Editing Operation Market Garden (section)

=== Day 5: Thursday 21 September ===

==== Oosterbeek ====
{{Main|Battle of Arnhem}}
[[File:Dutch school being searched for German snipers.jpg|thumb|A Dutch school damaged by [[mortar fire]], being searched for German snipers by Sergeant J. Whawell and Sergeant J. Turrell of the [[Glider Pilot Regiment]]. An empty [[CLE Canister]] lies open on the ground in the doorway of the school. 20 September 1944]]

Approximately 3,584 survivors of the 1st Airborne Division established themselves in the buildings and woods around Oosterbeek with the intention of holding a [[bridgehead]] on the north side of the Rhine until XXX Corps could arrive. Throughout the day their position was heavily attacked on all sides. In the southeast, [[Lonsdale Force]] (the remnants of the 1st, 3rd, and 11th Parachute Battalions and 2nd South Staffordshires) repulsed a big attack aided by the fire of the divisional light [[artillery]]. In the north the 7th [[King's Own Scottish Borderers]] were almost overrun during the afternoon but a counterattack with [[bayonets]] restored the situation and the heavily depleted battalion moved further south to occupy a narrower front. The most serious attack of the day was made at dawn against "B" Company, 1st Battalion, [[Border Regiment]] which controlled a vital area of high ground in the southwestern tip of the perimeter overlooking the Heveadorp ferry crossing at Driel, which was the division's only straightforward means of receiving reinforcements from the south. The company was attacked by enemy infantry and armour, including captured French tanks equipped with flamethrowers, and the heights were lost. Counterattacks failed and the remnants of the company were redeployed. The division was left in a precarious position, controlling just {{convert|700|m|yd|abbr=off}} of the riverbank. The division held ground to similar attacks elsewhere on their front.

A supply attempt by RAF [[Short Stirling|Stirlings]] of 38 Group was disrupted by the only Luftwaffe fighter interception during the operation. [[Focke-Wulf Fw 190|Fw 190s]] intercepted the Stirlings at low altitude and shot down 15. Anti-aircraft fire accounted for 8 further losses. The Fw 190s were able to penetrate the screen of Allied fighters sent to cover the drop when the U.S. [[56th Fighter Group]] was late in arriving in its patrol sector between [[Lochem]] and [[Deventer]]. The 56th redeemed itself to an extent by shooting down 15 of the 22 Fw 190s as they departed.{{sfn|Warren|1956|pp=137–138}}

==== Remainder of Polish paratroopers enter the battle ====
{{Main|Battle of Arnhem}}

After two days of delay due to the weather, the remainder of the Polish [[1st Independent Parachute Brigade]] under Major-General [[Stanislaw Sosabowski]] entered the battle on the afternoon of 21 September, delivered at about 17:15 by 114 C-47s of the U.S. 61st and 314th Troop Carrier Groups. Two of the brigade's three battalions were dropped amidst heavy German fire, opposite the 1st Airborne Division's position on a new drop zone south of the Rhine near the village of [[Driel]]. The third battalion was dropped 12–15 miles away near Grave. Overall, the poor coordination by the British air transfer officers and persistent attacks by Luftwaffe aircraft caused their supplies to be dropped {{convert|15|km|mi|abbr=on}} away on the opposite side of the Rhine.

Intending to use the Heveadorp ferry to reinforce the division, they discovered that the opposite bank was dominated by the enemy and that the ferry was missing; it was later found downstream past the road bridge, completely unserviceable. Unable to help the British, the Polish withdrew to Driel for the night and organised defence there, with the Rhine behind their backs and German units increasing in strength around them. The brigade had lost 25% of its fighting strength, amounting to 590 casualties. Several attempts to cross the Rhine on improvised equipment were only partly successful due to heavy German fire and an inability by the 1st Airborne to secure the landing area on the Rhine's northern bank. The 1st Airborne Division made radio contact during the day with guns of the 64th Medium Regiment of XXX Corps' artillery, which had advanced with the ground forces and were assigned to the division for support. Unlike many others, this radio link worked throughout the battle and the regiment provided valuable fire support to the division.

