Editing Mind–body dualism (section)

===Argument from simplicity===
The argument from simplicity is probably the simplest and also the most common form of argument against dualism of the mental. The dualist is always faced with the question of why anyone should find it necessary to believe in the existence of two, ontologically distinct, entities (mind and brain), when it seems possible and would make for a simpler thesis to test against scientific evidence, to explain the same events and properties in terms of one. It is a heuristic principle in science and philosophy not to assume the existence of more entities than is necessary for clear explanation and prediction.

This argument was criticized by [[Peter Glassen]] in a debate with [[J. J. C. Smart]] in the pages of ''[[Philosophy (journal)|Philosophy]]'' in the late 1970s and early 1980s.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Glassen | first1 = Peter | year = 1976 | title = J. J. C. Smart, Materialism and Occam's Razor | journal = Philosophy | volume = 51 | issue = 197| pages = 349–352 | doi=10.1017/s0031819100019392| s2cid = 170163667 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Smart | first1 = J. J. C. | year = 1978 | title = Is Occam's Razor a Physical Thing? | journal = Philosophy | volume = 53 | issue = 205| pages = 382–385 | doi=10.1017/s0031819100022439| s2cid = 170593277 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Glassen | first1 = Peter | year = 1983 | title = Smart, Materialism and Believing | journal = Philosophy | volume = 58 | issue = 223| pages = 95–101 | doi=10.1017/s0031819100056291| s2cid = 170472361 }}</ref> Glassen argued that, because it is not a physical entity, [[Occam's razor]] cannot consistently be appealed to by a physicalist or materialist as a justification of mental states or events, such as the belief that dualism is false. The idea is that Occam's razor may not be as "unrestricted" as it is normally described (applying to all qualitative postulates, even abstract ones) but instead concrete (only applies to physical objects). If one applies Occam's Razor unrestrictedly, then it recommends monism until pluralism either receives more support or is disproved. If one applies Occam's Razor only concretely, then it may not be used on abstract concepts (this route, however, has serious consequences for selecting between hypotheses ''about'' the abstract).<ref name=Stanford>[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/ Plato Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Simplicity]. Excerpt: "Perhaps scientists apply an unrestricted version of Occam's Razor to that portion of reality in which they are interested, namely the concrete, causal, spatiotemporal world. Or perhaps scientists apply a 'concretized' version of Occam's Razor unrestrictedly. Which is the case? The answer determines which general philosophical principle we end up with: ought we to avoid the multiplication of objects of whatever kind, or merely the multiplication of concrete objects? The distinction here is crucial for a number of central philosophical debates. Unrestricted Occam's Razor favors monism over dualism, and nominalism over platonism. By contrast, 'concretized' Occam's Razor has no bearing on these debates, since the extra entities in each case are not concrete".</ref>

This argument has also been criticized by Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad, who argues that the principle of simplicity could only be applied when there is no need for an additional entity. Despite arguments indicating the need for the soul, the principle of simplicity does not apply. Therefore, if there were no argument establishing the existence of the soul, one could deny its existence based on the principle of simplicity. However, various arguments have been put forth to establish its existence. These arguments demonstrate that while neuroscience can explain the mysteries of the material brain, certain significant issues, such as personal identity and free will, remain beyond the scope of neuroscience. The crux of the matter lies in the essential limitations of neuroscience and the potency of substance dualism in explaining these phenomena.<ref name="Mousavirad 2023"/>