Editing Lyndon B. Johnson (section)

===Vietnam War===
{{Main|Vietnam War}}
{{Further|United States in the Vietnam War|Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson#Vietnam}}
[[File:Robert S. McNamara and General Westmoreland in Vietnam 1965.png|thumb|Secretary of Defense [[Robert McNamara]] and [[William Westmoreland|General Westmoreland]] in [[Da Nang]] in August 1965 as Johnson was preparing to commence a systematic bombing campaign, known as [[Operation Rolling Thunder]], in the [[Vietnam War]]]]

The [[Vietnam War]] began in 1955 as Communist forces started operating in [[South Vietnam]]. By the time Johnson took office, there were 16,700 American military personnel in South Vietnam.<ref>Mackenzie and Weisbrot (2008), pp. 289, 293</ref> Despite some misgivings, Johnson ultimately came to support escalation of the U.S. role in Vietnam.{{sfn|Patterson|1996|pp=600–601}} Like the vast majority of American leaders in the mid-1960s, he was determined to prevent the spread of Communism.{{sfn|Patterson|1996|pp=604–605}} Johnson's decision to escalate was also influenced heavily by reputation. Under pressure from pro-war politicians like [[Barry Goldwater]], Johnson feared that if he made the decision to not stand firm in Vietnam he would lose domestic political credibility as well as contribute to a decline in the international reputation of the U.S.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Logevall |first=Frederick |title=Making sense of the Vietnam wars: local, national, and transnational perspectives |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2008 |isbn=9786611342067 |edition=1st |pages=91–108}}</ref>
On October 11, 1963, President Kennedy had signed [[National Security Action Memorandum 263|NSAM 263]] ordering the withdrawal of 1,000 military personnel by the end of the year following recommendations of the [[McNamara–Taylor mission]] report.<ref>Logevall, Frederick (1998), "Vietnam and the Question of What Might Have Been," in Mark J. White, ed. ''Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited'', New York: New York University Press, pp. 25, 27, 34-53</ref><ref>{{cite report|title=National Security Action Memoranda [NSAM]: NSAM 263, South Vietnam|publisher=[[John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum]]|url=https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/jfknsf-342-007#?image_identifier=JFKNSF-342-007-p0001|access-date=May 6, 2024}}</ref><ref name="McNamara-Taylor">{{cite report|title=MCNAMARA-TAYLOR REPORT ON VIETNAM|website=[[Central Intelligence Agency|cia.gov]]|url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R000100120009-1.pdf|access-date=May 6, 2024}}</ref> On November 26, Johnson signed [[National Security Action Memorandum 273|NSAM 273]] which reaffirmed the Kennedy administration withdrawal approval and continued support for South Vietnam.<ref>{{cite report|title=331. National Security Action Memorandum No. 273 — FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963, VOLUME IV, VIETNAM, AUGUST–DECEMBER 1963|date=November 26, 1963|publisher=United States Department of State, [[Office of the Historian]]|url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d331|access-date=May 6, 2024}}</ref><ref>''Pentagon Papers, IV:B Evolution of the War, Counterinsurgency, The Kennedy Commitments, 1961–1963, 4. Phased Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam, 1962–1964'', p. 30</ref> In August 1964, ambiguous evidence suggested two U.S. destroyers had been [[Gulf of Tonkin incident|attacked]] by North Vietnamese torpedo boats in international waters in the [[Gulf of Tonkin]]. Although Johnson very much wanted to keep discussions about Vietnam out of the 1964 election campaign, he felt forced to respond to the supposed Communist aggression. He obtained from Congress the [[Gulf of Tonkin Resolution]] on August 7, 1964, giving blanket congressional approval for use of military force to repel future attacks.<ref>Dallek (1998), pp. 144–155.</ref>

