirts of London) instead of the intended target, [[RAF Kenley]].<ref>{{harvnb|Korda|2010|pp=197–198}}</ref> German intelligence reports made the Luftwaffe optimistic that the RAF, thought to be dependent on local air control, was struggling with supply problems and pilot losses. After a raid on [[London Biggin Hill Airport#History|Biggin Hill]] on 18 August, Luftwaffe aircrew said they had been unopposed, the airfield was "completely destroyed", and asked, "Is England already finished?" In accordance with the strategy agreed on 6 August, defeat of the RAF was to be followed by bombing military and economic targets, systematically extending up to the Midlands.{{sfn|Overy|2013|pp=81–82}}

Göring ordered attacks on aircraft factories on 19 August 1940.<ref name="Taylor and Mayer p.74">{{harvnb|Taylor|Mayer|1974|p=74}}</ref> Sixty raids on the night of 19/20 August targeted the aircraft industry and harbours, and bombs fell on suburban areas around London: [[Croydon]], [[Wimbledon, London|Wimbledon]] and [[Municipal Borough of Malden and Coombe|the Maldens]].{{sfn|Overy|2013|p=82}} Night raids were made on 21/22 August on [[Aberdeen]], [[Bristol]] and [[South Wales]]. That morning, bombs were dropped on [[Harrow, London|Harrow]] and [[Wealdstone]], on the outskirts of London. Overnight on 22/23 August, the output of an aircraft factory at [[Filton]] near Bristol was drastically affected by a raid in which Ju 88 bombers dropped over {{cvt|16|LT}} of high explosive bombs. On the night of 23/24 August over 200 bombers attacked the [[Fort Dunlop]] tyre factory in [[Birmingham]], with a significant effect on production. A bombing campaign began on 24 August with the largest raid so far, killing 100 in [[Portsmouth]], and that night, several areas of London were bombed; the [[East End of London|East End]] was set ablaze and bombs landed on central London. Some historians believe that these bombs were dropped accidentally by a group of [[Heinkel He 111]]s which had failed to find their target; this account has been contested.<ref name="19-24aug">Putland, Alan L. [http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/0029.html "19 August – 24 August 1940."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091210220107/http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/0029.html |date=10 December 2009 }} ''Battle of Britain Historical Society''. Retrieved: 12 August 2009.</ref>

More night raids were made around London on 24/25 August, when bombs fell on Croydon, [[Banstead]], [[Lewisham]], [[Uxbridge]], [[Harrow, London|Harrow]] and [[Hayes, Hillingdon|Hayes]]. London was on red alert over the night of 28/29 August, with bombs reported in [[Finchley]], [[St Pancras, London|St Pancras]], [[Wembley]], [[Wood Green]], [[Southgate, London|Southgate]], [[Old Kent Road]], [[Mill Hill]], [[Ilford]], [[Chigwell]] and [[Hendon]].{{sfn|Overy|2013|pp=82–83}}

====Attacks on airfields from 24 August====
[[File:Pilots of No. 303 (Polish) Squadron RAF with one of their Hawker Hurricanes, October 1940. CH1535.jpg|thumb|right|Polish [[No. 303 Squadron RAF|303 Squadron]] pilots, 1940. Left to right: P/O [[Mirosław Ferić|Ferić]], Flt Lt [[John A. Kent|Kent]], F/O Grzeszczak, P/O Radomski, P/O [[Jan Zumbach|Zumbach]], P/O [[Witold Łokuciewski|Łokuciewski]], F/O [[Zdzisław Henneberg|Henneberg]], Sgt. Rogowski, Sgt. Szaposznikow.]]
Göring's directive issued on 23 August 1940 ordered ceaseless attacks on the aircraft industry and on RAF ground organisation to force the RAF to use its fighters, continuing the tactic of luring them up to be destroyed, and added that focussed attacks were to be made on RAF airfields.<ref name="19-24aug"/>

From 24 August onwards, the battle was a fight between Kesselring's ''Luftflotte'' 2 and Park's 11 Group. The Luftwaffe concentrated all their strength on knocking out Fighter Command and made repeated attacks on the airfields. Of the 33 heavy attacks in the following two weeks, 24 were against airfields. The key sector stations were hit repeatedly: [[RAF Biggin Hill|Biggin Hill]] and [[RAF Hornchurch|Hornchurch]] four times each; [[RAF Debden|Debden]] and [[North Weald airfield|North Weald]] twice each. [[Croydon Airport|Croydon]], [[Gravesend Airport|Gravesend]], [[London Southend Airport|Rochford]], [[RAF Hawkinge|Hawkinge]] and [[RAF Manston|Manston]] were also attacked in strength. [[Coastal Command]]'s [[RAF Eastchurch|Eastchurch]] was bombed at least seven times because it was believed to be a Fighter Command aerodrome. At times these raids caused some damage to the sector stations, threatening the integrity of the Dowding system.