==== Nijmegen ====
{{See also|Battle of Nijmegen}}
[[File:Market-Garden - Nijmegen and the bridge.jpg|thumb|[[Nijmegen]] after the battle. 28 September 1944.]]

Despite the capture of Nijmegen bridge and the clearing of the town on the previous evening, the five tanks of Guards Armoured Division which were across the river did not advance due to: darkness, one tank having been hit, meeting hidden German anti-tank guns, not knowing the full situation on the road ahead and having to secure the northern end of the bridge until infantry were fully in place. Unbeknown to the leading tank crews, three Tiger tanks and two companies of infantry were heading down the road south from Arnhem to Lent. The division resumed its advance about 18 hours later, at noon in daylight with reinforcements from Nijmegen.{{sfn|Saunders|2001|loc=Chapter Nine}}

Horrocks claimed he needed to hold his force as his troops were still fighting in Nijmegen and supplies were slow coming up the single road from Belgium. The Coldstream Guards Group were repulsing an attack on the Groesbeek position, the Irish Guards Group had moved back south to Eindhoven to meet another attack, the Grenadiers had just captured the approaches to the bridge with assistance by the 82nd Airborne paratroops and had five tanks across to support securing the north end of the bridge, and the Welsh Guards were in reserve for the 82nd Airborne. The Guards Armoured Division was scattered over 25 square miles of the south bank of the Waal.{{sfn|Margry|2002b}} Horrocks stated, "Jim Gavin, the divisional commander, could have had no idea of the utter confusion that reigned in Nijmegen at the time, with sporadic battles going on all over the place, and particularly on our one road to the rear where chaos reigned".{{sfn|Saunders|2001|p=188}}

The Market Garden plan depended upon a single highway as the route of advance and supply. This imposed a delay, although the delay was not that great. A problem was that other units could not be deployed on other routes to maintain momentum. Brigadier General Gavin opinioned that this would not have been an issue with firm leadership, although he failed to discuss his own failings in maintaining the set schedule. The historian Max Hastings argued that the delays in moving towards Arnhem "reflected poorly on the British Army".{{sfn|Hastings|2005|p=54}} Carrington stated that he met no one who "suggested we should press on to Arnhem." The historian Robin Neillands argued that the failure of Gavin's 82nd Airborne to take the Nijmegan bridge on 17 September, was a "major contribution to the failure of the entire Arnhem operation and it will not do to pass the blame for that failure on to the British or to Captain Lord Carrington."<ref>''The Battle for the Rhine 1944'', p. 122, by Robin Neillands {{ISBN?}}</ref>

The delay enabled the Germans to reinforce the defence already established at [[Ressen]] (an SS infantry battalion, eleven tanks, an infantry battalion, two 88&nbsp;mm batteries, twenty 20&nbsp;mm flak and the remnants of the forces fighting at Arnhem), aided by use of the bridge following their capture of its northern end.<ref>''US Official History'' by Robin Neillands p. 125 {{ISBN?}}</ref> The advance of the Guards, hindered by marshes that prevented off-road movement, was soon halted by a firm German defensive line. The Guards spearhead did not have the strength to outflank the line. The 43rd Division was ordered to take over the lead, work its way around the enemy positions and make contact with the Polish airborne troops at Driel to the west. The 43rd was {{convert|16|km|mi|abbr=on}} away and there was a traffic jam between them and Nijmegen. It was not until the following day, Friday, that the whole division crossed the River Waal and began its advance.

The Germans, clearly starting to gain the upper hand at Arnhem, continued counterattacking all along the path of XXX Corps. XXX Corps still managed to advance with the 101st Airborne Division and XXX Corps holding ground. Glider tugs and cargo carriers delivered supplies to the 82nd Airborne Division. About 60% of the supplies were recovered with 351 of the gliders being counted as effective, partly with the help of Dutch civilians. Most of the 82nd and 101st, reinforced with British armoured units, were engaged in defensive fighting with the objective of holding the highway corridor. Small engagements were fought along the whole length of the corridor.