Editing Lyndon B. Johnson (section)

====Tet Offensive====
[[File:L B Johnson Model Khe Sanh.jpeg|thumb|[[Walt Rostow]], Johnson's [[National Security Advisor (United States)|national security advisor]], meeting with Johnson in the [[Situation Room]] in 1968, where the two reviewed a map of the region where the [[Battle of Khe Sanh]] was being waged]]

On January 30, 1968, the Viet Cong and the [[North Vietnamese Army]] began the [[Tet Offensive]] against South Vietnam's five largest cities, including Saigon. While the Tet Offensive failed militarily, it was a psychological victory, definitively turning American public opinion against the war effort. In February 1968, influential news anchor [[Walter Cronkite]] of [[CBS News]] expressed on the air that the conflict was deadlocked and that additional fighting would change nothing. Johnson reacted, saying "If I've lost Cronkite, I've lost middle America".<ref>Dallek (1998), pp. 505–506.</ref> Indeed, demoralization about the war was everywhere; 26 percent then approved of Johnson's handling of Vietnam, while 63 percent disapproved.<ref>Dallek (1998), p. 509.</ref> College students and others protested, burned [[Conscription in the United States|draft]] cards, and chanted, "Hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids did you kill today?"<ref>"The Sixties." Junior Scholastic. February 11, 1994. p. 4.</ref>

The Tet Offensive convinced senior leaders of the Johnson administration, including the "Wise Men" and new Defense Secretary [[Clark Clifford]], that further escalation of troop levels would not help bring an end to the war.<ref>{{harvp|Dallek|1998|p=511}}</ref> Johnson was initially reluctant to follow this advice, but ultimately agreed to allow a partial bombing halt and to signal his willingness to engage in peace talks.{{sfn|Patterson|1996|pp=683–684}} On March 31, 1968, Johnson announced that he would halt the bombing in North Vietnam, while at the same time announcing that he would not seek re-election.<ref>{{harvp|Dallek|1998|p=513}}</ref> He also escalated U.S. military operations in South Vietnam in order to consolidate control of as much of the countryside as possible before the onset of serious peace talks.{{sfn|Patterson|1996|pp=684–685}} Talks began in Paris in May, but failed to yield any results.<ref>{{harvp|Dallek|1998|pp=538–541, 564}}</ref> Two of the major obstacles in negotiations were the unwillingness of the United States to allow the Viet Cong to take part in the South Vietnamese government, and the unwillingness of North Vietnam to recognize the legitimacy of South Vietnam.{{sfn|Patterson|1996|p=703}} In October 1968, when the parties came close to an agreement on a bombing halt, Republican presidential nominee Richard Nixon intervened with the South Vietnamese, promising better terms so as to delay a settlement on the issue until after the election.<ref>{{harvp|Dallek|1998|pp=584–585}}</ref> Johnson sought a continuation of talks after the 1968 election, but the North Vietnamese argued about procedural matters until after Nixon took office.<ref>{{harvp|Dallek|1998|p=597}}</ref>