Editing Utilitarianism (section)

===Demandingness objection===
[[Act utilitarianism]] not only requires everyone to do what they can to maximize utility, but to do so without any favouritism. Mill said, "As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator."<ref name="Mill, John Stuart"/> Critics say that this combination of requirements leads to utilitarianism making unreasonable demands. The well-being of strangers counts just as much as that of friends, family or self. "What makes this requirement so demanding is the gargantuan number of strangers in great need of help and the indefinitely many opportunities to make sacrifices to help them."<ref>{{cite book |last=Hooker |first=Brad |editor-first=Timothy |editor-last=Chappell |title=The Problem of Moral Demandingness: new philosophical essays |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |date=2011 |page=151 |chapter=Chapter 8: The Demandingness Objection |isbn=978-0-230-21940-3}}</ref> As [[Shelly Kagan]] says, "Given the parameters of the actual world, there is no question that&nbsp;... (maximally)&nbsp;... promoting the good would require a life of hardship, self-denial, and austerity&nbsp;... a life spent promoting the good would be a severe one indeed."<ref>{{cite book |last=Kagan |first=Shelly |title=The Limits of Morality |series=Oxford Ethics Series |publisher=Clarendon Press |date=1991 |page=360 |isbn=978-0-19-823916-1}}</ref>

Hooker (2002) describes two aspects to the problem: act utilitarianism requires ''huge'' sacrifices from those who are relatively better off and also requires sacrifice of your own good even when the aggregate good will be only ''slightly'' increased.<ref name="Hooker 2002 152">{{cite book |last=Hooker |first=Brad |title=Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality |publisher=Clarendon Press |date=2002 |page=152 |isbn=978-0-19-925657-0}}</ref> Another way of highlighting the complaint is to say that in utilitarianism, "there is no such thing as morally permissible [[self-sacrifice]] that goes above and beyond the call of duty."<ref name="Hooker 2002 152"/> Mill was quite clear about this, "A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, it considers as wasted."<ref name="Mill, John Stuart"/>

One response to the problem is to accept its demands. This is the view taken by [[Peter Singer]], who says:<ref>{{cite book|last=Singer|first=Peter|title=Practical Ethics|date=2011|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-70768-8|edition=3rd|pages=202–3}}</ref><blockquote>No doubt we do instinctively prefer to help those who are close to us. Few could stand by and watch a child drown; many can ignore the avoidable deaths of children in Africa or India. The question, however, is not what we usually do, but what we ought to do, and it is difficult to see any sound moral justification for the view that distance, or community membership, makes a crucial difference to our obligations.</blockquote>Others argue that a moral theory that is so contrary to our deeply held moral convictions must either be rejected or modified.<ref>{{cite book |last=Hooker |first=Brad |editor-first=Timothy |editor-last= Chappell |title=The problem of moral demandingness: new philosophical essays |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |date=2011 |page=148 |chapter=Chapter 8: The Demandingness Objection |isbn=978-0-230-21940-3}}</ref> There have been various attempts to modify utilitarianism to escape its seemingly over-demanding requirements.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Kagan|first= Shelly |title=Does Consequentialism Demand too Much? Recent Work on the Limits of Obligation |journal= [[Philosophy & Public Affairs]] |volume=13 |issue=3 |date=1984 |pages=239–54 |jstor=2265413}}</ref> One approach is to drop the demand that utility be maximized. In ''Satisficing Consequentialism'', [[Michael Slote]] argues for a form of utilitarianism where "an act might qualify as morally right through having good enough consequences, even though better consequences could have been produced."<ref>{{cite journal |last=Slote|first= Michael |title= Satisficing Consequentialism |journal= Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes |volume=58 |pages= 139–176 |year=1984 |jstor=4106846|doi= 10.1093/aristoteliansupp/58.1.139 }}</ref> One advantage of such a system is that it would be able to accommodate the notion of [[Supererogation|supererogatory]] actions.

[[Samuel Scheffler]] takes a different approach and amends the requirement that everyone be treated the same.<ref>{{cite book |last=Scheffler |first=Samuel |title=The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions |edition=2nd |publisher=Clarendon Press |date=August 1994 |isbn = 978-0-19-823511-8}}</ref> In particular, Scheffler suggests that there is an "agent-centered [[prerogative]]" such that when the overall utility is being calculated it is permitted to count our own interests more heavily than the interests of others. Kagan suggests that such a procedure might be justified on the grounds that "a general requirement to promote the good would lack the motivational underpinning necessary for genuine moral requirements" and, secondly, that personal independence is necessary for the existence of commitments and close personal relations and that "the value of such commitments yields a positive reason for preserving within moral theory at least some moral independence for the personal point of view."<ref>{{cite journal |last=Kagan|first= Shelly |title=Does Consequentialism Demand too Much? Recent Work on the Limits of Obligation |journal= Philosophy & Public Affairs |volume=13 |issue=3 |pages= 239–254 |date=Summer 1984 |jstor=2265413}}</ref>

Robert Goodin takes yet another approach and argues that the demandingness objection can be "blunted" by treating utilitarianism as a guide to public policy rather than one of individual morality. He suggests that many of the problems arise under the traditional formulation because the conscientious utilitarian ends up having to make up for the failings of others and so contributing more than their fair share.<ref>{{cite book |last=Goodin |first=Robert E. |title=Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy |publisher=Cambridge University Press |date=1995 |page=66 |isbn=978-0-521-46806-0}}</ref>

Gandjour specifically considers market situations and analyses whether individuals who act in markets may produce a utilitarian optimum. He lists several demanding conditions that need to be satisfied: individuals need to display instrumental rationality, markets need to be perfectly competitive, and income and goods need to be redistributed.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=GANDJOUR |first1=Afschin |title=Is it Rational to Pursue Utilitarianism? |journal=Ethical Perspectives |date=30 June 2007 |volume=14 |issue=2 |pages=139–158 |doi=10.2143/EP.14.2.2023965}}</ref>

Harsanyi argues that the objection overlooks the fact that "people attach considerable utility to freedom from unduly burdensome moral obligations&nbsp;... most people will prefer a society with a more relaxed moral code, and will feel that such a society will achieve a higher level of average utility—even if adoption of such a moral code should lead to some losses in economic and cultural accomplishments (so long as these losses remain within tolerable limits). This means that utilitarianism, if correctly interpreted, will yield a moral code with a standard of acceptable conduct very much below the level of highest moral perfection, leaving plenty of scope for supererogatory actions exceeding this minimum standard."<ref>{{cite journal |last= Harsanyi |first= John C. |title= Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory A Theory of Justice by John Rawls | journal=American Political Science Review |volume=69 |issue=2 |pages= 594–606 |date=June 1975 |jstor=1959090 |doi=10.2307/1959090|s2cid= 118261543 }}</ref>