Editing Blitzkrieg (section)

===Doctrine===
Most academic historians regard the notion of blitzkrieg as military doctrine to be a myth. Shimon Naveh wrote, "The striking feature of the blitzkrieg concept is the complete absence of a coherent theory which should have served as the general cognitive basis for the actual conduct of operations". Naveh described it as an "ad hoc solution" to operational dangers, thrown together at the last moment.{{sfn|Naveh|1997|pp=128–129}} Overy disagreed with the idea that Hitler and the Nazi regime ever intended a blitzkrieg war because the once-popular belief that the Nazi state organized its economy to carry out its grand strategy in short campaigns was false. Hitler had intended for a rapid unlimited war to occur much later than 1939, but Germany's aggressive [[foreign policy]] forced the state into war before it was ready. The planning of Hitler and the ''[[Wehrmacht]]'' in the 1930s did not reflect a blitzkrieg method but the opposite.{{sfn|Overy|1995|pp=233–235}} J. P. Harris wrote that the Wehrmacht never used the word, and it did not appear in German army or air force field manuals. The word was coined in September 1939 by a ''Times'' newspaper reporter. Harris also found no evidence that German military thinking developed a blitzkrieg mentality.{{sfn|Harris|1995|pp=333–336}} [[Karl-Heinz Frieser]] and [[Adam Tooze]] reached similar conclusions to Overy and Naveh that the notions of blitzkrieg economy and strategy are myths.{{sfn|Frieser|2005|pp=25–27}}{{sfn|Tooze|2006|pp=371–373}} Frieser wrote that surviving German economists and General Staff officers denied that Germany went to war with a blitzkrieg strategy.{{sfn|Frieser|2005|p=}} [[Robert M. Citino]] argues:

{{blockquote|
''Blitzkrieg'' was not a doctrine, or an operational scheme, or even a tactical system. In fact, it simply doesn't exist, at least not in the way we usually think it does. The Germans never used the term ''Blitzkrieg'' in any precise sense, and almost never used it outside of quotations. It simply meant a rapid and decisive victory (lightning war)... The Germans didn't invent anything new in the interwar period, but rather used new technologies like tanks and air and radio-controlled command to restore an old way of war that they still found to be valid, ''Bewegungskrieg.''{{sfn|Yerxa|2011|p=11}}
}}

Historian [[Victor Davis Hanson]] states that ''Blitzkrieg'' "played on the myth of German technological superiority and industrial dominance" and adds that German successes, particularly that of its Panzer divisions were "instead predicated on the poor preparation and morale of Germany's enemies".{{sfn|Hanson|2017|p=363}} Hanson also reports that at a Munich public address in November 1941, Hitler had "disowned" the concept of ''Blitzkrieg'' by calling it an "idiotic word".{{sfn|Hanson|2017|p=260}} Further, successful ''Blitzkrieg'' operations were predicated on superior numbers, air support and were possible for only short periods of time without sufficient supply lines.{{sfn|Hanson|2017|p=280}} For all intents and purposes, ''Blitzkrieg'' ended at the Eastern Front once the German forces had given up Stalingrad, after they faced hundreds of new T-34 tanks, when the Luftwaffe became unable to assure air dominance, and after the stalemate at Kursk. To that end, Hanson concludes that German military success was not accompanied by the adequate provisioning of its troops with food and materiel far from the source of supply, which contributed to its ultimate failure.{{sfn|Hanson|2017|pp=280–281}} Despite its later disappointments as German troops extended their lines at too great a distance, the very specter of armored ''Blitzkrieg'' forces initially proved victorious against the Polish, Dutch, Belgian and French Armies early in the war.{{sfn|Hanson|2017|p=382}}