Editing Yom Kippur War (section)

==Naval operations==
[[File:Battle baltim en.svg|thumb|upright=1.3|A diagram of the [[Battle of Baltim]]]]
On the first day of the war, Egyptian [[missile boat]]s bombarded Israeli positions on the Sinai coast; targeting Rumana, Ras Beyron, Ras Masala and Ras Sudar on the Mediterranean and Sharm el-Sheikh on the Red Sea coast of the Sinai Peninsula. Egyptian [[Frogman|frogmen]] raided the oil installations at Bala'eem, disabling the massive driller.{{sfnp|Hammad|2002|pp=100–101}} Several small naval engagements took place on 7 October, including the [[Battle of Latakia]] and [[Battle of Marsa Talamat]].<ref>Almog, "Israel's Navy beat the odds", United States Naval Institute&nbsp;– ''Proceedings'' (March 1997), Vol. 123, Iss. 3; p. 106.</ref>
 
[[File:StiksSyrianShore10101973.jpg|thumb|right|A Syrian Styx missile fired at an Israeli missile boat]]
The [[Battle of Baltim]], which took place on 8–9 October off the coast of [[Baltim]] and [[Damietta]], ended in a decisive Israeli victory. Six Israeli missile boats heading towards Port Said encountered four Egyptian missile boats coming from [[Alexandria]]. In an engagement lasting about forty minutes, the Israelis evaded Egyptian [[P-15 Termit|Styx missiles]] using electronic countermeasures and sank three of the Egyptian missile boats with [[Gabriel (missile)|Gabriel missiles]] and gunfire.<ref name=dunstan114>Dunstan, ''The Yom Kippur War'', p. 114.</ref><ref name=bolia>Bolia, ''[https://web.archive.org/web/20040910163802/http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume2/september_2004/9_04_4.html Overreliance on Technology: Yom Kippur Case Study]'' </ref>{{sfnmp|Rabinovich|1988|1pp=256–262|Dupuy|1978|2pp=562–563|Herzog|1982|3p=312}} The Battles of Latakia and Baltim "drastically changed the operational situation at sea to Israeli advantage".<ref>Vego, ''Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas'' (Routledge: 1999), at p. 151.</ref>

Five nights after the Battle of Baltim, five Israeli patrol boats entered the Egyptian anchorage at [[Ras Ghareb]], where over fifty Egyptian small patrol craft and armed fishing boats mobilized for the war effort and loaded with troops, ammunition, and supplies bound for the Israeli side of the Gulf were based. In the battle that followed, 19 Egyptian boats were sunk, while others remained bottled up in port.<ref name=almog/>

The Israeli Navy had control of the Gulf of Suez during the war, which made possible the continued deployment of an Israeli SAM battery near an Israeli naval base close to the southern end of the Suez Canal, depriving the Egyptian Third Army of air support and preventing it from moving southward and attempting to capture the southern Sinai.<ref>Almog, Ze'ev (March 1997). "Israel's Navy beat the odds"&nbsp;– ''United States Naval Institute&nbsp;– Proceedings'' (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute){{page needed|date=January 2012}}</ref>

On 18 October, Israeli frogmen set off an explosion that severed two underwater communications cables off [[Beirut]], one of which led to Alexandria and the other to [[Marseille]]. As a result, [[telex]] and telecommunications between the West and Syria were severed, and were not restored until the cables were repaired on 27 October. The cables had also been used by the Syrians and Egyptians to communicate with each other in preference to using radio, which was monitored by Israeli, U.S. and Soviet intelligence. Egypt and Syria resorted to communicating via a Jordanian radio station in [[Ajloun]], bouncing the signals off a U.S. satellite.<ref name="O'Ballance, p. 157">O'Ballance, p. 157.</ref>
[[File:Baniasfmkesh.jpg|thumb|A Syrian oil terminal in [[Baniyas]] after being shelled by Israeli [[Sa'ar 3-class missile boat]]s]]
Having decisively beaten the Egyptian and Syrian navies, the Israeli Navy had the run of the coastlines. Israeli missile boats utilized their 76&nbsp;mm cannons and other armaments to strike targets along the Egyptian and Syrian coastlines, including wharves, oil tank farms, coastal batteries, radar stations, airstrips, and other targets of military value. The Israeli Navy even attacked some of Egypt's northernmost SAM batteries.<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', pp. 212–213.</ref><ref>Safran, Nadav: ''Israel{{snd}}The Embattled Ally'', p. 312</ref> The Israeli Navy's attacks were carried out with minimal support from the IAF (only one Arab naval target was destroyed from the air during the entire war).<ref name=almog/>

