Editing Auschwitz concentration camp (section)

===Bombing proposal{{anchor|bombing proposal}}===
{{main|Auschwitz bombing debate}}
[[File:Auschwitz aerial view RAF.jpg|thumb|upright=0.8|Aerial view of Auschwitz II-Birkenau taken by the [[Royal Air Force|RAF]] on 23 August 1944]]
In January 1941, the Commander-in-Chief of the [[Polish Armed Forces|Polish Army]] and prime minister-in-exile, [[Władysław Sikorski]], arranged for a report to be forwarded to Air Marshal [[Richard Pierse]], head of [[RAF]] [[Bomber Command]].{{sfn|Biddle|2000|p=36}} Written by Auschwitz prisoners in or around December 1940, the report described the camp's atrocious living conditions and asked the [[Polish government-in-exile]] to bomb it:
{{blockquote|The prisoners implore the Polish Government to have the camp bombed. The destruction of the electrified barbed wire, the ensuing panic and darkness prevailing, the chances of escape would be great. The local population will hide them and help them to leave the neighbourhood. The prisoners are confidently awaiting the day when Polish planes from Great Britain will enable their escape. This is the prisoners unanimous demand to the Polish Government in London.{{sfn|Westermann|2004|p=197}}}}

Pierse replied that it was not technically feasible to bomb the camp without harming the prisoners.{{sfn|Biddle|2000|p=36}} In May 1944 Slovak rabbi [[Michael Dov Weissmandl]] suggested that the Allies bomb the rails leading to the camp.{{sfn|Kitchens|2000|pp=80–81}} Historian [[David Wyman]] published an essay in ''[[Commentary (magazine)|Commentary]]'' in 1978 entitled "Why Auschwitz Was Never Bombed", arguing that the [[United States Army Air Forces]] could and should have attacked Auschwitz. In his book ''[[The Abandonment of the Jews|The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust 1941–1945]]'' (1984), Wyman argued that, since the IG Farben plant at Auschwitz III had been bombed three times between August and December 1944 by the US [[Fifteenth Air Force]] in Italy, it would have been feasible for the other camps or railway lines to be bombed too. [[Bernard Wasserstein]]'s ''Britain and the Jews of Europe'' (1979) and [[Martin Gilbert]]'s ''Auschwitz and the Allies'' (1981) raised similar questions about British inaction.{{sfn|Neufeld|2000|pp=1–2}} Since the 1990s, other historians have argued that Allied bombing accuracy was not sufficient for Wyman's proposed attack, and that [[counterfactual history]] is an inherently problematic endeavor.{{sfn|Neufeld|2000|pp=4–5, 9–10}}