Editing Operation Sea Lion (section)

== Indefinite postponement ==
During the summer of 1940, both the British public and the Americans believed that a German invasion was imminent, and they studied the forthcoming [[high tide]]s of 5–9 August, 2–7 September, 1–6 October, and 30 October – 4 November as likely dates.<ref name="sptimes19400803">{{cite news
| url        = https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=Dk8wAAAAIBAJ&pg=5186%2C219407
| title      = Next Week May See Nazis Attempt British Invasion
| work       = St. Petersburg Times
| date       = 3 August 1940
| access-date = 26 November 2011
| page       = 1
}}</ref> The British [[British anti-invasion preparations of the Second World War|prepared extensive defences]], and, in Churchill's view, "the great invasion scare" was "serving a most useful purpose" by "keeping every man and woman tuned to a high pitch of readiness".{{sfn|Bishop|2009|pp=70–71}}<ref>John Colville, ''The Fringes of Power'' (1986), diary notes on Churchill's 11 July meetings; in {{cite book
| author    = Michael I. Handel
| title     = War, Strategy and Intelligence
| url       = https://books.google.com/books?id=NtKN-Vo93GsC&pg=PA221
| year      =  2012
| publisher = Routledge
| isbn      = 978-1-136-28631-5
| page      = 221
| quote     = He emphasised that the great invasion scare (which we only ceased to deride six weeks ago) is serving a most useful purpose: it is well on the way to providing us with the finest offensive army we have ever possessed and it is keeping every man and woman tuned to a high pitch of readiness. He does not wish the scare to abate therefore, and although personally he doubts whether invasion is a serious menace he intends to give that impression, and to talk about long and dangerous vigils, etc., when he broadcasts on Sunday.
}}</ref> He did not think the threat credible. On 10 July, he advised the War Cabinet that the possibility of invasion could be ignored, as it "would be a most hazardous and suicidal operation"; and on 13 August that "now that we were so much stronger", he thought "we could spare an armoured brigade from this country". Over-riding [[John Dill|General Dill]], Churchill initiated [[Operation Compass|Operation Apology]] by which a series of troop convoys, including three tank regiments and eventually the entire 2nd Armoured Division, were sent around the [[Cape of Good Hope]] to reinforce [[Archibald Wavell|General Wavell]] in the Middle East in support of operations against [[Italy|Italian]] colonial forces (Italy had declared war on 10 June).{{sfn|Deighton|1996|p=51}} Furthermore, on Churchill's urging, on 5 August the War Cabinet approved Operation Menace, in which a substantial proportion of the Home Fleet – two battleships, an aircraft carrier, five cruisers, and twelve destroyers, together with five out of six battalions of [[Royal Marines]], were dispatched to Dakar on 30 August in an attempt to neutralise the battleship [[French battleship Richelieu|Richelieu]] and detach [[French West Africa]] from [[Vichy France]] to the control of the [[Free French]].  Overall, these actions demonstrated Churchill's confidence that the immediate danger of a German invasion was now over.{{sfn|Forczyk|2016|pp=196–199}}

The Germans were confident enough to film a simulation of the intended invasion in advance. A crew turned up at the Belgian port of [[Antwerp]] in early September 1940 and, for two days, they filmed tanks and troops landing from barges on a nearby beach under simulated fire. It was explained that, as the invasion would happen at night, Hitler wanted the German people to see all the details.<ref>Reagan, Geoffrey. ''Military Anecdotes'' (1992) p. 210, Guinness Publishing {{ISBN|0-85112-519-0}}</ref>

In early August, the German command had agreed that the invasion should begin on 15 September, but the Navy's revisions to its schedule set the date back to 20 September. At a conference on 14 September, Hitler praised the various preparations, but told his service chiefs that, as air superiority had still not been achieved, he would review whether to proceed with the invasion. At this conference, he gave the Luftwaffe the opportunity to act independently of the other services, with intensified continuous air attacks to overcome British resistance; on 16 September, Göring issued orders for this new phase of the air attack.{{sfn|Overy|2010|pp=87–88}} On 17 September 1940, Hitler held a meeting with ''Reichsmarschall'' Hermann Göring and {{Lang|de|[[Generalfeldmarschall]]}} [[Gerd von Rundstedt]] during which he became convinced the operation was not viable. Control of the skies was still lacking, and co-ordination among three branches of the armed forces was out of the question. Later that day, Hitler ordered the postponement of the operation. He ordered the dispersal of the invasion fleet in order to avert further damage by British air and naval attacks.<ref>{{cite book
| last      = Wright
| first     = Gordon
| title     = The Ordeal of Total War: 1939–1945
| url      = https://archive.org/details/ordealoftotalwar00wrig
| url-access = registration
| location  = New York
| publisher = Harper & Row
| year      = 1968
| page      = [https://archive.org/details/ordealoftotalwar00wrig/page/32 32]
}}</ref>

The postponement coincided with rumours that there had been an attempt to land on British shores on or about 7 September, which had been repulsed with large German casualties. The story was later expanded to include false reports that the British had set the sea on fire using flaming oil. Both versions were widely reported in the American press and in [[William L. Shirer]]'s ''[[Berlin Diary]]'', but both were officially denied by Britain and Germany. Author [[James Hayward (writer)|James Hayward]] has suggested that the whispering campaign around the "failed invasion" was a successful example of British [[black propaganda]] to bolster morale at home and in [[occupied Europe]], and convince America that Britain was not a lost cause.<ref>Hayward, James. ''Myths and Legends of the Second World War'', p. 214</ref>

On 12 October 1940, Hitler issued a directive releasing forces for other fronts. The appearance of preparations for Sea Lion was to be continued to keep political pressure on Britain, and a fresh directive would be issued if it was decided that invasion was to be reconsidered in the spring of 1941.{{sfn|Shirer|1960|p=927}}{{sfn|Overy|2010|p=88}} On 12 November 1940, Hitler issued Directive No. 18 demanding further refinement to the invasion plan. On 1 May 1941, fresh invasion orders were issued under the codename ''Haifische'' (shark), accompanied by additional landings on the southwest and northeast coasts of England codenamed ''Harpune Nord'' and ''Harpune Süd'' (harpoon north and south), although commanders of naval stations were informed that these were deception plans. Work continued on the various amphibious warfare developments such as purpose-built landing craft, which were later employed in operations in the Baltic.<ref>Schenk, p. 353</ref>

While the bombing of Britain intensified during the Blitz, Hitler issued his Directive No. 21 on 18 December 1940 instructing the Wehrmacht to be ready for a quick attack to commence his long planned invasion of the Soviet Union.{{sfn | Bungay | 2000 | p=339}} {{lang|de|Seelöwe}} lapsed, never to be resumed.<ref>Fleming, Peter. ''Invasion 1940'' (Readers Union, London, 1958), p. 273.</ref> On 23 September 1941, Hitler ordered all Sea Lion preparations to cease, but it was 1942 before the last of the barges at Antwerp were returned to trade. Hitler's last recorded order with reference to Sea Lion was on 24 January 1944, reusing equipment that was still stockpiled for the invasion and stating that twelve months' notice would be given of its resumption.<ref>Schenk, p. 354</ref>