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Korean Air Lines Flight 007
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====Soviet memoranda==== [[File:Mikhail Merchink.jpg|thumb|''Mikhail Merchink'', lead Soviet vessel in simulated search]] In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin disclosed five top-secret memos dating from a few weeks after the downing of KAL 007 in 1983.<ref group="note">These memos were published in the Soviet news magazine, [[Izvestia]] #228, October 15, 1992, shortly after being made public by Yeltsin.</ref> The memos contained Soviet communications (from KGB Chief [[Viktor Chebrikov]] and Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov to General Secretary Yuri Andropov) that indicated that they knew the location of KAL 007's wreckage while they were simulating a search and harassing the American Navy; they had found the sought-after [[cockpit voice recorder]] on October 20, 1983 (50 days after the incident),<ref name="Bohlen">{{cite news |url=https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE1D91030F935A25753C1A964958260 |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=October 16, 1992 |title=Tape Displays the Anguish On Jet the Soviets Downed |author=Bohlen, Celestine |access-date=February 1, 2009}}</ref> and had decided to keep this knowledge secret, the reason being that the tapes could not unequivocally support their firmly held view that KAL 007's flight to Soviet territory was a deliberately planned intelligence mission.<ref>Daniloff, p. 303</ref><ref>Andrew, p. 60</ref> {{quote box|align=right|width=33%|quote=Simulated search efforts in the Sea of Japan are being performed by our vessels at present in order to dis-inform the U.S. and Japan. These activities will be discontinued in accordance with a specific plan... Therefore, if the flight recorders shall be transferred to western countries their objective data can equally be used by the U.S.S.R. and the western countries in proving the opposite viewpoints on the nature of the flight of the South Korean airplane. In such circumstances, a new phase in anti-Soviet hysteria cannot be excluded. In connection with all mentioned above, it seems highly preferable not to transfer the flight recorders to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) or any third party willing to decipher their contents. The fact that the recorders are in possession of the U.S.S.R. shall be kept secret... As far as we are aware neither the U.S. nor Japan has any information on the flight recorders. We have made necessary efforts in order to prevent any disclosure of the information in the future. Looking to your approval.|author=D. Ustinov, V. Chebrikov (photo)<ref group="note">{{cite web |url=http://www.airliners.net/articles/graphics/chebrikov.jpg |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060623025748/http://www.airliners.net/articles/graphics/chebrikov.jpg |archive-date=2006-06-23 |title=Photo of Chebrikov |publisher=Airliners.net |access-date=5 April 2010}}</ref> December 1983}} The third memo acknowledges that analysis of the recorder tapes showed no evidence of the Soviet interceptor attempting to contact KAL 007 via radio nor any indication that the KAL 007 had been given warning shots. <blockquote>However in case the flight recorders shall become available to the western countries their data may be used for Confirmation of no attempt by the intercepting aircraft to establish radio contact with the intruder plane on 121.5 MHz and no tracers warning shots in the last section of the flight<ref>Conclusions by the Group of Experts of the Defense Ministry, KGB of the U.S.S.R. and Ministry of Aerospace Industry, Head of the Group Lieutenant-General of Aviation Makarov The staff of the Group Lieutenant-General Engineer Tichomirov Major-General Engineer Didenko Major-General of Aviation Stepanov Major-General of Aviation Kovtun Corresponding Member of Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. Fedosov November 28, 1983</ref> </blockquote> That the Soviet search was simulated (while they knew the wreckage lay elsewhere) also is suggested by the article of Mikhail Prozumentshchikov, Deputy Director of the [[Russian State Archives of Recent History]], commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the airplane's shoot-down. Commenting on the Soviet and American searches: "Since the U.S.S.R., for natural reasons, knew better where the Boeing had been downed...it was very problematical to retrieve anything, especially as the U.S.S.R. was not particularly interested".<ref>{{cite web |author=Prozumentshchikov |first=Mikhail |date=September 1, 2003 |title=Commentary: 20th Anniversary of Flight 007 |url=http://www.jamesoberg.com/09012003commentarymikhailkal.html |access-date=January 13, 2009 |work=jamesoberg.com |publisher=[[RIA Novosti]]}}</ref>
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