Editing European Central Bank (section)

==Organisation==
The ECB has four decision-making bodies, that take all the decisions with the objective of fulfilling the ECB's mandate:
* the Executive Board,
* the Governing Council,
* the General Council,
* the Supervisory Board.

===Decision-making bodies===

====Executive Board====
[[File:Jean-Claude Trichet - World Economic Forum Annual Meeting Davos 2010.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Jean-Claude Trichet]], the second President of the European Central Bank]]
The [[Executive Board of the European Central Bank|Executive Board]] is responsible for the implementation of monetary policy (defined by the Governing Council) and the day-to-day running of the bank.<ref name="Governing Council2">{{cite web|url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/decisions/govc/html/index.en.html|title=ECB: Governing Council|date=1 January 2002|work=ECB|publisher=ecb.int|access-date=28 October 2011}}</ref> It can issue decisions to national central banks and may also exercise powers delegated to it by the Governing Council.<ref name="Governing Council2" /> Executive Board members are assigned a portfolio of responsibilities by the President of the ECB.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/pdf/orga/distributionofresp_EB.pdf|title=Distribution of responsibilities among the Members of the Executive Board of the ECB}}</ref> The executive board normally meets every Tuesday.

It is composed of the President of the Bank (currently [[Christine Lagarde]]), the vice-president (currently [[Luis de Guindos]]) and four other members.<ref name="Governing Council2" /> They are all appointed by the [[European Council]] for non-renewable terms of eight years.<ref name="Governing Council2" /> Members of the executive board of the ECB are appointed "from among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters by common accord of the governments of the Member States at the level of Heads of State or Government, on a recommendation from the Council, after it has consulted the European Parliament and the Governing Council of the ECB".<ref>Article 11.2 of the ESCB Statute</ref>

[[José Manuel González-Páramo]], a Spanish member of the executive board since June 2004, was due to leave the board in early June 2012, but no replacement had been named as of late May.<ref name=MW01>Marsh, David, [http://www.marketwatch.com/story/cameron-irritates-as-euros-high-noon-approaches-2012-05-28 "Cameron irritates as euro’s High Noon approaches"], ''MarketWatch'', 28 May 2012. Retrieved 29 May 2012.</ref> The Spanish had nominated Barcelona-born Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña – an ECB veteran who heads its legal department – as González-Páramo's replacement as early as January 2012, but alternatives from Luxembourg, Finland, and Slovenia were put forward and no decision made by May.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://blogs.ft.com/money-supply/tag/jose-manuel-gonzalez-paramo/#axzz1wP9yAdBr |title=Tag: José Manuel González-Páramo |newspaper=[[Financial Times]] Money Supply blog entries |date=23 January 2012 |access-date=14 September 2014}}</ref> After a long political battle and delays due to the European Parliament's protest over the lack of gender balance at the ECB,<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-parliament-mersch-idUSBRE89O0KA20121025|title=EU parliament vetoes Mersch, wants woman for ECB |last=Davenport |first=Claire |work=U.S. |access-date=3 October 2018 |language=en-US}}</ref> Luxembourg's [[Yves Mersch]] was appointed as González-Páramo's replacement.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-22/mersch-named-to-ecb-post-after-longest-euro-appointment-battle.html |title=Mersch Named to ECB After Longest Euro Appointment Battle |date=23 November 2012 |work=Bloomberg |access-date=14 September 2014}}</ref>

In December 2020, [[Frank Elderson]] succeeded to [[Yves Mersch]] at the ECB's board.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Frank Elderson officially appointed member of executive boar...|url=https://agenceurope.eu/en/bulletin/article/12620/7|access-date=2021-03-07|website=agenceurope.eu}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Benoeming Nederlander Frank Elderson in directie ECB stap dichterbij|url=https://nos.nl/l/2357869|access-date=2020-11-25|website=nos.nl|date=24 November 2020 |language=nl}}</ref>

====Governing Council====
The [[Governing Council of the European Central Bank|Governing Council]] is the main decision-making body of the [[Eurosystem]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/educational/facts/orga/html/or_016.en.html |title=ECB: Decision-making bodies |access-date=14 September 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130206095156/http://www.ecb.int/ecb/educational/facts/orga/html/or_016.en.html |archive-date=6 February 2013 |url-status=dead}}</ref> It comprises the members of the executive board (six in total) and the governors of the National Central Banks of the euro area countries (20 as of 2023).

