Editing Deconstruction (section)

==Criticisms==
Derrida was involved in a number of high-profile disagreements with prominent philosophers, including [[Michel Foucault]], [[John Searle]], [[Willard Van Orman Quine]], [[Peter Kreeft]], and [[Jürgen Habermas]]. Most of the criticisms of deconstruction were first articulated by these philosophers and then repeated elsewhere.

===John Searle===
{{See also|Limited Inc.}}
In the early 1970s, Searle had a brief exchange with [[Jacques Derrida]] regarding [[Speech act theory|speech-act theory]]. The exchange was characterized by a degree of mutual hostility between the philosophers, each of whom accused the other of having misunderstood his basic points.<ref name="Limited"/>{{rp|29}}{{Citation needed|date=September 2012|reason=Footnote provided only sources half the claim.}} Searle was particularly hostile to Derrida's deconstructionist framework and much later refused to let his response to Derrida be printed along with Derrida's papers in the 1988 collection ''[[Limited Inc]]''. Searle did not consider Derrida's approach to be legitimate philosophy, or even intelligible writing, and argued that he did not want to legitimize the deconstructionist point of view by paying any attention to it. Consequently, some critics{{who|date=October 2020}}<ref>{{cite book|last1=Maclachlan|first1=Ian|title=Jacques Derrida: Critical Thought|date=2004|publisher=Ashgate|location=Aldershot|isbn=978-0754608066}}</ref> have considered the exchange to be a series of elaborate misunderstandings rather than a debate, while others{{who|date=October 2020}}<ref name="Alfino">{{cite journal|last1=Alfino|first1=Mark|title=Another Look at the Derrida-Searle Debate|journal=Philosophy & Rhetoric|date=1991|volume=24|issue=2|pages=143–152|jstor=40237667}}</ref> have seen either Derrida or Searle gaining the upper hand.

The debate began in 1972, when, in his paper "Signature Event Context", Derrida analyzed J. L. Austin's theory of the [[illocutionary act]]. While sympathetic to Austin's departure from a purely denotational account of language to one that includes "force", Derrida was sceptical of the framework of normativity employed by Austin. Derrida argued that Austin had missed the fact that any speech event is framed by a "structure of absence" (the words that are left unsaid due to contextual constraints) and by "iterability" (the constraints on what can be said, imposed by what has been said in the past). Derrida argued that the focus on [[intentionality]] in speech-act theory was misguided because intentionality is restricted to that which is already established as a possible intention. He also took issue with the way Austin had excluded the study of fiction, non-serious, or "parasitic" speech, wondering whether this exclusion was because Austin had considered these speech genres as governed by different structures of meaning, or had not considered them due to a lack of interest. In his brief reply to Derrida, "Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida", Searle argued that Derrida's critique was unwarranted because it assumed that Austin's theory attempted to give a full account of language and meaning when its aim was much narrower. Searle considered the omission of parasitic discourse forms to be justified by the narrow scope of Austin's inquiry.<ref>Gregor Campbell. 1993. "John R. Searle" in Irene Rima Makaryk (ed). Encyclopedia of contemporary literary theory: approaches, scholars, terms. University of Toronto Press, 1993</ref><ref>John Searle, "Reiterating the Différences: A Reply to Derrida", Glyph 2 (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977).</ref> Searle agreed with Derrida's proposal that intentionality presupposes iterability, but did not apply the same concept of intentionality used by Derrida, being unable or unwilling to engage with the continental conceptual apparatus.<ref name="Alfino"/> This, in turn, caused Derrida to criticize Searle for not being sufficiently familiar with [[wikt:phenomenological|phenomenological]] perspectives on intentionality.<ref name="Hobson">{{cite book |last1=Hobson |first1=Marian |title=Jacques Derrida: opening lines |date=1998 |publisher=Routledge |location=London |isbn=9780415021975 |pages=95–97}}</ref> Some critics{{who|date=October 2020}}<ref name="Hobson"/> have suggested that Searle, by being so grounded in the analytical tradition that he was unable to engage with Derrida's continental phenomenological tradition, was at fault for the unsuccessful nature of the exchange, however Searle also argued that Derrida's disagreement with Austin turned on Derrida's having misunderstood Austin's [[type–token distinction]] and having failed to understand Austin's concept of failure in relation to [[performativity]].

