Editing Soviet–Afghan War (section)

=== January 1987 – February 1989: Withdrawal ===
{{Main|Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan}}
[[File:T-62 withdraws from Afghanistan.JPEG|thumb|Soviet [[T-62]]M main battle tank withdraws from Afghanistan]]

The promotion of [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] to General Secretary in 1985 and his 'new thinking' on foreign and domestic policy was likely an important factor in the Soviets' decision to withdraw. Gorbachev had been attempting to remove the Soviet Union from the economic stagnation that had set in under the leadership of Brezhnev, and to reform the Soviet Union's economy and image with the [[Glasnost]] and [[Perestroika]] policies. Gorbachev had also been attempting to ease cold war tensions by signing the [[Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty]] with the U.S. in 1987 and withdrawing the troops from Afghanistan, whose presence had garnered so much international condemnation.  Beijing had stipulated that a normalization of relations would have to wait until Moscow withdrew its army from Afghanistan (among other things), and in 1989 the first Sino-Soviet summit in 30 years took place.{{sfn|Maley|Saikal|1989|p=127}} At the same time, Gorbachev pressured his Cuban allies in Angola to scale down activities and withdraw even though Soviet allies were faring somewhat better there.<ref>{{cite book|last=Urban, Mark|title=War in Afghanistan|year=1990|publisher=St. Martin's Press|page= 300}}</ref> The Soviets also pulled many of their troops out of [[Mongolia]] in 1987, where they were also having a far easier time than in Afghanistan, and restrained the [[Cambodian–Vietnamese War|Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea]] to the point of an all-out withdrawal in 1988.{{sfn|Maley|Saikal|1989|p=132}} This massive withdrawal of Soviet forces from such highly contested areas shows that the Soviet government's decision to leave Afghanistan was based upon a general change in Soviet foreign policy – from one of confrontation to avoidance of conflict wherever possible.<ref name="britannica2001">{{cite web|url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War|title=Afghanistan War &#124; History, Combatants, Facts, & Timeline|website=Encyclopedia Britannica|date=7 June 2023 }}</ref><ref name="britannica1978">{{cite web|url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghan-War|title=Afghan War &#124; History & Facts|website=Encyclopedia Britannica|date=24 May 2023 }}</ref>

In the last phase, Soviet troops prepared and executed their withdrawal from Afghanistan, whilst limiting the launching of offensive operations by those who had not withdrawn yet.

By mid-1987 the Soviet Union announced that it would start withdrawing its forces. [[Sibghatullah Mojaddedi]] was selected as the head of the Interim Islamic State of Afghanistan, in an attempt to reassert its legitimacy against the Moscow-sponsored Kabul regime. Mojaddedi, as head of the Interim Afghan Government, met with then-Vice President of the United States [[George H. W. Bush]], achieving a critical diplomatic victory for the Afghan resistance. Defeat of the Kabul government was their solution for peace. This confidence, sharpened by their distrust of the United Nations, virtually guaranteed their refusal to accept a political compromise.

In September 1988, Soviet MiG-23 fighters shot down two Iranian [[Bell AH-1 SuperCobra|AH-1J Cobra]] helicopters which had intruded into Afghan airspace.<ref>"The Aviation History", Florian Ion Petrescu, Relly Victoria Petrescu, 2012, p. 82</ref>

[[Operation Magistral]] was one of the final offensive operations undertaken by the Soviets, a successful sweep operation that cleared the road between the towns of [[Gardez]] and [[Khost]]. This operation did not have any lasting effect on the outcome of the conflict nor on the soiled political and military status of the Soviets in the eyes of the West but was a symbolic gesture that marked the end of their widely condemned presence in the country with a victory.<ref>Isby, ''War in a Distant Country'', p. 47</ref>

The first half of the Soviet contingent was withdrawn from 15 May to 16 August 1988, and the second from 15 November to 15 February 1989. In order to ensure a safe passage, the Soviets had negotiated ceasefires with local Mujahideen commanders. The withdrawal was generally executed peacefully<ref>Urban, ''War in Afghanistan'', p. 251</ref> except for the operation "Typhoon".

[[File:RIAN archive 660671 Pullout of Soviet troops contingent from Afghanistan.jpg|thumb|left|[[Colonel General|CGen]] of [[40th Army (Soviet Union)|40th Army]], [[Boris Gromov]], announcing the withdrawal of Soviet contingent forces]]

General Yazov, the [[Minister of Defence (Soviet Union)|Defense Minister of Soviet Union]], ordered the 40th Army to violate the agreement with [[Ahmad Shah Massoud]], who commanded a large force in the Panjshir Valley, and attack his relaxed and exposed forces. The Soviet attack was initiated to protect Najibullah, who did not have a ceasefire in effect with Massoud, and who rightly feared an offensive by Massoud's forces after the Soviet withdrawal.<ref name="fmso.leavenworth.army.mil">{{cite web|url=http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Withdrawal.pdf|title=Breaking contact without leaving chaos: the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan|page=19|work=fmso.leavenworth.army.mil|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101225113905/http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Withdrawal.pdf|archive-date=25 December 2010}}</ref> General Gromov, the 40th Army Commander, objected to the operation, but reluctantly obeyed the order. "Typhoon" began on 23 January and continued for three days. To minimize their own losses, the Soviets abstained from close-range fighting. Instead, they used long-range artillery, surface-to-surface and air-to-surface missiles. Numerous civilian casualties were reported. Massoud had not threatened the withdrawal to this point and did not attack Soviet forces after they breached the agreement.<ref name="fmso.leavenworth.army.mil" /> Overall, the Soviet attack represented a defeat for Massoud's forces, who lost 600 fighters killed and wounded.<ref name="fmso.leavenworth.army.mil" />

