Editing Mind–body dualism (section)

===Argument from brain damage===
This argument has been formulated by [[Paul Churchland]], among others. The point is that, in instances of some sort of brain damage (e.g. caused by automobile accidents, drug abuse, pathological diseases, etc.), it is always the case that the mental substance and/or properties of the person are significantly changed or compromised. If the mind were a completely separate substance from the brain, how could it be possible that every single time the brain is injured, the mind is also injured? Indeed, it is very frequently the case that one can even predict and explain the kind of mental or psychological deterioration or change that human beings will undergo when specific parts of their brains are damaged. So the question for the dualist to try to confront is how can all of this be explained if the mind is a separate and immaterial substance from, or if its properties are ontologically independent of, the brain.<ref>[[Paul Churchland|Churchland, Paul]]. 1988. ''Matter and Consciousness'' (rev. ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.</ref>

[[Phineas Gage]], who suffered destruction of one or both frontal lobes by a projectile iron rod, is often cited as an example illustrating that the brain causes mind. Gage certainly exhibited some mental changes after his accident, suggesting a correlation between brain states and mental states. It has been noted, however, that Gage's most serious mental changes were only temporary,<ref>(September 2008). "Phineas Gage – Unravelling the myth". The Psychologist. 21 (9): 828–31.</ref> and that he made a reasonable social and mental recovery.<ref>Lena, M. L. (2010). "Rehabilitating Phineas Gage". Neuropsychological Rehabilitation. 20 (5): 641–58.</ref> The changes in question have almost always been distorted and exaggerated by scientific and popular literature, often relying on hearsay.<ref>Macmillan, Malcolm B. (2014). "Phineas Gage". Encyclopedia of the Neurological Sciences. Academic Press. p. 383.</ref><ref>Kotowicz, Z. (2007). "The strange case of Phineas Gage". History of the Human Sciences. 20 (1): 115–31.</ref><ref>Grafman, J. (2002). "The Structured Event Complex and the Human Prefrontal Cortex". In Stuss, D. T.; Knight, R. T. (eds.). Principles of Frontal Lobe Function. pp. 292–310.</ref> Similar examples abound; neuroscientist [[David Eagleman]] describes the case of another individual who exhibited escalating [[pedophile|pedophilic]] tendencies at two different times, and in each case was found to have tumors growing in a particular part of his brain.<ref>Choi, Charles. 21 October 2002. "[https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn2943-brain-tumour-causes-uncontrollable-paedophilia.htmlNewScientist.com, Brain tumour causes uncontrollable paedophilia]." ''[[New Scientist]]''. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150412195711/http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn2943-brain-tumour-causes-uncontrollable-paedophilia.htmlNewScientist.com,|date=2015-04-12}}.</ref><ref>[[Nigel Warburton|Warburton, Nigel]], and [[David Edmonds (philosopher)|David Edmonds]], hosts. 22 May 2011. "[https://philosophybites.com/2011/05/david-eagleman-on-morality-and-the-brain.html David Eagleman on Morality and the Brain]." ''[[Philosophy Bites]]'' (podcast).</ref>

Case studies aside, modern experiments have demonstrated that the relation between brain and mind is much more than simple correlation. By damaging, or manipulating, specific areas of the brain repeatedly under controlled conditions (e.g. in monkeys) and reliably obtaining the same results in measures of mental state and abilities, neuroscientists have shown that the relation between damage to the brain and mental deterioration is likely causal. This conclusion is further supported by data from the effects of neuro-active chemicals (e.g., those affecting [[neurotransmitters]]) on mental functions,<ref>{{cite journal|pmid=11190987 | volume=25 | issue=1 | title=Verbal and visual memory improve after choline supplementation in long-term total parenteral nutrition: a pilot study | year=2001 | journal=JPEN J Parenter Enteral Nutr | pages=30–35 |vauthors=Buchman AL, Sohel M, Brown M |doi=10.1177/014860710102500130|display-authors=etal}}</ref> but also from research on [[neurostimulation]] (direct electrical stimulation of the brain, including [[transcranial magnetic stimulation]]).<ref>''Alterations of sociomoral judgement and glucose use in the frontomedial cortex induced by electrical stimulation of the subthalamic nucleus (STN) in Parkinsonian patients (2004):'' {{cite journal |journal=Genman Medical Science |url=http://www.egms.de/de/meetings/dgnc2004/04dgnc0207.shtml |title=Alterations of sociomoral judgement and glucose utilization in the frontomedial cortex induced by electrical stimulation of the subthalamic nucleus (STN) in Parkinsonian patients |pages=DocDI.06.06 |access-date=2008-09-08 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040903084719/http://www.egms.de/de/meetings/dgnc2004/04dgnc0207.shtml |archive-date=2004-09-03 |date=2004-04-23}}</ref>

====Replies====

[[Property dualism]] and [[William Hasker]]'s "emergent dualism"<ref>[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Emergent Properties"]. Excerpt: "William Hasker (1999) goes one step further in arguing for the existence of the mind conceived as a non-composite substance which 'emerges' from the brain at a certain point in its development. He dubs his position 'emergent dualism,' and claims for it all the philosophical advantages of traditional, Cartesian substance dualism while being able to overcome a central difficulty, viz., explaining how individual brains and mental substances come to be linked in a persistent, 'monogamous' relationship. Here, Hasker, is using the term to express a view structurally like one (vitalism) that the British emergentists were anxious to disavow, thus proving that the term is capable of evoking all manner of ideas for metaphysicians."</ref> seek to avoid this problem. They assert that the mind is a property or substance that emerges from the appropriate arrangement of physical matter, and therefore could be affected by any rearrangement of matter.

Writing in the 13th century, St. [[Thomas Aquinas]] writes that "the body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as {{as written|i|t's}} origin of action." Thus, if the body is dysfunctional, the intellect will not actualize as it intends to.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1075.htm|title=Summa Theologiae: Man who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal substance: and in the first place, concerning what belongs to the essence of the soul}} Article 2, Reply to Objection 3.</ref> According to the philosopher [[C. Stephen Evans|Stephen Evans]]:

{{blockquote|We did not need [[neurophysiology]] to come to know that a person whose head is bashed in with a club quickly loses his or her ability to think or have any conscious processes. Why should we not think of neurophysiological findings as giving us detailed, precise knowledge of something that human beings have always known, or at least could have known, which is that the mind (at least in this mortal life) requires and depends on a functioning brain? We now know a lot more than we used to know about precisely ''how'' the mind depends on the body. However, ''that'' the mind depends on the body, at least prior to death, is surely not something discovered in the 20th century".<ref>[[C. Stephen Evans]], "Separable Souls: Dualism, Selfhood, and the Possibility of Life After Death." ''Christian Scholars Review'' 34 (2005): 333–34.</ref>}}