According to Article 284 of the TFEU, the [[President of the European Council|President]] of the [[European Council]] and a representative from the [[European Commission]] may attend the meetings as observers, but they lack voting rights.

Since January 2015, the ECB has published on its website a summary of the Governing Council deliberations ("accounts").<ref>{{cite press release |url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/accounts/2016/html/index.en.html |title=Monetary policy accounts published in 2016|date=17 December 2019}}</ref> These publications came as a partial response to recurring criticism against the ECB's opacity.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.ft.com/content/7e58a3ea-d1bc-11e2-9336-00144feab7de?ftcamp=published_links/rss/comment/feed//product |title=The ECB must open itself up |work=Financial Times |date=10 June 2013 |language=en-GB |access-date=23 September 2018 |url-access=subscription}}</ref> However, in contrast to other central banks, the ECB still does not disclose individual voting records of the governors seating in its council.

{| class="wikitable"
|+Members of the Governing Council (as of January 2023)<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/decisions/govc/html/index.en.html |title=Members of the Governing Council |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040717041849/http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/decisions/govc/html/index.en.html |archive-date=17 July 2004 |url-status=dead |access-date=22 September 2018}}</ref>
!
!Name
!Role
! colspan="2" align="Center" |Terms of office
|-
! rowspan="6" align="Center" |Executive Board
|{{Flagicon|France}} [[Christine Lagarde]]
|President
|1 November 2019
|31 October 2027
|-
|{{Flagicon|Spain}} [[Luis de Guindos]]
|Vice President
|1 June 2018
|31 May 2026
|-
|{{flagicon|Italy}} [[Piero Cipollone]]
|Member of the Executive Board
|1 November 2023
|31 October 2031
|-
|{{Flagicon|Ireland}} [[Philip R. Lane]]
|Member of the Executive Board & Chief Economist
|1 June 2019
|31 May 2027
|-
|{{Flagicon|Netherlands}} [[Frank Elderson]]
|Member of the Executive Board
Vice-chair of the Supervisory board
|15 December 2020
|14 December 2028
|-
|{{Flagicon|Germany}} [[Isabel Schnabel]]
|Member of the Executive Board
|1 January 2020
|31 December 2027
|-
! rowspan="20" |National Governors
|{{Flagicon|Spain}} [[José Luis Escrivá]]
|
|6 September 2024
| 5 September 2030
|-
|{{Flagicon|Germany}} [[Joachim Nagel]]
|
|1 January 2022
|January 2030
|-
|{{Flagicon|Belgium}} {{Interlanguage link|Pierre Wunsch|lt=|nl||fr|Pierre Wunsch|qid=|vertical-align=sup}}
|
|2 January 2019
|January 2029
|-
|{{Flagicon|Greece}} [[Yannis Stournaras]]
|
|June 2020
|June 2026
|-
|{{Flagicon|Croatia}} [[Boris Vujčić]]
|
|8 July 2012
|July 2030
|-
|{{Flagicon|Luxembourg}} [[Gaston Reinesch (economist)|Gaston Reinesch]]
|
|January 2013
|January 2031
|-
|{{Flagicon|France}} [[François Villeroy de Galhau]]
|
|1 November 2015
|November 2027
|-
|{{Flagicon|Austria}} [[Robert Holzmann]]
|
|1 September 2019
|31 August 2025
|-
|{{Flagicon|Slovakia}} [[Peter Kažimír]]
|
|1 June 2019
|1 June 2025
|-
|{{Flagicon|Lithuania}} [[Gediminas Šimkus]]
|
|7 April 2021
|6 April 2026
|-
|{{Flagicon|Finland}} [[Olli Rehn]]
|
|12 July 2018
|12 July 2025
|-
|{{Flagicon|Portugal}} [[Mário Centeno]]
|
|July 2020
|June 2025
|-
|{{Flagicon|Malta}} [[Edward Scicluna]]
|
|1 January 2021
|30 December 2025 
|-
|{{Flagicon|Slovenia}} {{Interlanguage link|Boštjan Vasle|lt=|||qid=Q63614880|vertical-align=sup}}
|
|1 January 2019
|31 December 2024
|-
|{{Flagicon|Estonia}} [[Madis Müller]]
|
|June 2019
|June 2026
|-
| {{Flagicon|Latvia}} [[Mārtiņš Kazāks]]
|
|21 December 2019
|21 December 2025
|-
|{{Flagicon|Netherlands}} [[Klaas Knot]]
|
|1 July 2011
|May 2025
|-
|{{Flagicon|Cyprus}}  [[Christodoulos Patsalides]]
|
|11 April 2024
|April 2029
|-
|{{Flagicon|Ireland}} [[Gabriel Makhlouf]]
|
|1 September 2019
|1 September 2026
|-
|{{Flagicon|Italy}} [[Fabio Panetta]]
|
|1 November 2023
|31 October 2028
|}

