Editing Robert McNamara (section)

====Gulf of Tonkin incident====
{{main|Gulf of Tonkin incident}}
By 1964, the U.S. Navy sent destroyers into the [[Gulf of Tonkin]] to support [[Operation 34A|raids by South Vietnamese commandos on North Vietnam]] and to gather intelligence.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|pp=365–367}} On 2 August 1964, one destroyer, the {{USS|Maddox|DD-731|6}} was involved in a naval skirmish with North Vietnamese [[Vietnam People's Navy]] torpedo boats.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|pp=367–368}} On 4 August 1964, the ''Maddox'' and another destroyer, the {{USS|Turner Joy|DD-951|6}}, initially reported they were attacked by the North Vietnamese torpedo boats in international waters on a stormy night, but shortly afterward reported there was probably no attack.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|pp=369–371}}  Captain [[John J. Herrick]] of the ''Maddox'' reported that the "torpedo boats" were almost certainly just radar "blips" caused by the "freak weather effects" of the storm and the reports of an attack on his ship were due to an "overeager" sonar operator who mistook the motors of the ship for the rush of torpedoes.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=371}}{{sfn|Morris|2003}} Johnson promptly seized upon the reports of an attack on a Navy warship in international waters to ask Congress to pass a resolution giving him the authority to wage war in Vietnam.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=371}} McNamara, via Admiral [[U. S. Grant Sharp Jr.]] of the Pacific fleet, put strong pressure on Herrick to say that his ship had been attacked by torpedo boats, despite Herrick's reservations.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|pp=371–372}} 

On 5 August 1964, McNamara appeared before Congress to present proof of what he claimed was an attack on the Navy's warships in international waters off the Gulf of Tonkin and stated it was imperative that Congress pass the resolution as quickly as possible.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=374}} Records from the Lyndon Johnson Library show McNamara may have misled Johnson on the purported attack on the Maddox by allegedly withholding recommendations from US Pacific Commanders against executing airstrikes.{{sfn|Porter|2014}} McNamara was also instrumental in presenting the event to Congress and the public as justification for escalation of the war against the communists.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.biography.com/people/robert-s-mcnamara-9394201|title=Robert S. McNamara|website=Biography.com|language=en-us|access-date=2017-09-19|archive-date=August 5, 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170805225453/https://www.biography.com/people/robert-s-mcnamara-9394201|url-status=live}}</ref> 

Decades later after the fact in 1995, [[#1995 Vietnam visit|McNamara met]] with former North Vietnam Defense Minister {{lang|vi|[[Võ Nguyên Giáp]]|italic=no}}, who told his American counterpart that the August 4 attack never happened, a conclusion McNamara eventually came to accept.{{sfn|McNamara|1995|p=128}}

Congress approved the resolution on August 10, 1964, with only Senators [[Wayne Morse]] ([[Democratic Party (US)|D]]-[[Oregon|OR]]), and [[Ernest Gruening]] (D-[[Alaska|AK]]), voting against,<ref>[http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/tonkin-gulf-resolution-is-passed This day in history-Tonkin Gulf resolution is passed] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160309201949/http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/tonkin-gulf-resolution-is-passed |date=2016-03-09 }}, ''[[A&E Network]]'', August 7, 2010. Retrieved 9 March 2016.</ref> Concurrent with his efforts to pass the resolution, President Johnson had ordered [[Operation Pierce Arrow]], retaliatory air strikes on North Vietnamese naval bases. The [[Gulf of Tonkin Resolution]] authorized the president "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the U.S. and to prevent further aggression" but the larger issue turned out to be the sweeping powers granted by the resolution. It gave Johnson virtually unfettered authority to expand retaliation for a relatively minor naval incident into a major land war involving 500,000 American soldiers. "The fundamental issue of Tonkin Gulf involved not deception but, rather, misuse of power bestowed by the resolution," McNamara wrote later.{{sfn|McNamara|1995|p=142}} Though Johnson now had the authority to wage war, he proved reluctant to use it, for example by rejecting the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to bomb North Vietnam after a VC [[Bien Hoa Air Base#1964 Mortar attack|attack on Bien Hoa Air Base]] killed five Americans and destroyed 5 [[Martin B-57 Canberra|B-57]] bombers.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|pp=402–404}}