Editing Battle of the Bulge (section)

===Allied high-command controversy===
{{Main|Broad front versus narrow front controversy in World War II}}
[[File:Bernard Law Montgomery.jpg|thumb|upright|Field Marshal [[Bernard Montgomery|Montgomery]]]]
[[File:Dwight D. Eisenhower as General of the Army crop.jpg|thumb|upright|General [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]], the [[Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force|Supreme Allied Commander]]]]
[[File:General Bradley.jpg|thumb|upright|General [[Omar Bradley|Bradley]]]]

One of the fault lines between the British and American high commands was Eisenhower's commitment to a broad front advance. This view was opposed by the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal [[Alan Brooke]], as well as Field Marshal Montgomery, who promoted a rapid advance on a narrow front under his command, with the other allied armies in reserve.{{sfn|Eisenhower|1969|p=91}}

Eisenhower based his decision on various military and political realities. The [[Allied-occupied Germany|Allied occupation zones]] in Germany had been agreed upon in February 1944, and a faster Allied advance in the autumn of 1944 would not have altered this.{{sfn|Weigley|1995|pp=32–43}} The Soviet Union would have also benefited from a rapid German collapse, and its participation in the war against Japan was greatly desired. There were reservations about whether the Allied logistical system possessed the required flexibility to support the narrow-front strategy,{{sfn|Van Creveld|1977|p=230}} the reality of terrain and logistics argued strongly against it, and the consequences if the narrow front advance had failed would have been very severe.{{sfn|Andidora|2002|p=177}}

Montgomery's Chief of Staff, Major-General Francis de Guingand, stated in his post-war account that he had opposed Montgomery's narrow front strategy on political and administrative grounds.{{sfn|De Guingand|1947|pp=410–413}}