====General Council====
The General Council is a body dealing with transitional issues of euro adoption, for example, fixing the exchange rates of currencies being replaced by the euro (continuing the tasks of the former EMI).<ref name="Governing Council2"/> It will continue to exist until all EU member states adopt the euro, at which point it will be dissolved.<ref name="Governing Council2"/> It is composed of the President and vice-president together with the [[European System of Central Banks#Member banks|governors of all of the EU's national central banks]].<ref name="ENA Com">{{cite web |title=Composition of the European Central Bank |publisher=CVCE |url=http://www.cvce.eu/collections/unit-content/-/unit/en/d5906df5-4f83-4603-85f7-0cabc24b9fe1/ae7780e3-050b-4a5e-914e-e1599d6f04dc |access-date=18 February 2014}}</ref><ref name="ECB GC">{{cite web | title=ECB: General Council | publisher=European Central Bank | url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/decisions/genc/html/index.en.html | access-date=4 January 2015 }}</ref>

====Supervisory Board====
The [[ECB Supervisory Board]] meets twice a month to discuss, plan and carry out the ECB's supervisory tasks.<ref name="SupBoard">{{cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/decisions/ssm/html/index.en.html|title=Supervisory Board|publisher=European Central Bank|access-date=3 December 2015}}</ref> It proposes draft decisions to the Governing Council under the non-objection procedure. It is composed of Chair (appointed for a non-renewable term of five years), Vice-chair (chosen from among the members of the ECB's executive board) four ECB representatives and representatives of national supervisors. If the national supervisory authority designated by a Member State is not a national central bank (NCB), the representative of the competent authority can be accompanied by a representative from their NCB. In such cases, the representatives are together considered as one member for the purposes of the voting procedure.<ref name="SupBoard"/>

It also includes the Steering Committee, which supports the activities of the supervisory board and prepares the Board's meetings. It is composed by the chair of the supervisory board, Vice-chair of the supervisory board, one ECB representative and five representatives of national supervisors. The five representatives of national supervisors are appointed by the supervisory board for one year based on a rotation system that ensures a fair representation of countries.<ref name="SupBoard"/>

===Capital subscription===
{{Politics of the European Union}}
The ECB is governed by European law directly, but its set-up resembles that of a corporation in the sense that the ECB has shareholders and stock capital. Its initial capital was supposed to be €5 billion<ref>Article 28.1 of the ESCB Statute</ref> and the initial capital allocation key was determined in 1998 on the basis of the member states' populations and GDP,<ref name="capital"/><ref>Article 29 of the ESCB Statute</ref> but the key is adjustable.<ref>Article 28.5 of the ESCB Statute</ref> The euro area NCBs were required to pay their respective subscriptions to the ECB's capital in full. The NCBs of the non-participating countries have had to pay 7% of their respective subscriptions to the ECB's capital as a contribution to the operational costs of the ECB. As a result, the ECB was endowed with an initial capital of just under €4&nbsp;billion.{{citation needed|date=July 2016}} The capital is held by the national central banks of the member states as shareholders. Shares in the ECB are not transferable and cannot be used as collateral.<ref>Article 28.4 of the ESCB Statute</ref> The NCBs are the sole subscribers to and holders of the capital of the ECB.

Today, ECB capital is about €11 billion, which is held by the national central banks of the member states as shareholders.<ref name="capital"/> The NCBs' shares in this capital are calculated using a capital key which reflects the respective member's share in the total population and gross domestic product of the EU. The ECB adjusts the shares every five years and whenever the number of contributing NCBs changes. The adjustment is made on the basis of data provided by the European Commission.

