Editing Latin America (section)

==Trade blocs==
[[File:Banco del Sur.jpg|thumb|[[Rafael Correa]], [[Evo Morales]], [[Néstor Kirchner]], [[Cristina Fernández]], [[Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva]], [[Nicanor Duarte]], and [[Hugo Chávez]] at the signing of the founding charter of the [[Bank of the South]]]]{{Unreferenced section|date=April 2022}}
The major [[trade bloc]]s (or [[Trade agreement|agreements]]) in the region are the [[Pacific Alliance]] and [[Mercosur]]. Minor blocs or trade agreements are the [[G3 Free Trade Agreement]], the [[Dominican Republic – Central America Free Trade Agreement]] (DR-CAFTA), the [[Caribbean Community]] (CARICOM) and the [[Andean Community of Nations]] (CAN). However, major reconfigurations are taking place along opposing approaches to integration and trade; Venezuela has officially withdrawn from both the CAN and G3 and it has been formally admitted into the Mercosur (pending ratification from the Paraguayan legislature).{{when|date=November 2021}} The president-elect of Ecuador has manifested his intentions of following the same path. This bloc nominally opposes any Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States, although Uruguay has manifested its intention otherwise. Chile, [[Peru]], [[Colombia]] and Mexico are the only four Latin American nations that have an FTA with the United States and Canada, both members of the [[North American Free Trade Agreement]] (NAFTA).

=== China ===
China's economic influence in Latin America increased substantially in the 21st century. Imports from China valued $8.3 billion in 2000, but by 2022 its value was $450 billion and had grown to be the largest trading partner of South America, as well as the second-largest for the broader Latin America.<ref name="Council on Foreign Relations">{{cite web|title=China's Growing Influence in Latin America|url=https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri#chapter-title-0-1|website=Council on Foreign Relations|access-date=May 5, 2022|archive-date=May 5, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220505174838/https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri#chapter-title-0-1|url-status=live}}</ref> In particular, many of the investments are related to the [[Belt and Road Initiative]] or energy. China has also provided loans to several Latin American countries; this has raised concerns about the possibility of "[[Debt-trap diplomacy#CITEREFChina Africa Research Initiative2022|debt traps]]."<ref>{{cite news|title=China Faces 'Creditor Trap' in Lending to Latin America: Q&A|website=[[Bloomberg News]]|date=February 22, 2022|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-22/china-faces-creditor-trap-in-lending-to-latin-america-q-a|access-date=May 5, 2022|archive-date=May 5, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220505174839/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-22/china-faces-creditor-trap-in-lending-to-latin-america-q-a|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Council on Foreign Relations" /> Specifically, Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, and Argentina received the most loans from China during 2005–2016.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Baisotti|first1=Pablo|title=New Global Cities in Latin America and Asia: Welcome to the Twenty-First Century|date=2022|publisher=University of Michigan Press|isbn=9780472902743|page=324|doi=10.3998/mpub.12105185|jstor=10.3998/mpub.12105185|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.12105185|access-date=May 18, 2022|archive-date=May 18, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220518174253/https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.12105185|url-status=live}}</ref>