[[File:Boeing B-52 dropping bombs.jpg|thumb|left|Tens of thousands of Vietnamese civilians were [[Vietnam War casualties|killed]] during the bombing of North Vietnam in [[Operation Rolling Thunder]].<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.pbs.org/battlefieldvietnam/timeline/index2.html |title=Battlefield:Vietnam Timeline |publisher=[[PBS|Public Broadcasting Service (PBS)]]}}</ref>]]
Johnson decided on a systematic bombing campaign, which became known as [[Operation Rolling Thunder]], in February 1965 after an attack by [[Viet Cong]] guerrillas on [[Pleiku Air Base]], killing eight Americans.<ref>{{cite web |title=Election and the Vietnam War - Lyndon B. Johnson |url=https://www.britannica.com/biography/Lyndon-B-Johnson/Election-and-the-Vietnam-War |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=February 3, 2024}}</ref> The U.S. would continue to bomb North Vietnam until late 1968.<ref>Mackenzie and Weisbrot (2008), p. 309</ref> In March 1965, McGeorge Bundy called for American ground operations; Johnson agreed and also quietly changed the mission from defensive to offensive operations.<ref>Dallek (1998), p. 255.</ref> On March 8, 1965, 3,500 troops went ashore near [[Da Nang]], the first time U.S. combat forces had been sent to mainland Asia since the [[Korean War]].<ref>{{cite web |last1=Germany |first1=Kent |title=Lyndon B. Johnson: Foreign Affairs |url=https://millercenter.org/president/lbjohnson/foreign-affairs |website=The Miller Center |date=October 4, 2016 |access-date=February 3, 2024}}</ref> In June, South Vietnamese Ambassador [[Maxwell D. Taylor]] reported that the bombing offensive against North Vietnam had been ineffective and that the [[Army of the Republic of Vietnam|South Vietnamese army]] was outclassed and in danger of collapse.<ref>{{harvp|Dallek|1998|p=270}}</ref> In late July, McNamara and Johnson's top advisors recommended an increase in U.S. soldiers from 75,000 to over 200,000.{{sfn|Patterson|1996|pp=612–613}} Johnson agreed but felt boxed in by unpalatable choices. If he sent additional troops he would be attacked as an interventionist, and if he did not, he thought he risked being impeached.<ref name="dallek272277">Dallek (1998), pp. 272–277.</ref> By October 1965, there were over 200,000 troops deployed in Vietnam.<ref>Dallek (1998), p. 284.</ref> Throughout 1965, few members of Congress or the administration openly criticized Johnson's handling of the war.<ref>Mackenzie and Weisbrot (2008), pp. 304–305, 308</ref>

[[File:OCTOBER 1966 - PRESIDENT JOHNSON VISITS U.S. SOLDIERS AT CAM RANH BAY IN SOUTH VIETNAM.jpg|thumb|President Johnson shakes hands with U.S. airmen at [[Cam Ranh Bay]] in South Vietnam, {{circa|October 1966}}.]]

