Editing Rare-earth element (section)

==Geopolitical considerations==
[[File:USGS rare earth oxides production graph.PNG|thumb|400px|alt=A U.S.G.S. graph of global rare-earth-oxide production trends, 1956–2008|Global rare-earth-oxide production trends, 1956-2008 ([[USGS]])]]
China has officially cited [[resource depletion]] and environmental concerns as the reasons for a nationwide crackdown on its rare-earth mineral production sector.<ref name=ReutersSept611>{{cite web |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/china-rare-earth-idUSL3E7K620P20110906 |title=China halts rare earth production at three mines |website=Reuters |access-date=2011-09-07 |date=2011-09-06 |archive-date=April 10, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220410095530/https://www.reuters.com/article/china-rare-earth-idUSL3E7K620P20110906 |url-status=live}}</ref> Non-environmental motives have also been imputed to China's rare-earth policy.<ref name="NYT"/> In 2010, according to ''[[The Economist]]'', "Slashing their exports of rare-earth metals&nbsp;... is all about moving Chinese manufacturers up the supply chain, so they can sell valuable finished goods to the world rather than lowly raw materials."<ref>[https://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/09/rare-earth_metals "The Difference Engine: More precious than gold"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180423192601/https://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/09/rare-earth_metals |date=April 23, 2018}}. ''[[The Economist]]'' September 17, 2010.</ref> 

China currently has an effective monopoly on the world's REE Value Chain.<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1016/j.jsm.2016.05.002 |title=Strategic evaluations and mining process optimization towards a strong global REE supply chain |journal=Journal of Sustainable Mining |volume=15 |issue=1 |pages=26–35 |year=2016 |last1=Barakos |first1=G |last2=Gutzmer |first2=J |last3=Mischo |first3=H |doi-access=free|bibcode=2016JSMin..15...26B }}</ref> (All of the refineries and processing plants that transform the raw ore into valuable elements.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/valuechain.asp |title=Value Chain |website=Investopedia |access-date=September 26, 2017 |archive-date=June 10, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220610222900/https://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/valuechain.asp |url-status=live}}</ref>) In the words of Deng Xiaoping, a Chinese politician from the late 1970s to the late 1980s, "The Middle East has oil; we have rare earths ... it is of extremely important strategic significance; we must be sure to handle the rare earth issue properly and make the fullest use of our country's advantage in rare-earth resources."<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.businessinsider.com/seventeen-metals-the-middle-east-has-oil-china-has-rare-earth-2011-1 |title=Seventeen Metals: 'The Middle East has oil, China has rare earth' |website=Business Insider |author=Dian L. Chu |date=Nov 11, 2010 |access-date=September 27, 2017 |archive-date=June 24, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220624033304/https://www.businessinsider.com/seventeen-metals-the-middle-east-has-oil-china-has-rare-earth-2011-1 |url-status=live}}</ref>

One possible example of market control is the division of General Motors that deals with miniaturized magnet research, which shut down its US office and moved its entire staff to [[China]] in 2006<ref>{{cite web |first=C. |last=Cox |url=http://theanchorhouse.com/2006/11/ |title=Rare earth innovation: the silent shift to China |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080421031137/http://theanchorhouse.com/2006/11/ |archive-date=2008-04-21 |date=16 November 2006 |publisher=The Anchor House, Inc |access-date=29 February 2008}}</ref> China's export quota only applies to the metal but not products made from these metals such as magnets.

It was reported,<ref name="nytimes">{{cite news |last=Bradsher |first=Keith |title=Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss |publisher=The New York Times Company |access-date=22 September 2010 |date=2010-09-22 |archive-date=April 23, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220423200732/https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss |url-status=live}}</ref> but officially denied,<ref name="wsjs">{{cite news |last=James T. Areddy, David Fickling And Norihiko Shirouzu |title=China Denies Halting Rare-Earth Exports to Japan |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704062804575509640345070222?mod=WSJ_hps_LEFTTopStories |newspaper=Wall Street Journal |access-date=22 September 2010 |date=2010-09-23 |archive-date=June 15, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220615124340/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704062804575509640345070222?mod=WSJ_hps_LEFTTopStories |url-status=live}}</ref> that China instituted an [[economic sanctions|export ban]] on shipments of rare-earth oxides, but not alloys, to Japan on 22 September 2010, in response to [[2010 Senkaku boat collision incident|the detainment of a Chinese fishing boat captain]] by the [[Japanese Coast Guard]].<ref>[https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/mining/7970872/Backlash-over-China-curb-on-metal-exports.html Backlash over the alleged China curb on metal exports] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180415150316/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/mining/7970872/Backlash-over-China-curb-on-metal-exports.html |date=April 15, 2018}}, ''[[Daily Telegraph]]'', London, 29 Aug 2010. Retrieved 2010-08-30.</ref><ref name="Distillations"/> On September 2, 2010, a few days before the fishing boat incident, ''The Economist'' reported that "China&nbsp;... in July announced the latest in a series of annual export reductions, this time by 40% to precisely 30,258 tonnes."<ref>[http://www.economist.com/node/16944034 "Rare earths: Digging in"] ''[[The Economist]]'' September 2, 2010.</ref><ref name="Distillations">{{cite web |title=Rare Earths: The Hidden Cost to Their Magic", Distillations Podcast and transcript, Episode 242 |url=https://www.sciencehistory.org/distillations/podcast/rare-earths-the-hidden-cost-to-their-magic |website=Science History Institute |date=June 25, 2019 |access-date=28 August 2019 |archive-date=August 3, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190803101711/https://www.sciencehistory.org/distillations/podcast/rare-earths-the-hidden-cost-to-their-magic |url-status=live}}</ref>

