Editing Blitzkrieg (section)

===''Luftwaffe''===
[[James Corum]] wrote that it was a myth that the ''Luftwaffe'' had a doctrine of [[terror bombing]] in which civilians were attacked to break the will or aid the collapse of an enemy by the ''Luftwaffe'' in ''blitzkrieg'' operations. After the bombing of Guernica in 1937 and the [[Rotterdam Blitz]] in 1940, it was commonly assumed that terror bombing was a part of ''Luftwaffe'' doctrine. During the interwar period, the ''Luftwaffe'' leadership rejected the concept of terror bombing in favour of battlefield support and [[interdiction]] operations:{{sfn|Corum|1997|p=7}}

{{blockquote|The vital industries and transportation centers that would be targeted for shutdown were valid military targets. Civilians were not to be targeted directly, but the breakdown of production would affect their morale and will to fight. German legal scholars of the 1930s carefully worked out guidelines for what type of bombing was permissible under international law. While direct attacks against civilians were ruled out as "terror bombing", the concept of the attacking the vital war industries – and probable heavy civilian casualties and breakdown of civilian morale – was ruled as acceptable.{{sfn|Corum|1997|p=240}}}}

Corum continued: [[General]] [[Walther Wever (general)|Walther Wever]] compiled a doctrine known as ''The Conduct of the Aerial War''. This document, which the ''Luftwaffe'' adopted, rejected [[Giulio Douhet]]'s theory of terror bombing. Terror bombing was deemed to be "counter-productive", increasing rather than destroying the enemy's will to resist. Such bombing campaigns were regarded as diversion from the ''Luftwaffe's'' main operations; destruction of the enemy armed forces. The bombings of Guernica, Rotterdam and [[Bombing of Warsaw in World War II|Warsaw]] were tactical missions in support of military operations and were not intended as strategic terror attacks.{{sfn|Corum|1997|pp=143–144, 146, 7}}

J. P. Harris wrote that most Luftwaffe leaders from Goering through the general staff believed, as did their counterparts in Britain and the United States, that strategic bombing was the chief mission of the air force and that given such a role, the Luftwaffe would win the next war and that

{{blockquote|Nearly all lectures concerned the strategic uses of airpower; virtually none discussed tactical co-operation with the Army. Similarly in the military journals, emphasis centred on 'strategic' bombing. The prestigious Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau, the War Ministry's journal, which was founded in 1936, published a number of theoretical pieces on future developments in air warfare. Nearly all discussed the use of strategic airpower, some emphasising that aspect of air warfare to the exclusion of others. One author commented that European military powers were increasingly making the bomber force the heart of their airpower. The manoeuvrability and technical capability of the next generation of bombers would be 'as unstoppable as the flight of a shell.{{sfn|Harris|1995|p=346}}}}

The Luftwaffe ended up with an air force consisting mainly of relatively short-range aircraft, but that does not prove that the German air force was solely interested in "tactical" bombing. It happened because the German aircraft industry lacked the experience to build a long-range bomber fleet quickly and because Hitler was insistent on the very rapid creation of a numerically large force. It is also significant that Germany's position in the centre of Europe to a large extent obviated the need to make a clear distinction between bombers suitable only for "tactical" purposes and those necessary for strategic purposes in the early stages of a likely future war.{{sfn|Harris|1995|pp=346–347}}