To offset some losses, some 58 Fleet Air Arm fighter pilot volunteers were seconded to RAF squadrons, and a similar number of former Fairey Battle pilots were used. Most replacements from [[Operational Conversion Unit|Operational Training Units]] (OTUs) had as little as nine hours flying time and no gunnery or air-to-air combat training. At this point, the [[Battle of Britain Foreign Contribution|multinational nature of Fighter Command]] came to the fore. Many squadrons and personnel from the air forces of the [[British Dominions|Dominions]] were already [[List of Royal Air Force aircraft squadrons|attached to the RAF]], including top-level commanders – Australians, Canadians, New Zealanders, [[Rhodesia]]ns and South Africans. Other nationalities were also represented, including [[Free French Forces|Free French]], Belgian and a Jewish pilot from the [[Mandatory Palestine|British mandate of Palestine]].

They were bolstered by the arrival of fresh Czechoslovak and [[Polish Air Forces in France and Great Britain|Polish squadrons]]. These had been held back by Dowding, who thought non-English speaking aircrew would have trouble working within his control system, but Polish and Czech fliers proved to be especially effective. The pre-war [[Polish Air Force]] had lengthy and extensive training, and high standards; with Poland conquered and under [[World War II crimes in Poland|brutal]] [[Occupation of Poland (1939–1945)|German occupation]], the pilots of [[No. 303 Polish Fighter Squadron|No. 303 (Polish) Squadron]], which became the highest-scoring Allied unit,<ref name="Zaloga and Hook 1982, p. 15"/> were experienced and strongly motivated. [[Josef František]], a Czech regular airman who had flown from the occupation of his own country to join [[Invasion of Poland|the Polish]] and then French air forces before arriving in Britain, flew as a guest of 303 Squadron and was ultimately credited with the highest "RAF score" in the Battle of Britain.<ref>{{harvnb|Deighton|1996|pp=188, 275}}</ref>

The RAF had the advantage of fighting over home territory. Pilots who bailed out after being shot down could be back at their airfields within hours, and aircraft low on fuel or ammunition could be immediately re-equipped.<ref>{{harvnb|Holland|2011|pp=760. 657–658}}</ref> One RAF pilot interviewed in late 1940 had been shot down five times during the Battle of Britain, but was able to crash-land in Britain or bail out each time.<ref>{{harvnb|Ingersoll|1940|pp=159–169}}</ref> For Luftwaffe aircrews, a bailout or crash landing in England meant capture – in the critical August period, almost as many Luftwaffe pilots were taken prisoner as were killed<ref>{{harvnb|Holland|2011|p=658}}</ref> – while parachuting into the English Channel often meant drowning. Morale began to suffer, and ''Kanalkrankheit'' ("Channel sickness") – a form of [[Combat stress reaction|combat fatigue]] – began to appear among the German pilots. Their replacement problem became worse than the British.

====Assessment of attempt to destroy the RAF====
The effect of the German attacks on airfields is unclear. According to [[Stephen Bungay]], Dowding, in a letter to [[Hugh Trenchard]]<ref>the PRO, AIR 19/60.</ref> accompanying Park's report on the period 8 August – 10 September 1940, states that the Luftwaffe "achieved very little" in the last week of August and the first week of September. The only Sector Station to be shut down operationally was [[Biggin Hill]], and it was non-operational for just two hours. Dowding admitted that 11 Group's efficiency was impaired but, despite serious damage to some airfields, only two out of 13 heavily attacked airfields were down for more than a few hours. The German refocus on London was not critical.<ref name="Bungay 2000, pp. 368-369">{{harvnb|Bungay|2000|pp=368–369}}</ref>