All national central banks (NCBs) that own a share of the ECB capital stock as of 1 February 2020 are listed below. Non-Euro area NCBs are required to pay up only a very small percentage of their subscribed capital, which accounts for the different magnitudes of Euro area and Non-Euro area total paid-up capital.<ref name="capital">{{cite web|title=Capital Subscription|url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/capital/html/index.en.html|publisher=European Central Bank|access-date=1 February 2020}}</ref>

{{static row numbers}} 
{| class="wikitable sortable static-row-numbers static-row-header-text"
|-
! NCB
! Capital Key (%)
! Paid-up Capital (€)
|-
| [[National Bank of Belgium]]
| align=right | 2.9630
| align=right | 276,290,916.71
|-
| [[Croatian National Bank]]
| align=right | 0.6595
| align=right | 71,390,921.62
|-
| [[Deutsche Bundesbank]]
| align=right | 21.4394
| align=right | 1,999,160,134.91
|-
| [[Bank of Estonia]]
| align=right | 0.2291
| align=right | 21,362,892.01
|-
| [[Central Bank of Ireland]]
| align=right | 1.3772
| align=right | 128,419,794.29
|-
| [[Bank of Greece]]
| align=right | 2.0117
| align=right | 187,585,027.73
|-
| [[Bank of Spain]]
| align=right | 9.6981
| align=right | 904,318,913.05
|-
| [[Bank of France]]
| align=right | 16.6108
| align=right | 1,548,907,579.93
|-
| [[Banca d'Italia|Bank of Italy]]
| align=right | 13.8165
| align=right | 1,288,347,435.28
|-
| [[Central Bank of Cyprus]]
| align=right | 0.1750
| align=right | 16,318,228.29
|-
| [[Bank of Latvia]]
| align=right | 0.3169
| align=right | 29,549,980.26
|-
| [[Bank of Lithuania]]
| align=right | 0.4707
| align=right | 43,891,371.75
|-
| [[Central Bank of Luxembourg]]
| align=right | 0.2679
| align=right | 24,980,876.34
|-
| [[Central Bank of Malta]]
| align=right | 0.0853
| align=right | 7,953,970.70
|-
| [[De Nederlandsche Bank]]
| align=right | 4.7662
| align=right | 444,433,941.0
|-
| [[Oesterreichische Nationalbank]]
| align=right | 2.3804
| align=right | 221,965,203.55
|-
| [[Banco de Portugal]]
| align=right |  1.9035 
| align=right | 177,495,700.29 
|-
| [[Bank of Slovenia]]
| align=right | 0.3916
| align=right | 36,515,532.56
|-
| [[National Bank of Slovakia]]
| align=right | 0.9314
| align=right | 86,850,273.32
|-
| [[Bank of Finland]]
| align=right | 1.4939
| align=right | 136,005,388.82
|-
| '''Euro area total'''
| align=right | '''81.9881'''
| align=right | '''7,610,421,092.94'''
|-
| [[Bulgarian National Bank]]
| align=right | 0.9832
| align=right | 3,991,180.11
|-
| [[Czech National Bank]]
| align=right | 1.8794
| align=right | 7,629,194.36
|-
| [[Danmarks Nationalbank]]
| align=right | 1.7591
| align=right | 7,140,851.23
|-
| [[Hungarian National Bank]]
| align=right | 1.5488
| align=right | 6,287,164.11
|-
| [[National Bank of Poland]]
| align=right | 6.0335
| align=right | 24,492,255.06
|-
| [[National Bank of Romania]]
| align=right | 2.8289
| align=right | 11,483,573.44
|-
| [[Sveriges Riksbank]]
| align=right | 2.9790
| align=right | 12,092,886.02
|-
! '''Non-Euro area total'''
! align=right | '''18.0119'''
! align=right | '''73,117,104.33'''
|-
! '''Net total'''
! align=right | '''100.0000'''
! align=right | '''7,683,538,197.27'''
|}

===Reserves===
In addition to capital subscriptions, the NCBs of the member states participating in the euro area provided the ECB with foreign reserve assets equivalent to around €40&nbsp;billion. The contributions of each NCB is in proportion to its share in the ECB's subscribed capital, while in return each NCB is credited by the ECB with a claim in euro equivalent to its contribution. 15% of the contributions was made in gold, and the remaining 85% in US dollars and UK pounds sterling.{{citation needed|date=July 2016}}

