Editing Korean Air Lines Flight 007 (section)

===Revised ICAO report (1993)===
On November 18, 1992, Russian President [[Boris Yeltsin]], in a goodwill gesture to South Korea during a visit to Seoul to ratify a new [[treaty]], released both the flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) of KAL&nbsp;007.<ref>Ross, ''East Asia in Transition: Toward a New Regional Order''</ref> Initial South Korean research showed the FDR to be empty and the CVR to have an unintelligible copy. The Russians then released the recordings to the ICAO Secretary General.<ref>{{cite press release |url=http://legacy.icao.int/icao/en/nr/1993/pio199301_e.pdf |title=KAL Tapes to be Handed Over to ICAO |access-date=January 14, 2009 |date=January 1993 |location=Montreal |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121209114516/http://legacy.icao.int/icao/en/nr/1993/pio199301_e.pdf |archive-date=December 9, 2012}}</ref> The ICAO report continued to support the initial assertion that KAL&nbsp;007 accidentally flew in Soviet airspace,<ref name="ICAO 2">{{cite press release |title=ICAO Completes Fact-Finding Investigation |url=http://www.icao.int/cgi/goto_m.pl?icao%2Fen%2Ftrivia%2Fkal_flight_007.htm |date=June 16, 1993 |access-date=January 16, 2009 |location=Montreal |archive-date=September 27, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110927014036/http://www.icao.int/cgi/goto_m.pl?icao%2Fen%2Ftrivia%2Fkal_flight_007.htm |url-status=dead}}</ref> after listening to the flight crew's conversations recorded by the CVR, and confirming that either the aircraft had flown on a constant magnetic heading instead of activating the INS and following its assigned waypoints, or, if it had activated the INS, it had been activated when the aircraft had already deviated beyond the 7{{sfrac|1|2}}-[[nautical mile]] Desired Track Envelope within which the waypoints would have been captured.

[[File:Grossi-7.png|thumb|left|A typical digital [[flight data recorder]] and [[cockpit voice recorder]]<ref group="note">For illustration only – KAL&nbsp;007 did not necessarily use this type of recorder.</ref>]]

In addition, the Russian Federation released "Transcript of Communications. U.S.S.R. Air Defence Command Centres on Sakhalin Island" transcripts to ICAO—this new evidence triggered the revised ICAO report in 1993 "The Report of the Completion of the Fact-Finding Investigation",<ref>{{cite press release |url=http://www.icao.int/icao/en/nr/1993/pio199308_e.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090305141141/http://www.icao.int/icao/en/nr/1993/pio199308_e.pdf |title=ICAO Completes Fact-Finding Investigation |year=1993 |publisher=[[International Civil Aviation Organization]] |archive-date=March 5, 2009 |location=Montreal}}</ref> and is appended to it. These transcripts (of two reels of tape, each containing multiple tracks) are time specified, some to the second, of the communications between the various command posts and other military facilities on Sakhalin from the time of the initial orders for the shoot-down and then through the stalking of KAL&nbsp;007 by Major Osipovich in his Su-15 interceptor, the attack as seen and commented on by General Kornukov, Commander of [[Sokol Air Base]], down the ranks to the Combat Controller Captain Titovnin.<ref name="ICAO pp. 48">ICAO '93, Information Paper No. 1, pp. 48–208</ref>

The transcripts include the post-attack flight of KAL&nbsp;007 until it had reached Moneron Island, the descent of KAL&nbsp;007 over Moneron, the initial Soviet SAR missions to Moneron, the futile search of the support interceptors for KAL&nbsp;007 on the water, and ending with the debriefing of Osipovich on return to base. Some of the communications are the telephone conversations between superior officers and subordinates and involve commands to them, while other communications involve the recorded responses to what was then being viewed on radar tracking KAL&nbsp;007. These multi-track communications from various command posts telecommunicating at the same minute and seconds as other command posts were communicating provide a "composite" picture of what was taking place.<ref name="ICAO pp. 48"/>

The data from the CVR and the FDR revealed that the recordings broke off after the first minute and 44&nbsp;seconds of KAL&nbsp;007's post-missile detonation 12&nbsp;minute flight. The remaining minutes of the flight would be supplied by the Russia 1992 submission to ICAO of the real-time Soviet military communication of the shoot-down and aftermath. The fact that both recorder tapes stopped exactly at the same time 1&nbsp;minute and 44&nbsp;seconds after missile detonation (18:38:02 UTC) without the tape portions for the more than 10 minutes of KAL&nbsp;007's post-detonation flight before it descended below radar tracking (18:38 UTC) finds no explanation in the ICAO analysis: "It could not be established why both flight recorders simultaneously ceased to operate 104 seconds after the attack. The power supply cables were fed to the rear of the aircraft in raceways on opposite sides of the fuselage until they came together behind the two recorders."<ref name="ICAO93-55"/>