The Egyptian Navy managed to enforce a blockade at [[Bab-el-Mandeb]]. Eighteen million tons of oil had been transported yearly from [[Iran]] to Israel through the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb. The blockade was enforced by two Egyptian destroyers and two submarines, supported by ancillary craft. Shipping destined for Israel through the [[Gulf of Eilat]] was halted by the Egyptians. The Israeli Navy had no means of lifting the blockade due to the long range involved, and the Israeli Air Force, apparently also incapable of lifting the blockade, did not challenge it. The blockade was lifted on 1 November, after Israel used the surrounded Egyptian Third Army as a bargaining chip. The Egyptians unsuccessfully attempted to blockade the Israeli Mediterranean coastline, and mined the Gulf of Suez to prevent the transportation of oil from the Bala'eem and Abu Rudeis oil fields in southwestern Sinai to [[Eilat]] in southern Israel. Two oil tankers, of 48,000 ton and 2,000 ton capacity, sank after hitting mines in the Gulf.<ref>El Gammasy, ''The October War, 1973'' pp. 215–216.</ref>{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=287}}

According to Admiral [[Ze'ev Almog]], the Israeli Navy escorted tankers from the Gulf to Eilat throughout the war, and Israeli tankers sailing from Iran were directed to bypass the Red Sea. As a result of these actions and the failure of Egypt's Mediterranean blockade, the transport of oil, grain and weapons to Israeli ports was made possible throughout nearly the entire war. A post-war survey found that during the entire war period, Israel suffered no oil shortages, and even sold oil to third parties affected by the Arab oil embargo.<ref name=almog/> This claim was disputed by [[Edgar O'Ballance]], who claimed that no oil went to Israel during the blockade, and the Eilat-[[Ashdod]] pipeline was empty by the end of the war.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979|p=160}}

Israel responded with a counter-blockade of Egypt in the Gulf of Suez. The Israeli blockade was enforced by naval vessels based at Sharm el-Sheikh and on the Sinai coast facing the Gulf of Suez. The Israeli blockade substantially damaged the Egyptian economy. According to historian Gammal Hammad, Egypt's principal ports, Alexandria and [[Port Safaga]], remained open to shipping throughout the war.{{sfnp|Hammad|2002|pp=100-101}} Throughout the war, the Israeli Navy enjoyed complete command of the seas both in the Mediterranean approaches and in the Gulf of Suez.{{sfnp|Herzog|1975|pp=268–269}}

During the last week of the war, Egyptian frogmen carried out three or four raids on Eilat. The attacks caused minor damage, but created some alarm.<ref name="O'Ballance, p. 157"/>

According to Israeli and Western sources, the Israelis lost no vessels in the war.<ref name=dunstan114/><ref name=bolia/>{{sfnp|Morris|2011|p=432}}{{sfnp|Herzog|1982|p=314}} Israeli vessels were "targeted by as many as 52 Soviet-made anti-ship missiles", but none hit their targets.<ref>Annati, "Anti-ship missiles and countermeasures"{{snd}}part I (ASM), ''Naval Forces'' (2001), Vol. 22, Iss. 1; p. 20.</ref> According to historian [[Benny Morris]], the Egyptians lost seven missile boats and four torpedo boats and coastal defense craft, while the Syrians lost five missile boats, one minesweeper, and one coastal defense vessel.{{sfnp|Morris|2011|p=432}}

=== U.S.–Soviet naval standoff ===
The war saw the largest naval confrontation between the [[United States Navy]] and [[Soviet Navy]] of the entire Cold War. As the United States and Soviet Union supported their respective allies, their fleets in the Mediterranean became increasingly hostile toward each other. The Soviet [[5th Operational Squadron]] had 52 ships in the Mediterranean when the war began, including 11 submarines, some of which carried cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. The [[United States Sixth Fleet]] had 48, including two aircraft carriers, a [[helicopter carrier]], and amphibious vessels carrying 2,000 marines.<ref name="The war that nearly was">{{Cite news|url=https://www.jpost.com/features/in-thespotlight/the-war-that-nearly-was|title = The war that nearly was| newspaper=The Jerusalem Post &#124; Jpost.com}}</ref><ref name="pri.org">{{Cite web|url=https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-10-26/little-known-us-soviet-confrontation-during-yom-kippur-war|title = The little-known US-Soviet confrontation during Yom Kippur War| date=31 July 2016 }}</ref>

As the war continued, both sides reinforced their fleets. The Soviet squadron grew to 97 vessels including 23 submarines, while the US Sixth Fleet grew to 60 vessels including 9 submarines, 2 helicopter carriers, and 3 aircraft carriers. Both fleets made preparations for war, and US aircraft conducted reconnaissance over the Soviet fleet. The two fleets began to disengage following the ceasefire.<ref name="The war that nearly was"/><ref name="pri.org"/>