===Languages===
The internal working language of the ECB is English, and press conferences are held in English. External communications are handled flexibly: English is preferred (though not exclusively) for communication within the ESCB (i.e. with other central banks) and with financial markets; communication with other national bodies and with EU citizens is normally in their respective language, but the ECB website is predominantly English; official documents such as the Annual Report are in the official languages of the EU (generally English, German and French).<ref>{{cite news|title=Translation Adds Complexity to European Central Bank's Supervisory Role: ECB Wants Communication in English, But EU Rules Allow Use of Any Official Language|first=Todd|last=Buell|date=29 October 2014|access-date=11 October 2015|newspaper=The Wall Street Journal|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/translation-adds-complexity-to-european-central-banks-supervisory-role-1414580925}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|page=26|title=The Application of multilingualism in the European Union Context|publisher=ECB|date=February 2006|access-date=11 October 2015|url=http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp2.pdf|first=Phoebus|last= Athanassiou}}</ref>

In 2022, the ECB publishes for the first time details on the nationality of its staff,<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/annual/html/ecb.ar2021~14d7439b2d.en.html#toc93 | title=Annual Report 2021 | date=28 April 2022 |publisher=European Central Bank| last1=Bank | first1=European Central }}</ref> revealing an over-representation of Germans and Italians along the ECB employees, including in management positions.

===Independence===
The European Central Bank (and by extension, the Eurosystem) is often considered as the "most independent central bank in the world".<ref>{{Cite press release|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/1997/html/sp970513.en.html|title=The European Central Bank: independent and accountable|website=European Central Bank|date=13 May 1997|language=en|access-date=5 November 2017}}</ref><ref>{{Cite press release|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/1999/html/sp990504.en.html|title=The role of the Central Bank in the United Europe|website=European Central Bank|date=4 May 1999|language=en|access-date=5 November 2017}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Papadia|first1=Francesco|last2=Ruggiero|first2=Gian Paolo|date=1 February 1999|title=Central Bank Independence and Budget Constraints for a Stable Euro|journal=Open Economies Review|language=en|volume=10|issue=1|pages=63–90|doi=10.1023/A:1008305128157|s2cid=153508547|issn=0923-7992}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB902443500523452500|title=Is the ECB Too Independent?|last=Wood|first=Geoffrey|work=The Wall Street Journal|access-date=5 November 2017|language=en-US}}</ref> In general terms, this means that the Eurosystem tasks and policies can be discussed, designed, decided and implemented in full autonomy, without pressure or need for instructions from any external body. The main justification for the ECB's independence is that such an institutional setup assists the maintenance of price stability.<ref name="Independence">{{cite web |url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/independence/html/index.en.html |title=Independence |publisher=European Central Bank |access-date=1 December 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me-more/html/ecb_independent.en.html |title=Why is the ECB independent? |website=European Central Bank |date=12 January 2017 |language=en |access-date=5 November 2017|last1=Bank |first1=European Central }}</ref>

In practice, the ECB's independence is pinned by four key principles:<ref>{{cite web |url=http://transparency.eu/ecb|title=Transparency International EU – The global coalition against corruption in Brussels |website=transparency.eu |language=en |access-date=5 November 2017 |date=28 March 2017}}</ref>

