Editing Wahhabism (section)

== International influence and propagation ==
{{Main|Arab Cold War|International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism|Petro-Islam}}
{{Further|International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism by region|Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict}}

=== Explanation for influence ===
{{proseline|date=February 2025}}
[[Khaled Abou El Fadl]] listed four major factors that contributed to expansion of Wahhabi ideas across the [[Muslim world|Islamic World]]:
* The appeal of [[Arab nationalism]], which considered the [[Ottoman Empire]] to be a foreign occupying power and took a powerful precedent from the Wahhabi rebellion against the Ottomans
* Wahhabi calls for a return to the pristine Islam of the ''[[Salaf|Salaf al-Salih]]'' (righteous predecessors) which rejected much of the classical legal precedents; instead deriving directly from ''[[Quran|Qur'an]]'', ''[[Hadith]]'' and the sayings of the ''Salaf''; through ''[[Ijtihad]]''. This also appealed to the Islamic reformers who pushed for a revival of ''ijtihad'', and a direct return to the original sources for interpreting the ''Qur'an'' and ''[[Sunnah]]'', to seek solutions to the present day problems.
* Control of [[Mecca]] and [[Medina]], which allowed the [[King of Saudi Arabia]] to take the mantle of "[[Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques]]". This enabled the Wahhabis to exert great influence on Islamic culture and thinking;
* [[Saudi Aramco|Saudi Oil industry]], especially after its boom during the [[1970s energy crisis]], allowed Saudi Arabia to successfully promote their interpretations of Islam throughout the [[Muslim world|Islamic World]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Abou El Fadl |first=Khalid |title=The Great Theft |publisher=HarperCollins |date=2005 |isbn=9780060563394 |location=New York |pages=70–72}}</ref>

[[Peter Mandaville]] lists two more reasons:<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Mandaville |first1=Peter |title=Wahhabism and the World: Understanding Saudi Arabia's Global Influence on Islam |last2=Hammond |first2=Andrew |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |date=2022 |isbn=9780197532577 |pages=11–12 |chapter=1: Wahhabism and the World: The Historical Evolution, Structure, and Future of Saudi Religious Transnationalism}}</ref>
* Societal factors: With the influx of modernity, younger generations of [[Muslims]] increasingly departed from the "localized" religious understanding of their parents and looked up to a [[Pan-Islamism|pan-Islamic]] outlook authentically rooted in Scriptures and early generations of ''[[Salaf|Salaf al-Salih]]''
* Rise of other native [[Islah|Islamic reformist]] movements such as the ''[[Ahl-i Hadith|Ahl-e Hadith]]'' in [[South Asia]] and the ''[[Salafi movement|Salafiyya]]'' movement in the [[Arab world]] which shared a common religious outlook. These movements expanded collaboration in various socio-economic, political and educational fields and formed a joint intellectual alliance. Additionally, influential conservative reform movements like [[Deobandi]]sm began co-operating with Wahhabis to a certain extent, despite doctrinal variations

According to French scholar and critic of [[Islamism]] [[Gilles Kepel]],  the tripling in the price of oil in the mid-1970s and the progressive takeover of [[Saudi Aramco]] in the 1974–1980 period, provided the source of much influence of Wahhabism in the [[Muslim World|Islamic World]].{{efn|... the financial clout of Saudi Arabia had been amply demonstrated during the oil embargo against the United States, following the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. This show of international power, along with the nation's astronomical increase in wealth, allowed Saudi Arabia's puritanical, conservative Wahhabite faction to attain a preeminent position of strength in the global expression of Islam. Saudi Arabia's impact on Muslims throughout the world was less visible than that of Khomeini's Iran, but the effect was deeper and more enduring{{spaces}}... it reorganized the religious landscape by promoting those associations and ulamas who followed its lead, and then, by injecting substantial amounts of money into Islamic interests of all sorts, it won over many more converts. Above all, the Saudis raised a new standard{{snd}}the virtuous Islamic civilization{{snd}}as foil for the corrupting influence of the West.<ref name="Kepel-petro" />}}

