Editing State (polity) (section)

==State failure==
{{Main|Failed state}}
Some states are often labeled as "weak" or "failed". In [[David Samuels (political scientist)|David Samuels]]'s words "...a failed state occurs when sovereignty over claimed territory has collapsed or was never effectively at all".<ref>{{Cite book |title=Comparative Politics |last=Samuels |first=David |publisher=Pearson Higher Education |year=2012 |pages=29}}</ref> Authors like [[David Samuels (political scientist)|Samuels]] and [[Joel S. Migdal]] have explored the emergence of weak states, how they are different from Western "strong" states and its consequences to the economic development of developing countries.

Samuels introduces the idea of state capacity, which he uses to refer to the ability of the state to fulfill its basic functions, such as providing security, maintaining law and order, and delivering public services. When a state does not accomplish this, state failure happens (Samuels, 2012). Other authors like Jeffrey Herbst add to this idea by arguing that state failure is the result of weak or non-existent institutions, which means that there is no state legitimacy because states are not able to provide goods or services or maintain order and safety (Herbst, 1990). However, there are also ideas that challenge this notion of state failure. Stephen D. Krasner argues that state failure is not just the result of weak institutions, but rather a very complex phenomenon that varies according to context-specific circumstances, and should therefore not be analyzed through a simplistic understanding like the one normally presented (Krasner, 2004).

===The problem with state failure===

In "The Problem of Failed States", Susan Rice argues that state failure is an important threat to global stability and security, since failed states are vulnerable to terrorism and conflict (Rice, 1994).{{Full citation needed|date=March 2024}} Additionally, it is believed that state failure hinders democratic values, since these states often experience political violence, authoritarian rules, and a number of human rights abuses (Rotberg, 2004).{{Full citation needed|date=March 2024}} While there is great discussion regarding the direct effects of state failure, its indirect effects should also be highlighted: state failure could lead to refugee flows and cross-border conflicts, while also becoming safe havens for criminal or extremist groups (Corbridge, 2005).{{Full citation needed|date=March 2024}} In order to solve and prevent these issues in the future, it is necessary to focus on building strong institutions, promoting economic diversification and development, and addressing the causes of violence in each state (Mkandawire, 2001).{{Full citation needed|date=March 2024}}

===Early state formation===

To understand the formation of weak states, [[David Samuels (political scientist)|Samuels]] compares the formation of European states in the 1600s with the conditions under which more recent states were formed in the twentieth century. In this line of argument, the state allows a population to resolve a collective action problem, in which citizens recognize the authority of the state and exercise the power of coercion over them. This kind of social organization required a decline in the legitimacy of traditional forms of ruling (like religious authorities) and replaced them with an increase in the legitimacy of depersonalized rule; an increase in the central government's sovereignty; and an increase in the organizational complexity of the central government ([[bureaucracy]]).

The transition to this modern state was possible in Europe around 1600 thanks to the confluence of factors like the technological developments in warfare, which generated strong incentives to tax and consolidate central structures of governance to respond to external threats. This was complemented by the increase in the production of food (as a result of productivity improvements), which allowed to sustain a larger population and so increased the complexity and centralization of states. Finally, cultural changes challenged the authority of monarchies and paved the way for the emergence of modern states.<ref name="Samuels">{{Cite book |title=Comparative Politics |last=Samuels |first=David |publisher=Pearson Higher Education }}</ref>

===Late state formation===

The conditions that enabled the emergence of modern states in Europe were different for other [[country|countries]] that started this process later. As a result, many of these states lack effective capabilities to tax and extract revenue from their citizens, which derives in problems like corruption, tax evasion and low economic growth. Unlike the European case, late state formation occurred in a context of limited international conflict that diminished the incentives to tax and increase military spending. Also, many of these states emerged from colonization in a state of poverty and with institutions designed to extract natural resources, which have made more difficult to form states. European colonization also defined many arbitrary borders that mixed different cultural groups under the same national identities, which has made difficult to build states with legitimacy among all the population, since some states have to compete for it with other forms of political identity.<ref name="Samuels" />

As a complement to this argument, [[Joel S. Migdal|Migdal]] gives a historical account on how sudden social changes in the Third World during the [[Industrial Revolution]] contributed to the formation of weak states. The expansion of international trade that started around 1850, brought profound changes in Africa, Asia and Latin America that were introduced with the objective of assure the availability of raw materials for the European market. These changes consisted in: i) reforms to landownership laws with the objective of integrate more lands to the international economy, ii) increase in the taxation of peasants and little landowners, as well as collecting of these taxes in cash instead of in kind as was usual up to that moment and iii) the introduction of new and less costly modes of transportation, mainly railroads. As a result, the traditional forms of social control became obsolete, deteriorating the existing institutions and opening the way to the creation of new ones, that not necessarily lead these countries to build strong states.<ref>{{Cite book |title=Strong societies and weak states: state-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World |last=Migdal |first=Joel |year=1988 |pages=Chapter 2}}</ref> This fragmentation of the social order induced a political logic in which these states were captured to some extent by "strongmen", who were capable to take advantage of the above-mentioned changes and that challenge the sovereignty of the state. As a result, these decentralization of social control impedes to consolidate strong states.<ref>{{Cite book |title=Strong societies and weak states: state-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World |last=Migdal |first=Joel |publisher=Princeton University Press |year=1988 |pages=Chapter 8}}</ref>