After the withdrawal of the Soviets, the [[Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan|DRA forces]] were left fighting alone and had to abandon some provincial capitals, as well as disbanding their [[ANA Special Operations Command|air assault brigades]] a year prior.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Army of Afghanistan|url=https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-army-of-afghanistan/ |access-date=2024-04-11 |website=Hurst Publishers}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-11-30 |title="Пожарная команда" Кабула |website= Warspot.ru |url=https://warspot.ru/21620-pozharnaya-komanda-kabula |access-date=2024-04-11 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221130074403/https://warspot.ru/21620-pozharnaya-komanda-kabula |archive-date=30 November 2022 }}</ref> It was widely believed that they would not be able to resist the Mujahideen for long. However, in the spring of 1989, DRA forces inflicted a major defeat on the Mujahideen during the [[Battle of Jalalabad (1989)|Battle of Jalalabad]], as well launching successful assaults on fortified complexes in [[Paghman]] in 1990.<ref>{{Cite web |title=A Tale of Two Afghan Armies|url=https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/a-tale-of-two-afghan-armies |access-date=2024-04-11 |website=Small Wars Journal}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Fleiss |first=Alex |date=2022-04-05 |title=What happened in the battle of Jalalabad? |url=https://www.rebellionresearch.com/what-happened-in-the-battle-of-jalalabad |access-date=2024-04-11 |website=Rebellion Research}}</ref><ref>Marshall, p.7</ref> The United States, having achieved its goal of forcing the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan, gradually disengaged itself from the country.<ref name="cdlib" />

==== Causes of withdrawal ====
Some of the causes of the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan leading to the Afghanistan regime's eventual defeat include<ref name=Fremont-Barnes>{{cite book|last1=Fremont-Barnes|first1=Gregory|title=The Soviet–Afghan War 1979–89|date=2012|publisher=Osprey Publishing|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LH55BgAAQBAJ&pg=PT89|isbn=978-1-4728-1038-0}}{{Dead link|date=February 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>
* The Soviet Army of 1980 was trained and equipped for large scale, conventional warfare in Central Europe against a similar opponent, i.e., it used armored and motor-rifle formations. This was notably ineffective against small scale guerrilla groups using hit-and-run tactics in the rough terrain of Afghanistan. Also, the Soviet Army's large formations were not mobile enough to engage small groups of Mujahideen fighters that easily merged back into the terrain.<ref name=Fremont-Barnes /> The set strategy also meant that troops were discouraged from "tactical initiative", essential in counter insurgency, because it "tended to upset operational timing".<ref name=Grau-201 />
* The Soviets used large-scale offensives against Mujahideen strongholds, such as in the Panjshir Valley, which temporarily cleared those sectors and killed many civilians in addition to enemy combatants. The biggest shortcoming here, though, was the fact that once the Soviets engaged the enemy with force, they failed to hold the ground, as they withdrew once their operation was completed. The killing of civilians further alienated the population from the Soviets, with bad long-term effects.<ref name=Fremont-Barnes />
* The Soviets did not have enough men to fight a counter-insurgency war (COIN),<ref name=Grau-201>{{cite book|last1=Grau|first1=Lester W.|title=The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan|date=1996|publisher=DIANE Publishing. |pages=201–2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=yOtThPNqKP8C&pg=PA197|isbn=978-0-7881-4665-7}}</ref> and their troops had low morale. The peak number of Soviet troops during the war was 115,000, but the bulk of these troops were conscripts, which led to poor combat performance in their Motor-Rifle Formations. However, the Soviets did have their elite infantry units, such as the famed Spetsnaz, the VDV, and their recon infantry. The problem with their elite units was not combat effectiveness, but that there were not enough of them and that they were employed incorrectly.<ref name=Fremont-Barnes />
* Intelligence gathering, essential for successful COIN, was inadequate. The Soviets overly relied on less-than-accurate aerial recon and radio intercepts rather than their recon infantry and special forces. Although their special forces and recon infantry units performed very well in combat against the Mujahideen, they would have better served in intelligence gathering.<ref name=Fremont-Barnes />
* The concept of a "war of national liberation" against a Soviet-sponsored "revolutionary" regime was so alien to the Soviet dogma that the leadership could not "come to grips" with it. This led to, among other things, a suppression by the Soviet media for several years of the truth about how bad the war was going, which caused a backlash when it was unable to hide it further.<ref name=Grau-201 />