Derrida, in his response to Searle ({{nowrap|"a b c ..."}} in ''Limited Inc''), ridiculed Searle's positions. Claiming that a clear sender of Searle's message could not be established, Derrida suggested that Searle had formed with Austin a {{Lang|fr|société à responsabilité limitée}} (a "[[limited liability company]]") due to the ways in which the ambiguities of authorship within Searle's reply circumvented the very speech act of his reply. Searle did not reply. Later in 1988, Derrida tried to review his position and his critiques of Austin and Searle, reiterating that he found the constant appeal to "normality" in the analytical tradition to be problematic.<ref name="Limited"/>{{rp|133}}<ref name="Alfino"/><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Farrell|first1=Frank B.|title=Iterability and Meaning: The Searle-Derrida Debate|journal=Metaphilosophy|date=1 January 1988|volume=19|issue=1|pages=53–64|doi=10.1111/j.1467-9973.1988.tb00701.x|language=en|issn=1467-9973}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Fish|first1=Stanley E.|title=With the Compliments of the Author: Reflections on Austin and Derrida|journal=Critical Inquiry|date=1982|volume=8|issue=4|pages=693–721|doi=10.1086/448177|jstor=1343193|s2cid=161086152}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Wright|first1=Edmond|title=Derrida, Searle, Contexts, Games, Riddles|journal=[[New Literary History]]|date=1982|volume=13|issue=3|pages=463–477|doi=10.2307/468793|jstor=468793}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Culler|first1=Jonathan|title=Convention and Meaning: Derrida and Austin|journal=New Literary History|date=1981|volume=13|issue=1|pages=15–30|doi=10.2307/468640|jstor=468640}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Kenaan|first1=Hagi|title=Language, philosophy and the risk of failure: rereading the debate between Searle and Derrida|journal=Continental Philosophy Review|date=2002|volume=35|issue=2|pages=117–133|doi=10.1023/A:1016583115826|s2cid=140898191}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Raffel|first1=Stanley|title=Understanding Each Other: The Case of the Derrida-Searle Debate|journal=Human Studies|date=28 July 2011|volume=34|issue=3|pages=277–292|doi=10.1007/s10746-011-9189-6|s2cid=145210811}}</ref>

===Jürgen Habermas===
In ''[[The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity]]'', [[Jürgen Habermas]] criticized what he considered Derrida's opposition to [[Rationality|rational discourse]].<ref name=":0">{{cite book|last1=Habermas|first1=Jürgen|last2=Lawrence|first2=Frederick|title=The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures|date=2005|publisher=Polity Press|location=Cambridge|isbn=978-0745608303|pages=185–210|edition=Reprinted}}</ref> Further, in an essay on religion and religious language, Habermas criticized what he saw as Derrida's emphasis on [[etymology]] and [[philology]]<ref name=":0" /> (see ''[[Etymological fallacy]]'').

===Walter A. Davis===
The American philosopher [[Walter A. Davis]], in ''Inwardness and Existence: Subjectivity in/and Hegel, Heidegger, Marx and Freud'', argues that both deconstruction and structuralism are prematurely arrested moments of a dialectical movement that issues from Hegelian "unhappy consciousness".<ref>{{cite book|last1=Davis|first1=Walter A.|author-link=Walter A. Davis|title=Inwardness and Existence: Subjectivity In/and Hegel, Heidegger, Marx, and Freud|date=1989|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=reQovh-6gjYC&pg=PA57 |publisher=University of Wisconsin Press|location=Madison, Wisconsin|isbn=978-0299120146|edition=1st|page=57}}</ref>

===In popular media===
Popular criticism of deconstruction intensified following the [[Sokal affair]], which many people took as an indicator of the quality of deconstruction as a whole, despite the absence of Derrida from Sokal's follow-up book ''[[Impostures intellectuelles]]''.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Sokal|first1=Alan D.|title=A Physicist Experiments With Cultural Studies|url=http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/lingua_franca_v4/lingua_franca_v4.html|website=www.physics.nyu.edu|access-date=3 April 2007|date=May 1996}}</ref>

[[Chip Morningstar]] holds a view critical of deconstruction, believing it to be "epistemologically challenged". He claims the humanities are subject to isolation and genetic drift due to their unaccountability to the world outside academia. During the Second International Conference on Cyberspace ([[Santa Cruz, California]], 1991), he reportedly [[Heckler|heckled]] deconstructionists off the stage.<ref>{{cite magazine|last1=Steinberg|first1=Steve|title=Hype List|url=https://www.wired.com/1993/01/hypelist-19/|magazine=WIRED|access-date=19 May 2017|date=1 January 1993}}</ref> He subsequently presented his views in the article "How to Deconstruct Almost Anything", where he stated, "Contrary to the report given in the 'Hype List' column of issue #1 of Wired ('Po-Mo Gets Tek-No', page 87), we did not shout down the [[Postmodernism|postmodernists]]. We made fun of them."<ref>{{cite web|last1=Morningstar|first1=Chip|title=How To Deconstruct Almost Anything: My Postmodern Adventure|url=ftp://ftp.metalab.unc.edu/pub/academic/communications/papers/habitat/deconstr.rtf|date=1993-07-05|access-date=2017-05-19}}</ref>