Retired Air Vice-Marshal [[Peter Dye]], head of the RAF Museum, discussed the logistics of the battle in 2000<ref name="Dye00.">{{harvnb|Dye|2000|pp=1, 31–40}}</ref> and 2010,<ref name="Dye2010.">Dye, Air Vice Marshal Peter. ''Aeroplane'', Issue July 2010, p. 33.</ref> dealing specifically with the single-seat fighters. He said that not only was British aircraft production replacing aircraft, but replacement pilots were keeping pace with losses. The number of pilots in RAF Fighter Command increased during July, August and September. The figures indicate the number of pilots available never decreased: from July, 1,200 were available; from 1 August, 1,400; in September, over 1,400; in October, nearly 1,600; by 1 November, 1,800. Throughout the battle, the RAF had more fighter pilots available than the Luftwaffe.<ref name="Dye00."/><ref name="Dye2010."/> Although the RAF's reserves of single-seat fighters fell during July, the wastage was made up for by an efficient [[Civilian Repair Organisation]] (CRO), which by December had repaired and put back into service some 4,955 aircraft,<ref>{{harvnb|Dye|2000|p=33}}</ref> and by aircraft held at Air Servicing Unit (ASU) airfields.<ref>{{harvnb|Dye|2000|pp=33, 37}}</ref>
[[File:RAF Fighter Command 1940 HU104508.jpg|thumb|Pilots of [[No. 66 Squadron RAF|No. 66 Squadron]] at [[RAF Gravesend|Gravesend]], September 1940]]

[[Richard Overy]] agrees with Dye and Bungay. Overy says that only one airfield was temporarily put out of action and "only" 103 pilots were lost. British fighter production, not counting repaired aircraft, produced 496 new aircraft in July, 467 in August, and 467 in September, covering the losses of August and September. Overy indicates the number of serviceable and total strength returns reveal an ''increase'' in fighters from 3 August to 7 September, 1,061 on strength and 708 serviceable to 1,161 on strength and 746 serviceable.<ref>{{harvnb|Overy|1980|pp=32–33}}</ref> Moreover, Overy points out that the number of RAF fighter pilots grew by one-third between June and August 1940. Personnel records show a constant supply of around 1,400 pilots in the crucial weeks of the battle. In the second half of September it reached 1,500. The shortfall of pilots was never above 10%. The Germans never had more than between 1,100 and 1,200 pilots, a deficiency of up to one-third. "If Fighter Command were 'the few', the German fighter pilots were fewer".<ref>{{harvnb|Overy|2001|p=38}}</ref>

Other scholars assert that this period was the most dangerous of all. In ''The Narrow Margin'', published in 1961, historians [[Derek Wood (author)|Derek Wood]] and [[Derek Dempster]] believed that the two weeks from 24 August to 6 September represented a real danger. According to them, from 24 August to 6 September 295 fighters had been totally destroyed and 171 badly damaged, against a total output of 269 new and repaired Spitfires and Hurricanes. They say that 103 pilots were killed or missing and 128 were wounded, a total wastage of 120 pilots per week out of a fighting strength of just under 1,000, and that during August no more than 260 fighter pilots were turned out by OTUs, while casualties were just over 300. A full squadron establishment was 26 pilots, whereas the average in August was 16. In their assessment, the RAF was losing the battle.<ref>{{harvnb|Wood|Dempster|2003|pp=212–213}}</ref> [[Denis Richards]], in his 1953 contribution to the official British account ''[[History of the Second World War]]'', agreed that lack of pilots, especially experienced ones, was the RAF's greatest problem. He states that between 8 and 18 August 154 RAF pilots were killed, severely wounded, or missing, while only 63 new pilots were trained. Availability of aircraft was also a serious issue. While its reserves during the Battle of Britain never declined to a half dozen planes as some later claimed, Richards describes 24 August to 6 September as the critical period because during these two weeks Germany destroyed far more aircraft through its attacks on 11 Group's southeast bases than Britain was producing. Three more weeks of such a pace would indeed have exhausted aircraft reserves. Germany had also suffered heavy losses of pilots and aircraft, hence its shift to night-time attacks in September. On 7 September RAF aircraft losses fell below British production and remained so until the end of the war.<ref>{{harvnb|Richards|1953|pp=176, 190–193}}</ref>