=== Funding ===
Estimates of Saudi spending on religious causes abroad include "upward of $100{{spaces}}billion";<ref>documentary ''The Qur'an'' aired in the UK, [https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/film-and-tv/tv-radio-reviews/last-nights-tv-the-quran-channel-4-banged-up-five-867474.html ''The Qur'an'' review in ''The Independent''] {{Webarchive|url= https://swap.stanford.edu/20100416011259/http://www.independent.co.uk/arts%2Dentertainment/film%2Dand%2Dtv/tv%2Dradio%2Dreviews/last%2Dnights%2Dtv%2Dthe%2Dquran%2Dchannel%2D4%2Dbanged%2Dup%2Dfive%2D867474.html |date=16 April 2010}}</ref> $2–3{{spaces}}billion per year since 1975 (compared to the annual [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] propaganda budget of $1{{spaces}}billion/year);<ref name="deadly">Yahya Birt, an academic who is director of The City Circle, a networking body of young British Muslim professionals, quoted in [https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/wahhabism-a-deadly-scripture-398516.html Wahhabism: A deadly scripture] {{Webarchive|url= https://web.archive.org/web/20101209021212/http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/wahhabism-a-deadly-scripture-398516.html |date=9 December 2010}}| Paul Vallely 1 November 2007</ref> and "at least $87{{spaces}}billion" from 1987 to 2007.<ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.globalpolitician.com/23661-saudi |title=Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism and the Spread of Sunni Theofascism |date=22 October 2007 |work=Global Politician |url-status=dead |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20080610043506/http://www.globalpolitician.com/23661-saudi |archive-date=10 June 2008 |author=Curtin Winsor}}</ref> Reliability of these rough estimates have been disputed due to their inconsistencies and lack of a scientific methodology for precise quantification.<ref name="Oxford University Press">{{Cite book |last1=Mandaville |first1=Peter |title=Wahhabism and the World: Understanding Saudi Arabia's Global Influence on Islam |last2=Hammond |first2=Andrew |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |date=2022 |isbn=9780197532577 |pages=6–10 |chapter=1: Wahhabism and the World: The Historical Evolution, Structure, and Future of Saudi Religious Transnationalism}}</ref>

Its largesse funded an estimated "90% of the expenses of the entire faith", throughout the Muslim world, according to journalist Dawood al-Shirian.<ref name="ReferenceA">Dawood al-Shirian, 'What Is Saudi Arabia Going to Do?' ''Al-Hayat'', 19 May 2003</ref> It extended to young and old, from children's [[madrasah|madrasas]] to high-level scholarship.<ref>Abou al Fadl, Khaled, ''The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists'', HarperSanFrancisco, 2005, pp. 48–64</ref> "Books, scholarships, fellowships, mosques" (for example, "more than 1,500 mosques were built from Saudi public funds over the last 50 years") were paid for.{{sfn|Kepel|2002|p=72}} It rewarded journalists and academics, who followed it and built satellite campuses around [[Egypt]] for [[Al-Azhar University|Al Azhar]], the oldest and most influential Islamic university.<ref name="Murphy, Caryle p. 32">Murphy, Caryle, ''Passion for Islam : Shaping the Modern Middle East: the Egyptian Experience'', Simon and Schuster, 2002 p. 32</ref> Yahya Birt counts spending on "1,500 mosques, 210 Islamic centres and dozens of Muslim academies and schools".<ref name="deadly" /><ref name="Coolsaet">{{cite book |last=Coolsaet |first=Rik |title=Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American |publisher=Ashgate Publishing Ltd. |chapter-url= https://books.google.com/books?id=GOKhAgAAQBAJ&pg=PT126 |editor-first=Rik |editor-last=Coolsaet |chapter=7: Cycles of Revolutionary Terrorism |date=2013 |isbn=9781409476450}}</ref> Apart from state patronage, a major source of proselytization has been the private charities and religious activities of Muslim individuals and organizations.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Mandaville |first1=Peter |title=Wahhabism and the World: Understanding Saudi Arabia's Global Influence on Islam |last2=Hammond |first2=Andrew |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |date=2022 |isbn=9780197532577 |pages=8–9 |chapter=1: Wahhabism and the World: The Historical Evolution, Structure, and Future of Saudi Religious Transnationalism}}</ref>

