Editing Analytic philosophy (section)

=== Epistemology ===
{{Main|Epistemology}}

==== Justification ====

===== Gettier =====
[[File:Edmund L Gettier III ca 1960s umass.jpg|thumb|140px|Edmund Gettier helped to revitalize analytic epistemology.]]

Owing largely to [[Edmund Gettier]]'s 1963 paper "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?",<ref>{{Citation |last=Gettier |first=Edmund |title=Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? |date=15 July 2020 |url=https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01439314/file/2013%20Gettier%20Conocimiento.pdf |work=Arguing About Knowledge |pages=14–15 |publisher=Routledge |doi=10.4324/9781003061038-5 |isbn=978-1-003-06103-8 |s2cid=243290967}}</ref> and the so-called [[Gettier problem]], epistemology has enjoyed a resurgence as a topic of analytic philosophy during the last 50 years. A large portion of current epistemological research is intended to resolve the problems that Gettier's examples presented to the traditional "justified true belief" model of knowledge, found as early as Plato's dialogue ''[[Theaetetus (dialogue)|Theaetetus]]''. These include developing [[Theory of justification|theories of justification]] to deal with Gettier's examples, or giving alternatives to the justified-true-belief model.

===== Theories =====
Chisholm defended [[foundationalism]]. Quine defended [[coherentism]], a "web of belief".<ref>The Web of Belief</ref> Quine proposed [[naturalized epistemology]].

====== Internalism and externalism ======
The debate between [[internalism and externalism]] still exists in analytic philosophy.<ref>Bonjour, Laurence, "Recent Work on the Internalism–Externalism Controversy" in Dancy, Sosa, and Steup (eds.), ''A Companion to Epistemology, Second Edition'' (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), p. 33.</ref> [[Alvin Goldman]] is an externalist known for developing a popular form of externalism called [[reliabilism]]. Most externalists reject the [[KK thesis]], which has been disputed since the introduction of the epistemic logic by [[Jaakko Hintikka]] in 1962.<ref name=":3">{{Cite book |last1=Rahman |first1=Shahid |title=Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science |last2=Symons |first2=John |last3=Gabbay |first3=Dov M. |last4=bendegem |first4=jean paul van |publisher=Springer Science & Business Media |year=2009 |isbn=978-1-4020-2807-6 |location=Dordrecht |pages=92 |language=en}}</ref>

==== Problem of the Criterion ====
While a problem since antiquity, American philosopher [[Roderick Chisholm]], in his ''Theory of Knowledge'', details the [[problem of the criterion]] with two sets of questions:

# What do we know? or What is the extent of our knowledge?
# How do we know? or What is the criterion for deciding whether we have knowledge in any particular case?

An answer to either set of questions will allow us to devise a means of answering the other. Answering the former question-set first is called ''[[Epistemological particularism|particularism]]'', whereas answering the latter set first is called ''[[Methodism (philosophy)|methodism]]''. A third solution is ''[[philosophical skepticism|skepticism]]'', or doubting there is such a thing as knowledge.

==== Truth ====
[[File:AlfredTarski1968.jpeg|thumb|150px|Alfred Tarski has an influential theory of truth.]]

Frege questioned standard theories of [[truth]], and sometimes advocated a [[redundancy theory of truth]]. Frank Ramsey also advocated a redundancy theory.  [[Alfred Tarski]] put forward a [[semantic theory of truth]].<ref name="Vaught">{{cite journal |last=Vaught |first=Robert L. |date=Dec 1986 |title=Alfred Tarski's Work in Model Theory |journal=[[Journal of Symbolic Logic]] |publisher=ASL |volume=51 |issue=4 |pages=869–882 |doi=10.2307/2273900 |jstor=2273900}}</ref><ref name="FF">[[Lwów–Warsaw school#F-F|Feferman & Feferman]], p. 1</ref>

In ''Truth-Makers'' (1984), [[Kevin Mulligan]], [[Peter Simons (academic)|Peter Simons]], and [[Barry Smith (academic)|Barry Smith]] introduced the [[Truthmaker theory|truth-maker]] idea as a contribution to the [[correspondence theory of truth]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Mulligan |first1=Kevin |last2=Simons |first2=Peter |last3=Smith |first3=Barry |date=1984 |title=Truth-Makers |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MULT |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |volume=44 |issue=3 |pages=287–321 |doi=10.2307/2107686 |jstor=2107686}}</ref> A truth-maker is contrasted with a [[truth-bearer]].

==== Closure ====
[[File:3349839-left-hand-outstretched.jpg|thumb|140px|"Here is one hand"]]

[[Epistemic closure]] is the claim that knowledge is closed under [[Logical consequence|entailment]]; in other words epistemic closure is a [[Property (philosophy)|property]] or the [[Concept|principle]] that if a subject <math>S</math> knows <math>p</math>, and <math>S</math> knows that <math>p</math> [[Logical consequence|entails]] <math>q</math>, then <math>S</math> can thereby come to know <math>q</math>.<ref name="stanford">{{cite encyclopedia |title=The Epistemic Closure Principle |encyclopedia=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=31 December 2001 |author=Luper, Steven |chapter-url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/closure-epistemic/#CloPri |chapter=Epistemic Closure}}</ref> Most [[Epistemology|epistemological]] theories involve a closure principle, and many skeptical arguments assume a closure principle. In ''Proof of An External World'', G. E. Moore uses closure in his famous anti-skeptical "[[here is one hand]]" argument. Shortly before his death, Wittgenstein wrote ''[[On Certainty]]'' in response to Moore.

While the principle of epistemic closure is generally regarded as intuitive,<ref>{{cite journal |author1=Brady, Michael |author2=Pritchard, Duncan |year=2005 |title=Epistemological Contextualism: Problems and Prospects |journal=[[The Philosophical Quarterly]] |volume=55 |issue=219 |pages=161–171 |doi=10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00393.x}}</ref> philosophers, such as [[Fred Dretske]] with [[relevant alternatives theory]] and Robert Nozick in ''[[Philosophical Explanations]]'', have argued against it.

==== Induction ====
[[File:Зүмірет.jpg|thumb|150px|All emeralds are "grue".]]

In his book ''[[Fact, Fiction, and Forecast]]'', [[Nelson Goodman]] introduced the "[[new riddle of induction]]", so-called by analogy with [[David Hume|Hume]]'s classical [[problem of induction]].  Goodman's famous example was to introduce the predicates [[New riddle of induction|grue and bleen]]. "Grue" applies to all things before a certain time ''t'', just in case they are green, but also just in case they are blue after time ''t''; and "bleen" applies to all things before a certain time ''t'', just in the case they are blue, but also just in case they are green after time ''t''.

==== Other topics ====
Other, related topics of contemporary research include debates over basic knowledge, the nature of [[evidence]], the value of knowledge, [[epistemic luck]], [[virtue epistemology]], the role of [[intuition (philosophy)|intuitions]] in justification, and treating knowledge as a primitive concept.