In early 1966, Senator Robert F. Kennedy harshly criticized Johnson's bombing campaign, stating that the U.S. may be headed "on a road from which there is no turning back, a road that leads to catastrophe for all mankind."<ref name=VietnamAPP>{{Cite web| title=The War in Vietnam: Escalation Phase| publisher=The American Presidency Project| location=Santa Barbara, California| url=http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/vietnam/timeline.php| access-date=July 11, 2017| archive-date=August 28, 2017| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170828025416/http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/vietnam/timeline.php| url-status=dead}}</ref> Soon thereafter, the [[United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations|Senate Foreign Relations Committee]], chaired by Senator [[James William Fulbright]], held televised hearings examining the administration's Vietnam policy.<ref>Dallek (1998), p. 369.</ref> In July, polling results indicated that Americans favored the bombing campaign by a five-to-one margin; however, in August a [[United States Department of Defense|Defense Department]] study indicated that the bombing campaign was having minimal impact on North Vietnam.<ref>{{harvp|Dallek|1998|p=376}}</ref> By late 1966, multiple sources began to report progress was being made against the North Vietnamese logistics and infrastructure; Johnson was urged to begin peace discussions. English philosopher Bertrand Russell initiated the [[Russell Tribunal|International War Crimes Tribunal]] to condemn the American effort.<ref>{{harvp|Dallek|1998|p= 380}}</ref> The gap with Hanoi, however, was an unbridgeable demand on both sides for a unilateral end to bombing and withdrawal of forces.<ref>Dallek (1998), p. 381.</ref> Johnson grew more and more anxious about justifying war casualties, and talked of the need for decisive victory, despite the unpopularity of the cause.<ref>Dallek (1998), p. 386.</ref> By the end of 1966, it was clear that the air campaign and the pacification effort had both failed, and Johnson agreed to McNamara's new recommendation to add 70,000 troops in 1967 and the CIA's recommendations to increased bombings against North Vietnam.<ref>Dallek (1998), pp. 386–388.</ref> The bombing escalation ended secret talks being held with North Vietnam, but U.S. leaders did not consider North Vietnamese intentions in those talks to be genuine.<ref>Dallek (1998), p. 390.</ref>
[[File:Vietnamdem.jpg|thumb|A female demonstrator offers a flower to a soldier during a 1967 anti-war demonstration at [[the Pentagon]].]]

By the middle of 1967 nearly 70,000 Americans had been killed or wounded in the war, which was being commonly described in the news media and elsewhere as a "stalemate."<ref>Dallek (1998), pp. 470–471.</ref> In January and February, probes were made to assess North Vietnamese's willingness to discuss peace, but they fell on deaf ears. [[Ho Chi Minh]] declared that the only solution was a unilateral U.S. withdrawal.<ref>{{harvp|Dallek|1998|pp=445–447}}</ref> A [[Gallup, Inc.]] poll in July 1967 showed that 52&nbsp;percent of Americans disapproved of the president's handling of the war, and only 34&nbsp;percent thought progress was being made.<ref>{{harvp|Dallek|1998|p=474}}</ref> Nonetheless, Johnson agreed to an increase of 55,000 troops, bringing the total to 525,000.<ref name=dallek473>Dallek (1998), p. 473.</ref> In August, Johnson, with the Joint Chiefs' support, decided to expand the air campaign and exempted only Hanoi, Haiphong and a buffer zone with [[China]] from the target list.<ref>Dallek (1998), p. 477.</ref> Later that month McNamara told a Senate subcommittee that an expanded air campaign would not bring Hanoi to the peace table. The Joint Chiefs were astounded, and threatened mass resignation; McNamara was summoned to the White House for a three-hour dressing down. Nevertheless, Johnson had received reports from the CIA confirming McNamara's analysis at least in part. In the meantime an election establishing a constitutional government in the South was concluded and provided hope for peace talks.<ref>Dallek (1998), pp. 478–479.</ref>

With the war arguably in a stalemate and in light of the widespread disapproval of the conflict, Johnson convened a group of veteran government foreign policy experts, informally known as "the Wise Men": [[Dean Acheson]], General [[Omar Bradley]], [[George Ball (diplomat)|George Ball]], [[McGeorge Bundy]], [[Arthur Dean (lawyer)|Arthur Dean]], [[C. Douglas Dillon]], [[Abe Fortas]], [[Averell Harriman]], [[Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.|Henry Cabot Lodge]], [[Robert Daniel Murphy]], and [[Maxwell D. Taylor]].<ref>Dallek (1998), p. 494.</ref> They unanimously opposed leaving Vietnam, and encouraged Johnson to "stay the course."<ref name=PoliticoWiseMen>{{cite web| title=Johnson meets with 'The Wise Men,' March 25, 1968| last=Glass| first=Andrew| date=March 25, 2010| url=http://www.politico.com/story/2010/03/johnson-meets-with-the-wise-men-march-25-1968-034945| publisher=[[Politico]]| location=Arlington, Virginia| access-date=July 11, 2017}}</ref> Afterward, on November 17, in a nationally televised address, the president assured the American public, "We are inflicting greater losses than we're taking...We are making progress." Less than two weeks later, Robert McNamara announced his resignation as Defense Secretary. Behind closed doors, he had begun regularly expressing doubts over Johnson's war strategy, angering the president. He joined a growing list of Johnson's top aides who resigned over the war, including Bill Moyers, McGeorge Bundy, and George Ball.<ref name=VietnamAPP/><ref>Dallek (1998), p. 495.</ref> In October, with ever-increasing [[Opposition to United States involvement in the Vietnam War|public protests against the war]], Johnson engaged the FBI and the CIA to investigate, monitor, and undermine anti-war activists.<ref>{{harvp|Dallek|1998|pp=486–487}}</ref> In mid-October, there was a demonstration of 100,000 at [[the Pentagon]]; Johnson and [[Dean Rusk]] were convinced that foreign communist sources were behind the demonstration, but that was refuted in the CIA's findings.<ref>{{harvp|Dallek|1998|p=489}}</ref>

