Editing Battle of the Bulge (section)

===Hitler's chosen few===
The plan and timing for the Ardennes attack sprang from the mind of Adolf Hitler. He believed a critical fault line existed between the British and American military commands, and that a heavy blow on the Western Front would shatter this alliance. Planning for the "Watch on the Rhine" offensive emphasized secrecy and the commitment of overwhelming force. Due to the use of landline communications within Germany, motorized runners carrying orders, and draconian threats from Hitler, the timing and mass of the attack was not detected by Ultra codebreakers and achieved complete surprise.{{sfn|MacDonald|1984|pp=77–79}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-J28477, Ardennenoffensive, Lagebesprechnung.jpg|thumb|German field commanders plan the advance]]

After officers of the regular German Army attempted to assassinate him, Hitler had increasingly trusted only the Nazi Party SS and its armed branch, the Waffen-SS. He entrusted them with carrying out his decisive counterattack.{{sfn|MacDonald|1984|pp=21–22}} But following the Allied Normandy invasion, the SS armored units had suffered significant leadership casualties. This included SS-{{lang|de|Brigadeführer}} (Brigadier general) [[Kurt Meyer]], commander of the 12th SS Panzer (Armor) Division, captured by Belgian partisans on 6 September 1944.{{sfn|Mitcham|2006|p=10}}{{sfn|Meyer|2005|p=308}} Thus Hitler gave responsibility for the key right flank of the assault to the best SS troops and a few {{lang|de|Volksgrenadier}} units under the command of "Sepp" (Joseph) Dietrich, a fanatical political disciple of Hitler, and a loyal follower from the early days of the rise of [[National Socialism]] in Germany. The leadership composition of the Sixth Panzer Army had a distinctly political nature.{{sfn|Cole|1964|pp=1–64}}

Despite their loyalty, none of the German field commanders entrusted with planning and executing the offensive believed it was possible to capture Antwerp. Even Dietrich believed the Ardennes was a poor area for armored warfare and that the inexperienced and badly equipped {{lang|de|Volksgrenadier}} soldiers would clog the roads the tanks needed for their rapid advance. In fact, their horse-drawn artillery and rocket units became a significant obstacle to the armored units.{{sfn|Astor|1992|p=113}} Other than making futile objections to Hitler in private, Dietrich generally stayed out of planning the offensive. Model and Manteuffel, technical experts from the eastern front, told Hitler that a limited offensive with the goal of surrounding and crushing the American 1st Army would be the best goal their offensive could hope to achieve. Their ideas shared the same fate as Dietrich's objections.{{sfn|Eisenhower|1969|p=224}}

The German staff planning and organization of the attack was well done. Most of the units committed to the offensive reached their jump off points undetected. They were for the most part well organized and supplied for the attack, although they were counting on capturing American gasoline dumps to fuel their vehicles. As the battle ensued, on the northern shoulder of the offensive, Dietrich stopped the armored assault on the twin villages after two days and changed the axis of their advance southward through the hamlet of Domäne Bütgenbach. The headlong drive on Elsenborn Ridge lacked needed support from German units that had already bypassed the ridge.{{sfn|Eisenhower|1969|p=224}} Dietrich's decision unknowingly played into American hands, as Robertson had already decided to abandon the villages.