This financial aid has done much to overwhelm less strict local interpretations of Islam, according to observers like Dawood al-Shirian and [[Lee Kuan Yew]],<ref name="ReferenceA" /> arguing that it caused the Saudi interpretation (sometimes called "petro-Islam"{{sfn|Kepel|2002|pp=69–75}}) to be perceived as the correct interpretation{{snd}}or the "gold standard" of Islam{{snd}}in many Muslims' minds.<ref name="Radical Islam in Central Asia">{{cite web |url= http://www.kashmirherald.com/featuredarticle/radicalislam.html |title=Radical Islam in Central Asia |access-date=13 November 2014 |archive-date=4 March 2016 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20160304030845/http://www.kashmirherald.com/featuredarticle/radicalislam.html |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=geiCymK1IWIC&pg=PA71 |title=Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and ... |author=Kuan Yew Lee |author2=Ali Wyne |publisher=MIT Press |isbn=9780262019125 |date=2012}}</ref>

[[Peter Mandaville]] asserts that the commonly reported data estimates regarding Saudi religious funding are unreliable due to the sources being "internally inconsistent" and based on "non-specific hearsay". According to Mandaville, the wide-ranging and controversial usage of the term "Wahhabism" has rendered researching Saudi religious transnationalism and assessing its actual magnitude even more confusing. Moreover, the [[Post–Cold War era|post-Cold War era]] governments had commonly used the label "Wahhabism" to designate a wide swathe of religious sects, including those which were doctrinally at odds with Wahhabism.<ref name="Oxford University Press" />

=== Militant and political Islam ===
{{Further|International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism#Debate over impact on Salafi-Jihadist insurgencies|label1=Debate over Wahhabi influence on Salafi-Jihadism}}

Allegations of links between Wahhabism proper and the ideology of [[Militant Islamism|militant Islamists]] such as [[al-Qaeda]] and [[Islamic State]], have been disputed.<ref name="auto">{{cite journal |issue=1 |title=Al-Qaeda: the misunderstood Wahhabi connection and the ideology of violence |url= https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%2520Security/azzaml.pdf |date=February 2003 |location=Washington, DC |journal=Middle East Programme |publisher=THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS |access-date=17 November 2021 |archive-date=4 January 2022 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20220104133535/https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Security/azzaml.pdf |url-status=dead}}</ref> Throughout the 20th century [[Council of Senior Scholars (Saudi Arabia)|Board of Senior Ulema]] (BSU) of the ''Dar al-Ifta'' in Saudi Arabia, were known for issuing ''fatawa'' which strongly condemned various forms of [[war crimes]] and [[terrorism]], in line with [[Islamic military jurisprudence]]. In a well-known ''[[fatwa]]'' issued at its 32nd session in [[Taif|Ta'if]] on 25 August 1988, the board members recommended the death penalty for acts of terrorism.<ref name="Al-Atawneh 2010 161–162">{{Cite book |last=Al-Atawneh |first=Muhammad |title=Wahhābī Islam Facing the Challenges of Modernity |publisher=[[Brill Publishers|Brill]] |date=2010 |isbn=978900418469-5 |location=Leiden |pages=161–162 |chapter=Appendix A: Translated Decisions of BSU}}</ref> Moreover, the Wahhabi ''[[ulema]]'' of Saudi Arabia had ruled the illegality of all forms of [[suicide bombings]], including in [[Israel]]. The doctrine of suicide bombings which started appearing in the manuals of various Egyptian extremists during the 1970s and 1980s; has been rejected as heretical by the Wahhabi scholars.<ref name="auto" /> Jonathan Sozek reports that while Bin Laden self-identified as a Salafist, he was not affiliated with the Wahhabi movement.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Sozek |first=Jonathan |title=Osama bin Laden's Global Islamism and Wahhabi Islam |url= https://www.mcgill.ca/mes/files/mes/MJMESSozek.pdf |website=[[McGill University]] |page=34 |access-date=12 June 2022 |archive-date=26 March 2015 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20150326091848/https://www.mcgill.ca/mes/files/mes/MJMESSozek.pdf |url-status=live}}</ref>

