Editing Problem of evil (section)

==== Critique ====
A hallmark of process theodicy is its conception of God as persuasive rather than coercive.<ref name="Nancy Frankenberry">{{cite journal |last1=Frankenberry |first1=Nancy |title=Some Problems in Process Theodicy |journal=Religious Studies |date=June 1981 |volume=17 |issue=2 |pages=179–197 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20005735 |publisher=Cambridge University Press|doi=10.1017/S0034412500000962 |jstor=20005735 |s2cid=170658129 }}</ref>{{rp|179}} [[Nancy Frankenberry]] asserts that this creates an either-or dichotomy – either God is persuasive or coercive – whereas lived experience has an "irreducible ambiguity" where it seems God can be both.<ref name="Nancy Frankenberry"/>{{rp|180–181}}

Since the 1940s, process theodicy has also been "dogged by the problem of 'religious adequacy' of its concept of God" and doubts about the 'goodness' of its view of God.<ref name="Nancy Frankenberry"/>{{rp|186}} It has not resolved all the old questions concerning the problem of evil,<ref>{{cite book |last1=Griffin |first1=David Ray |title=God, Power, and Evil A Process Theodicy |date=2004 |publisher=Presbyterian Publishing Corporation |isbn=9780664229061 |pages=300, 308}}</ref> while it has raised new ones concerning "the nature of divine power, the meaning of God's goodness, and the realistic assessment of what we may reasonably hope for by way of creative advance".<ref name="Nancy Frankenberry"/>{{rp|196}}