* '''Operational and legal independence''': the ECB has all required competences to achieve its price stability mandate{{Citation needed|date=August 2020}} and thereby can steer monetary policy in full autonomy and by means of high level of discretion. The ECB's governing council deliberates with a high degree of secrecy, since individual voting records are not disclosed to the public (leading to suspicions that Governing Council members are voting along national lines.<ref name="Heinemann Hüfner 2003 p.">{{cite journal | last1=Heinemann | first1=Friedrich | last2=Hüfner | first2=Felix P. | title=Is the View from the Eurotower Purely European? - National Divergence and ECB Interest Rate Policy | journal=SSRN Electronic Journal | publisher=Elsevier BV | year=2003 | issn=1556-5068 | doi=10.2139/ssrn.374600 | page=| s2cid=12675305 | url=https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/376/1/dp0269.pdf }}</ref><ref>Jose Ramon Cancelo, Diego Varela and Jose Manuel Sanchez-Santos (2011) 'Interest rate setting at the ECB: Individual preferences and collective decision making', ''Journal of Policy Modeling'' 33(6): 804–820. [[doi:10.1016/j.jpolmod.2011.08.017|DOI]].</ref>) In addition to monetary policy decisions, the ECB has the right to issue legally binding regulations, within its competence and if the conditions laid down in Union law are fulfilled, it can sanction non-compliant actors if they violate legal requirements laid down in directly applicable Union regulations. The ECB's own legal personality also allows the ECB to enter into international legal agreements independently from other EU institutions, and be the party of legal proceedings. Finally, the ECB can organise its internal structure as it sees fit. 
* '''Personal independence:''' the mandate of ECB board members is purposefully very long (8 years) and Governors of national central banks have a minimum renewable term of office of five years.<ref name="Independence" /> In addition, ECB board members are vastly immune from judicial proceedings.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp4.pdf?581a2ecf674a6554f5af698f5bf54019|title=PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK|date=2007|website=European Central Bank}}</ref> Indeed, removals from the office can only be decided by the [[Court of Justice of the European Union]] (CJEU), under the request of the ECB's Governing Council or the executive board (i.e. the ECB itself). Such a decision is only possible in the event of incapacity or serious misconduct. National governors of the Eurosystem's national central banks can be dismissed under national law (with a possibility to appeal) in case they can no longer fulfil their functions or are guilty of serious misconduct.
* '''Financial independence''': the ECB is the only body within the EU whose statute guarantees budgetary independence through its own resources and income. The ECB uses its own profits generated by its monetary policy operations and cannot be technically insolvent. The ECB's financial independence reinforces its political independence. Because the ECB does not require external financing and symmetrically is prohibited from [[Monetary financing|direct monetary financing]] of public institutions, this shields it from potential pressure from public authorities.
*'''Political independence''': The Community institutions and bodies and the governments of the member states may not seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the NCBs in the performance of their tasks. Symmetrically, EU institutions and national governments are bound by the treaties to respect the ECB's independence. It is the latter which is the subject of much debate.

===Democratic accountability===
In return to its high degree of independence and discretion, the ECB is accountable to the [[European Parliament]] (and to a lesser extent to the European Court of Auditors, the European Ombudsman and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU)). Although the accountability mechanisms are not enshrined in EU law, several practices were established following a resolution of the European Parliament adopted in 1998,<ref>{{Cite web|title=Report on democratic accountability in the third phase of European Monetary Union – Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy – A4-0110/1998|url=http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A4-1998-0110&language=EN|access-date=8 October 2018|website=europarl.europa.eu|language=en}}</ref> which were informally agreed by the ECB, and incorporated into the Parliament's rule of procedure.<ref>{{Cite web|title=The evolution of the ECB's accountability practices during the crisis|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/articles/2018/html/ecb.ebart201805_01.en.html|access-date=8 October 2018|website=European Central Bank|date=9 August 2018|language=en}}</ref> In 2023, the European Parliament and the ECB made these accountability arrangements were made more formal by signing an exchange of letter.<ref>[https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/Exchange_of_Letters_ECB_European_Parliament_central_banking230605~87aa8ed4a3.en.pdf Exchange of letters between the ECB and the European Parliament]  (5 June 2023)</ref>

The accountability framework involves five main mechanisms:<ref>{{Cite web|title=Accountability|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/accountability/html/index.en.html|access-date=2020-11-25|website=European Central Bank|date=20 August 2020|language=en}}</ref>

