Editing Charles Sanders Peirce (section)

==== Presuppositions of logic ====
In his "F.R.L." [First Rule of Logic] (1899), Peirce states that the first, and "in one sense, the sole", rule of reason is that, ''to learn, one needs to desire to learn'' and desire it without resting satisfied with that which one is inclined to think.<ref name="FRL"/> So, the first rule is, ''to wonder''. Peirce proceeds to a critical theme in research practices and the shaping of theories:

<blockquote><poem>...there follows one [[corollary]] which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy:
::Do not block the way of inquiry.</poem></blockquote>

Peirce adds, that method and economy are best in research but no outright sin inheres in trying any theory in the sense that the investigation via its trial adoption can proceed unimpeded and undiscouraged, and that "the one unpardonable offence" is a philosophical barricade against truth's advance, an offense to which "metaphysicians in all ages have shown themselves the most addicted". Peirce in many writings holds that [[Classification of the sciences (Peirce)|logic precedes metaphysics]] (ontological, religious, and physical).

Peirce goes on to list four common barriers to inquiry: (1) Assertion of absolute certainty; (2) maintaining that something is absolutely unknowable; (3) maintaining that something is absolutely inexplicable because absolutely basic or ultimate; (4) holding that perfect exactitude is possible, especially such as to quite preclude unusual and anomalous phenomena. To refuse absolute theoretical certainty is the heart of ''fallibilism'', which Peirce unfolds into refusals to set up any of the listed barriers. Peirce elsewhere argues (1897) that logic's presupposition of fallibilism leads at length to the view that chance and continuity are very real ([[tychism]] and [[synechism]]).<ref name="FCE"/>

The First Rule of Logic pertains to the mind's presuppositions in undertaking reason and logic; presuppositions, for instance, that truth and the real do not depend on yours or my opinion of them but do depend on representational relation and consist in the destined end in investigation taken far enough ([[#defs|see below]]). He describes such ideas as, collectively, hopes which, in particular cases, one is unable seriously to doubt.<ref>Peirce (1902), The Carnegie Institute Application, Memoir 10, MS L75.361–362, ''Arisbe'' [http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-04.htm#m10 Eprint] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110524021037/http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-04.htm#m10 |date=2011-05-24  }}.</ref>