The Yemeni origins of the [[Bin Laden family]] also reflected a non-Wahhabi heritage.<ref>{{cite journal |date=February 2003 |title=Al-Qaeda: the misunderstood Wahhabi connection and the ideology of violence |url= https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%2520Security/azzaml.pdf |url-status=dead |journal=Middle East Programme |location=Washington, DC |publisher=The Royal Institute of International Affairs |issue=1 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20220104133535/https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Security/azzaml.pdf |archive-date=4 January 2022 |access-date=17 November 2021 |quote=A number of Islamists claim that Bin Laden has no connection with Wahhabism and also point to his Yemeni background, which is typically non-Wahhabi.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Scheuer |first=Michael |date=7 February 2008 |title=Yemen still close to al-Qaeda's heart |url= http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JB07Ak01.html |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20160702080545/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JB07Ak01.html |archive-date=2 July 2016 |website=Asia Times}}</ref> Bin Laden's feud with the Saudi government intensified during the [[Gulf War]]; prompting Saudi authorities to place Bin Laden under [[house arrest]] in 1991, before exiling him the same year. In 1994, Saudi Arabia revoked Bin Laden's [[citizenship]] and froze all his assets, turning him into a fugitive and the Bin Laden family disowned him. After Saudi pressure on [[Sudan]], the Al-Qaeda leader sought refuge under the [[Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001)|Taliban government in Afghanistan]]. Taliban's denial of Saudi requests to extradite Bin Laden led to a diplomatic row between [[Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001)|Afghanistan]] and [[Saudi Arabia]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=27 April 2022 |title=Osama bin Laden Fast Facts |work=CNN |url= https://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/30/world/osama-bin-laden-fast-facts/index.html |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20220802200906/https://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/30/world/osama-bin-laden-fast-facts/index.html |archive-date=2 August 2022}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=1 September 2007 |title=Profile: Osama bin Laden |url= https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/profile-osama-bin-laden |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20220318095118/https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/profile-osama-bin-laden |archive-date=18 March 2022 |website=Council on Foreign Relations}}</ref> Throughout the 1990s, mainstream Wahhabi clerics in the Kingdom supported [[Coalition of the Gulf War|US-Saudi alliance]] against [[Ba'athist Iraq]] during the [[Gulf War]] and condemned terrorist acts by Al-Qaeda. Anti-establishment Wahhabi scholars have also been vehemently opposed to tactics advocated by Bin Laden, not withstanding their opposition to [[American foreign policy in the Middle East|American foreign policy in West Asia]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Gause III |first=F. Gregory |title=Saudi Arabia and the War on Terrorism |url= https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/0817945423_89.pdf |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20230607234752/https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/0817945423_89.pdf |archive-date=7 June 2023 |website=Hoover Institution |page=91}}</ref> Scholars like [[Professor]] [[F. Gregory Gause, III|F. Gregory Gause]] have strongly opposed hysterical assertions made by [[war hawk]]s in the [[Presidency of George W. Bush|Bush administration]], contrasting their portrayals of Wahhabism with attempts made by [[American militia movement|far-right militants]] to appropriate [[American patriotism]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Gause III |first=F. Gregory |title=Saudi Arabia and the War on Terrorism |url= https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/0817945423_89.pdf |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20230607234752/https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/0817945423_89.pdf |archive-date=7 June 2023 |website=Hoover Institution |pages=90–92}}</ref>