The [[United States Department of Energy]] in its 2010 Critical Materials Strategy report identified [[dysprosium]] as the element that was most critical in terms of import reliance.<ref>Mills, Mark P. [https://blogs.forbes.com/markpmills/2011/01/01/techs-mineral-infrastructure-time-to-emulate-chinas-rare-earth-policies/ "Tech's Mineral Infrastructure&nbsp;– Time to Emulate China's Rare Earth Policies."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110526090822/https://blogs.forbes.com/markpmills/2011/01/01/techs-mineral-infrastructure-time-to-emulate-chinas-rare-earth-policies/ |date=May 26, 2011}} ''[[Forbes]]'', 1 January 2010.</ref>

A 2011 report "China's Rare-Earth Industry", issued by the US Geological Survey and US Department of the Interior, outlines industry trends within China and examines national policies that may guide the future of the country's production. The report notes that China's lead in the production of rare-earth minerals has accelerated over the past two decades. In 1990, China accounted for only 27% of such minerals. In 2009, world production was 132,000 metric tons; China produced 129,000 of those tons. According to the report, recent patterns suggest that China will slow the export of such materials to the world: "Owing to the increase in domestic demand, the Government has gradually reduced the export quota during the past several years."<ref name="auto2">{{cite web |url=http://journalistsresource.org/studies/government/international/usgs-china-rare-earth-industry |title=US Geological Survey: China's Rare-Earth Industry |publisher=Journalist's Resource.org |date=2011-07-18}}</ref>

In 2006, China allowed 47 domestic rare-earth producers and traders and 12 Sino-foreign rare-earth producers to export. Controls have since tightened annually; by 2011, only 22 domestic rare-earth producers and traders and 9 Sino-foreign rare-earth producers were authorized. The government's future policies will likely keep in place strict controls: "According to China's draft rare-earth development plan, annual rare-earth production may be limited to between 130,000 and 140,000 [metric tons] during the period from 2009 to 2015. The export quota for rare-earth products may be about 35,000 [metric tons] and the Government may allow 20 domestic rare-earth producers and traders to export rare earths."<ref name="auto2"/>

The United States Geological Survey was actively surveying southern [[Afghanistan]] for rare-earth deposits under the protection of United States military forces. Since 2009 the USGS has conducted remote sensing surveys as well as fieldwork to verify Soviet claims that volcanic rocks containing rare-earth metals exist in [[Helmand Province]] near the village of [[Khanashin]]. The USGS study team has located a sizable area of rocks in the center of an extinct volcano containing light rare-earth elements including cerium and neodymium. It has mapped 1.3 million metric tons of desirable rock, or about ten years of supply at current demand levels. [[The Pentagon]] has estimated its value at about $7.4 billion.<ref>{{cite magazine |author=Simpson, S. |title=Afghanistan's Buried Riches |magazine=Scientific American |date=October 2011}}</ref>

It has been argued that the geopolitical importance of rare earths has been exaggerated in the literature on the geopolitics of renewable energy, underestimating the power of economic incentives for expanded production.<ref>{{cite web |title=EU, U.S. exploring new sources of Rare Earth Minerals, should China limit exports |last1=Trakimavicius |first1=Lukas |date=25 February 2021 |publisher=Energy Post |url=https://energypost.eu/eu-u-s-exploring-new-sources-of-rare-earth-minerals-should-china-limit-exports/ |access-date=25 February 2021 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220215100817/https://energypost.eu/eu-u-s-exploring-new-sources-of-rare-earth-minerals-should-china-limit-exports/ |archive-date=February 15, 2022}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{cite journal |last=Overland |first=Indra |date=2019-03-01 |title=The geopolitics of renewable energy: Debunking four emerging myths |journal=Energy Research & Social Science |volume=49 |pages=36–40 |doi=10.1016/j.erss.2018.10.018 |issn=2214-6296 |doi-access=free|bibcode=2019ERSS...49...36O |hdl=11250/2579292 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> This especially concerns neodymium. Due to its role in permanent magnets used for wind turbines, it has been argued that neodymium will be one of the main objects of geopolitical competition in a world running on renewable energy. But this perspective has been criticized for failing to recognize that most wind turbines have gears and do not use permanent magnets.<ref name=":0"/>