Editing Atlantic Ocean (section)

=== Threats and Vulnerabilities ===
Critical maritime infrastructure is exposed to a broad spectrum of threats, both in terms of actors and vectors. While [[counterterrorism]] has traditionally dominated the threat landscape, since the 2010s there has been a marked shift toward cyber and hybrid threats. Threat classifications often rely on distinctions such as intentional versus unintentional acts, and the identity of the threat actor, whether state-sponsored, terrorist, criminal, or individual. However, the rise of grey zone activities has increasingly blurred these boundaries.

In response to attacks on [[Telecommunications cable|communication cables]] in the [[Baltic Sea|Baltic]] [[Baltic Sea|Sea]] and [[North Sea]], the [[European Union]] established the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Cell in 2023. Based in Brussels, the Cell is tasked with identifying vulnerabilities and enhancing coordination across industry, civilian, and military sectors through information sharing and best practice dissemination.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Tang |first=Andreas |date=2024-12-19 |title=NATO determined to protect critical undersea energy infrastructure |url=https://windeurope.org/newsroom/news/nato-determined-to-protect-critical-undersea-energy-infrastructure/#:~:text=At%20its%202023%20Vilnius%20Summit,Cell%20became%20operational%20in%202023. |access-date=2025-05-12 |website=WindEurope}}</ref> An [[European Union]] parliamentary report has found four potential attack vectors in 1) weaponizing civilian vessels using improvised cutting devices (anchor or [[dredging]]), 2) undersea explosives with [[naval mine]]s or improvised maritime explosive devices, 3) submersible boats, crafts, drones and [[submarine]]s, 4) targeting of land based infrastructure such as landing points or power supply, 5) [[cyberattack]]s against [[Information technology|IT]] and [[Operational technology|OT]] infrastructure.<ref name=":2" /> A related potential target are the repair and maintenance facilities which due to their low number (as of 2022, the EU has 3 [[Cable layer|cable]] [[Cable layer|layer ships]]) are highly vulnerable.<ref name=":2" />

Due to the multitude of data cables between [[North America]] and [[Europe]], a singular attack on one cable does not translate to a total loss of communication. However vulnerabilities in the Atlantic include: [[Greenland Connect]], [[Greenland|Greenland's]] only communication cable connecting it with [[Iceland]] and [[Canada]]; [[Fortaleza]] landing point but more specifically [[Atlantis-2]], [[EllaLink]], [[SACS (cable system)|SACS]] and [[SAIL (cable system)|SAIL]] cable systems which represent the only four communication cables that directly link [[South America]] with [[Europe]] and [[Africa]]; the [[Strait of Gibraltar]] which connects the [[Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]]  with the Atlantic through 7 cables and due to the volume of maritime traffic presents ideal cover for malicious activities.<ref>{{Cite web |last=TeleGeography |title=Submarine Cable Map Trivia |url=https://www2.telegeography.com/submarine-cable-map-trivia |access-date=2025-05-12 |website=www2.telegeography.com |language=es}}</ref><ref name=":2" />

The critical maritime energy infrastructure threat profile is dominated by [[cyberattack]]s.<ref name=":3" /> Cyberattacks targeting the [[Digital control|digital control systems]] of [[Oil platform|offshore oil rigs]], [[Submarine pipeline|undersea pipelines]], and [[Liquefied natural gas terminal|LNG terminals]], which are increasingly automated and vulnerable to remote interference due to [[automation]] and network dependencies. Likewise natural hazards, including hurricanes, rough seas, and long-term climate change effects like sea-level rise and increased storm intensity, also endanger infrastructure integrity and continuity of operations.

Deliberate attacks on port infrastructure are rare and port security is much more relevant in the domain of blue crime. However as the [[USS Cole bombing]] or [[2008 Mumbai attacks]] highlight, port infrastructure can become a target for terror attacks. Similarly to energy infrastructure the threat vector adversaries take is increasingly in the cyber domain, with ransomware attacks such as the NotPetya attacks on [[Maersk|A.P. Møller-Maersk]].<ref name=":1" />