====Tet Offensive====
[[File:L B Johnson Model Khe Sanh.jpeg|thumb|[[Walt Rostow]], Johnson's [[National Security Advisor (United States)|national security advisor]], meeting with Johnson in the [[Situation Room]] in 1968, where the two reviewed a map of the region where the [[Battle of Khe Sanh]] was being waged]]

On January 30, 1968, the Viet Cong and the [[North Vietnamese Army]] began the [[Tet Offensive]] against South Vietnam's five largest cities, including Saigon. While the Tet Offensive failed militarily, it was a psychological victory, definitively turning American public opinion against the war effort. In February 1968, influential news anchor [[Walter Cronkite]] of [[CBS News]] expressed on the air that the conflict was deadlocked and that additional fighting would change nothing. Johnson reacted, saying "If I've lost Cronkite, I've lost middle America".<ref>Dallek (1998), pp. 505–506.</ref> Indeed, demoralization about the war was everywhere; 26 percent then approved of Johnson's handling of Vietnam, while 63 percent disapproved.<ref>Dallek (1998), p. 509.</ref> College students and others protested, burned [[Conscription in the United States|draft]] cards, and chanted, "Hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids did you kill today?"<ref>"The Sixties." Junior Scholastic. February 11, 1994. p. 4.</ref>

The Tet Offensive convinced senior leaders of the Johnson administration, including the "Wise Men" and new Defense Secretary [[Clark Clifford]], that further escalation of troop levels would not help bring an end to the war.<ref>{{harvp|Dallek|1998|p=511}}</ref> Johnson was initially reluctant to follow this advice, but ultimately agreed to allow a partial bombing halt and to signal his willingness to engage in peace talks.{{sfn|Patterson|1996|pp=683–684}} On March 31, 1968, Johnson announced that he would halt the bombing in North Vietnam, while at the same time announcing that he would not seek re-election.<ref>{{harvp|Dallek|1998|p=513}}</ref> He also escalated U.S. military operations in South Vietnam in order to consolidate control of as much of the countryside as possible before the onset of serious peace talks.{{sfn|Patterson|1996|pp=684–685}} Talks began in Paris in May, but failed to yield any results.<ref>{{harvp|Dallek|1998|pp=538–541, 564}}</ref> Two of the major obstacles in negotiations were the unwillingness of the United States to allow the Viet Cong to take part in the South Vietnamese government, and the unwillingness of North Vietnam to recognize the legitimacy of South Vietnam.{{sfn|Patterson|1996|p=703}} In October 1968, when the parties came close to an agreement on a bombing halt, Republican presidential nominee Richard Nixon intervened with the South Vietnamese, promising better terms so as to delay a settlement on the issue until after the election.<ref>{{harvp|Dallek|1998|pp=584–585}}</ref> Johnson sought a continuation of talks after the 1968 election, but the North Vietnamese argued about procedural matters until after Nixon took office.<ref>{{harvp|Dallek|1998|p=597}}</ref>