* '''Annual report:''' the ECB is bound to publish reports on its activities and has to address its annual report to the [[European Parliament]], the [[European Commission]], the [[Council of the European Union]] and the [[European Council]] .<ref name="ECB Acc">{{cite web|title=Accountability|url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/accountability/html/index.en.html|access-date=15 October 2007|publisher=European Central Bank}}</ref> The report is presented to the European parliament at the occasion of a specific hearing with the ECB's vice-president at the ECON committee.
* '''Annual parliamentary resolution:''' in return, the European Parliament evaluates the past activities to the ECB via its own annual resolution on the European Central Bank's report (which is essentially a non-legally-binding list of resolutions). Since 2016, the ECB replies to the Parliament's suggestions in an annex to its annual report.
* '''Quarterly hearings  (known as the "Monetary Dialogue"):''' the [[European Parliament Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs|Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament]] organises a hearing with the ECB every quarter,<ref>{{Cite web|title=Monetary dialogue {{!}} ECON Policies {{!}} ECON {{!}} Committees {{!}} European Parliament|url=http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/monetary-dialogue.html|access-date=6 October 2017|website=europarl.europa.eu|language=en}}</ref> allowing members of parliament to address oral questions to the ECB president.
* '''Parliamentary questions:''' all Members of the European Parliament have the right to address written questions<ref>{{Cite web|title=Questions to the ECB {{!}} Documents {{!}} ECON {{!}} Committees {{!}} European Parliament|url=http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/questions-ecb.html|access-date=6 October 2017|website=europarl.europa.eu|language=en}}</ref> to the ECB president. The ECB president provides a written answer in about six weeks.
* '''Appointments:''' The European Parliament is consulted during the appointment process of executive board members of the ECB.<ref name="BF EB">{{cite web|year=2005|title=Executive Board|url=http://www.banque-france.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/banque_de_france/Eurosysteme_et_international/Directoire_GB.pdf|access-date=23 July 2012|publisher=[[Banque de France]]}}</ref> However the Parliament's vote is only consultative, and in practice, the Parliament's opinion – when negative – has been ignored by the European Council.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2012-10-30 |title=Mersch's ECB candidacy survives MEPs' 'No' vote |url=https://www.politico.eu/article/merschs-ecb-candidacy-survives-meps-no-vote/ |access-date=2023-10-24 |website=POLITICO |language=en}}</ref>
* '''Legal proceedings:''' the ECB's legal personality allows civil society or public institutions to file complaints against the ECB to the Court of Justice of the EU.

In 2013, an interinstitutional agreement was reached between the ECB and the European Parliament in the context of the establishment of the ECB's Banking Supervision. This agreement sets broader powers to the European Parliament than the established practice on the monetary policy side of the ECB's activities. For example, under the agreement, the Parliament can veto the appointment of the chair and vice-chair of the ECB's supervisory board and may approve removals if requested by the ECB.<ref>{{cite web|title=Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank on the practical modalities of the exercise of democratic accountability and oversight over the exercise of the tasks conferred on the ECB within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism|date=30 November 2013 |url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/celex_32013q113001_en_txt.pdf}}</ref>

=== Transparency ===
In addition to its independence, the ECB is subject to limited transparency obligations in contrast to EU Institutions standards and other major central banks. Indeed, as pointed out by [[Transparency International]], "The Treaties establish transparency and openness as principles of the EU and its institutions. They do, however, grant the ECB a partial exemption from these principles. According to Art. 15(3) TFEU, the ECB is bound by the EU's transparency principles "only when exercising [its] administrative tasks" (the exemption – which leaves the term "administrative tasks" undefined – equally applies to the Court of Justice of the European Union and to the European Investment Bank).<ref>Braun, Benjamin, and Leo Hoffmann-Axthelm. ‘[https://transparency.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/TI-EU_ECB_Report_DIGITAL.pdf Two Sides of the Same Coin: Independence and Accountability of the European Central Bank]’. Transparency International, March 2017.</ref>

In practice, there are several concrete examples where the ECB is less transparent than other institutions:
* '''Voting secrecy:''' while other central banks publish the voting record of its decision makers, the ECB's Governing Council decisions are made in full discretion. Since 2014, the ECB has published "accounts" of its monetary policy meetings,<ref>{{cite press release |url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140703_1.en.html |title=ECB to adjust schedule of meetings and to publish regular accounts of monetary policy discussions in 2015 |website=European Central Bank |date=3 July 2014 |language=en |access-date=5 November 2017}}</ref> but those remain rather vague and do not include individual votes.
* '''Access to documents:''' The obligation for EU bodies to make documents freely accessible after a 30-year embargo applies to the ECB. However, under the ECB's Rules of Procedure, the Governing Council may decide to keep individual documents classified beyond the 30 years.<!-- Art. 23.3 Rules of Procedure. See also CJEU in joined cases T-3/00 and T-337/04 -->
* '''Disclosure of securities:''' The ECB is less transparent than the Fed when it comes to disclosing the list of securities being held in its balance sheet under monetary policy operations such as QE.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://bruegel.org/2017/11/the-eurosystem-too-opaque-and-costly/|title=The Eurosystem – Too opaque and costly? |website=bruegel.org|language=en-US|access-date=7 November 2017}}</ref>